My mistake, I apologize.Lethl215 wrote:Now your [sic] just being sloppy.
Obviously not. I'm going to disregard the arguments about whether Miller sucks or rules. Irrelevant. He made a point I agree with (Allied strategic incoherence), but I also observed that he contradicted himself in making that point (by saying WPO authors made no serious mistakes). We're all big boys here, we'll need to stand on our own judgments.Lethl215 wrote:Obviously, you didn't rely on Miller for your assessment of RKT
I'm generally annoyed by RKT's blaming of the Navy for adverse conditions around Guadalcanal, John Parshall has a particularly pungent take there. I don't like RKT and enjoy calling him a drunk, but his alcoholism or sainthood is irrelevant. Feel free to consider my original statement to be:
"The question is whether one MAN's strategic evaluation reflected a full analytical treatment of all global options."
That gets us to the actual point in dispute:
Did the Allies have a coherent strategy to defend the Malay Barrier (or coherent acceptance of its indefensibility)?
I say they didn't; you say whatever this is supposed to be:
Please (1) make a point then (2) support your point with evidence. You've skipped (1) and jumped to (2). I'm not going to guess what your point is.Lethl215 wrote:Now, let's go back to your original post. For those that have WPO, I'll do your job for you; quote #1, p 284; #2, p.317; #3, p277.
3-1 was offhand and not necessary to the argument.Lethl215 wrote:Can you show me those 3-1 correlation of forces?
Do you agree or disagree that Allied navies had enormous superiority over Axis?
How does a coalition with marked naval superiority suffer months of humiliating defeats?
Bad strategy is one explanation: Allied forces weren't in the critical theater (Malay Barrier), were doing strategically defeasible tasks such as defending the West Coast (lol), securing the Atlantic against a couple apparently superhuman German ships, securing the Med (Against what compared to losing all of Southeast Asia?).
Alternatively, perhaps logistics is a valid explanation. I.e. Allies could not have concentrated sufficient forces to defend the Barrier for logistical reasons. As we've already noted, one man who might have been a miserable drunk or an exalted genius put forward this explanation. But hopefully we're not in the business of taking one man's word for it, whatever he is.
Even if logistics is the explanation:
1. Logistics isn't a priori; the Allied coalition didn't create the logistical predicates for successful defense of the Barrier.
2. Even if such predicate-creation were impossible, the Allied coalition remained strategically incoherent about such impossibility and its foreseeable consequences (massive losses to Japan, causing the functional abandonment of Germany First for a year).
Again, we're all big boys here. Sorry if your feelings are hurt by arguments. Hopefully you'll recover and maybe we can discuss this in a rational manner.Lethl215 wrote:such opinionated arrogance