Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

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paulrward
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#16

Post by paulrward » 21 Nov 2021, 01:56

Hello All :

Mr Linkagain has posted another screed which is worthy of correction:

He stated:
Send the Marines cross country to the eastern (sic) of Korea..link with
Walter (sic) Walker forces to cut off the enemies (sic) retreat then liberte (sic) Seoul
Apparently Mr. Linkagain does not have access to either a Map of Korea, or Google Earth. To march
the Marines across the Korean Peninsula to meet up with WALTON Walker, would mean marching
hundreds of miles on one lane dirt roads, with hampered supply and logistics, and then, when you
got to the East Coast of Korea, more marching north to try to cut off the PRKA. The Marines would
have arrived footsore and exhausted, and then been forced to start fighting. This is a formula for
disaster. Only a fool would do it.

Instead, MacArthur, who had used Amphibious Envelopments again and again in New Guinea and
the Philippines, moved his troops at a steady 10 knots of speed ( thats 240 miles per day ! ) around
the Korean Peninsula, giving the Marines a chance to rest and recuperate on shipboard, and then
landed them exactly where he wanted them. Their landings were virtually un-opposed, and the
Marines were immediately able to start moving north against the North Korean forces.

The PRKA continued to flee northward, and MacArthur's plan had the U.N. Forces essentially
taking both coast lines of North Korea and driving the PRKA into the mountainous central regions of
North Korea where, without logistical support, food, or fuel, their army would have ' Died on the Vine
- which was exactly what MacArthur had done to the Japanese on New Guinea and the Philippines.

The North Korean Army was, by that time, a broken force, and allowing thousands of hungry, ragged,
dispirited refugee soldiers to retreat into the hinterlands of North Korea, where they would have
eventually deteriorated into bands of terrorist looters who would have discredited the Communist
cause, making the U.N.s job of wiping them out all the easier.

The only two people who snatched Defeat from the Jaws of Victory in Korea were Harry the Habberdasher
Truman and Omar Bradley. The first couldn't see beyond the end of his own prepuce, and the second
couldn't see anything in the world outside of Europe.

Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
Korea Map.jpg
Korea
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Linkagain
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#17

Post by Linkagain » 01 Jan 2022, 02:58

Read the account of the USAAC At Manila 7{8} December 1941.....
viewtopic.php?f=113&p=2383460&sid=7b231 ... f#p2383460


paulrward
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#18

Post by paulrward » 01 Jan 2022, 08:36

Hello Mr. Linkagain:

And you should read Mr. Rcocean's excellent refutation of the timeline. And I will add:

More than half of the B-17s in the Philippines were of the C/D Model - the ' small tail '
Fortresses, armed with five .30 caliber guns, and, in many cases, NOT equipped with
the Norden Bombsight, so their bombing capabilities were meager to say the least.

Further, there wasnt room at Clark Air Field for more than about 20 B-17s- the remainder
had to be parked at Del Monte Field on Mindanao, where there was no refueling equipment
for them. So, B-17s would be fueled up, flown with no bomb load to Del Monte, and,
in the case of war, were expected to wait until the Clark B-17s had taken off, at which
time they could fly back to Clark, land, refuel and load up with bombs to begin a mission.

In fact, a few weeks earlier, MacArthur had issued orders to Brereton to move ALL of
the B-17s to Del Monte, which was out of range of the Japanese on Formosa, so
that they would be safe. When he found out on the first day of the war that this
had not been done by Brereton, and half his B-17s were gone, he was outraged
at Brereton, but MacArthur NEVER publicly criticized Brereton for his failure.

In addition, the P-40 pilots had arrived less than four months earlier, and of the roughly
100, only about a dozen had ever flown a fighter plane before arriving in the islands.
They were literally right out of Flight School, and were not ready for combat operations,
much less a fight to the death against the IJN and IJA fighter pilots. They were so
inexperienced that Brereton, in a sort of desperation move, transferred the pilots
who had been assigned to fly the Swedish P-35s and Boeing P-26s to fly some of the
P-40s, but these pilots were also just getting familiar with their aircraft when the
balloon went up.

