Reliability of Sovjet military deaths

[tramonte]

If men came back from war they likely were not killed or deceased in combat? It's the same thing with everlasting talks of Soviet aircraft losses. It really makes me wondering why people can't realize the basic fact that every military forces knew far better and more accurately their own losses than losses of their enemies. But when it comes to Soviet losses there is always that church of "smoking gun" fan boys looming behind the corner: "no Russians are always cheating". After all these war time reports were secret and well needed for war leaders to plan future operations.

[thorwald77]

Here is my reply to doubting Thomas, I have this to say. Krivosheev's figures may be right or wrong, yet they are treated as gospel by historians outside of Russia.

Figures in (1,000)

Details of Losses

• KIA 5,187
  Non combat 541
  DOW 1,100
  Border/Security 55
  MIA 500
  POW-Krivosheev 1,283
  POW- Philimoshin 2,164
  Subtotal 10,830
  Defectors to west 180
  Penal units 423
  Executed 135
  Deserters 376
  Total losses 11,944

Russian MOD adjustments

• Total losses 11,944
  Transferred NKVD (1,174)
  Subtotal 10,770
  Adjustments:
  Border/Security 55
  Convicts 939
  Deserters 180
  Total losses 11,944

Transferred NKVD details

• Defectors to west 180
  Penal units 428
  Executed 135
  Deserters 376
  Border/Security 55
  Transferred NKVD 1,174

Reconciliation of Conscripted

Reconciliation of conscripts

• Forces 6/41 4,826.9
  Civilians in military 74.9
  Conscripted during war 31,812.2
  Rejected medical reasons (1,154.8)
  Transferred to industry (142.8)
  Reconscripted (939.7)
  Total mobolized 34,476.7
  
  Less
  Evacuated to hospital (3,798.2)
  Transferred to industry (3,614.6)
  Transferred to NKVD/Civilian depts (1,174.6)
  Transferred to Polish/Romanian forces (250.4)
  Convicts (436.6)
  Discharged (206.0)
  Deserters to interior (212.4)
  
  Forces 7/45 (12,839.8)
  Irrecoverable losses 11,944.1

https://youtu.be/rwsAHHRc9Lo

[thorwald77]

If Krrivosheev came to my office and handed in that reconciliation, after my review I recommend that he be retired. I would call in Pilimoshen and order him to "clean this up"

Reconciliation of conscripts

• Forces 6/41 4,826.9
  Civilians in military 74.9
  Conscripted during war 31,812.2
  
  Rejected medical reasons (1,154.8)
  Transferred to industry (142.8)
  NKVD Border/Security 55.8
  Released Pows after 10/1944 (2,016.0)
  Total 33,456.2
  
  Less:
  Evacuated to hospital (3,798.2)
  Transferred to industry (3,614.6)
  Transferred to NKVD/Civilian depts (1,174.6)
  Transferred to Polish/Romanian forces (250.4)
  Convicts (436.6)
  Discharged (206.0)
  Deserters to interior (212.4)
  Civilians conscripted for military service (91.0)
  Forces 7/45 (12,839.8)
  Irrecoverable losses 10,832.6

Civilians conscripted for military service does not include 3,501 imprisoned.

Summary
Krivosheev 8,668.3
Forced labor in Germany 2,164.3
Irrecoverable losses 10,832.6

Note well this reconciliation does not include 346,000 Pows freed before October 1944.

[Art]

It really makes me wondering why people can't realize the basic fact that every military forces knew far better and more accurately their own losses than losses of their enemies.

Comrade Stalin himself had something to say about it:

STALIN. We asked the 44th Division to find out how many men from this division were killed, how many were taken prisoners, and they couldn't answer, just made guesses, they said a thousand...What was their strength when they arrived is also unknown, one cannot rely on books, because some were sick, some were in hospitals, some on leave. The roster strength was unrealistic, they ckecked men by a book. The actual strength didn't agree with records they made in a book. How many remained in the army and divisional [rear] is unknown, how many were on the line of fire is also uknown. If they did a rollcal is unknown. They didn't know how many became casualties, that remained uknown. Is it possible to organize work on such a way?
....
KHRULEV. In general registration of personnel and property in the army is organized aufully and one should take the most resolute measures to establish order.
...
Due to absence of strength data it was difficult to supply the Leningrad District and nothern armies. We had discrepancies with comrade Timoshenko equal to literally 200 thousand men. We held to our smaller figure. But I didn't have any confidence that I was right that it won't turn out that he was right and he had 200 thousand men more and people would began to starve.
STALIN. One should make this people count.
KHRULEV. And the General Staff didn't know the strength of the army during the entire war and doesn't know it at the present moment.
STALIN. Unfortunately.
KHRULEV. The Main Directorate of the Red Army didn't know the strength of the Finnish Front during the war and doesn't know it by the present moment. For example, they reported to me the ration strength of the Leningrad District in the IInd quarter [of 1940] as 46 thousand. But these are only military schools and rears and where are the armies? They don't know it.

So the poor state of personnel accounting was recognized on the highest level. Characterstically, this situation mostly repeated itself in 1941. For example, "resolute measures" had to be taken to establish some order with the ration supply several months after the war start. Naturally that meant lack of accurate data on losses, at least in this early period of the war.
What seems paradoxical is that hardly any other army had such an huge horde of officers responsible for administration and supply as the Red Army, but results were completely disproportional to their numbers.

