They had, after all, something approximating a doctrine by then, given the plans and preparations for SEALION and the various plans for Malta ... and some of the landing craft (built for the purpose, and extemporized, in both cases) would have been available, presumably...
And if so, any guess as to what troops may have been available? Obviously, pretty much everything they had was already on the eastern front, tied down on occupation duties across Europe, or (to a limited degree, in comparison) fighting in Africa; even if the Turks had joined in and the Italian navy and merchant marine could be spared, were there any troops left to the Germans in the summer of 1942 that could have mounted an operation worth trying?
For some details on the opposition, from: "Soviet strategic thinking regarding the "maritime flanks" of the USSR in 1941 and 1942." (thanks to Art):
"It should be added that the HQ of the Transcaucasus Front started to consider the worst case scenario (that is German invasion of Caucasus) in November 1941 and developed a preliminary directive which provided for defense from a land attack from the north and a seaborne attack against the Black Sea coast. The directive ordered the following distribution of forces:
- 44 Army in Dagestan (5 rifle and 1 mountain division) blocking attacks on Baku from the north
- 47 Army along the central Caucasus Mountains (5 rifle and 1 mountain division) blocking routes to Tbilisi
- 46 Army along the Black Sea coast up to Batumi (3 rifle and 2 mountain division) with the triple task to defend the coast in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet, guard passes of the West Caucasus Mountains, and block advance along the coastal road.
- 45 Army along the Turkish border (5 rifle divisions)
- group of forces in Iran (1 rifle, 2 cavalry division) guarding the Turkish-Iranian border
- front reserve ( 3 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades)
Further events interfered with this plan and after the fall of the Kerch peninsula a large portion of the Transcaucasus Front was transported to the Taman peninsula and was later employed in the Crimean landing. Still the 46 Army with several divisions continued to defend the coast against possible seaborne attack until August 1942. Retrospectively it is clear that fears of some landing operation on the Black Sea coast were exaggerated."
Presume the Turks would be content to build up the defenses of their southern coast and the land borders with Allied occupied Syria, Iraq, and Iran, as well as the northeastern border with the USSR. Also presume this requires the Axis to remain on the defensive in Africa, so no attack at Gazala, or Malta operation, of course.
Does open the possibility of a successful Axis offensive into the Transcaucasus region from Pito/Batumi to Tiflis, and the impact on the Soviet oil industry at Baku, etc.
Map (courtesy of the USMA):
https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default ... rope23.pdf
If the naval support and shipping is limited to what the Axis "historically" had in the Black Sea in 1941-42, it's a non-starter - basically, four Romanian destroyers for the covering force, and one doesn't expect the Romanian merchant marine, plus whatever the Germans can move down the Danube, would be anywhere near enough.
However, if the Turks will accept a "not quite neutral but only semi-co-belligerent" role like the Bulgarians, it could get interesting. As examples, IF they look the other way at Italian shipping moving through the Bosporus (suspend the Montreux Convention? The Italians pull a "Souchon" and send a naval squadron and amphibious shipping to the Aegean, swap flags and put their men in fezzes, sail through the Straits, and then become Italians again?), they could get some significant forces in play.
Operation HERCULES OST?
As it was, the Axis were planning to invade Malta with eight light divisions (one German, seven Italian, which included a German airborne division, an Italian airborne division, and an Italian airlanding division); the amphibious element were two reinforced Italian divisions in the first wave, with two more to follow, and a fifth in reserve. Covering forces were supposed to include four battleships, four heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers, and 21 destroyers.
Cut all that in half, even, and it amounts to (roughly) a reinforced German airborne division (four regiments?) and five infantry RCTs/brigade group equivalents by sea. Looking at what the Germans were able to move into North Africa and the Med after TORCH buy before HUSKY, and maybe that's the equivalent of a German armored/motorized division (10th Panzer, presumably) and an infantry division (334th, presumably, which had a mountain element), plus "some" Italians?
"Gebirgs-armee Ost," under Student, I guess, with:
With half the Italian surface forces planned for HERCULE/C3, that's (presumably) Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio. four Italian light cruisers, and nine Italian destroyers, plus various escorts, minesweepers, and assorted small craft, along with the Romanian fleet (four destroyers), and - presumably - at least Hermes to represent the KM surface force ... plus various submarines, Italian, German, and Romanian.
Although the question of transferring Yavuz BACK into German hands as Goeben is an intriguing one... the correlation of the above Axis naval forces with the Soviet Black Sea Fleet would be interesting.
Air power would have to be transferred from the Med, which would be another reason for Rommel et al to remain on the defensive in Libya, of course. Basing would be Romania, occupied Ukraine, etc.
As far as landing sites, looking at Google maps, seems like north of Poti would provide decent beaches.
But other than drawing from the forces that (historically) were in, or went to, the Med in 1942, hard to see any other reservoir of useful troops, shipping, aircraft, and equipment at the time, and of course getting them into the Black Sea requires the Turks to walk right up to the edge of joining the war, if not actually do so ... maybe the deal is the Axis agrees to supply the Turks with oil from Romania. and (presumably) some territorial gains - Azerbaijian or whatever, "postwar." Hard to imagine that being enough, but hey, it's a 'what if' ...
Definitely unrealistic in terms of diplomacy, but not - for once - in terms of equipment, doctrine, and trained forces. Better than most "Successful SEALION in 1940" or "Japan conquers Oahu in 1941" concepts, and those appear to be running gags.
Thoughts?