In effect, on December 8th, 1941, MacArthur, because of stringent budget restrictions
and 'Freewheelin'g Franklin's ' political machinations, had to go to war with a tiny,
under trained and under equipped land army, a tiny, under trained and under equipped
air force, and a navy whose commander, Admiral Hart, promptly cut and ran, evacuating
the Philippines to get out of range of the Japanese bombers.

Remember, Mr. Linkagain, it took the Japanese less than a month to occupy French Indo-
China, about two months to conquer Malaya, and capture Singapore, ' The Gibralter of
the East '
, and about than three months to conquer the Dutch East Indies.

But MacArthur's forces in the Philippines did not surrender until May 5th, 1942- nearly FIVE
months after the start of the war, despite the islands being completely surrounded and
cut off from all supply and reinforcement.

And MacArthur's legendary statement to the press, that " I have come through, and
I SHALL RETURN ! " served as a rallying cry to the People of the Philippines through-
out their brutal occupation by the Japanese. It was chalked on sidewalks, painted on
walls, and broadcast again and again on clandestine radios in the islands. And, on
that day in 1944, MacArthur stepped up to a microphone, and broadcast the equally
legendary message to the Philippine People, " People of the Philippines, this is
Douglas MacArthur. I HAVE RETURNED ! "


Respectfully :

Paul R Ward
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AnchorSteam
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#19

Post by AnchorSteam » 01 Jan 2022, 09:22

paulrward wrote:
04 Oct 2021, 04:23
Hello All :

Mr. Linkagain posted the following screed, which I have subdivided, corrected the spelling
and syntax, and addressed point by point.

.....
. (MANY WORDS!!!)

The fact is, the only reason the Mao's Communists won in 1949 was because George C. Marshall
didn't like Chiang Kai-shek. As a result, China became communist, at least 10 million people
were murdered in two years, and we are still paying the price for Marshall's stupidity.

October 14th is coming.
That is one hell of a post!
I have nothing to add..... :(

Oh yes I do!
My Grandfather was a tanker with the 6th army in P.I., and he hated MacArthur. I never got a chance to ask him why, so I did some digging.
Had a similar experiance to Manchester, but his book was way too sentimental for my tastes. All of his books are that way, aren't they?

Delta Tank
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#20

Post by Delta Tank » 08 Jan 2022, 17:23

AnchorSteam wrote:
01 Jan 2022, 09:22
paulrward wrote:
04 Oct 2021, 04:23
Hello All :

Mr. Linkagain posted the following screed, which I have subdivided, corrected the spelling
and syntax, and addressed point by point.

.....
. (MANY WORDS!!!)

The fact is, the only reason the Mao's Communists won in 1949 was because George C. Marshall
didn't like Chiang Kai-shek. As a result, China became communist, at least 10 million people
were murdered in two years, and we are still paying the price for Marshall's stupidity.

October 14th is coming.
That is one hell of a post!
I have nothing to add..... :(

Oh yes I do!
My Grandfather was a tanker with the 6th army in P.I., and he hated MacArthur. I never got a chance to ask him why, so I did some digging.
Had a similar experiance to Manchester, but his book was way too sentimental for my tastes. All of his books are that way, aren't they?
I always find it funny that an enlisted soldier would hate a Theater Commander!! How much interaction did your grandfather have with MacArthur? I assume everything he heard about MacArthur was probably a “shit house rumor”. When I was enlisted I never met the division commander let alone the corps commander! I was just trying to make my Gun Section Chief, SSG Moses Armstrong happy!

Mike

daveshoup2MD
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#21

Post by daveshoup2MD » 09 Jan 2022, 01:29

Linkagain wrote:
03 Oct 2021, 15:32
Julius Caesar was a clever politian and a masterful military leader...once when he was besiging a City in Gaul the Gaul tried to hem him in with a seige wall of their own..he countered by besiging them!

