There were major strategic mistakes on the part of the Axis powers, yes. I don't think, however, that the extent of their mistakes was greater than that of the Allies. It only appears to be so retroactively, because the Allies ultimately emerged victorious. To give some examples of Allied mistakes:
1. The Anglo-French plan to bomb Baku in 1940
2. The French defensive planning before the Battle of France
3. The British decision to send an expeditionary force to Greece in 1941
4. The Soviet refusal to evacuate Southwestern Front from the Kiev salient during Barbarossa
5. The Soviet broad-front offensive conducted from January to April 1942
6. The sudden British policy reversal in June 1942 in favor of holding Tobruk, absent any preparations
Yes: war or capitulation. It should have come as no surprise that a great power such as Imperial Japan would choose the former option - and indeed, such an outcome wasn't exactly unexpected by the U.S. government.
To facilitate Germany's defeat, which I'd say is a pretty aggressive action in and of itself.
Again, no great power would completely capitulate and accept de facto subordination without a fight. Besides, after such a capitulation neither the Nazi regime nor the Japanese militarists would have been likely to preserve their position of power within their respective societies.
I'd say responsibility for the poor planning and assumptions underpinning Barbarossa lays (1) with Hitler, for not coordinating a prudent, well-resourced interagency planning effort, and (2) with Halder, for producing an operational plan revolving around an expectation of Soviet collapse after the Germans had delivered the first blow.
Again, although I do agree that the German and Japanese leadership made egregious mistakes, it's not obvious to me that they made more than their opponents.