The new article demonstrates that in non-ferrous metals, Germany's resilience to blockade stemmed from deep (and secretive) institutional experience of WW1 blockade, from long-term investment in science and industrial/organizational infrastructure, and from a highly-disciplined wartime execution on these prewar capabilities.
Although Scherner states that more topic-specific research is needed in other areas, the clear implication of this long-term planning and successful/sophisticated execution is that Germany's war was not the gamble on Fall Gelb that folks like Tooze (and a million online meme-ers) claim. A military-industrial-scientific state capable of this feat was a formidable apparatus. As Scherner says:
----------------------------------------------The extent of
Hitler’s gamble in 1939, at least regarding these vitally important raw
materials, was thus significantly smaller than scholars have believed.
I won't excerpt more because anyone interested should read the article. A meta-commentary:
I see parallels between Scherner's work and Edgerton's Britain's War Machine. Both are revisionist takes that rebut analytically weak and ideologically-motivated narratives: of pervasive decline in Britain's case and of economic/strategic/political bankruptcy in Germany's case.
Re Germany it's a second-generation of revision, correcting a justified but over-done and morally-inflected "post-Wehraboo" reaction to the postwar narrative of a generally clean and militarily-superb Wehrmacht.
It took Scherner to dig up the details but the basic facts have been blatantly obvious for decades: blockade didn't collapse Germany, not even 6 years later. That the narratives of unpreparedness, incompetent planning, and short-war strategy have persisted so long despite these facts do not reflect well on the level of analytical rigor endemic to military history.