Although William Manchester could be a through biographer {The Death of A President; The Arms of Krupp; the Last Lion] his biography "Douglas MacArthur American Caesar" is just not up to par....While MacArthur did as Proconsul of Japan actually succeded in many [But not all ways] to bring Japan to the 20th Century when he ran for President in 1952 he Didnt even carry his home state of Wisconsin....AS for his reputatuin as a Great Stragist...Well it is true that as a Theater Commander the Phillippines were liberated thanks to the US 8th Army under Walter Kruger; the US Navy; the USMC and British and Australian ALlies......It obvious he never read San Tzu....how else to explain his two inglorious defeats....December 1941 His air forces are destroyed by the IJN in the Phillippines and nine years later in November 1950 almost on the anniversayry of his Phillippne Debachle the Chinese enter the Korea War,,,,[wnich negated his one piece of orginal military Planning in Korea (Inchon Landings)]......among the factors...His refusal to accept that the Chinese would actually attack him [as they had hinted} his making his Chief of Staff Ned ALmond also a Field Army commander; his refusal to have aLmond forces fight in concert with Walton Walker forces in Pusan; His letting US Forces to the Yalu River instead of the more sensible acourse of letting SOuth Koreans chasing the North Koreans and keeping the US Forces behind the line as support Troops; his deleberate insuboration to the Commander In Chief Harry S Truman; The Refusal of MacArthur and The GOP to understand that Chaing Kai Shek was in permennet exhile in Formosa and that not even a victory of reuniting Korea would have led to the other thors of the PRC in China and the restoration of Chaing Kai Shek.... :lol: :lol:
Lot of "caesars" in Roman history; not just one. ;)

Walter Krueger commanded the US 6th Army in the Pacific; Robert L. Eichelberger commanded the 8th Army.

Be that as it may, Douglas MacArthur was an effective combat commander at the brigade/division level in WW I and, given the limits of peacetime funding in the 1930s, was "capable" as chief of staff of the Army. He also demonstrated capacity in the SCAP/military government role during the occupation of Japan in 1945-50.

His abilities in terms of the peacetime administration and organization of the Philippine Commonwealth Army in the late 1930s, and his record as a wartime theater commander in the Philippines in 1941-42, in the SWPA in 1942-45, and in the Far East in 1950-51, is severely lacking. Whether he could have or should have been replaced in those assignments, and who could have functioned as such a replacement, and how well they would have done, is unknowable, but there are some indications - Ridgeway, for example, was a far more effective theater commander in the Far East than MacArthur had been.

Delta Tank
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#22

Post by Delta Tank » 09 Jan 2022, 02:35

daveshoup2MD wrote:
09 Jan 2022, 01:29
Linkagain wrote:
03 Oct 2021, 15:32
Julius Caesar was a clever politian and a masterful military leader...once when he was besiging a City in Gaul the Gaul tried to hem him in with a seige wall of their own..he countered by besiging them!

Although William Manchester could be a through biographer {The Death of A President; The Arms of Krupp; the Last Lion] his biography "Douglas MacArthur American Caesar" is just not up to par....While MacArthur did as Proconsul of Japan actually succeded in many [But not all ways] to bring Japan to the 20th Century when he ran for President in 1952 he Didnt even carry his home state of Wisconsin....AS for his reputatuin as a Great Stragist...Well it is true that as a Theater Commander the Phillippines were liberated thanks to the US 8th Army under Walter Kruger; the US Navy; the USMC and British and Australian ALlies......It obvious he never read San Tzu....how else to explain his two inglorious defeats....December 1941 His air forces are destroyed by the IJN in the Phillippines and nine years later in November 1950 almost on the anniversayry of his Phillippne Debachle the Chinese enter the Korea War,,,,[wnich negated his one piece of orginal military Planning in Korea (Inchon Landings)]......among the factors...His refusal to accept that the Chinese would actually attack him [as they had hinted} his making his Chief of Staff Ned ALmond also a Field Army commander; his refusal to have aLmond forces fight in concert with Walton Walker forces in Pusan; His letting US Forces to the Yalu River instead of the more sensible acourse of letting SOuth Koreans chasing the North Koreans and keeping the US Forces behind the line as support Troops; his deleberate insuboration to the Commander In Chief Harry S Truman; The Refusal of MacArthur and The GOP to understand that Chaing Kai Shek was in permennet exhile in Formosa and that not even a victory of reuniting Korea would have led to the other thors of the PRC in China and the restoration of Chaing Kai Shek.... :lol: :lol:
His abilities in terms of the peacetime administration and organization of the Philippine Commonwealth Army in the late 1930s, and his record as a wartime theater commander in the Philippines in 1941-42, in the SWPA in 1942-45, and in the Far East in 1950-51, is severely lacking. Whether he could have or should have been replaced in those assignments, and who could have functioned as such a replacement, and how well they would have done, is unknowable, but there are some indications - Ridgeway, for example, was a far more effective theater commander in the Far East than MacArthur had been.
Severely lacking? Please explain.

