PODs for Leningrad in 1941

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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#76

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Jan 2022, 07:08

It should also be pointed that Hitler's upbringing was solidly middle class. For all but one year in Vienna he lived mostly off family money and a pension from his father who was a fairly successful civil servant. Hitler was personally unsuccessful until he got into war and politics but this owed nothing to poverty. He was contemptuous of what he considered the coarse and uncultured working classes.

In addition, the Nazis were not the Party of the working class "rabble." That would be the Communists and Social Democrats, the only parties who consistently opposed Nazis in Europe and Germany, the only truly heroic Germans. The Nazi base was middle class initially, later adding Big Business and the military when those saw an opportunity to crush the Left. While some workers supported Nazism of course this was always the least-Nazi portion of German society.
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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#77

Post by KDF33 » 19 Jan 2022, 07:22

daveshoup2MD wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 06:56
Churchill kept Britain in the fight from 1940 to 1941 and the US alliance; would Chamberlain? Possibly not.
We don't have to speculate. It's a matter of historical record that Chamberlain sided with Churchill during the May cabinet crisis. As Leader of the Conservative Party, his decision was crucial to the survival of the nascent Churchill cabinet.

As for the U.S. alliance, it wasn't something that Churchill forced upon Roosevelt; the latter actively sought the defeat of Germany on his own. There is little reason to doubt that this marriage of both values and interests would have succeeded under a different Prime Minister.
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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#78

Post by KDF33 » 19 Jan 2022, 07:30

daveshoup2MD wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 06:54
Napoleon managed it in 1802, by offering a prisoner exchange and various territorial swaps and recognitions. Given the stalemate in the West and the threat the Axis posed to British interests in the Mediterranean, absent bringing the Soviets into the war, was there a possibility of a settlement?

Possibly...
A prisoner exchange, territorial swaps and recognitions as carrots and the Mediterranean strategy as stick? So, in effect...
1. Remain focused on Britain, with no immediate prospect of ending the war and with ever-increasing U.S. support for London, which risked, in time, to confront Berlin with an active Anglo-American war coalition... While having the Soviets in your rear, thus being de facto at their mercy.

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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#79

Post by historygeek2021 » 19 Jan 2022, 22:33

The Nazi base was rural farmers. German farms had one of the highest population densities in the world. Rather than accept reality and transition the rural population to the cities, Hitler and the Nazis clung to a delusional ideal of Germanic peasant life that could only be sustained by finding Lebensraum in the east. This is nothing like the colonialism of western powers, which was based on the need for raw materials, not living space. The western powers also colonized weak, far off countries that couldn't fight back. They didn't simultaneously go to war with all of their peers in order to fulfill some bizarre racial ideology.

Hitler was nothing like his western counterparts. He was a delusional racist trying to make sense of his personal failure before the Great War and his country's failure during the war.

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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#80

Post by KDF33 » 19 Jan 2022, 23:01

historygeek2021 wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 22:33
The Nazi base was rural farmers. German farms had one of the highest population densities in the world. Rather than accept reality and transition the rural population to the cities, Hitler and the Nazis clung to a delusional ideal of Germanic peasant life that could only be sustained by finding Lebensraum in the east. This is nothing like the colonialism of western powers, which was based on the need for raw materials, not living space.
Hitler was most definitely motivated by the acquisition of resources. What with his focus on the grain of Ukraine, the coal of Donbas and the oil of Baku?
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 22:33
The western powers also colonized weak, far off countries that couldn't fight back. They didn't simultaneously go to war with all of their peers in order to fulfill some bizarre racial ideology.
This is getting tedious. To say that Hitler went to war simultaneously with all of his peers is a gross simplification. First, France and Britain went to war with him, not the other way around. He strenuously tried to preserve American neutrality, until such a time as American involvement 'short-of-war' became barely discernible from the actual thing itself. The only 'peer' he attacked unprovoked was the Soviet Union, and then as part of a coherent, if risky and poorly planned and executed, strategy to consolidate his European power base.

Not that racial ideology was absent from his thoughts, obviously. But one can be both a racial ideologue and be preoccupied with more 'mundane' issues of geopolitical power. It's not a binary choice.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 22:33
Hitler was nothing like his western counterparts. He was a delusional racist trying to make sense of his personal failure before the Great War and his country's failure during the war.
Inasmuch as individuals all differ in certain respects from each other, then, yes, sure. But there's little evidence that his opponents ran their war efforts any more 'rationally' than he did.

