Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

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histan
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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#76

Post by histan » 24 May 2022, 04:25

It is worth looking at the Memorandum that is being quoted in the above posts.
It's available for free downloading at the UK national archives.

Sorry for the fact that it is 8 pages but the volume of information and analysis in it makes it a must read. Key points - the RN will specifically not deploy to the Pacific but to the Indian Ocean. There is no possibility of an early deployment into the South China Sea. The RN will conduct a SLOC campaign in the Indian Ocean and deploy to defend Australia against invasion. Some major RN warships will not begin to deploy until February 1942.

In practice, the size of the Fleet envisaged would not have been assembled until after the Japanese had succeeded in capturing Malaya, Singapore, and the NL East Indies.

It wasn't 7 December but 11 December that changed things because the Americans could now shoot at things in the Atlantic.

A slightly related point but the Hart complained that the British obsession with convoys meant that his surface ships couldn't sortie into the South China Sea.
Naval Strategy 01.jpg
Naval Strategy 02.jpg
Naval Strategy 03.png
Naval Strategy 04.png
More to follow

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John

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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#77

Post by histan » 24 May 2022, 04:32

Second part
Naval Strategy 05.png
Naval Strategy 06.jpg
Naval Strategy 07.jpg
Naval Strtaegy 08.jpg
Happy to provide more primary sources for UK strategy and response to US strategic thinking.

Regards

John


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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#78

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 24 May 2022, 06:37

Thanks, John.

The document basically coheres with Boyd's representation in Far Eastern Waters of the RN's thinking, but contains really interesting details/discussion. The author is strikingly clear in his analysis and presents a coherent view of global naval strategy within the constraints of his role as Vice Chief, Naval Staff. Nonetheless, it's in those constraints that the incoherence of Allied strategy inheres, not in the analytical skills of the military officers working within them. The author clearly identifies these constraints and flags their impact on his proposed naval strategy. I'll list the constraints and the author's acknowledgement of them:
  • 1. That the US would not help defend the Malay Barrier, as it did not see strong US interests lying there.
    -"The main interests of the US lie in the Atlantic and in the Eastern Pacific."
  • 2. That Britain realized (too late) that US Atlantic focus diminished her deterrence/distraction impact in the Pacific.
    -lists "strength of [IJN] and the degree to which the US Pac Fleet are containing a portion of it northward" as a contingent factor
    -states "We cannot hope for much forward action from this fleet, but nevertheless we must continue to press for it."
  • 3. That naval planners had no control over whether other UK arms would adequately defend Malaya.
    -"State of the land campaign" and Far East Air Force strength are unknown, endangering approaches to Singapore.
Now let me criticize the author a bit too.

First, his discussion of RN needs in the Atlantic remains suspect to me (and to Churchill). Even after assuming that the RAF would/could knock out Scharnhorst, Gniesnau, and Prinz Eugen, he still recommends that Tirpitz, Scheer, and Lutzow be allowed to tie down 5 capital ships (at least 3 fast), two British carriers (plus 2 US carriers), plus older BB's for convoy escort. I'm sorry, that's dumb. Churchill knew it. Tirpitz was not an Ueberschiff, despite modern fanboys and Nazi propaganda.

Second, his discussion of Med needs lacks analytical depth. He merely reports the Med admiral's statement that Italy should not be allowed to concentrate its capital ships in Eastern Med basin without British capital ship counter. Why not? It's not analyzed. Of course we know from OTL that the complete absence of British capital ships in the Eastern Med had no disastrous results. It was foreseeably so because of (1) airpower and (2) what is Italy going to do? Land an army on the Nile Delta? They couldn't even take Malta.




