British Order of Battle

Discussions on all aspects of the The United Kingdom & its Empire and Commonwealth during the Inter-War era and Second World War. Hosted by Andy H
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daveshoup2MD
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Re: British Order of Battle

#121

Post by daveshoup2MD » 18 Feb 2022, 03:38

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
17 Feb 2022, 23:45
My view here is drawn entirely from my personal observations in service. In 20 years I went through more reorgnizations than I could accurately count. Some of my peers dealt with these well, others did not & got themselves wrapped around the axle over details others hardly noticed. Some had a meltdown over the most surprising details. I suspect the Brits were not different & problems from changes depended on a few key commanders & staff officers grasping the event correctly. The propensity to overthink and make tasks harder than they need to be seems endemic in 10% of the population, which can waste too many hours of the rest of us.

& I'll forgo the anecdote about a certain LtCol in the interest of getting back on topic.
Yep. Add in the human factors - who knows who? Who has served together? What's the level trust up and down and across? Hell, who recognizes each other's face and voice? - and self-inflicted churn is not helpful.

Hard enough to integrate replacements (or fillers) to an existing organization; couple combat/operational losses with transferring 30 percent of the maneuver battalions in a given command out for, essentially, shits and grins, and the impact is real. Tough to measure, but undeniable.
Last edited by daveshoup2MD on 18 Feb 2022, 06:07, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: British Order of Battle

#122

Post by daveshoup2MD » 18 Feb 2022, 03:46

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:35
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:03
True, but making unnecessary changes in the first place is a bad idea.
Unnecessary is opinion on 80 years hindsight .
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:03
Unit cohesion,
Where was be break on unit cohesion ? Everything you was write was on topic divisions . On Britain army everything on cohesion was be on level battalion on fighting and regiment on ceremonys . Britain mentality was not be same as Amerikan mentality . Organization changes on division structure not big problem on cohesion .
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:03
esprit de corps, trust up and down the chain of command, and institutional knowledge are all significant elements of operational readiness; as has been said, a mob is not an army, any more than pile of bricks and lumber is not a house.
You write like you are salesperson what have no idea on what you sell but have many words for to confuse customer .

Have you some historical evidence on topic esprit de corps, trust up and down the chain of command, and institutional knowledge on Britain army and what was be changes and what was be historical differences on operational readiness or was you just write many words to confuse ?

Have you some historical evidence on topic Britain army was become a mob is not an army because they was make churn ?

Unnecessary was the British Army's own opinion during the war, even in 1942, so no, hardly "80 years hindsight." :roll:

And some individuals may be easily confused...


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Re: British Order of Battle

#123

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 18 Feb 2022, 03:48

daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:30
The British lost a lot of equipment in France in 1940, but in terms of organized manpower, only the 51st Division was forced to surrender.
It is almost correct fact but not help for to understand combat capable .
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:30
However, once the divisions that were evacuated from France in 1940 made it back to the UK and got sorted out, reorganized, re-quipped, etc., the 12th and 23rd (both LE) were both disbanded, while the existing 9th Infantry Division in the UK was redesignated as the 51st, hence the point about one frontline division and two LE divisions being removed from the Imperial order of battle as a result of the 1940 campaign in France.
Appreciation FUTURE STRATEGY by Chiefs of Staff Committee on september 1941.year write very clear Britain was not have problem on manpower problem was be on equipment .

On June 1940.year Britain army was take 4 divisions off division list .
Before end 1940.year Britain army was put on 12 or 13 on list .

4 off and 12/13 on list not change how much equipment was possible for divisions on topic combat capable .

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Re: British Order of Battle

#124

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 18 Feb 2022, 03:50

daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:46
Unnecessary was the British Army's own opinion during the war, even in 1942,
Can you please to give evidence and sources .

Thank you.

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Re: British Order of Battle

#125

Post by daveshoup2MD » 18 Feb 2022, 04:03

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:50
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:46
Unnecessary was the British Army's own opinion during the war, even in 1942,
Can you please to give evidence and sources .

Thank you.
The "mixed" divisions (converted as such in 1941) were converted back to a three infantry brigade structure, beginning in 1942; it's in Joslen.

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Re: British Order of Battle

#126

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 18 Feb 2022, 04:08

daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 04:03
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:50
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:46
Unnecessary was the British Army's own opinion during the war, even in 1942,
Can you please to give evidence and sources .

