Ukraine lost the defensible Perekop Isthmus in a day, whereas the Germans and Russians held it for months in WWII. Why?

[Yuri]

Defensive fortifications against an offensive from the Crimea to the North should be built along the coast of the Sea of Azov from the mouth of the Molochnaya River (in the East) to the Crimean Isthmus, then the Crimean Isthmus and then to the mouth of the Dneper River.
This is a total line with a length of more than 250 km.
The depth of the protective structures (from the South to the North) should be at least 20 km.
Take into account that the terrain here is flat as a table. This is of course an exaggeration, but a small one. There are no rivers, gullies, and no hills.
In such an area, the cost of building a protective structure with a length of 250 km and a width of 20 km will be more than the cost of building the Mageno Line. This is of course an exaggeration, but a small one.
Provided that the side advancing from the Crimea has air and sea superiority over the defender, it would be very risky for the defender at Perekop to take the fight with the involvement of the main forces here, moreover, it would be unwise.
When the attackers from the Crimean Isthmus move to the North, West and East, his supply lines are greatly stretched and space begins to absorb his forces.
From a military point of view, the Tavrida's steppes have no value for the defender.
It is reasonable to give it to a strong opponent without a big battle.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Yuri,

We have seen the result of not successfully contesting the Perekop Isthmus. It therefore doesn't look "reasonable to give it to a strong opponent without a big battle."

It would appear that something went badly wrong on the Ukrainian side at Perekop on day one. What was it?

Are you saying that the Ukrainians voluntarily decided not to contest the Perekop Isthmus and that is what went right?

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

I wonder if this report today might go some way towards explaining what happened:

"A southern-region security chief lost his general’s rank, Mr. Zelensky said. Serhiy Kryvoruchko had led Ukraine’s security service office in the Kherson region, where Russia seized the local capital earlier in the war with little military opposition."

Cheers,

Sid.

[Yuri]

Hi Yuri,

We have seen the result of not successfully contesting the Perekop Isthmus. It therefore doesn't look "reasonable to give it to a strong opponent without a big battle."

It would appear that something went badly wrong on the Ukrainian side at Perekop on day one. What was it?

Are you saying that the Ukrainians voluntarily decided not to contest the Perekop Isthmus and that is what went right?

Cheers,

Sid.

Hi Sid.

To this day, we know of three cases of an offensive into the Crimea through the Perekop Isthmus:
The first case is the offensive of the Red Army against the White Army in November 1920;
The second case is the offensive of the German Wehrmacht and the Royal Romanian Army against the Red Army in November 1941;
The third case was the offensive of the Red Army against the German Wehrmacht, the Royal Romanian Army and Slovak troops in April 1944.
In all three cases, the attacking side had very heavy losses.

Until February 28 of this year, only one case of an offensive from the Crimea was known, this was the offensive of the White Army against the Red Army in March-April 1920.
This offensive was very successful for the White Army, and the Red Army suffered heavy losses precisely because it tried to detain the enemy at the base of the Perekop Isthmus and on the shores of the Azov and Black Seas.

What do you mean when you write:
"We have seen the result of not successfully contesting the Perekop Isthmus."

I'm afraid I misunderstand your question.
Please explain.

[Yuri]

I wonder if this report today might go some way towards explaining what happened:

"A southern-region security chief lost his general’s rank, Mr. Zelensky said. Serhiy Kryvoruchko had led Ukraine’s security service office in the Kherson region, where Russia seized the local capital earlier in the war with little military opposition."

Cheers,

Sid.

This general of the Security Service of Ukraine (the SBU) (the SBU is not related to the Armed Forces of Ukraine) and, by the way, his chief in Kiev fled to Poland two days before the start of a special military operation. The chief of the SBU returned back to Ukraine and was not punished (Zelensky promised: whoever returns will not be punished). But Krivoruchko remained in Poland and therefore was deprived of the rank of general.
As we now know, two days before the start of the special military operation, Putin informed the US President about the inevitability of its conduct through the French President. Apparently, the generals of the SBU found out about this and therefore left the country, as they understood that "denazification" is primarily about them.

P. S.
The Security Service of Ukraine (the SBU) is a branch of the CIA in Ukraine.
In the SBU building in Kiev, CIA officers occupy two floors. This was the case under all the presidents of Ukraine, starting with Leonid Kuchma and under Viktor Yanukovych (whom Western propaganda calls "pro-Russian", which is complete nonsense), nothing has changed in this regard.

[Reigo2]

I wonder if this report today might go some way towards explaining what happened:

"A southern-region security chief lost his general’s rank, Mr. Zelensky said. Serhiy Kryvoruchko had led Ukraine’s security service office in the Kherson region, where Russia seized the local capital earlier in the war with little military opposition."

Cheers,

Sid.

If he was involved in acquiring intelligence information of strategic value which influenced the decicions of the Ukrainian leadership then maybe. Otherwise his position highly likely had no real possibility to influence military planning.