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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#81

Post by historygeek2021 » 19 Jan 2022, 23:59

KDF33 wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 23:01
France and Britain went to war with him, not the other way around.
This is Nazi propaganda. Hitler knew that Britain and France had guaranteed Polish security and knew by August 25 that they would honor their commitments. He could also see that the USA would support them and that the USSR would not remain neutral for long. But he plunged his country into war anyway because he cared more about his Wagnerian delusions than what was best for his country. Hitler is easily the dumbest ruler of the 20th Century.

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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#82

Post by KDF33 » 20 Jan 2022, 00:17

historygeek2021 wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 23:59
This is Nazi propaganda.
Whether or not it is Nazi propaganda is irrelevant. It is simply a fact that Britain and France declared war on Germany, and not the other way around. Now I'm not saying that them declaring war was unjustified, but the fact remains that they did, not Germany.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 23:59
Hitler knew that Britain and France had guaranteed Polish security and knew by August 25 that they would honor their commitments.
I don't think that he knew that. He saw it as a serious possibility, and he was certainly willing to risk it, but my understanding is that Hitler still hoped to contain the conflagration to a German-Polish war until the very last moment.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 23:59
He could also see that the USA would support them and that the USSR would not remain neutral for long.
It could be foreseen that the U.S. would support the democracies, although the extent and impact of such support was at the time still an open question.

As for the USSR, I strongly disagree. I see no reason to believe that the USSR wouldn't, in fact, have remained neutral for the indefinite future.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 23:59
But he plunged his country into war anyway because he cared more about his Wagnerian delusions than what was best for his country. Hitler is easily the dumbest ruler of the 20th Century.
I'd say he was the most reckless leader of a major power in the 20th century.

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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#83

Post by historygeek2021 » 20 Jan 2022, 00:33

KDF33 wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 00:17


Whether or not it is Nazi propaganda is irrelevant. It is simply a fact that Britain and France declared war on Germany, and not the other way around. Now I'm not saying that them declaring war was unjustified, but the fact remains that they did, not Germany.
Yes, it does matter that you're repeating Nazi propaganda. It is, quite frankly, disgusting, but I guess I shouldn't be surprised to find people who would do that on a website like this. What's irrelevant is the formality of who declared war on whom. An attack on one member of an alliance is an attack on all, and any world leader with half a brain would know that. Just like any world leader with half a brain would know that the USA's sympathies lay with the British and that the Soviet Union was a natural and historical enemy of Germany and would strike the first chance it got.

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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#84

Post by KDF33 » 20 Jan 2022, 00:50

historygeek2021 wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 00:33
Yes, it does matter that you're repeating Nazi propaganda.bIt is, quite frankly, disgusting, but I guess I shouldn't be surprised to find people who would do that on a website like this.
Again, Britain and France declared war on Germany.

Was that a reasonable response to the invasion of Poland? From a moral standpoint, I would think so - although I remain unconvinced that it made sense from a geostrategic perspective.

The reasonableness of the decision, however, doesn't change the fact that Britain and France declared war.
historygeek2021 wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 00:33
What's irrelevant is the formality of who declared war on whom. An attack on one member of an alliance is an attack on all, and any world leader with half a brain would know that.
This is silly. The Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance was signed on August 25, in the midst of troop movements and at the height of the Polish-German crisis.

It's not like Poland was a long-term treaty ally of Britain. Britain was only obliged to enter the war began on September 1 because it had signed a treaty, of its own volition, a week earlier saying so.
historygeek2021 wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 00:33
Just like any world leader with half a brain would know that the USA's sympathies lay with the British and that the Soviet Union was a natural and historical enemy of Germany and would strike the first chance it got.
Again, there's absolutely no evidence that the Soviet Union planned to attack Germany.

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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#85

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Jan 2022, 00:52

KDF33 wrote:This is getting tedious.
As usual you have a much higher tolerance for tedium and intentional obtuseness.

