Stalingrad

[Yuri]

I don't see why the figures from WW 2 stats which I have given,should be erroneous . They are official German stats who are accessible at the BA-MA at Freiburg.
Besides, if the whole 6 Army was encircled (338000 men ) how could the Germans have stopped the Soviet advance to the West ?

ljadw:

I presented the documents of the European armies operating in the Battle of Stalingrad. These are not novels by Russian/Soviet writers and they are not works of Soviet historians.
The above two documents of the Romanian headquarters contain all the necessary information to understand which forces of the Romanian troops were in the ring, which did not get into the ring, avoided destruction and were used outside the encirclement ring (west and south of the city) by the German command of HG "B" (from November 26 by the HG "Don")to counter the movement of the Red Army troops to the South and West.

However, it follows from your words that only German soldiers and officers could stop the advance of Soviet troops to the west, and therefore we should not take into account the presence of a colossal number of soldiers and officers of the armies of other European countries acting against of the Red Army's Units.

Do I understand you correctly?

If this is the case, then I have nothing more to add to what has been said above about the number of troops of the European armies that did not fall into the encirclement ring and opposed the movement of the Red Army to the South and West.

[ljadw]

I don't see why the figures from WW 2 stats which I have given,should be erroneous . They are official German stats who are accessible at the BA-MA at Freiburg.
Besides, if the whole 6 Army was encircled (338000 men ) how could the Germans have stopped the Soviet advance to the West ?

ljadw:

I presented the documents of the European armies operating in the Battle of Stalingrad. These are not novels by Russian/Soviet writers and they are not works of Soviet historians.
The above two documents of the Romanian headquarters contain all the necessary information to understand which forces of the Romanian troops were in the ring, which did not get into the ring, avoided destruction and were used outside the encirclement ring (west and south of the city) by the German command of HG "B" (from November 26 by the HG "Don")to counter the movement of the Red Army troops to the South and West.

However, it follows from your words that only German soldiers and officers could stop the advance of Soviet troops to the west, and therefore we should not take into account the presence of a colossal number of soldiers and officers of the armies of other European countries acting against of the Red Army's Units.

Do I understand you correctly?

If this is the case, then I have nothing more to add to what has been said above about the number of troops of the European armies that did not fall into the encirclement ring and opposed the movement of the Red Army to the South and West.

In June/July 1941 the USSR was fighting against Germany ,a developed state with 80 million inhabitants and against Finland and Romania , 2 states that were not much developed, with a total of 20 million inhabitants .
Later Slovakia and Croatia sent very small forces,Italy an expeditionary force and Spain sent ONE division that reached the front in the autumn of 1941 .
Compared to the 3 million + Germans,the forces of Croatia, Slovakia,Italy and Spain were peanuts .
About Finland and Romania ,who committed considerable forces, NOT colossal forces,they were not Europe .Besides,there was not much fighting in 1942 and 1943 on the Finnish front .
About the ''colossal '' Romanian forces in the Stalingrad area : Romania had there 225000 men ,who had as mission to protect the northern and southern wing of the Axis forces and to make an encirclement impossible .They failed to do this and lost 70 % of their manpower .It is obvious that the remaining 30% was unable to prevent a further Soviet advance and that only the Germans could do this . Unless you can prove
a that all Stalingrad divisions ( 22 ) with all combat forces were encircled
b that the OKH was able to sent in a few days 20 divisions to stop the Soviets
the conclusion is that a further Soviet advance West of the pocket was prevented by the existing non encircled German Stalingrad forces,some 150000 men on 15 October following the German Abwicklungstab.
There is no reason to disbelieve these figures which indicate that half on the Stalingrad forces ( a mix of combat and non combat forces ) were encircled and that the other half (also a mix of combat and non combat forces ) were not encircled .The surface of the pocket was very small and there was no reason on 20 November that the whole 6. Army would be concentrated in the pocket .
Last point : the superiority of the USSR in WWII was very big,it would have defeated Germany without a Second Front and without Lend Lease,thus there is no reason ,no need to add unreliable stories to make its victory even more greater .

[Inked]

I'm new here, so forgive me if this has been discussed. Why didn't the three Germany armies pincer-blitz Moscow, thus going for the head of the snake? Then do Stalingrad, since that was more of an ego decision, afterthought even.