[Reigo2]

Yuri wrote:
P. S.
The Security Service of Ukraine (the SBU) is a branch of the CIA in Ukraine.
In the SBU building in Kiev, CIA officers occupy two floors.

Yuri, please let me correct a mistake in your writing. Surely instead of P.S. you wanted to write BS.

[Delwin]

There are two likely issues:
- up to very end (before the war) Ukraine did not expected Orcs to attack. The forces were far to small - which was proven by the campaign so far. This led to first mistake (generally all over the front): Ukrainian engineers supposedly did not perform necessary destruction of bridges etc. not only in the south. Unfortunately in the south the terrain was generally better for attacking army (not much cover etc)
- the claims of likely betrayal at the intelligence level are known. This relates to the fact that apparently none of the bridges linking Crimea with rest of Ukraine (outside of Perekop) was destroyed as well as bidges in Cherson and Nova Kachovka This led to quick advance of Orc forces both towars Odessa and Mariupol.

Of course - we will know the truth (possibly) after the war.

[Sid Guttridge]

HiYuri,

You ask what I meant by, "We have seen the result of not successfully contesting the Perekop Isthmus."

The result is that the Russians were free to head for Mikolaiev, Kherson and Mariupol and threaten Odessa and the rear of the Ukrainian forces defending the Donbas.

The immediate loss of the Perekop position is arguably the single biggest disaster the Ukrainians have yet suffered. Instead of contesting a narrow 30-kilometer front, they now have to cover hundreds of kilometers of front. The only thing that seems to have saved them from a worse situation is that the Russians appear to only have used a few tens of thousands of troops and look to be over extended already. They have been repulsed from Mikolaiev and now seem under pressure in Kherson.

Cheers,

Sid.

[James A Pratt III]

I would also like to point out while there was fighting going on in the Donbas from 2014-22. I haven't heard anything about fighting near the Perekop Isthmus. I have read that after the Russians took the Crimea in 2014 Ukrainians still went on vacation there in large numbers. As for Ukrainians not digging in during the period 2014-22. First the terrain is very open so the Russians will see where the fortifications are and target them. Fortifications have to be kept up or they aren't going to be of much use to the defenders. Defending the Isthmus and the areas on either side of it for 50 miles is going to require a lot of troops. The Russians have had some bad logistics problems in their advance into the Ukraine. Defending the isthmus would have enabled to the Russians no real logistics problems since the Ukrainians are so close. Another problem is if the Ukrainians had decideed to defend the Isthmus is the forces their would have been on their own with few reserves to come to their aid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi James,

All that would have some logic to it, if it wasn't for the fact that not defending the Perekop Isthmus presents Ukraine with all the same problems writ very much larger than defending it would have.

For example, "Defending the Isthmus and the areas on either side of it for 50 miles is going to require a lot of troops." Perhaps, but how many more troops will it now require to defend the hundreds of miles of front opened up by the failure to defend the istmus and 50 miles on either side?

It is a bit like suggesting that the Spartans were mistaken defending the narrow pass at Thermopylae and would have been better advised to have fought the Persians on some open plain!

Cheers,

Sid.

[Reigo2]

https://m.nashaniva.com/ru/articles/287077/

Claims by former governor of Kherson oblast Andrei Gordeev:
- AG heard that the isthmus line was mined but by some reason the mines were cleared a week before the invasion.
- On the first say of the invasion the acting governor of Kherson oblast declared that he is not participating and left the city. Deputy governor (his tasks included defense matters) left also the city. Police, prosecutor's office and court leadership left. Soon also the SBU left.
- Territorial Defence (TD) units of the Kherson oblast were passive when the invasion started - no previous tasks were given (no road blocks etc).
- The Ukrainian 59th Brigade was crushed (razgromlen) under Russian attack.
- Blowing of Dnipro bridges was apparently not prepared [he does not say it directly but his story allows to conclude that]

Claim by a Kherson journalist Konstantin Ryzhenko:
- Only 200 men of TD were gathered after the invasion started. They were poorly armed.

Considering what happened in Kherson oblast and that the Russians basically drove without opposition from the north towards Kyiv, it is very likely that the Ukrainian armed forces were not ready for invasion on the morning of 24th February. This appears to be a strategic miscalculation which reasons can be only speculated at the moment. And this seems to have happened no matter of US warnings. It is highly likely that the Russians put all their agents and disinformation channels into action in Ukraine by 24 February in order to achieve maximum surprise. There was obviously also treason in Ukrainian ranks.

[Sid Guttridge]

Here is a Ukrainian "treachery" theory: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oX0X4OL4oUk

Cheers,

Sid

[Terry Duncan]

This thread, and all others dealing with the Russo-Ukrainian War, is now locked as per the policy announcement at the top of the page from Georg_S.

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Terry