Mike

daveshoup2MD
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#23

Post by daveshoup2MD » 09 Jan 2022, 02:55

Delta Tank wrote:
09 Jan 2022, 02:35
daveshoup2MD wrote:
09 Jan 2022, 01:29
His abilities in terms of the peacetime administration and organization of the Philippine Commonwealth Army in the late 1930s, and his record as a wartime theater commander in the Philippines in 1941-42, in the SWPA in 1942-45, and in the Far East in 1950-51, is severely lacking. Whether he could have or should have been replaced in those assignments, and who could have functioned as such a replacement, and how well they would have done, is unknowable, but there are some indications - Ridgeway, for example, was a far more effective theater commander in the Far East than MacArthur had been.
Severely lacking? Please explain.

Mike
See below:

1) The PCA's organization and administration in the prewar period (call it 1936-40) was poorly conceived and led, given the available resources; the PCA's performance in 1941-42 makes that clear. The PCA fought, and many of its officers and men did so gallantly, but they lost, hard ... and MacArthur was the architect and builder of the PCA, who had taken up that responsibility willingly. Thus, he failed.

2) As theater commander in the PI in 1941-42, MacArthur and his subordinates and staff were surprised by Japan's initiation of hostilities, his initial strategy to meet the Japanese on the beaches failed, and his management of the withdrawal to, and defense of, Bataan was fair at best. The comparison with Hart's ability to preserve his force, and actually fight and win a battle against the Japanese in the theater, is a notable contrast.

3) In the SWPA in 1942-45, his ability to lead a joint, combined, and Allied force was fair to poor, especially in comparison to his American peers in similar posts, who - in comparison to MacArthur - were masters of coalition warfare. There's no comparison between MacArthur's ability and those of, for example, Eisenhower's ability to lead an Allied command, much less Nimitz' (and Halsey's) ability to lead joint commands. Of the four US flag/general officers who served as (essentially) supreme Allied commanders in theaters in high intensity operations with Allied and joint forces under command, MacArthur was by far the least capable.

4) In FEC, MacArthur and his his subordinates and staff were surprised yet again, twice - both by the initial North Korean invasion and the subsequent Chinese intervention, which is a matter of historical record in both instances.

Other than that, he was a great captain, undoubtedly. ;)

Delta Tank
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#24

Post by Delta Tank » 09 Jan 2022, 03:18

daveshoup2MD wrote:
09 Jan 2022, 02:55
Delta Tank wrote:
09 Jan 2022, 02:35
daveshoup2MD wrote:
09 Jan 2022, 01:29
His abilities in terms of the peacetime administration and organization of the Philippine Commonwealth Army in the late 1930s, and his record as a wartime theater commander in the Philippines in 1941-42, in the SWPA in 1942-45, and in the Far East in 1950-51, is severely lacking. Whether he could have or should have been replaced in those assignments, and who could have functioned as such a replacement, and how well they would have done, is unknowable, but there are some indications - Ridgeway, for example, was a far more effective theater commander in the Far East than MacArthur had been.
Severely lacking? Please explain.

Mike
See below:

1) The PCA's organization and administration in the prewar period (call it 1936-40) was poorly conceived and led, given the available resources; the PCA's performance in 1941-42 makes that clear. The PCA fought, and many of its officers and men did so gallantly, but they lost, hard ... and MacArthur was the architect and builder of the PCA, who had taken up that responsibility willingly. Thus, he failed.

2) As theater commander in the PI in 1941-42, MacArthur and his subordinates and staff were surprised by Japan's initiation of hostilities, his initial strategy to meet the Japanese on the beaches failed, and his management of the withdrawal to, and defense of, Bataan was fair at best. The comparison with Hart's ability to preserve his force, and actually fight and win a battle against the Japanese in the theater, is a notable contrast.

