German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

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Peter89
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#286

Post by Peter89 » 25 May 2022, 21:55

ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 20:42
When there was a shortage of oil,it was mostly caused by transport problems, not by production problems .Besides :production problems could be catched by the use of stocks .
This is absolutely false on many ways.

Between September 1940 and March 1941, when most of the Heer was on an operational pause, it consumed 1.204 million tons of motor gasoline, and produced 1.019 million tons, and thus the stocks dwindled by 155 thousand tons, only 677 thousand tons to begin with; and before the highly successful Westfeldzug and Weserübung, the German motor gas stocks were below 300 thousand tons (249 thousand tons in March 1940).

Thus:
  • Yes, the only way to avoid a critical oil shortage was to increase production
  • No, the transportation problems did not cause the shortage of oil (btw you are using a fallacy confusing the shortage at the front and a general shortage)
  • No, the stocks could not offset the faulty production
ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 20:42
And the influence of Soviet oil deliveries is much exaggerated( by Marxists,the ''von '' lobby and by US ''historians ").
In 1940 Germany produced( imports included ) 6,9 million ton of oil,of which 690000 were imported from Russia .
You are throwing irrelevant data again, and draw a wrong conclusion from that. The lack of Soviet oil imports to Germany would empty the stocks of Germany and therefore seriously undermine its mobile warfare capabilities and the motorization of its economy. It didn't matter that Soviet oil imports had a relatively small share in German oil mix: what mattered was that Germany's lack of oil would be exacerbated by the lack of Soviet imports.
ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 20:42
There is no proof that without these imports,Fall Gelb and Fall Blau would have failed .
Who said that? I certainly didn't.
ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 20:42
About the influence on the training programs : this was mainly the case for the LW and here also the influence was exaggerated,because the post war German narratives tried to place the responsibility for the defeat of the LW on the oil production and to deny the role of the Allied Air Forces .
It's not a post war German narrative, it's a fact. The pilot training program didn't keep up with the aircraft production from 1942 onwards. The defeat of the LW was a much more complex issue than saying that it was defeated by the Allied air forces: every armed force can be defeated under circumstances disfavoring success. There is no proof and there can be no proof what the LW would be capable of if there was no war in the SU and if the Mediterranean war finished with German success. Because the Western Allies' idea that the strategic bombing campaign would break Germany didn't work until the LW was defeated badly on the peripheries. Until then, the LW exacted a huge toll on the Allied aircrafts in defense, and won the Battle of Berlin, etc.
ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 20:42
About the strategic depth of defense : defense was the worst strategy for Germany: it would lead inevitably to defeat .
There is no proof for that and there can be no proof for that.
ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 20:42
Such a strategic depth would not prevent the nuking of the German cities .
Nukes were invented in America (even though by a Hungarian (Szilárd) and an Italian (Fermi)), not in Britain, thus there is no proof if Hitler takes Raeder's advice and makes Britain his principal enemy (keeping the Soviet relations neutral), what could bring the USA into the war. Pearl Harbour is a cheap excuse: Hitler was in no dire need to declare war on the USA just as the Japanese were in no dire need to declare war on the Soviet Union. Hitler could have said: we overlook the fact that the USA helps Britain as long as we can avoid direct confrontation with them. Besides, the power of the nukes is overrated in the eyes of the Nazi regime: German cities suffered comparable destruction as Hiroshima and Nagasaki (except the radiation). Japan didn't capitulate because of the destruction: Japan capitulated because it was defeated beforehand and the nukes presented such a technological gap as the gunboats did almost a century before.

Besides: it is questionable what effect of the V1 and V2 programs could have had on Britain by the time the nukes were invented.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#287

Post by Peter89 » 25 May 2022, 22:00

ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 21:04
For those who dream of List going from Vienna to Tehran ( 4500 km ) : if Rommel could not go from Tripoli to Alexandria (2000 km ) ,why would List succeed ?
You do realize that the two are not even comparable, don't you?
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."


ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#288

Post by ljadw » 26 May 2022, 08:03

On the LW training program : after the war the front units blamed the training schools,saying they delivered untrained pilots and the responsibles of the training program blamed the oil industry . And everyone was happy : it was all the fault of the civilians, a new stab in the back myth .
Fife more points :
1 The training of the West Point officers was halved in WW 2 and no one blamed this for US failures .The training of army and KM officers was also curtailed .
2 It was not a question of hours of training but of numbers of pilots and it was better to have 10 less trained pilots than 5 fully trained pilots .
3 The number of pilots that finished the training was depending on the number of pilots that started the training .
4 The front units needed more pilots, more crew and this was the main reason for the curtailment of the training hours ,not the lack of oil .
If the front units needed every month 100 replacements ,and only 90 men started the training ,the only way was to curtail the training .
5 More training hours ,thus less men who finish the training, does not mean that more enemy aircraft would be shot .
And as usual, the LW lobby and fans forget the role of the FLAK.Losses by FLAK are not sexy.Losses by fighters would give these Knights Crosses .

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#289

Post by ljadw » 26 May 2022, 08:16

Hartman had less training hours than other pilots who were trained before the war,butt still he shot more enemy aircraft .
Thus blaming the lack of oil for the defeat of the LW is not serious .

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#290

Post by ljadw » 26 May 2022, 09:23

Peter89 wrote:
25 May 2022, 21:55



It's not a post war German narrative, it's a fact. The pilot training program didn't keep up with the aircraft production from 1942 onwards. The defeat of the LW was a much more complex issue than saying that it was defeated by the Allied air forces: every armed force can be defeated under circumstances disfavoring success. There is no proof and there can be no proof what the LW would be capable of if there was no war in the SU and if the Mediterranean war finished with German success. Because the Western Allies' idea that the strategic bombing campaign would break Germany didn't work until the LW was defeated badly on the peripheries. Until then, the LW exacted a huge toll on the Allied aircrafts in defense, and won the Battle of Berlin, etc.
ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 20:42
About the strategic depth of defense : defense was the worst strategy for Germany: it would lead inevitably to defeat .
There is no proof for that and there can be no proof for that.
ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 20:42
Such a strategic depth would not prevent the nuking of the German cities .
Nukes were invented in America (even though by a Hungarian (Szilárd) and an Italian (Fermi)), not in Britain, thus there is no proof if Hitler takes Raeder's advice and makes Britain his principal enemy (keeping the Soviet relations neutral), what could bring the USA into the war. Pearl Harbour is a cheap excuse: Hitler was in no dire need to declare war on the USA just as the Japanese were in no dire need to declare war on the Soviet Union. Hitler could have said: we overlook the fact that the USA helps Britain as long as we can avoid direct confrontation with them. Besides, the power of the nukes is overrated in the eyes of the Nazi regime: German cities suffered comparable destruction as Hiroshima and Nagasaki (except the radiation). Japan didn't capitulate because of the destruction: Japan capitulated because it was defeated beforehand and the nukes presented such a technological gap as the gunboats did almost a century before.

Besides: it is questionable what effect of the V1 and V2 programs could have had on Britain by the time the nukes were invented.
[/quote]

1 There was no need for the training program to keep up with the aircraft production ,besides it was impossible . No country could do it ,as it took less time to build an aircraft than to train a pilot/air crew .
2 In 1939 ( before September ) hundreds of German pilots died/were wounded during their training,although there was no shortage of oil for the training schools .
During the war the USAAF lost 14903 men and 13873 aircraft in the continental USA during training and non combat missions and half of the aircraft losses overseas were non combat losses,although there was no shortage of oil .
3 You are again totally neglecting the role of the FLAK in the air defense of Germany ,and the FLAK training was not depending on oil .
4 If Hitler did not declare war on the US,US would have very fast declared war on Germany . And you can't compare Japan and Germany .Nuclear attacks on German cities would have resulted in the capitulation of Germany .
5 The effect of the V1 and V2 programs was totally meaningless .