Thank you.
The "mixed" divisions (converted as such in 1941) were converted back to a three infantry brigade structure, beginning in 1942; it's in Joslen.
:lol: :lol: :lol:

That can not be evidence change was unnecessary .

Maybe it can to be evidence on mistake or it can to be evidence was change mind .

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Re: British Order of Battle

#127

Post by daveshoup2MD » 18 Feb 2022, 04:19

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 04:08
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 04:03
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:50
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:46
Unnecessary was the British Army's own opinion during the war, even in 1942,
Can you please to give evidence and sources .

Thank you.
The "mixed" divisions (converted as such in 1941) were converted back to a three infantry brigade structure, beginning in 1942; it's in Joslen.
:lol: :lol: :lol:

That can not be evidence change was unnecessary .

Maybe it can to be evidence on mistake or it can to be evidence was change mind .
Posted earlier in this thread by Mr. Kennedy, actually:
The War Office announced the intention to abolish the Mixed Division at the beginning of September 1943, on the basis that they were 'unlikely to prove a suitable organisation for operations on the continent of Europe'. It took a while for all the affected Divs to be brought up to the necessary strength.

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Re: British Order of Battle

#128

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Feb 2022, 05:19

daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:24
Think the argument regarding the US is a little different; but be that as it may, the end result was the US raised 96 combat divisions and managed to keep ~96 division/equivalents (including the 2nd CD/1st ABNTF/MTF as an IDE in 1943-45) in action throughout the conflict; the British were breaking up combat divisions for replacements instead, (arguably) as early as the 8th and 10th armoured and 44th Infantry divisions in MENA in 1942-43, with 1st Armoured and 50th, and 59th infantry divisions in 1944. Coupled with - frankly - non-standard reorgs like the 78th Division in 1942, the 70th Division to the Chindits in 1943 (and then elements back to infantry as the 36th in 1944-45, raising the 6th Airborne in 1943, and some other "interesting" uses of manpower, and of the two countries' manpower policies, safe bet the US did better.
Um, there are actually two parallel, but slightly different arguments going on.

1. Both the British and Americans had difficulties in maintaining the strength of divisions.
2. Both the British and Americans had difficulties in raising divisions and preparing them for combat.

For the US Army, inexperience and lack of mobilization preparation combined with the exigencies of war to throw much of the mobilization into near chaos at times, and doubled the expected time for raising divisions and getting them into combat. Early deployement of divisions took valuable cadre out of the Z/I and early commitment to combat led to a scramble for replacements and the use of divisions in mobilization as a source of replacement manpower. To get its 88-89 division strength:

Two infantry divisions used African American manpower that was underutilized in combat...they were treated as stevedore and general labor units, so did not contribute to the overall combat strength of the Army.
Two infantry divisions spent much of their time as cadre-training units, aiding in the formation of other divisions without themselves being combat capable.
One armored division did the same and if the "missing" activations (15th, 17th, 18th, and 19th) had been carried out, then a second armored division would have done the same.
One armored division, the 9th, was the 2d Cavalry Division reborn.
Half of the armored divisions served in combat for less than five months at the end of the war.
One airborne division saw no combat.
Eleven infantry divisions served in combat for less than five months at the end of the war.
One infantry division saw no combat.
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Re: British Order of Battle

#129

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Feb 2022, 05:26

daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 04:19
Posted earlier in this thread by Mr. Kennedy, actually:
The War Office announced the intention to abolish the Mixed Division at the beginning of September 1943, on the basis that they were 'unlikely to prove a suitable organisation for operations on the continent of Europe'. It took a while for all the affected Divs to be brought up to the necessary strength.
Yep, but the decision ultimately only affected four divisions: the 4th Division, which reverted to the old organization on 12 December1943, the 15th Division, which reverted on 9 September 1943, the 43d Division, which reverted on 10 December 1943, and the 53d, which reverted on 10 September 1943. So in the great scheme of things, how much did the experiment really matter?
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Re: British Order of Battle