3) In the SWPA in 1942-45, his ability to lead a joint, combined, and Allied force was fair to poor, especially in comparison to his American peers in similar posts, who - in comparison to MacArthur - were masters of coalition warfare. There's no comparison between MacArthur's ability and those of, for example, Eisenhower's ability to lead an Allied command, much less Nimitz' (and Halsey's) ability to lead joint commands. Of the four US flag/general officers who served as (essentially) supreme Allied commanders in theaters in high intensity operations with Allied and joint forces under command, MacArthur was by far the least capable.

4) In FEC, MacArthur and his his subordinates and staff were surprised yet again, twice - both by the initial North Korean invasion and the subsequent Chinese intervention, which is a matter of historical record in both instances.

Other than that, he was a great captain, undoubtedly. ;)
Define PCA?

Will respond in due time.

Mike

daveshoup2MD
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#25

Post by daveshoup2MD » 09 Jan 2022, 03:29

Delta Tank wrote:
09 Jan 2022, 03:18
daveshoup2MD wrote:
09 Jan 2022, 02:55
Delta Tank wrote:
09 Jan 2022, 02:35
daveshoup2MD wrote:
09 Jan 2022, 01:29
His abilities in terms of the peacetime administration and organization of the Philippine Commonwealth Army in the late 1930s, and his record as a wartime theater commander in the Philippines in 1941-42, in the SWPA in 1942-45, and in the Far East in 1950-51, is severely lacking. Whether he could have or should have been replaced in those assignments, and who could have functioned as such a replacement, and how well they would have done, is unknowable, but there are some indications - Ridgeway, for example, was a far more effective theater commander in the Far East than MacArthur had been.
Severely lacking? Please explain.

Mike
See below:

1) The PCA's organization and administration in the prewar period (call it 1936-40) was poorly conceived and led, given the available resources; the PCA's performance in 1941-42 makes that clear. The PCA fought, and many of its officers and men did so gallantly, but they lost, hard ... and MacArthur was the architect and builder of the PCA, who had taken up that responsibility willingly. Thus, he failed.

2) As theater commander in the PI in 1941-42, MacArthur and his subordinates and staff were surprised by Japan's initiation of hostilities, his initial strategy to meet the Japanese on the beaches failed, and his management of the withdrawal to, and defense of, Bataan was fair at best. The comparison with Hart's ability to preserve his force, and actually fight and win a battle against the Japanese in the theater, is a notable contrast.

3) In the SWPA in 1942-45, his ability to lead a joint, combined, and Allied force was fair to poor, especially in comparison to his American peers in similar posts, who - in comparison to MacArthur - were masters of coalition warfare. There's no comparison between MacArthur's ability and those of, for example, Eisenhower's ability to lead an Allied command, much less Nimitz' (and Halsey's) ability to lead joint commands. Of the four US flag/general officers who served as (essentially) supreme Allied commanders in theaters in high intensity operations with Allied and joint forces under command, MacArthur was by far the least capable.

4) In FEC, MacArthur and his his subordinates and staff were surprised yet again, twice - both by the initial North Korean invasion and the subsequent Chinese intervention, which is a matter of historical record in both instances.

Other than that, he was a great captain, undoubtedly. ;)
Define PCA?

Will respond in due time.

Mike
Philippine Commonwealth Army, which was the force he was hired to create in 1935, and which he led from (arguably) 1936-41, when MacArthur was named CinC of the US Far East command, which included both the PCA, the PC, and the US forces in the Philippines.

Linkagain
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#26

Post by Linkagain » 10 Jan 2022, 01:39

SOOOO True...How things would have turned out if he been killed in the Phillippines in 1942.....For example the Battle of Leyte Gulf campaign was found by 2 US Seperate fleets...one under Nimitz and the other under MacArthur....there was no single unity of command....By coincidence the IJN was three fleets....and they also had no Unity of Command.....yet them came cery close to winng the objected of destryoing the trasport...only the sacrafice of the tin cans [destroyers} and air wing saved the us from a strtegic/tactical defeat....

