when was it too late for sealion if they got ashore

[Penchanski]

Hi Peter

I wasn't arguing with you at all, think I just quoted Glenn quoting you.

What I was arguing against was the notion that Sealion could be "like Anzio" with a supply chain "like Stalingrad".

However, this being Friday that's not what the notion is any more and I am done arguing with anybody any further.

[Peter89]

Hi Peter

I wasn't arguing with you at all, think I just quoted Glenn quoting you.

What I was arguing against was the notion that Sealion could be "like Anzio" with a supply chain "like Stalingrad".

However, this being Friday that's not what the notion is any more and I am done arguing with anybody any further.

Good thing is that we are on the same page so no need to argue at all. Have a nice weekend!

[Richard Anderson]

What I was arguing against was the notion that Sealion could be "like Anzio" with a supply chain "like Stalingrad".

However, this being Friday that's not what the notion is any more and I am done arguing with anybody any further.

Yeah, a particular glenn specialty is to drag in spurious "comparisons", supported by factoids that don't really apply to them.

SHINGLE landed two nearly complete reinforced infantry divisions on a hostile shore in a single day, opposed by a single, weak, infantry battalion. German reinforcements required days to match the Allied buildup and well over a week to gain fractional superiority, albeit from a collection of fragmentary ad hoc units.
SEELÖWE intended to land part of the infantry component of nine different divisions at four separate locations, each landing opposed by about a battalion, but immediately supported by another brigade, with division-sized reinforcements hours away.

SHINGLE was executed by a unified command with a force experienced in five major and numerous minor amphibious operations, amply provided with specialty craft and equipment.
SEELÖWE featured three major services working to different plans, with poor coordination and worse execution, using a force with zero amphibious experience and improvised landing vessels and equipment.

SHINGLE enjoyed air and naval superiority.
SEELÖWE in this scenario is expected to go on despite complete British naval superiority and contested air superiority.

And so on...these things are not like each other.

[glenn239]

You missed the description of the chart that you 're taking that from - "Under present conditions the average total supply requirements per German soldier are estimated to vary as follows". Present means 1945, when it was published. My figures, from the same publication, specifically referred to 1941. I'll stick with them. An average expenditure of 1100lbs for a 1941 German infantry division in heavy combat. Presumably sometimes they actually used even more than that. It's an average not an upper limit nor a minimum requirement. But to me it's a reasonable figure for what they need to be effective over any decent length of time, and your guess of 250 seems too low.

1,100 tons per infantry division per day might be the occassional peak, but 250 tons per day would be far closer to the average.

The implication is that...<snip>.

The implication is that sustained Luftwaffe attacks on major RN ports of operation, (day and night) would have an increasing effect on the logistics capacities of those ports to conduct the type of high volume, high tempo operations required to support the RN. RAF night defenses in this time were basically non-existent, and countermeasures against navigational aids still evolving. I think that the response to concentrated air attacks on RN ports would be that logistics support would shift further north.

So now it's not like Stalingrad? And above you use 50lbs. That's three different amounts in one post. Is it any wonder if people can't follow the discussion?

Stalingrad was quoted simply to highlight the fact that German infantry divisions in static defense did not require 1,100 tons per day as you asserted. 30-50lbs per man per day is more what a beachhead would require.

OK, that's a completely different question to the idea that Sealion could establish a permanent beachhead. It's not a question I care to waste time thinking about as there are umpty different counter-factuals to imagine.

Why would I care about what you do not prefer to think about?

[glenn239]

Airlift could provide only a tiny friction of that, about one tenth or one fifth tops.

That's 200-500 tons per day by air, max. Sounds about right.

[glenn239]

X-Gerät required the specialized crews and aircraft of KGr 100, operating out of Vannes with He 111H-1/3...all of seven of them operational by 7 September.

The Knickebein system did not require an over-water approach to function, it required the confidence of the crew. The problem with it was the crews got it into their heads that the RAF was going to use the beams to guide night fighters at them, so they refused to use the system.

The point being that in 1940 the Luftwaffe could hit RN bases at night with accuracy.

So the Germans will simply keep giving it the old college try over and over again because...they would be trying to use up their diminishing resources even faster? They were masochists? They were stupid?

No, just capable of producing large quantities of amphibious landing craft if this were the top industrial priority. That type of program was not compatible with an invasion of the USSR, of course.

BTW, why would the Soviets attack the Japanese...<snip>

For the historical reason; to reverse the outcome of the 1905 war. You're thinking they won't do that because of....Sealion?

[glenn239]

What I was arguing against was the notion that Sealion could be "like Anzio" with a supply chain "like Stalingrad".