Peter89
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#291

Post by Peter89 » 26 May 2022, 09:36

ljadw wrote:
26 May 2022, 08:03
On the LW training program : after the war the front units blamed the training schools,saying they delivered untrained pilots and the responsibles of the training program blamed the oil industry . And everyone was happy : it was all the fault of the civilians, a new stab in the back myth .
Fife more points :
1 The training of the West Point officers was halved in WW 2 and no one blamed this for US failures .The training of army and KM officers was also curtailed .
2 It was not a question of hours of training but of numbers of pilots and it was better to have 10 less trained pilots than 5 fully trained pilots .
3 The number of pilots that finished the training was depending on the number of pilots that started the training .
4 The front units needed more pilots, more crew and this was the main reason for the curtailment of the training hours ,not the lack of oil .
If the front units needed every month 100 replacements ,and only 90 men started the training ,the only way was to curtail the training .
5 More training hours ,thus less men who finish the training, does not mean that more enemy aircraft would be shot .
And as usual, the LW lobby and fans forget the role of the FLAK.Losses by FLAK are not sexy.Losses by fighters would give these Knights Crosses .
It was not "blaming" or "stab in the back": no one claimed it. The usual whitewashing blames Hitler, Göring and other prominent nazis, and distinguish them from the "apolitical military professionals". Besides, the training program was directly depending on three factors: oil, trainer aircraft and instructors, all of which were problematic, but oil had the most dire effect on the outcome.

Flugabwehr was part of the Luftwaffe, so the "LW lobby" doesn't make any sense here.

1. There are differences between peacetime training and wartime training, no need to reinvent warm water.
2. The exact opposite has been proved too many times.
3. The number of pilots admitted to start a complete training was depending on the fuel allocation of the training program.
4. If you need 2000 pilots with 1 year training, but have fuel to train only 1000 properly, you can half-train 2000 pilots that do not need to spend a whole year in flight schools either. The Germans could not increase the pilot training and uphold the quality of the training mostly because the lack of oil.
5. More training hours does not mean that less men finish the training: you can increase from 1000 fully trained pilots per year to 2000 fully trained pilots per year throughput IF you have oil, trainers and instructors. In absence of oil, the world's best trainers and instructors (which were not present either) could not offset the chances. With less training of the pilots, less enemy aircraft will be shot down, thus: less oil = less enemy aircraft will be shot down.

I don't know why is that even a question?
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#292

Post by Peter89 » 26 May 2022, 09:48

ljadw wrote:
26 May 2022, 09:23
Peter89 wrote:
25 May 2022, 21:55
It's not a post war German narrative, it's a fact. The pilot training program didn't keep up with the aircraft production from 1942 onwards. The defeat of the LW was a much more complex issue than saying that it was defeated by the Allied air forces: every armed force can be defeated under circumstances disfavoring success. There is no proof and there can be no proof what the LW would be capable of if there was no war in the SU and if the Mediterranean war finished with German success. Because the Western Allies' idea that the strategic bombing campaign would break Germany didn't work until the LW was defeated badly on the peripheries. Until then, the LW exacted a huge toll on the Allied aircrafts in defense, and won the Battle of Berlin, etc.
ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 20:42
About the strategic depth of defense : defense was the worst strategy for Germany: it would lead inevitably to defeat .
There is no proof for that and there can be no proof for that.
ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022, 20:42
Such a strategic depth would not prevent the nuking of the German cities .
Nukes were invented in America (even though by a Hungarian (Szilárd) and an Italian (Fermi)), not in Britain, thus there is no proof if Hitler takes Raeder's advice and makes Britain his principal enemy (keeping the Soviet relations neutral), what could bring the USA into the war. Pearl Harbour is a cheap excuse: Hitler was in no dire need to declare war on the USA just as the Japanese were in no dire need to declare war on the Soviet Union. Hitler could have said: we overlook the fact that the USA helps Britain as long as we can avoid direct confrontation with them. Besides, the power of the nukes is overrated in the eyes of the Nazi regime: German cities suffered comparable destruction as Hiroshima and Nagasaki (except the radiation). Japan didn't capitulate because of the destruction: Japan capitulated because it was defeated beforehand and the nukes presented such a technological gap as the gunboats did almost a century before.