[Globalization41]

Hitler eyed southern Russia for economic exploitation before the invasion, but to get the generals politically on board, he agreed to a Moscow strategy. Halfway to Moscow in 1941, Hitler ordered the main German offensive to divert to the Ukraine. Following the successful battles near Kiev, Hitler ordered the resumption of the offensive on Moscow. The Soviets stopped the German army just short of Moscow before winter. (Incidentally, had the Germans reached Moscow in 1941, it would have been like Stalingrad was in late 1942.) … Over the winter, Hitler decided on a southern Russia strategy for the exploitation of oil and expropriation of grain harvests. He was not interested in Moscow because it had no economic value. During the late summer of '42, a grouchy Hitler split his already overextended armies in southern Russia to take non-strategic Stalingrad.

12/7/1942, Red Army Steadily Eliminating Encircled German Garrisons in Stalingrad … Map, Stalingrad, Google

Globalization41.

[historygeek2021]

I'm new here, so forgive me if this has been discussed. Why didn't the three Germany armies pincer-blitz Moscow, thus going for the head of the snake? Then do Stalingrad, since that was more of an ego decision, afterthought even.

That is what the German army generals originally proposed, discussed here:

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=263593

Hitler was a bit scatterbrained and obsessed with trying to protect every corner of his new empire, so he dispersed the panzers in different directions to try to cover all his bases. This failed miserably. More on that here:

viewtopic.php?f=76&t=262948

[ljadw]

A successful attack direction Moscow in 1942 was out of the question,due to the heavy losses in 1941 .
Besides,such an attack would, even if it was successful, not be decisive and the war in the east would continue .
Moscow could fall only after the fall of the USSR ,but the fall of Moscow would not cause the fall of the USSR .
The aim of Blau was to try to deprive the USSR from its oil (which was very unlikely to happen,as the USSR was not that depending on oil/on the oil of the Caucasus ,as post war western historians ,who were living in an other society,are trying us to believe .

[Yuri]

The Soviet-European War differed from the war in the West (France-Belgium-Holland) in many aspects. These differences must be understood and taken into account. Without taking into account these differences, it is impossible to understand either the scale or the significance of the battles of this war.
I have prepared (modified) the layout of the map of the southern section of the front of the Soviet-European war. The layout is made on the OKH map "The situation on November 15, 1942".

15-Nov-1942 South(0-3_3-1980_Bild)1.jpg

Explanations for the layout next time.

[Yuri]

Before giving an explanation to the layout, I decided to place a fragment of the OKH map.
OST. South, the situation on November 15, 1942.
The fragment covers the front line and the rear line of Army Group "B" on the site of the 8th Italian, 3rd Romanian, 6th German, 4th Panzer German, 4th Romanian armies and then the border with Army Group "A".
It seems inconceivable that parts of the divisions of Paulus' 6th Army could be located in some place outside of this fragment.
I have such a request to ljadw or someone else: indicate on a fragment of the map the location of the divisions of the 6th Army outside the future encirclement ring.
The size of the encirclement ring as of 23-11-1942.
And please indicate the source.

15-Nov-1942 South(0-5338)-11_5_10_9-8_(600pd).jpg

[ljadw]

Your question is wrongly formulated .
It should be :
indicate on a fragment of the map the location of PARTS of the divisions of the 6th Army outside the future encirclement ring .
Why parts ? Because it was not so that X number of the 20 divisions of 6th Army fought in the city while the other divisions did not fight and were outside the city ,in /out the future pocket .
Divisions did not fight in the pocket as divisions, but as battalions/Kampfgruppen .
Take 14.Pz :
on 15 October 235 of its officers and 9359 of its soldiers were outside the future pocket,while 180 officers and 5051 men were inside the future pocket .
And this applied to most divisions .
The Kampfstärke of most divisions was very low ,only a part of this was in Stalingrad and most of the non combat units were outside the future pocket .
The source is : WW 2 stats .

[Yuri]

Your question is wrongly formulated .
It should be :
indicate on a fragment of the map the location of PARTS of the divisions of the 6th Army outside the future encirclement ring .
Why parts ? Because it was not so that X number of the 20 divisions of 6th Army fought in the city while the other divisions did not fight and were outside the city ,in /out the future pocket .
Divisions did not fight in the pocket as divisions, but as battalions/Kampfgruppen .
Take 14.Pz :
on 15 October 235 of its officers and 9359 of its soldiers were outside the future pocket,while 180 officers and 5051 men were inside the future pocket .
And this applied to most divisions .
The Kampfstärke of most divisions was very low ,only a part of this was in Stalingrad and most of the non combat units were outside the future pocket .
The source is : WW 2 stats .