KDF33/TMP: Actually not every decision Hitler made was stupid and on some issues he was smarter than his generals.
AHF: Oh okay Hitler worshipper, if Hitler was such a genius then why "X"
KDF33/TMP: ...I never said Hitler was a genius...
AHF: Oh okay Hitler worshipper, if Hitler was such a genius then why "Y"
TMP: [backs away from direct engagement]
KDF33: [A true mensch, presses on]
...
AHF: By the way [absolutely insane reactionary sh&* about the ruling classes]
KDF33 wrote:I'd say he was the most reckless leader of a major power in the 20th century.
It's enough to say the most ontologically insane, IMO. Meaning his conception of the Good Life, of for what individuals and nations should strive, is wrong in a way that should cast him outside of humane community and reciprocity. The content of that conception was eternal racial struggle and war.

He's definitely the most reckless if we're evaluating him on normal ontological bases. Within his ontology, however, it's not reckless to court war and disaster. The 9/11 hijackers are similar: their ontology favored immolation for their goals; by our standards it was reckless but by theirs they were acting with instrumental rationality on a carefully prepared plan.

The German people, especially those German elites (nearly all) who went along with Hitler to achieve their own aims, were certainly reckless on their own ontological aims.
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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#86

Post by KDF33 » 20 Jan 2022, 01:10

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 00:52
As usual you have a much higher tolerance for tedium and intentional obtuseness.

[...]

KDF33: [A true mensch, presses on]
What can I say, it's COVID lockdown around here and I have time to kill! :roll:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 00:52
It's enough to say the most ontologically insane, IMO. Meaning his conception of the Good Life, of for what individuals and nations should strive, is wrong in a way that should cast him outside of humane community and reciprocity. The content of that conception was eternal racial struggle and war.

He's definitely the most reckless if we're evaluating him on normal ontological bases. Within his ontology, however, it's not reckless to court war and disaster. The 9/11 hijackers are similar: their ontology favored immolation for their goals; by our standards it was reckless but by theirs they were acting with instrumental rationality on a carefully prepared plan.

The German people, especially those German elites (nearly all) who went along with Hitler to achieve their own aims, were certainly reckless on their own ontological aims.
That's an excellent synthesis. It neatly encapsulates the character: ontologically insane, but instrumentally rational. I might use it in the future, if you don't mind.

I'd still say that despite his overall instrumental rationality, he was a gambler who tended to gravitate toward optimistic scenarios: attacking Poland, hoping the Franco-British wouldn't declare war; attacking the USSR, assuming the Soviet state would collapse quickly; extending the front to the Caucasus, assuming that the Soviets no longer had reserves, etc.

Gravitating toward optimistic scenarios, however, was a trait widely shared by the leaders of that era - or, let's face it, probably any era. In that sense, he wasn't that different from his adversaries.

Of note, the one time he proceeded relatively cautiously was in the planning and build-up to the Battle of France, which culminated in Germany's greatest military victory of the 20th century.

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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#87

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Jan 2022, 01:39

KDF33 wrote:ontologically insane, but instrumentally rational. I might use it in the future, if you don't mind.
Of course. As I'm conscious of sounding too pretentious, I used the more common word "ontology" (the study of being/existence) somewhat promiscuously, as I'm sure you're aware. If I were saying this in a philosophical seminar I'd have said "eschatologically" or "teleologically" insane.
KDF33 wrote:I'd still say that despite his overall instrumental rationality, he was a gambler who tended to gravitate toward optimistic scenarios: attacking Poland, hoping the Franco-British wouldn't declare war; attacking the USSR, assuming the Soviet state would collapse quickly; extending the front to the Caucasus, assuming that the Soviets no longer had reserves, etc.

Gravitating toward optimistic scenarios, however, was a trait widely shared by the leaders of that era - or, let's face it, probably any era. In that sense, he wasn't that different from his adversaries.

Of note, the one time he proceeded relatively cautiously was in the planning and build-up to the Battle of France, which culminated in Germany's greatest military victory of the 20th century.
Agreed. Hitler took bigger risks within his ontological program than did his opponents within theirs, overall. But even this has a supervening instrumental level: Hitler's project was always a long shot, always assumed scenarios that weren't, a priori, all that likely (primarily the opportunity to engage his continental foes singly). To have a non-zero chance of success, he had to take big risks and couldn't afford catastrophic reverses. By contrast, Hitler's opponents were going to win so long as they didn't make too many catastrophic reverses. Their optimal strategy was risk aversion, his was risk-acceptance.