Besides: it is questionable what effect of the V1 and V2 programs could have had on Britain by the time the nukes were invented.
1 There was no need for the training program to keep up with the aircraft production ,besides it was impossible . No country could do it ,as it took less time to build an aircraft than to train a pilot/air crew .
2 In 1939 ( before September ) hundreds of German pilots died/were wounded during their training,although there was no shortage of oil for the training schools .
During the war the USAAF lost 14903 men and 13873 aircraft in the continental USA during training and non combat missions and half of the aircraft losses overseas were non combat losses,although there was no shortage of oil .
3 You are again totally neglecting the role of the FLAK in the air defense of Germany ,and the FLAK training was not depending on oil .
4 If Hitler did not declare war on the US,US would have very fast declared war on Germany . And you can't compare Japan and Germany .Nuclear attacks on German cities would have resulted in the capitulation of Germany .
5 The effect of the V1 and V2 programs was totally meaningless .
[/quote]

1. American pilot training quality did not decrease during the war, on the contrary. Obviously, it wasn't about 1 aircraft for 1 pilot, it doesn't make sense.
2. Yes, pilot training was a dangerous business, no one said that training accidents happened because the lack of oil.
3. Flak is irrelevant in pilot training, besides having more Flak in your own territory does not mean you can bomb targets, fly recon missions or provide air cover for your advancing troops. Flak is one thing and pilot training is another.
4. Even if the US declares war on Germany (which would definately not happen at or before December 1941), they still had to battle Germany on the continent, where - in absence of an eastern front - Germany would reign supreme at least until the atomic bomb was invented. Thus nuking German cities would only force Germany to surrender if Berlin was taken. The Wehrmacht's officier corps and Hitler promised themselves to fight until the bitter end, and do not quit like the last time.
5. Yes on OTL, but you can not tell what could have happened if the invasion of Normandy and the total air superiority above the launching sites did not happen, or not on the scale as in OTL.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#293

Post by Counter » 26 May 2022, 11:38

Peter89 wrote:Even if the US declares war on Germany (which would definately not happen at or before December 1941), they still had to battle Germany on the continent, where - in absence of an eastern front - Germany would reign supreme at least until the atomic bomb was invented. Thus nuking German cities would only force Germany to surrender if Berlin was taken. The Wehrmacht's officier corps and Hitler promised themselves to fight until the bitter end, and do not quit like the last time.
5. Yes on OTL, but you can not tell what could have happened if the invasion of Normandy and the total air superiority above the launching sites did not happen, or not on the scale as in OTL.
German technology was good, but it was handicapped by scarcity of material resources. LW particularly: less fuel, fewer aircraft and also worse training for the pilots. The jet aircrafts also required more fuel to be effective earlier. Industrial resources in general would have favored also the advanced new rockets.
Also in the Russian campaign. If Hitler waiting for one year (invading Russia in 1942, after conquering the Persian Gulf) the Wehrmacht could have made it with a full motorized army, and that would have been decisive.

Peter89
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#294

Post by Peter89 » 26 May 2022, 12:02

Counter wrote:
26 May 2022, 11:38
Peter89 wrote:Even if the US declares war on Germany (which would definately not happen at or before December 1941), they still had to battle Germany on the continent, where - in absence of an eastern front - Germany would reign supreme at least until the atomic bomb was invented. Thus nuking German cities would only force Germany to surrender if Berlin was taken. The Wehrmacht's officier corps and Hitler promised themselves to fight until the bitter end, and do not quit like the last time.
5. Yes on OTL, but you can not tell what could have happened if the invasion of Normandy and the total air superiority above the launching sites did not happen, or not on the scale as in OTL.
German technology was good, but it was handicapped by scarcity of material resources. LW particularly: less fuel, fewer aircraft and also worse training for the pilots. The jet aircrafts also required more fuel to be effective earlier. Industrial resources in general would have favored also the advanced new rockets.
Also in the Russian campaign. If Hitler waiting for one year (invading Russia in 1942, after conquering the Persian Gulf) the Wehrmacht could have made it with a full motorized army, and that would have been decisive.
There was exactly zero chance to support a German army group attacking the Soviet Union from the south. Besides: why would the Germans do it if the whole Mediterranean strategy was based on the idea that Britain was the principal enemy?

There was nothing that could collapse the British Empire by 1942. At most the Germans could deliver a blow to them in the MTO and that's about it.

