german general mistake?

[daveshoup2MD]

I often see the classic "hitler should have listen to his general" as if the general were some kind of genius who never did any mistake during the war ,so my question is :what mistake did the german general do? I remember that franz halder view were quite flawed per example (particulary the "drive to moscow" thing during barbarossa if I remember correctly)

Not putting Hitler and the rest of the 1923 putschers against a wall?

[ChrisDR68]

Most of the really big strategic mistakes were Hitler's.

1. Not attempting an invasion of Britain in 1940 or 1941 thereby leaving his western flank vulnerable to Allied air attack and eventually an amphibious invasion of the continent. Ironically Hitler was overly cautious in this regard (although the evidence suggests he never wanted or expected to invade Britain given that planning for Operation Barbarossa started as early as July 1940).

2. Allowing himself to be persuaded by his generals to attempt a drive on Moscow in October 1941 when his instincts were to advance to the Caucasus on it's oil. A drive towards the Caucasus would have made good strategic sense given that the Germans already had 2 panzer groups in the south and the Soviets had just lost 600,000 POW's at Kiev the previous September.

3. Declaring war on the USA in December 1941 following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. This seems to have been done out of frustration in respect to FDR's beligerent attitude and actions towards Germany up until that point. Hitler therefore fell into the trap FDR set him given the president's difficulties with isolationists in the House Of Representatives at the time. In the long run Hitler surely lost the war with this decision.

4. During Operation Blue deviating from the plan with Fuhrer Directive 45 and attempting an advance into the Caucasus while at the same time advancing along the Don-Volga river lines with the aim of reaching Astrakhan. The Ost Heer had the logistical support (just) for one axis of advance but they didn't have it for two simultaneuosly. Get Army Group B set-up along it's planned defensive line with around 46 infantry, 3 panzer and 4 motorised divisions then attack into the Caucasus in the planned for phased approach with the remaining 29 infantry, 6 panzer and 3 motorised divisions .

5. Going against doctrine and attacking into the strength of the enemy's defences at Kursk. Previously the Germans had bypassed strong enemy positions and then wheeled around them from north and south surrounding the enemy formations and then destroying them. Generally this had worked well. Perhaps Hitler felt his strategic options in the east were few by this time so a brute force frontal assault against prepared defences with 2800 panzers was his best bet.

After Kursk Hitler was goosed whatever strategy he adopted given the American presence in the west and the fact that the Red Army had learned how to fight a modern mechanised war from the Germans themselves by this time.

[Aida1]

Bock, Guderian and Hoth also arguably made a critical mistake in ordering the panzer divisions to plunge ahead to the Dnieper while the infantry divisions were still mopping up the Minsk pocket. This was the opposite of the principle of concentration of effort - instead of concentrating the entire army group on one task at a time, it was dispersed across a vast space and had to fight the Red Army in all directions eccentrically.

That is what they wanted to do but where not allowed to. Hoth wanted the pz div to execute an overtaking pursuit instead of being being fixed in sealing off a pocket. The intent of this was to prevent the red army from fixing itself again behind Dnjepr and Duna(Hoth Panzer Operationen Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft 1956 pp 61-62).

[Von Bock]

Most of the really big strategic mistakes were Hitler's.

1. Not attempting an invasion of Britain in 1940 or 1941 thereby leaving his western flank vulnerable to Allied air attack and eventually an amphibious invasion of the continent. Ironically Hitler was overly cautious in this regard (although the evidence suggests he never wanted or expected to invade Britain given that planning for Operation Barbarossa started as early as July 1940).

2. Allowing himself to be persuaded by his generals to attempt a drive on Moscow in October 1941 when his instincts were to advance to the Caucasus on it's oil. A drive towards the Caucasus would have made good strategic sense given that the Germans already had 2 panzer groups in the south and the Soviets had just lost 600,000 POW's at Kiev the previous September.

3. Declaring war on the USA in December 1941 following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. This seems to have been done out of frustration in respect to FDR's beligerent attitude and actions towards Germany up until that point. Hitler therefore fell into the trap FDR set him given the president's difficulties with isolationists in the House Of Representatives at the time. In the long run Hitler surely lost the war with this decision.

4. During Operation Blue deviating from the plan with Fuhrer Directive 45 and attempting an advance into the Caucasus while at the same time advancing along the Don-Volga river lines with the aim of reaching Astrakhan. The Ost Heer had the logistical support (just) for one axis of advance but they didn't have it for two simultaneuosly. Get Army Group B set-up along it's planned defensive line with around 46 infantry, 3 panzer and 4 motorised divisions then attack into the Caucasus in the planned for phased approach with the remaining 29 infantry, 6 panzer and 3 motorised divisions .

5. Going against doctrine and attacking into the strength of the enemy's defences at Kursk. Previously the Germans had bypassed strong enemy positions and then wheeled around them from north and south surrounding the enemy formations and then destroying them. Generally this had worked well. Perhaps Hitler felt his strategic options in the east were few by this time so a brute force frontal assault against prepared defences with 2800 panzers was his best bet.

After Kursk Hitler was goosed whatever strategy he adopted given the American presence in the west and the fact that the Red Army had learned how to fight a modern mechanised war from the Germans themselves by this time.

Well, if these really are the biggest mistakes, Hitler's decision making rises in my attention.

For every one of them, there is an argument to be made.

1. Impossible. Not enough vessels to make an invasion possible.
2. Interesting, but also extremely risky since it would have exposed the flanks like it did in 1942. Could have played out either way.
3. Stupid decision but USA would have entered the war anyway.
4. The flanks were too exposed anyway, I don't think this decision made much difference.
5. Not the smartest of offensives but if was all done in consultation with the OKH. And the war was indeed already lost by then.

In fact, it seems to me that these decisions didn't make much difference in the end. One could also argue that his decision to hold the line around Moscow saved Army Group Center.