Well, that's exactly what I meant, that is, it is necessary to indicate the locations of the divisions.
So you're banging on an open door.
That is, if the division is located in different places, then it is necessary to specify all these places. As it is indicated on the fragment for the German 14th Panzer Division or the German 16th Motorized Division or the Romanian 8th Cavalry Division or the Romanian 18th Infantry Division. Several locations are indicated for all these divisions of Europeans.
Specify all the locations of the divisions of the German 6th Army.
Your example from the German 14th Panzer Division is very well confirmed.
The map shows two locations of this division:
1. The main forces of the 14th TD (on the map it is "Ma 14.Pz") are located at Werkhnyaya Buzinovka;
2. The remains of the 14th TD are located in the city of Stalingrad itself.

Specify for all other divisions of the German 6th Army the same way as it is shown on the map for the German 14th TD.
The opinion that separation of the divisions in different places on the OKH map is ignored is not accepted.

[ljadw]

The map does NOT show that the main forces of the 14 Pz are located at Werkhnyaya Buzinovka, because no map can show this :maps do not indicate strength .Only a detailed report of the local commander can indicate the strength of 14 Pz at Werkhnyaya Buzinovka .
All we have is the report of the Abwicklungstab indicating the strength of 6th Army at 15 October inside and outside what would be 5 weeks later the pocket .
And this report proves clearly that the postwar claims,who have become a myth, that Uranus resulted in the encirclement of 300000 German soldiers,are totally wrong .

[Yuri]

The map does NOT show that the main forces of the 14 Pz are located at Werkhnyaya Buzinovka, because no map can show this :maps do not indicate strength .Only a detailed report of the local commander can indicate the strength of 14 Pz at Werkhnyaya Buzinovka .
All we have is the report of the Abwicklungstab indicating the strength of 6th Army at 15 October inside and outside what would be 5 weeks later the pocket .

Not "NOT", but "YES".
The map shows: the main forces of the German 14th Pz.D. are located in the Verkh. Buzinovka area, because the inscription "Ma 14.Pz" is the designation on the map of the location of the main forces of the division.
The designation "Ma" has no other meaning for our case.
This is the army document, not a receipt for the purchase of toilet paper..
Further, Your day of October 15, 1942 is not suitable, because there is too much time (five weeks) between this day and the day of November 23, 1942. A lot of things could have changed in these days.
We have the opportunity to find out about the location and strength of the German 14th Pz.D. with a date very close to November 23, namely the date of November 19/20, 1942.

42-11-19_4Pz_rum3A_XXXXVIII_Pz().jpg

This is not a novel of Soviet/Russian writers and not the work of Soviet/Russian historians, this is a document of the headquarters of the German XXXXVIII.Pz.K compiled just on the day of the beginning of the operation "Uranus" by the Red Army troops.

As you can see, during the period from October 15 to November 19, 1942, the main forces of the German 14th Pz.D., located in the Verkhnyaya Buzinovka area, increased from 9,594 people (235 officers + 9,359 man and uffz.) to a total of 10,389 people.
Thus, in five weeks, the number of the main forces of the German 14st Pz.D. located in the Verkhnyaya Buzinovka area increased by 795 people, that is, by 7.5%, which is not a little.
Conclusion. The source is: WW 2 stats is wrong.

And this report proves clearly that the postwar claims,who have become a myth, that Uranus resulted in the encirclement of 300,000 German soldiers,are totally wrong .

I agree, "are totally wrong". The number of 300,000 European soldiers, officers and generals who were surrounded as a result of Uranium is a myth.
In fact, on November 23, 1942, as a result of the 1st stage of the Stalingrad Offensive operation (which went down in military history as Operation Uranus), 330,000 European soldiers, officers and generals of all types of armed forces and all branches of the troops got into the encirclement ring.

[ljadw]

1 There is no proof (NO PROOF ) that the main forces of the 14 Pz were located in the area of Verkhnyaya BuzinovkaThe Tagesmeldung does not say that 10389 soldiers of the 14 Pz were located in that region .
2 There is NO proof that things changed between 15 October and the start of Uranus .
3 There were NO European soldiers located at Stalingrad and no European soldiers were encircled at Stalingrad .
Some 160000 German soldiers (LW not included ) and a small number of Romanians were encircled . Romania is not Europe and the USSR was NOT at war with Europe .
You can continue to invent non existent numbers of ''European '' soldiers ,fighting in Russia, but you will convince only your self .
Germany, Finland, Hungary, Romania,Italy were at war with the USSR .The other 16 European states were not at war with the USSR .