Finally, there is one further constraint - mass political appetite for the optimal grand strategy - that the author flags but doesn't properly weigh:
"There may be pressure by Australia, possibly as a result of raids by the enemy into Australian waters, to make us change our object before a real threat of a large scale attack arises. This must be resisted."
Here the author is foreseeing EXACTLY what happened to Allied grand strategy as a result of strategic incoherence in 1941: Japanese success did indeed force the Allies to "change our object" but on an even bigger scale than the memo predicts. Europe First was functionally abandoned in 1942 because Australian/American fear/humiliation ratcheted up pressure to fight Japan First (tied). This led to a situation in 1942 where everybody (who mattered) believed that if Russia were defeated, Europe was lost indefinitely. Because of Japan First (and arguably other factors), the Allies could little more than pray for the RKKA's endurance. They no ability/willingness to execute Sledgehammer absent a much larger US contribution to it, which Japan First precluded. In humanity's most important modern struggle, Allied strategic folly turned the incomparably powerful West into passive spectators.

The author does not do as some USN strategists did - warn against the possibility that "changing our object" after Japanese victories could not, in fact, be resisted (see OP). Not exactly a criticism (domestic political analysis being not his core duty) but an example of the strategic failure prevalent in the coalition.

That Russia was not defeated does not redeem Allied strategy from this folly. They/we just got lucky.



Thanks again to John for sharing this document. If anyone's holding similar, please do share as well.
Last edited by TheMarcksPlan on 24 May 2022, 06:51, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#79

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 24 May 2022, 06:42

histan wrote:Key points - the RN will specifically not deploy to the Pacific but to the Indian Ocean. There is no possibility of an early deployment into the South China Sea.
Small note - this is the Vice Chief's recommendation, not RN policy. As Boyd relates, Pound was planning to operate forward (e.g. from Manila) against LoC's in the South China Sea. Churchill may not have been aware of these plans.
histan wrote:the volume of information and analysis in it makes it a must read.
Agreed. An excellent document, clearly stating the problems confronting RN and nudging the political leadership to address them (defend Malaya! Get the US Pac Fleet to do something!).

For all the invective thrown at me on AHF, my criticisms are not without sympathy for the people involved in these decisions. The Vice Chief is dealing admirably here with problems not of his own making. Even his (IMO) poor analysis of Med and Atlantic RN deployments would probably go differently had he foreseen any chance of working with the USN to confront IJN with a superior fleet. He'd probably then have been willing to run more risks in the Atlantic. Under OTL conditions, however, running more risks in the Atlantic had no obvious strategic benefits.
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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#80

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 24 May 2022, 08:07

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
24 May 2022, 06:37
  • 1. That the US would not help defend the Malay Barrier, as it did not see strong US interests lying there.
    -"The main interests of the US lie in the Atlantic and in the Eastern Pacific."
Because my main arguments often get lost, I'll reiterate that this is the foundational American (therefore Allied) strategic error.

The US, qua US, had little interest in that region.* The US as an ally of Britain in world war had immense strategic interests there. By failing to see that alliance warfare involves at least partially integrating allied interests, the US was being strategically incoherent. On most questions the US can't be accused of this flaw; here it can be. USN's Anglophobia didn't help things.

Britain's unwillingness to commit more to the defense of Southeast Asia did not help overcome US reluctance to help in this theater.

*Actually Southeast Asia supplied ~90% of the world's natural rubber - something of which Hitler was well aware and which influenced his decision to welcome Japan as a war partner, even if it meant pushing the US over the brink. US ended up addressing its rubber problem through a crash Buna program but it truly courted a disaster by downplaying the significance of this factor in 1941-42. Hitler's Fatal Miscalculation by Schmider has good discussion of this issue.
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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#81

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 24 May 2022, 20:27

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
24 May 2022, 06:37
Thanks again to John for sharing this document. If anyone's holding similar, please do share as well.
Well going back a bit in 1941 you might like to look at:

CAB79/14/2 - C.O.S. (41) 302nd Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee - 29th August 1941

Contains a report by the UK Joint Planning Staff 'covering a revised draft agreement on the outline plan for the employment of American, Dutch and British forces in the Far East area in the event of war with Japan'.

It's free to download on-line at the UK National Archives website.
CAB79-14-2 - JPS Paper on ADB 2.GIF
Edit to add: I would be happy to add some more from the documents if they would be of interest.

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Tom

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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#82

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 25 May 2022, 19:50

histan wrote:
24 May 2022, 04:32
Happy to provide more primary sources for UK strategy and response to US strategic thinking.