Delta Tank
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#27

Post by Delta Tank » 10 Jan 2022, 03:52

Linkagain wrote:
10 Jan 2022, 01:39
SOOOO True...How things would have turned out if he been killed in the Phillippines in 1942.....For example the Battle of Leyte Gulf campaign was found by 2 US Seperate fleets...one under Nimitz and the other under MacArthur....there was no single unity of command....By coincidence the IJN was three fleets....and they also had no Unity of Command.....yet them came cery close to winng the objected of destryoing the trasport...only the sacrafice of the tin cans [destroyers} and air wing saved the us from a strtegic/tactical defeat....
What are you trying to say? This makes almost zero sense!! Is English your “Mother Tongue”?

Mike

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#28

Post by Sid Guttridge » 11 Jan 2022, 08:56

Hi paulrward,

You post, "It was chalked on sidewalks, painted onwalls, and broadcast again and again on clandestine radios in the islands"

Was it? What is the evidence? How many Filipinos spoke and wrote English? How many Filipinos had radios at the time?

While they were hardly an elite, didn't MacAthur's force heavily outnumber the Japanese? Weren't the Philipines a quaternary theatre for them after China, Manchuria and Malaya? Wasn't MacArthur facing, at best, Japan's fourth team?

And comparing the length of time MacArthur's forces held out favourably with events in Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies ignores the fact that these were completely isolated because France and the Netherlands had themselves been under German occupation for 18 months and to compare it favourably with Malaya is to ignore that this was the biggest single debacle in all British military history! I would suggest that the choice of these comparisons does MacArthur no favours. It is, if anything, "damning with faint praise"!.

Cheers,

Sid.
Last edited by Sid Guttridge on 11 Jan 2022, 09:08, edited 3 times in total.

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#29

Post by Sid Guttridge » 11 Jan 2022, 08:57

Double post.

daveshoup2MD
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Re: Douglas MacArthur was no Caesar

#30

Post by daveshoup2MD » 11 Jan 2022, 09:43

Sid Guttridge wrote:
11 Jan 2022, 08:56
While they were hardly an elite, didn't MacAthur's force heavily outnumber the Japanese? Weren't the Philipines a quaternary theatre for them after China, Manchuria and Malaya? Wasn't MacArthur facing, at best, Japan's fourth team?
No. The US Army forces in the Philippines amounted to one understrength triangular division (~11,000 officers and men), with one US infantry regiment and two Philippine Scout (PS) infantry regiment (Filipino enlisted and mostly US officers; roughly the same type of set-up as a Indian Army infantry unit). In terms of maneuver battalions, on Luzon, there were the equivalent of two US Army infantry battalions (31st Infantry Regiment), six US Army PS infantry battalions (45th and 57th regiments), a US Army PS cavalry "regiment" (the 26th, about equivalent to an infantry battalion in strength), and two light tank battalions (192nd and 194th); including the 4th Marines evacuated from China just days before the war began and various odds and ends from the US Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, there were - perhaps - 12,000 or so American military personnel available to fight the Japanese expeditionary force on Luzon, the 14th Army, which amounted to a corps-sized force of two reinforced divisions (the IJA's 16th and 48th divisions, plus the separate 65th Brigade, and two battalions of light tanks).

Elsewhere in the archipelago, the Japanese landed elements of the 56th Division, so the IJA forces committed to the PI in the initial assault amounted to three division equivalents, with additional follow-up and reserve forces in divisional strength. So, grand total, the US forces - including the two PS infantry regiments - amounted to perhaps the equivalent of three British brigade groups, facing what amounted to eight or more IJA equivalents, so outnumbered better than 2-1.

In Malaya, in contrast, eight British (six Indian Army and two Australian Imperial Force) brigade group equivalents faced about nine IJA equivalents in the initial assaults. Additional IJA forces were committed before the British surrender 70 days later, but so were additional British Army and Indian Army forces, including the entire British 18th Infantry Division and the 44th and 45th Indian brigades.

The above summation does not include the militia units of the Philippine Commonwealth Army or the MPs of the Philippine Constabulary, anymore than it includes the odds and sods of the ISF, SSVF, or Malaya Regiment battalions in Malaya; none of these troops were capable of combined arms, maneuver warfare; at best they were security forces.

The Japanese expeditionary force that was committed to the Philippines in December, 1941 was significantly stronger, in a relative sense, than the IJA force committed to Malaya in the same month, yet the US forces held out for five months; the British collapsed in 70 days.

So, no, actually.

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