This is why I think the simplistic "lol Hitler" narrative is fine circa 1938 when 95% of world GDP and population is stacked against him. There's just not much chance of the world being so stupid that his insane project could succeed.

By June 1941, however, most of the improbable predicates to Hitler's at-least-partial success had already occurred: He had already defeated, or lined up a favorable fight with, his continental adversaries.

We shouldn't underestimate the depths of human folly that enabled this to happen and the magnitude of the consequences. One insane person controlling a small portion of the world's population and resources created the modern world's biggest catastrophe and largely achieved his goal of eradicating European Jewry. It's insane that we (the community of non-insane people) let this happen when stopping it really would have been easy (circa 1938).

The stupidity, and lack of self-reflection, that allowed this to happen reminds me of more recent Wallied stupidity. Bin Laden specifically aimed to provoke US imperial overreaction to galvanize anti-Western sentiment and radicalism. We played the part spectacularly. There is much overlap between the "lol Hitler" crowd and those who blundered into current imperial folly. That inability to take a foe seriously is never good, neither for dictators nor democracies.
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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#88

Post by KDF33 » 20 Jan 2022, 03:18

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 01:39
Agreed. Hitler took bigger risks within his ontological program than did his opponents within theirs, overall. But even this has a supervening instrumental level: Hitler's project was always a long shot, always assumed scenarios that weren't, a priori, all that likely (primarily the opportunity to engage his continental foes singly). To have a non-zero chance of success, he had to take big risks and couldn't afford catastrophic reverses. By contrast, Hitler's opponents were going to win so long as they didn't make too many catastrophic reverses. Their optimal strategy was risk aversion, his was risk-acceptance.
Agree 100%.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 01:39
This is why I think the simplistic "lol Hitler" narrative is fine circa 1938 when 95% of world GDP and population is stacked against him. There's just not much chance of the world being so stupid that his insane project could succeed.
I agree. 'Lol Hitler' ought to have gone out of fashion when Stalin broke off negotiations with the Anglo-French on August 21. Somehow, given the serious planning and preparation that went into Operation Pike, there then was a brief phase of 'lol Hitler and Stalin'.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 01:39
By June 1941, however, most of the improbable predicates to Hitler's at-least-partial success had already occurred: He had already defeated, or lined up a favorable fight with, his continental adversaries.
Agreed. IMO, Hitler's project went from stillborn (pre-August 1939) to a long shot (August 1939 - May 1940) to a credible outcome (May 1940 - May 1941) to the most likely outcome (May - July 1941), then receded (July - December 1941, with admittedly an uptick in September - October), then regained strength (December 1941 - May 1942) to once again become the most likely outcome (May - July 1942), then receded again (July - November 1942) to finally go back to where it was pre-August 1939 (November 1942 - May 1945), i.e. a virtual impossibility.

Admittedly, we are of different views on the contingency of French defeat in May - June 1940. You would thus probably fold my 'long shot' (8/39 - 5/40) with my 'credible outcome' (5/40 - 5/41) periods.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 01:39
We shouldn't underestimate the depths of human folly that enabled this to happen and the magnitude of the consequences. One insane person controlling a small portion of the world's population and resources created the modern world's biggest catastrophe and largely achieved his goal of eradicating European Jewry. It's insane that we (the community of non-insane people) let this happen when stopping it really would have been easy (circa 1938).
In fairness, one problem the democracies faced was the shift in the international balance-of-power in favor of revisionist powers in general: breaking Germany at the most opportune moment would have deprived Europe of its greatest potential counterweight to the Soviet Union, which over the long term posed a far greater challenge than pre-Grossraum Germany.

The Anglo-French simply no longer had the relative power to secure what we call today the 'rules-based' international order, and in the absence of serious engagement by the United States, as usual paralyzed by internal political constraints, they simply couldn't stabilize Eurasia.

Which is why I'm ultimately critical of the guarantee to Poland. A better strategy, IMO, would have been to let Poland deal with Germany alone, to either be dismembered or (IMO the likely outcome) become a German satellite. The German sphere would then have bumped upon the Soviet sphere, which itself already bumped upon the Japanese sphere.