Regards

John
John,

Thanks for posting the naval strategy document, I think I'm nearly up to that point in the COS Committee meeting minutes. I suspect it was produced in response to this minute:
CAB79-16-21 - 13 Dec 41 - next six months Far East policy (1).JPG
CAB79-16-21 - 13 Dec 41 - next six months Far East policy (1).JPG (32.57 KiB) Viewed 1023 times
CAB79-16-21 - 13 Dec 41 - next six months Far East policy (2).JPG
CAB79-16-21 - 13 Dec 41 - next six months Far East policy (2).JPG (40.18 KiB) Viewed 1023 times
In my 'umble opinion, the records of the COS Meetings make interesting and salutary reading as they bring out the range of conflicting and contemporaneous strategic strands that were in play at any one time and also often include detailed 'what-ifs' in terms of planning documents for operations that were never launched.

Regards

Tom

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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#83

Post by histan » 26 May 2022, 01:47

Hi Tom

I think you are correct - both in the specific comment and the general statement

I too have been looking at the mass of records that are now available for free download.
I have copies of CAB 69 Defence Committee Operations (which is where the PM and elements of the War Cabinet discussed and agreed policy) The copy of the VCNS paper I posted was taken from these files, where it formed an Annex to a Memorandum provided by the Admiralty.

I have the COS and COS (O) Minutes CAB 79 and COS and COS (O) Memoranda CAB 80,

I think that between us it is possible to construct a timeline of papers and meetings that will provide a repository of information that both outlines the development of British policy and strategy and forms a basis for conducting a critique of the actual policy and strategy, including developing other options that might have worked better.

I have made a start on such a timeline for the Far East in 1941.
I have a second project that is looking at some elements of policy and strategy for 1942 and constructing a similar timeline.
I also like the idea of a counter-factual study around the decision to launch Operation Torch - basically no Torch but Round-Up launched in April / May 1943 as originally planned, that is an invasion in 1943 instead of 1944. Counter-factual is not my area of expertise so maybe some one like TMP who enjoys this kind of thinking might take it up.
Amazing the directions in which access to primary sources can lead one :)

With regard to the title of this thread, from what I have read so far, including US books but not primary sources, there is good evidence of strategic incoherence, wishful thinking, and poor analysis throughout 1041 by both Great Britain and the USA. I am concerned by the feeling that, at present, the only way I can get any form of coherence for the USA is to sign up to the conspiracy theory that Roosevelt deliberately created the conditions that meant that Japan had to attack and that as a result Germany would declare war on the USA, giving him an American war in Europe that he had been looking for all year.

Regards

John

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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#84

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 26 May 2022, 03:14

histan wrote:
26 May 2022, 01:47
With regard to the title of this thread, from what I have read so far, including US books but not primary sources, there is good evidence of strategic incoherence, wishful thinking, and poor analysis throughout 1041 by both Great Britain and the USA. I am concerned by the feeling that, at present, the only way I can get any form of coherence for the USA is to sign up to the conspiracy theory that Roosevelt deliberately created the conditions that meant that Japan had to attack and that as a result Germany would declare war on the USA, giving him an American war in Europe that he had been looking for all year.
Yes! I can't deny the same suspicion.

There's a lot of literature (mostly bad) giving intel-based evidence that FDR knew an attack was coming. IMO it's... "maybe?" but probably not likely. This strategic picture is one from which we might create circumstantial evidence to support the intel-based case. Still - who knows. If so, retitle the thread "Allied strategic brilliance."
histan wrote:I have made a start on such a timeline for the Far East in 1941.
I have a second project that is looking at some elements of policy and strategy for 1942 and constructing a similar timeline.
I also like the idea of a counter-factual study around the decision to launch Operation Torch - basically no Torch but Round-Up launched in April / May 1943 as originally planned, that is an invasion in 1943 instead of 1944. Counter-factual is not my area of expertise so maybe some one like TMP who enjoys this kind of thinking might take it up.
More than happy to help with both projects. As I hope is clear, I have a large appetite for reading documents, primary or secondary. I am much less adept at locating primary documents, though learning.
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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#85

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 26 May 2022, 04:03

histan wrote:Amazing the directions in which access to primary sources can lead one
Very true but limiting where the fundamental questions regard American thinking rather than British. We're not as transparent/digital yet.