#130

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Feb 2022, 05:36

daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:30
However, once the divisions that were evacuated from France in 1940 made it back to the UK and got sorted out, reorganized, re-quipped, etc., the 12th and 23rd (both LE) were both disbanded, while the existing 9th Infantry Division in the UK was redesignated as the 51st, hence the point about one frontline division and two LE divisions being removed from the Imperial order of battle as a result of the 1940 campaign in France.
Minor quibble. Neither the 12th or 23d Division were Lower Establishment units. They were 2d Line Territorial units that had not completed formation training and were sent to France as expedient labor units. Most of the division staff and divisional units stayed in England as did much of the heavy equipment of the division. They also happened to be those units that suffered the most in France in terms of casualties, for example, the 36th Infantry Brigade was essentially wiped out and the 37th Infantry Brigade losses were not far behind.
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Re: British Order of Battle

#131

Post by daveshoup2MD » 18 Feb 2022, 05:54

Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 05:19
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:24
Think the argument regarding the US is a little different; but be that as it may, the end result was the US raised 96 combat divisions and managed to keep ~96 division/equivalents (including the 2nd CD/1st ABNTF/MTF as an IDE in 1943-45) in action throughout the conflict; the British were breaking up combat divisions for replacements instead, (arguably) as early as the 8th and 10th armoured and 44th Infantry divisions in MENA in 1942-43, with 1st Armoured and 50th, and 59th infantry divisions in 1944. Coupled with - frankly - non-standard reorgs like the 78th Division in 1942, the 70th Division to the Chindits in 1943 (and then elements back to infantry as the 36th in 1944-45, raising the 6th Airborne in 1943, and some other "interesting" uses of manpower, and of the two countries' manpower policies, safe bet the US did better.
Um, there are actually two parallel, but slightly different arguments going on.

1. Both the British and Americans had difficulties in maintaining the strength of divisions.
2. Both the British and Americans had difficulties in raising divisions and preparing them for combat.

For the US Army, inexperience and lack of mobilization preparation combined with the exigencies of war to throw much of the mobilization into near chaos at times, and doubled the expected time for raising divisions and getting them into combat. Early deployement of divisions took valuable cadre out of the Z/I and early commitment to combat led to a scramble for replacements and the use of divisions in mobilization as a source of replacement manpower. To get its 88-89 division strength:

Two infantry divisions used African American manpower that was underutilized in combat...they were treated as stevedore and general labor units, so did not contribute to the overall combat strength of the Army.
Two infantry divisions spent much of their time as cadre-training units, aiding in the formation of other divisions without themselves being combat capable.
One armored division did the same and if the "missing" activations (15th, 17th, 18th, and 19th) had been carried out, then a second armored division would have done the same.
One armored division, the 9th, was the 2d Cavalry Division reborn.
Half of the armored divisions served in combat for less than five months at the end of the war.
One airborne division saw no combat.
Eleven infantry divisions served in combat for less than five months at the end of the war.
One infantry division saw no combat.
The US sent/had all ~96 Army and Marine divisions overseas in 1941-45, and kept them all up to strength for their assigned duties; the British broke up three divisions - 1st Armoured, 50th Infantry, and 59th Infantry, all of which were deployed and fighting in Europe - in 1944 to provide replacements for divisions in the 15th and 21st army groups. Although the 1st Airborne Division remained in the order of battle, it did not see action after Arnhem.

Before the European campaign opened in 1943, the British had sidelined four divisions (2nd Armoured, 8th Armoured, 10th Armoured, 4th Infantry) in the MTO, largely because of a need for replacements/augments/etc. of the forces that (for the most part) went into action in Europe in 1943-45. They also converted the RMD (from a light, 2-brigade but operational division) into cadre for two brigades worth of RM commandos in 1943.

In SEA, the British Indian 14th Division was sidelined after the heavy losses of the 1942-43 Arakan campaign. Also in SEA, the British (essentially) converted the 70th Infantry Division into about a light infantry/gliderborne force as about half of the Chindit Force OOB in 1943-44, and then broke it up, although some elements went to various other divisions in the theater and assisted in raising/organizing/sustaining the 36th Infantry Division. Call that one a wash, but still: pretty questionable use of manpower.

Based on the above, the British broke up - at least - eight combat divisions between 1942-44 because of a lack of replacements.

The only comparable US case was the 2nd Cavalry Division, except it was broken up in 1944 to provide logistics units, not combat replacements; considering that - at the time - the US was planning on maintaining two US field armies, and sustaining a significant amount of the French 1st Army's logistics needs, in the MTO, the need for more logistics troops is understandable.