Meanwhile, Britain ought to have built a strong land force to complement France's, with forward elements already on the continent, NATO-style, and the rest ready for quick deployment.

Then, London and Paris ought to have stayed put, observed developments in Eastern Europe and the Far East, and preserved the freedom of action afforded by virtue of being the last ones to commit. To this I would add restoring satisfactory ties with Japan, irrespective of the latter's brutality in China - an unsavory, yet strategically sound, decision.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 01:39
The stupidity, and lack of self-reflection, that allowed this to happen reminds me of more recent Wallied stupidity. Bin Laden specifically aimed to provoke US imperial overreaction to galvanize anti-Western sentiment and radicalism. We played the part spectacularly. There is much overlap between the "lol Hitler" crowd and those who blundered into current imperial folly.
At least terrorism was never more than a nuisance. To be feuding with both Russia and China at once, strikes me as a more serious situation.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Jan 2022, 01:39
That inability to take a foe seriously is never good, neither for dictators nor democracies.
Yes. Sadly, I think the easy assumption that democracies are any less irrational than dictatorships is untenable.
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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#89

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Jan 2022, 04:29

KDF33 wrote:Admittedly, we are of different views on the contingency of French defeat in May - June 1940. You would thus probably fold my 'long shot' (8/39 - 5/40) with my 'credible outcome' (5/40 - 5/41) periods.
It's a matter of degree. Viewed in isolation in September 39 I think a fairly rapid German victory was the more likely outcome. That doesn't mean, however, that contingency didn't intervene. Had a German officer betrayed Fall Gelb plans in March '40 rather in late '39, for example, perhaps the Sichelschnitt is disastrously counterattacked, the Belgians stay in the field, an agreement with Mussolini frees 10 French divisions from that border... Or the British and French start bombing the Ruhr early, provoking an early German offensive that fails. The Phoney War period - in which Germany executed perhaps the most successful crash training program in modern history on an army that showed serious deficiencies in Poland - is an underrated contingency.

A series of events individually likely can still be conjunctively unlikely; the rapid German victory - even if likely - adds retrospective contingency to Hitler's plumb position after France's fall.
KDF33 wrote:Which is why I'm ultimately critical of the guarantee to Poland. A better strategy, IMO, would have been to let Poland deal with Germany alone, to either be dismembered or (IMO the likely outcome) become a German satellite. The German sphere would then have bumped upon the Soviet sphere, which itself already bumped upon the Japanese sphere.
...critical on geostrategic grounds, of course, as you've said elsewhere (before the howls of moral indignation pour in).

The guarantee was certainly premature - a knee-jerk reaction by a politician trying to posture without thinking everything through first. The ambiguous guarantee of Polish independence rather than borders was immediately clocked by Hitler as a sign of weakness - it was - but Hitler didn't have the political sophistication to understand that public sentiment would carry Chamberlain farther than he wanted, once the guarantee had been given. Only the formal alliance convinced Hitler that Britain would likely go to war but Britain didn't reach that until far too late to deter Hitler, who had his own political dynamics that Chamberlain didn't understand.

I'm still of the opinion that collective security (with the SU) should have been given the chance it deserved. By guaranteeing Poland and at least rhetorically committing to war over her, Britain lost all leverage over the SU, which had the option of freeriding on the ensuing and expected mayhem. Stalin's desire for collective security was genuine - even his excellent but stridently right-wing biographer Stephen Kotkin concludes so - but was of course only one of his desires. OTL Stalin got to choose between free expansionism with Germany or pitching in to a difficult war. ATL Stalin (no Polish guarantee and earnest efforts at collective security) foresees the path you recommend and the prospect of abutting a hostile Germany and Japan alone. Unlike Hitler his instrumental rationality is of the highly deliberative type and he probably chooses collective security. The Poles simply have to go along.
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Re: PODs for Leningrad in 1941

#90

Post by daveshoup2MD » 21 Jan 2022, 06:32

KDF33 wrote:
19 Jan 2022, 23:01
Inasmuch as individuals all differ in certain respects from each other, then, yes, sure. But there's little evidence that his opponents ran their war efforts any more 'rationally' than he did.
Well, "his opponents" won, which would suggest otherwise. ;)

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