Re incoherence I've been trying to figure out how it was that, while USN is writing off the Philippines and treating the Asiatic Fleet like a liability, the US Army/AAF is straining (belatedly) to reinforce those islands. Marshall is making public pronouncements on defending them strongly, committing incredibly-expensive B-17's that were the American military's most in-demand asset (though nearly worthless as employed). I'd love to get the relevant inter-service correspondence (if any exists) but that seems to require a physical trip to College Park, Maryland or elsewhere. The secondary sources document the diverging USN/Army paths but don't seriously address the contradictions and incoherence (AFAIK).
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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#86

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 26 May 2022, 05:47

One more note on strategic incoherence...

In both Boyd's Royal Navy in Far Eastern Waters and in the RN Vice Chief Dec. 4, 1941 memo provided by Histan, there is a "fallback" strategy: Protect the vital Indian Ocean LoC's and India/Ceylon/Australia. In the Vice Chief's memo, this fallback position is recommended for "Phase II," should it no longer be possible to relieve/supply Singapore. Boyd judges this the wise strategy.

But if you can no longer relieve/supply Singapore, you also cannot evacuate it. The obvious implication is that any resources committed to an insufficient defense of Malaya are liable to quick destruction: the contingent factors in the Vice Chief's memo (strength of Far East Air Forces and army, whether Pacific Fleet is doing anything dramatic to distract Japan) become fixed factors immediately when the war starts (time has run out to reinforce Far East, Pacific Fleet either is or isn't doing anything). If the defenses are insufficient when the shooting starts, all forces present are immediately doomed under this (correct) analysis.

To really close the analysis, the Vice Chief should have recommended an evacuation threshold to avoid losing the air/ground forces, and most of the naval, committed to defense of Malaya - should the contingent factors become fixed and insufficient factors. Explicitly predicting the Singapore disaster - as the memo very nearly does - would at least have presented the strategic stakes in terms perhaps capable of jolting cabinet action (too late when written but impossible to know then). The memo at least puts to rest the notion that the Singapore disaster wasn't foreseeable or (virtually) foreseen.

Because losing everything committed to Malaya was foreseeable, the "fallback" option is more like "create a new defensive line with new forces after we lose those committed to the first line." Yet Boyd fails to compare:

1. The resources expended creating the second line of defense (Army, RAF, RN in Burma/Ceylon/India/Madagascar/Kenya/Northern Australia).
2. The resources lost in Malaya/Singapore.
3. The resources needed actually to hold the first line of defense at Malaya/Singapore.

If 1+2 exceeds 3, then the British strategy endorsed by Boyd was not as wise as he thinks. There's probably a good case that 1+2 exceeds 3, that Britain could have held Singapore/Malaya more cheaply than defending the thousands-mile arc of the Indian Ocean after losing virtually everything in Malaya/Singapore. I'm not prepared to argue that case fully, just noting that it's something Boyd passes over without noticing.
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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#87

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 26 May 2022, 06:33

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
24 May 2022, 20:27

CAB79-14-2 - JPS Paper on ADB 2.GIF

Edit to add: I would be happy to add some more from the documents if they would be of interest.
Missed this edit. That would be great, Tom.
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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#88

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 26 May 2022, 19:56

From CAB79/14/2: this is the draft ADB2 agreement being reported on in late August 1941 by the UK Joint Planning Staff:
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Title Page (1).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Title Page (1).JPG (45.36 KiB) Viewed 908 times
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Contents Page (2).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Contents Page (2).JPG (30.34 KiB) Viewed 908 times
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (3).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (4).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (5).JPG
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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#89

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 26 May 2022, 19:57

CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (6).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (7).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (8).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (9).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (10).JPG
And more...

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Re: Allied strategic incoherence in the Pacific, 1941

#90

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 26 May 2022, 19:57

CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (11).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (12).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (13).JPG
CAB79-14-2 - ADB2 - Page (14).JPG

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