I never said the supply chain could be "like Stalingrad". I said that the supply requirements drafted by the German army for Stalingrad were nowhere near the 1,100 tons you claimed an infantry division required. I think that 100,000 men would require about 2,000 tons a day at a minimum, which is exactly in conformity with the linked article which states 25-50lbs per man per day.

[daveshoup2MD]

The point being that in 1940 the Luftwaffe could hit RN bases at night with accuracy.

Did the German air forces ever - historically - sink a British warship at night in 1939-40? In harbor or at sea?

[Richard Anderson]

The point being that in 1940 the Luftwaffe could hit RN bases at night with accuracy.

With a half dozen bombers. Dropping on what target in a Royal Navy base with accuracy? A ship at anchor in the roadstead? How do they know its there? How do they align their beams with enough accuracy to target it?

No, just capable of producing large quantities of amphibious landing craft if this were the top industrial priority. That type of program was not compatible with an invasion of the USSR, of course.

So they're going to put pontons on tanks and call them landing craft? The shipyards available to build small craft such as MFP are scattered and tiny, with those in occupied Europe in disarray. The largest and most capable was in Italy. Putting them all to work at one time and they might have fifty or so under construction, but historically it took eleven months or more to complete a single MFP. Saying the magic word "priority" churns them out how much faster?

For the historical reason; to reverse the outcome of the 1905 war. You're thinking they won't do that because of....Sealion?

So Stalin was hell bent to redeem the honor of the Romanovs? Do tell.

[T. A. Gardner]

HMS Iron Duke at Scapa 17 October 1939...

[Richard Anderson]

HMS Iron Duke at Scapa 17 October 1939...

Daylight, not night.

[daveshoup2MD]

HMS Iron Duke at Scapa 17 October 1939...

Daylight, not night.

And calling Iron Duke a "warship" in October, 1939, is ... being charitable.

She had effectively been demilitarized as a training ship (indeed, it was a requirement to keep her in commission, the same for USS Wyoming, which was downgraded from 'battleship' to "auxiliary" because of it; elements of their armament, protection, etc. had all been removed, after all. If Iron Duke was still even a ship, as opposed to a hulk, it was a thin line...

And by April, 1940, a German attack with 60 aircraft was fought off, with basically no damage to the British and significant losses to the Germans.

https://books.google.com/books?id=AzK1C ... 39&f=false

[Penchanski]

1,100 tons per infantry division per day might be the occassional peak, but 250 tons per day would be far closer to the average.

As I said already, it was stated as an average not a peak. And anyway I argue that invading England is not average and the troops landed in England would be operating at their peak tempo throughout the critical early days. During this time their supplies would not meet their needs. Not even close.

And even at 250 tons/division a day the German naval/air capability would struggle to supply 2 divisions.

Meanwhile you have tried to argue that the British don't have enough ammunition to sustain counter-attacks. Ridiculous.

The implication is that sustained Luftwaffe attacks on major RN ports of operation, (day and night) would have an increasing effect on the logistics capacities of those ports to conduct the type of high volume, high tempo operations required to support the RN. RAF night defenses in this time were basically non-existent, and countermeasures against navigational aids still evolving. I think that the response to concentrated air attacks on RN ports would be that logistics support would shift further north.

Yet you do not accept that sustained attacks on German-held ports and landing zone would have any effect.

It's basic plot armour to support your fantasy.

Stalingrad was quoted simply to highlight the fact that German infantry divisions in static defense did not require 1,100 tons per day as you asserted. 30-50lbs per man per day is more what a beachhead would require.

They managed with less but they ended up in a cellar gnawing on a horse's ass-bone. I think they'd be quicker to surrender to the 1940 Tommies than the 1942 Ivans. I think it would come shortly after the destruction (or retreat) of their 'fleet' regardless of Hitler burbling on about 'Fortress Dover' and 'last bullets'.

OK, that's a completely different question to the idea that Sealion could establish a permanent beachhead. It's not a question I care to waste time thinking about as there are umpty different counter-factuals to imagine.

Why would I care about what you do not prefer to think about?

I never said you did. Just pointing out that when you change your fantasy from 1940 Sealion establishing a long-term enclave to some BS about a dozen subsequent invasions and every major power doing something completely a-historical then I can only be arsed addressing the first of those. The other isn't worth it.

Which idea are you actually advocating now by the way?

[Gooner1]

Meanwhile you have tried to argue that the British don't have enough ammunition to sustain counter-attacks. Ridiculous.

Filled shell production between July to September 1940 in the UK was:

Field Artillery: - 1,901,000
Medium Artillery: 108,000
Heavy Ack Ack: - 414,000
Mortar bombs: - 895,000

[T. A. Gardner]

HMS Iron Duke at Scapa 17 October 1939...

Daylight, not night.

Hey, one out of three is pretty good!