Whether the 2nd Cavalry Division deserved being broken up for it, is a different question. Not to get to deep in the weeds about the integration policies (or lack thereof) of the US military in the 1940s, the 92nd Division was, in fact, reformed in 1944-45 as (essentially) a semi-integrated formation at the unit (RCT) level, and fought as such in 1945. The 93rd Division also deployed overseas and saw action, albeit limited and generally at the RCT level and below, across the SWPA from the Solomons to the Philippines in 1944-45, including recorded KIA, etc.

The "96 division equivalents" point made above is arguable, given the PD saw action in 1941-42, the 2nd CD (both iterations) was in the order of battle and deployed overseas in 1941-44, the 1st ABTF was formed as a division equivalent in 1944, deployed, and saw action as such, and the MTF was formed as a division equivalent in 1944, deployed, and saw action as such, in 1944-45.

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Re: British Order of Battle

#132

Post by daveshoup2MD » 18 Feb 2022, 06:02

Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 05:26
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 04:19
Posted earlier in this thread by Mr. Kennedy, actually:
The War Office announced the intention to abolish the Mixed Division at the beginning of September 1943, on the basis that they were 'unlikely to prove a suitable organisation for operations on the continent of Europe'. It took a while for all the affected Divs to be brought up to the necessary strength.
Yep, but the decision ultimately only affected four divisions: the 4th Division, which reverted to the old organization on 12 December1943, the 15th Division, which reverted on 9 September 1943, the 43d Division, which reverted on 10 December 1943, and the 53d, which reverted on 10 September 1943. So in the great scheme of things, how much did the experiment really matter?
Considering the British were putting two field armies into action at the same time in the same theater for the first time since 1918? Probably didn't help ... ;)

Getting any group of young men moving - more or less - in the same direction at the same time in a desired manner with a desired goal is not a simple task, as presumably anyone who has had to do it in uniform - or otherwise - would attest.

Getting them to do it absent ~33% churn in the organization is challenging enough; getting them to do with said churn is not any less so. Human factors are a thing.
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Re: British Order of Battle

#133

Post by daveshoup2MD » 18 Feb 2022, 06:05

Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 05:36
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:30
However, once the divisions that were evacuated from France in 1940 made it back to the UK and got sorted out, reorganized, re-quipped, etc., the 12th and 23rd (both LE) were both disbanded, while the existing 9th Infantry Division in the UK was redesignated as the 51st, hence the point about one frontline division and two LE divisions being removed from the Imperial order of battle as a result of the 1940 campaign in France.
Minor quibble. Neither the 12th or 23d Division were Lower Establishment units. They were 2d Line Territorial units that had not completed formation training and were sent to France as expedient labor units. Most of the division staff and divisional units stayed in England as did much of the heavy equipment of the division. They also happened to be those units that suffered the most in France in terms of casualties, for example, the 36th Infantry Brigade was essentially wiped out and the 37th Infantry Brigade losses were not far behind.
(LE) being shorthand in this case that they were not "frontline" or "first line" divisions, or whatever one wishes to say to make clear they were not the equivalent of the 51st. In any event, after the 1940 campaign, they were disbanded in the UK, which means three divisions were gone from the British order of battle in 1940 due to enemy action. Not a desirable end state, presumably.

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Re: British Order of Battle

#134

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Feb 2022, 09:14

daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 05:54
The US sent/had all ~96 Army and Marine divisions overseas in 1941-45, and kept them all up to strength for their assigned duties;
That is disingenuous to put it politely.

The Marines did it by committing divisions for a few months and then spending a year or so to put Humpty back together again.

1st MARDIV - 4 months in combat, then 1 year out of combat, then 3 months of combat, then 6 months out of combat, then 1 month in combat, then 5 months out of combat, then 2 months in combat...end of the war. See? Less than a year of combat required two years out of combat for rebuilding.

Just looking at the Army's 67 Infantry division's, one was overseas in December 1941 and was destroyed. Two were in Hawaii in 1941, one was organized overseas and twelve more went overseas in 1942, eleven more followed in 1943, thirty-seven in 1944, and three in 1945. One quarter, twenty-four, went overseas in the last full year of the war. One, the 98th, saw no combat.