Also let's not forget that the British diverted their forces to the MTO and not to the Far East, meaning: Malaya and Singapore might not fall at all, so the British would still be in control of their most important colonies and sea lanes. The MTO was about to give no breathing room or strategic depth for the Axis, but its loss would not cripple the British Empire, and the German-Italian duo had zero capabilities to project power beyond it.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

pugsville
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#295

Post by pugsville » 26 May 2022, 13:11

Counter wrote:
26 May 2022, 11:38
Peter89 wrote:Even if the US declares war on Germany (which would definately not happen at or before December 1941), they still had to battle Germany on the continent, where - in absence of an eastern front - Germany would reign supreme at least until the atomic bomb was invented. Thus nuking German cities would only force Germany to surrender if Berlin was taken. The Wehrmacht's officier corps and Hitler promised themselves to fight until the bitter end, and do not quit like the last time.
5. Yes on OTL, but you can not tell what could have happened if the invasion of Normandy and the total air superiority above the launching sites did not happen, or not on the scale as in OTL.
German technology was good, but it was handicapped by scarcity of material resources. LW particularly: less fuel, fewer aircraft and also worse training for the pilots. The jet aircrafts also required more fuel to be effective earlier. Industrial resources in general would have favored also the advanced new rockets.
Also in the Russian campaign. If Hitler waiting for one year (invading Russia in 1942, after conquering the Persian Gulf) the Wehrmacht could have made it with a full motorized army, and that would have been decisive.
Fully Motorized. Really Just how many trucks do you think they could produce? IT;s very very hard ask..

166,0000 trucks, just for 104 infantry divisions.jeu alray had 60,000 so another 100,000, with production 4,000 month, treble truck production just to equip the Infantry divisions.

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#296

Post by ljadw » 26 May 2022, 15:26

Peter89 wrote:
26 May 2022, 09:36
ljadw wrote:
26 May 2022, 08:03
On the LW training program : after the war the front units blamed the training schools,saying they delivered untrained pilots and the responsibles of the training program blamed the oil industry . And everyone was happy : it was all the fault of the civilians, a new stab in the back myth .
Fife more points :
1 The training of the West Point officers was halved in WW 2 and no one blamed this for US failures .The training of army and KM officers was also curtailed .
2 It was not a question of hours of training but of numbers of pilots and it was better to have 10 less trained pilots than 5 fully trained pilots .
3 The number of pilots that finished the training was depending on the number of pilots that started the training .
4 The front units needed more pilots, more crew and this was the main reason for the curtailment of the training hours ,not the lack of oil .
If the front units needed every month 100 replacements ,and only 90 men started the training ,the only way was to curtail the training .
5 More training hours ,thus less men who finish the training, does not mean that more enemy aircraft would be shot .
And as usual, the LW lobby and fans forget the role of the FLAK.Losses by FLAK are not sexy.Losses by fighters would give these Knights Crosses .
It was not "blaming" or "stab in the back": no one claimed it. The usual whitewashing blames Hitler, Göring and other prominent nazis, and distinguish them from the "apolitical military professionals". Besides, the training program was directly depending on three factors: oil, trainer aircraft and instructors, all of which were problematic, but oil had the most dire effect on the outcome.

Flugabwehr was part of the Luftwaffe, so the "LW lobby" doesn't make any sense here.

1. There are differences between peacetime training and wartime training, no need to reinvent warm water.
2. The exact opposite has been proved too many times.
3. The number of pilots admitted to start a complete training was depending on the fuel allocation of the training program.
4. If you need 2000 pilots with 1 year training, but have fuel to train only 1000 properly, you can half-train 2000 pilots that do not need to spend a whole year in flight schools either. The Germans could not increase the pilot training and uphold the quality of the training mostly because the lack of oil.
5. More training hours does not mean that less men finish the training: you can increase from 1000 fully trained pilots per year to 2000 fully trained pilots per year throughput IF you have oil, trainers and instructors. In absence of oil, the world's best trainers and instructors (which were not present either) could not offset the chances. With less training of the pilots, less enemy aircraft will be shot down, thus: less oil = less enemy aircraft will be shot down.

I don't know why is that even a question?
The training program was NOT depending on 3 factors but at least on 6 factors: you forget time and the number of candidates and the ''needs ''.
And your point 5 is totally wrong : the influence of training on the shooting of enemy aircraft is secondary ( see Hartman ) ,besides it is questionable to say that the mission of a fighter pilot (and fighters were only a minority ) was to shoot enemy aircraft ;
And you still don't get it : more oil production does not mean that the front units or the training schools,etc,will get more oil,it can be the opposite.
Fuel oil deliveries from Romania to Italy did vary,but not because of the production variations of the Romanian oil industry :
in July 1942 : 60000 tons
in September 1942 :33000
In November 1942 :23000
In January 1943 : 11000
In July 1943 : 37000
This does not mean that the Romanian production of fuel oil was only 1/6 in January 1943 of the production in July 1942 .
The German aviation oil production was 966000 ton in 1940,consumption was 863000.In 1941 production was down to 910000,while consumption increased to 1,274,000 .
This proves that production has only a small influence on consumption .