[Yuri]

The one with ears will hear,
the one with eyes will see,
the one with mind will understand.

Well, in the hope that those reading these lines will be able to figure out for themselves who is right and who persists in their delusions, we will begin to decipher the signs, symbols, photographs and inscriptions that are applied to a fragment of the OKH map from November 15, 1942.
Let's start by deciphering the sign of the Army Corps "Hiwi" - see the blue sign of the Army Corps and the inscription "Hiwi" on the right in the city of Mariupol on the shore of the Sea of Azov.
(very relevant).

I will prepare as brief a reference as possible about what kind of corps it is, the composition of its parts and the functions of the headquarters. So I ask for a little patience.
I think many people will be interested.
Now the first three pages of the document of the headquarters of the 1st Tank Army "General order on volunteer units" dated 12-07-1942.
Here, among other things, the location of the headquarters of the Corps “Hiwi” is indicated – Mariupol .

Captured during the defeat of the headquarters of the 45th Scooter battalion on December 4, 1942 in the Haznidon area.

42-07-30 PzA_1 Hiwi.jpg

Translation from German
Captured 4.12.42 in the area Haznidon.

Copy
1.Pz.A /1c/ Army Headquarters 12.7.42
No. 5516/42
Secret

General Order on Volunteer units,
Formed in 1.Pz.A in the period February-July 1942.

Ukrainian volunteer units
Deutsche /non-German/ cavalry squadrons.
Cossack cavalry squadrons.

Table of Contents:
1. Preliminary remarks
2. The use of volunteer units.
3. Organization
4. Submission.
5. Personnel
6. Paperwork.
7. Weapons, equipment and uniforms.
8. Medical care.
9. Economic issues.

Applications:
4. The text of the oath.
5. Punishments and disciplinary penalties.
6. Uniforms and insignia.
7. Personal documents.
8. Salary.
9. Forwarding of correspondence and money by volunteers.

I. Preliminary remarks

1/. General concepts
Volunteer units should be understood as all formations of Ukrainians (companies, platoons and columns), as well as all Deutsche /non-German/ or Cossack cavalry squadrons.

2/. The formation of volunteer units / non-Germans/ and Ukrainians in the area of operation of the 1st Tank Army should be considered completed. New formations are no longer created.

3/. This does not apply to volunteer units from the Turkic nationalities, which will only be formed later (the regulations on them, issued by 1.Pz.A. 1c counterintelligence No. 5298/42 secret from 16.6.42 distributed to the corps).

At the same time, if necessary, the right to increase the number of Cossack volunteer units remains.

4/. The experience of using these formations should be periodically reported to the headquarters of 1.Pz.A 1c.

II. Use of volunteer units.

1/. Purpose and objectives:
a /. By order of the Fuhrer, volunteer units from Deutsche / non-Germans/ and Ukrainians should be used for guarding and other tasks in the immediate rear /strengthening police units and construction troops/.
Specific tasks: use for security, especially to strengthen the protection of the most important road structures.
The fight against partisans; coast guard; construction of roads and roads; use for intelligence service in the area of the rear of the army within the field commandant's offices;
b /. Cossack units with appropriate training can be used, in addition to the targets specified in paragraph I. 1 "a", as well as for combat operations.

2/ Preparation.
The commanders of the military units of the German Army, to whom the volunteer units are subordinate, are responsible for the training of volunteer units. Volunteers will also master the weapons they are equipped with. Otherwise, the methods of military training should correspond to the tasks assigned to volunteer units. Drill exercises should be carried out only to the extent necessary to strengthen discipline.
3/ Experience has shown that volunteer units are only under the guidance and supervision of German instructors, officers and non-commissioned officers can achieve good results. It is advisable to introduce volunteer formations platoon-by-platoon into German units of the German army. Subordinating them to these German units.

.. ..
Disbandment or demobilization can be carried out only in the homeland of volunteers by those authorities who keep the documents of volunteers /Volunteer Corps – Mariupol/.

[Art]

The ration strength in the pocket was estimated as some 250,000 men on 18 December 1942. Which included 13,000 Romanians and 20,000 Hiwis
Abwicklungsstab's numbers were somewhat on the low side for some reasons IMO.

Stalingrad ration strength.jpg