Of the last three Infantry Divisions deployed to Europe, the 71st was credited with 49 days in combat and suffered 788 battle casualties, the 86th had 34 combat days and 760 battle casualties, and the 97th had 31 days in combat and 934 battle casualties.
the British broke up three divisions - 1st Armoured, 50th Infantry, and 59th Infantry, all of which were deployed and fighting in Europe - in 1944 to provide replacements for divisions in the 15th and 21st army groups. Although the 1st Airborne Division remained in the order of battle, it did not see action after Arnhem.
Although in a sense the 92d Infantry Division was "broken up", it wasn't for replacements. Instead, divisions were bled white as the replacement situation grew more and more serious, while the 82d and 101st Airborne were kept in action by cannibalizing non-divisional airborne units. It was expected that by 31 December 1944, the ETOUSA would have available 37,937 Riflemen, but would require 68,343. As of 1 December, the ETOUSA was short 28,341 officers and men, of which 21,211 were Infantry. In essence, the better part of two infantry divisions were not present.
Based on the above, the British broke up - at least - eight combat divisions between 1942-44 because of a lack of replacements.
And the American Army kept divisions in the field that were critically short of Riflemen.
The only comparable US case was the 2nd Cavalry Division, except it was broken up in 1944 to provide logistics units, not combat replacements; considering that - at the time - the US was planning on maintaining two US field armies, and sustaining a significant amount of the French 1st Army's logistics needs, in the MTO, the need for more logistics troops is understandable.
That was the 2d 2d Cavalry Division. The 2st 2d Cavalry Division was disbanded and re-rolled as an armored division. There is also the not so minor problem that breaking up the 2d 2d Cavalry Division could not really provide combat replacements, except to Black combat units, which did not need them at the time.
Whether the 2nd Cavalry Division deserved being broken up for it, is a different question. Not to get to deep in the weeds about the integration policies (or lack thereof) of the US military in the 1940s, the 92nd Division was, in fact, reformed in 1944-45 as (essentially) a semi-integrated formation at the unit (RCT) level, and fought as such in 1945. The 93rd Division also deployed overseas and saw action, albeit limited and generally at the RCT level and below, across the SWPA from the Solomons to the Philippines in 1944-45, including recorded KIA, etc.
Yep, the idiotic under-utilization of Black personnel in the US Army in World War II easily matched any idiocy perpetrated by the British.
The "96 division equivalents" point made above is arguable, given the PD saw action in 1941-42, the 2nd CD (both iterations) was in the order of battle and deployed overseas in 1941-44, the 1st ABTF was formed as a division equivalent in 1944, deployed, and saw action as such, and the MTF was formed as a division equivalent in 1944, deployed, and saw action as such, in 1944-45.
Indeed, it is very arguably, which is why I am arguing it. :lol: Anyway, yes, both iterations of the 2d Cavalry existed, but neither were committed to battle, well, the 9th AD was, but not quite the same thing, and anyway, I think you are already counting it? One-third of the 1st ABTF was British and it was not formed as a "division equivalent", but as a provisional airborne task force for a specific mission. What is the "MTF"?
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Re: British Order of Battle

#135

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 18 Feb 2022, 14:46

daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 04:19
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 04:08
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 04:03
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:50
daveshoup2MD wrote:
18 Feb 2022, 03:46
Unnecessary was the British Army's own opinion during the war, even in 1942,
Can you please to give evidence and sources .

Thank you.
The "mixed" divisions (converted as such in 1941) were converted back to a three infantry brigade structure, beginning in 1942; it's in Joslen.
:lol: :lol: :lol:

That can not be evidence change was unnecessary .

Maybe it can to be evidence on mistake or it can to be evidence was change mind .
Posted earlier in this thread by Mr. Kennedy, actually:
The War Office announced the intention to abolish the Mixed Division at the beginning of September 1943, on the basis that they were 'unlikely to prove a suitable organisation for operations on the continent of Europe'. It took a while for all the affected Divs to be brought up to the necessary strength.
No evidence on unnecessary .

No evidence on Britain army on 1942.year was have opinion it was be unnecessary .

No evidence on how churn was make differences and was make problems .

No evidence for to help Carl Schwamberger on understand history combat capable .

Thank you . Now i understand it was comment only on daveshoup2md opinion on 80 years hindsight .

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