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#297

Post by ljadw » 26 May 2022, 16:09

Counter wrote:
26 May 2022, 11:38
Peter89 wrote:Even if the US declares war on Germany (which would definately not happen at or before December 1941), they still had to battle Germany on the continent, where - in absence of an eastern front - Germany would reign supreme at least until the atomic bomb was invented. Thus nuking German cities would only force Germany to surrender if Berlin was taken. The Wehrmacht's officier corps and Hitler promised themselves to fight until the bitter end, and do not quit like the last time.
5. Yes on OTL, but you can not tell what could have happened if the invasion of Normandy and the total air superiority above the launching sites did not happen, or not on the scale as in OTL.
German technology was good, but it was handicapped by scarcity of material resources. LW particularly: less fuel, fewer aircraft and also worse training for the pilots. The jet aircrafts also required more fuel to be effective earlier. Industrial resources in general would have favored also the advanced new rockets.
Also in the Russian campaign. If Hitler waiting for one year (invading Russia in 1942, after conquering the Persian Gulf) the Wehrmacht could have made it with a full motorized army, and that would have been decisive.
1942 is not 2022 and why would a ''full motorized army '' ( meaningless notion ) be successful in a country without decent roads ? And how would you supply a fully motorized army in Russia ?
Success or failure of Barbarossa did not depend on German planning or equipment,but on the Soviet determination to fight .
And a year of waiting would not make the Ostheer fully motorized :the Ostheer was not more motorized in 1942 than in 1941.

Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#298

Post by Counter » 26 May 2022, 17:00

Peter89 wrote:There was nothing that could collapse the British Empire by 1942. At most the Germans could deliver a blow to them in the MTO and that's about it.
Not doing "what-if" story, the strategy in the Mediterranean would mean forcing the UK to ask for an armistice. Were naive the german strategists supposing that could have ever happen?

Supposedly, the british will never surrender because they were heroes. But we know they were about to ask for an armistice at June 1940. Was inminent a german invasion? The germans had no Navy to invade England at that time. So why was Churchill so hardly pressed to accept conversations with the enemy at that time?

The british were defeated in Greece, then in Crete... Fortunately, due to logistic problems (and lack of interest of Hitler) were not defeated by Rommel in Egypt. Gibraltar could have fall at any time. Previous to the USA joining the Allies, was there no limit to the defeats that the british could have endured?

Peter89
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#299

Post by Peter89 » 26 May 2022, 18:22

Counter wrote:
26 May 2022, 17:00
But we know they were about to ask for an armistice at June 1940.
We know no such thing.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

#300

Post by ljadw » 26 May 2022, 20:27

Counter wrote:
26 May 2022, 17:00
Peter89 wrote:There was nothing that could collapse the British Empire by 1942. At most the Germans could deliver a blow to them in the MTO and that's about it.
Not doing "what-if" story, the strategy in the Mediterranean would mean forcing the UK to ask for an armistice. Were naive the german strategists supposing that could have ever happen?

Supposedly, the british will never surrender because they were heroes. But we know they were about to ask for an armistice at June 1940. Was inminent a german invasion? The germans had no Navy to invade England at that time. So why was Churchill so hardly pressed to accept conversations with the enemy at that time?

The british were defeated in Greece, then in Crete... Fortunately, due to logistic problems (and lack of interest of Hitler) were not defeated by Rommel in Egypt. Gibraltar could have fall at any time. Previous to the USA joining the Allies, was there no limit to the defeats that the british could have endured?
Britain would fight as long it was supported by the US,even without a DOW and the US would support Britain as long it would fight .Lend Lease would result inevitably in war between US and Germany .The only way to prevent such a war was the election of an isolationist as Potus in November 1940 . But after the GOP convention in August it was obvious that the presidential campaign would be between Roosevelt and Roosevelt .
And for Gibraltar : it was obvious for everyone that Spain would remain neutral and that Gibraltar was safe .

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