[thorwald77]

So the poor state of personnel accounting was recognized on the highest level. Characterstically, this situation mostly repeated itself in 1941. For example, "resolute measures" had to be taken to establish some order with the ration supply several months after the war start. Naturally that meant lack of accurate data on losses, at least in this early period of the war.

According to Krivosheev 135,000 convicts were sentenced to be shot.

https://youtu.be/zfQU1zU3K08

[Art]

Not that resolute. I mean introduction of "soldbuch", ration quotas, and attempts to improve quality of reporting in general.

[AriX]

It really makes me wondering why people can't realize the basic fact that every military forces knew far better and more accurately their own losses than losses of their enemies. But when it comes to Soviet losses there is always that church of "smoking gun" fan boys looming behind the corner: "no Russians are always cheating". After all these war time reports were secret and well needed for war leaders to plan future operations.

Not always, just in common, lol.
In Tscadenkos report to Stalin from Jan'43, irreventible casulties of the Red Army were downsized in two times - 5 million, instead of 9.5-10. Since the pre-war strenght wasn't counted in calculation.

[Art]

What is the report from January 1943 exactly? This thing:
https://www.vif2ne.org/forum/0/arhprint/2447327?

[thorwald77]

The document posted by Art is in close agreement with Кривошеев Г.Ф. Россия и СССР в войнах XX века. Книга потерь pp.213-215

Total Army personnel, not including Navy, at the front in document are 10,000,492 on 1 January 1943 6. СПИСОЧНАЯ ЧИСЛЕННОСТЬ ЛИЧНОГО СОСТАВА КРАСНОЙ АРМИИ
In Krivosheev p.215 Army forces at the front at 1/1/1943 are 10,017,612 not including 949,049 in hospitals.

Total reinforcements sent to the front in section 1 of the document dated 14 February 1943 are listed at 5,489,418.
In section 6. of Krivosheev p.213 they list 5,328,395 conscripted in 1942.

The reinforcements sent to the front were not entirely replacements for those killed or missing in action due to the following adjustments:
1-Some wounded or sick personnel were discharged for medical reasons.
2-Some Pows and missing were ultimately returned to the USSR
3-Transfers to the NKVD (penal units, executed or deserters)
4-There would be a timing difference because some personnel would be conscripted and would only later be sent to the front.
5-Some of those conscripted would be sent to the Navy.

Document 130022SS from 14 February 1943 indicates that the Soviet General staff had functioning system in early 1943 to account for losses in the war. The "resolute measures" taken in 194-42 were necessary to put this in place. I can imagine hundreds of Soviet women in Moscow working on adding machines under strict deadlines processing reports from the front. NKVD auditors would check and verify the reports. Timoshenko would present the final report to Comrade Stalin in the Kremlin. Timoshenko would deliver messages and manage the office in Moscow while Zhukov would be commanding the forces at the front.

[thorwald77]

The $64,000 question.

Do we have similar reports for 1/1/1944 and 1/1/1945?

[AriX]

What is the report from January 1943 exactly? This thing:
https://www.vif2ne.org/forum/0/arhprint/2447327?

Yes.

[thorwald77]

According to the document posted by Art 5,489,519 replacements were sent to the front.

Data from Кривошеев Г.Ф. Россия и СССР в войнах XX века. Книга потерь

Changes from 11/1942 to 1/1/1943
1-Forces at the front increased from 8.5 million to 10.0 million - 1.5 million
2-Irrecoverable losses(KIA,DOW & MIA)- to be replaced 3.2 million
3-Sanitary casualties 4.1 million, estimated discharged @ 17%-to be replaced 800,000
Total changes during 1942 -5.5 million

1- Кривошеев 2010 p.215
2- Кривошеев 2010 p.236
3- Кривошеев 2010 -p.233

[Art]

In Tscadenkos report to Stalin from Jan'43, irreventible casulties of the Red Army were downsized in two times - 5 million, instead of 9.5-10. Since the pre-war strenght wasn't counted in calculation.

I don't see where it follows from. In September 1942 Schadenko estmiated Soviet pool of men suitable for military as 31.5 million men. Including pre-war military strentgh.
https://vif2ne.org/nvk/forum/0/archive/2247/2247389.htm
In February 1943 he estimated that 29.3 million were already used up or lost, and the remainder of potentially conscriptable men was 3.7 million. The sum is 33 million and is actually even larger than the September figure. So it must include pre-war military. The difference was due to inclusion of 965,000 men of 1924 and 1925 classes lost on occupied territories and, probably, due to more complete and accurate calculations.
Not that these claculations were necesseraly accurate, but they were at any rate self-consistent.

[thorwald77]

The figures of the Soviet General Staff make sense when we analyze the details of the forces available in 6/41 (4.9 million) and the total called up 1941-42 (20.7) million.

The number of mobilized personnel available to sent to the front in was reduced by the following:
1-1.154 million of those called up were rejected for medical reasons.
2-3.674 million were sent to industry. Ethnic Russians suffered a disproportionate share of total casualties because the language of command and control was Russian. Ethnic minorities were considered unreliable and deployed in rear the area or in the civilian economy. There were a only a small number combat units from Georgia, Central Asia and the Baltic states.
3-About a million were in occupied territories and were not available for induction.
4-In 1941-42 about 1.3 million were deployed in the Far East.

[thorwald77]

The Soviet document cited by AriX was cited by S.N. Mihalev(2000) who put total losses in the war at 10,921.9 million. Mihalev did not include 1,174.6 million sent to the NKVD in penal units, executed, deserters and post war defectors.