British/Canadian performance performance in Normandy

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Texas Jäger
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British/Canadian performance performance in Normandy

#1

Post by Texas Jäger » 04 Jun 2022, 06:10

From a thread on Navweaps. Just curious what people here make of it.
https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warship ... 46278.html

Just a first thought that jumped out at me: the opposition to Operation Cobra was nothing like the opposition to Operation Goodwood, unlike this guy seems to think.

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Martin_Schenkel
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Re: British/Canadian performance performance in Normandy

#2

Post by Martin_Schenkel » 05 Jun 2022, 21:32

I don't understand the nit-picking and finger-pointing arguments about the Normandy campaign, particularly the US vs British performance and commanders. I read the whole thread you linked to. There's arguments over farmland and trees. They almost literally can't see the forest for the trees... :)

Strategically and geographically, it always seems like a pre-determined outcome, in terms of general course of events. The British/Canadians will always have a slower more slogging go at the stronger German formations coming in from the North and West. The Germans are always going to send the bulk of their heavy forces to the eastern (British/Canadian) sector (shorter and more direct lines of communication and supply) otherwise their flank gets turned and their heavy forces are pinned/surrounded in the west or south.

And what are the British/Canadians going to do? Break-out into the oncoming bulk of German forces from northern France? Follow-up their break-through with what forces? Are the Americans going pass through the British/Canadian break-through to Paris in a long narrow Market-Garden like punch with German reserves converging on them?

Not that wargaming is the be-all-end-all of historical exploration, but that's how it almost always (strategically) transpires: the same as it did historically. The only way to have it go any differently would have been to land the Americans on the east flank and the British/Canadian on the west flank of Normandy and see how that turns out. Even then, I'd imagine a similar outcome, with a couple US Armies pinning down the bulk of the German strength on the eastern flank, and a combined British/Canadian and US breakout into the South/South-West. A combined British/Canadian and US breakout to the South would have added logistical difficulties and overall would have had a slower advance, IMO.

It's almost like the events even suited the nationalities involved: a more methodical slogging approach by the British against the German heavy formations, with the Americans punching through to the south letting the hard-driving cowboys run wild into the German rear. Would Patton have been better than Monty at a slow methodical atritional battle against the bulk of the German armour (how would Patton have been able to break-out had he been in Monty's position?), or would Monty have been better than Patton in a hard-driving wild breakout to the south?

Not to say that there weren't mistakes made or that there's nothing that could've been done differently or that nothing can be learned from the campaign. With hindsight it's easy to say they should've done this or that. Generally though, you or I would've done very similar things if we were in the same position(s) and had the same knowledge/experience/information. There is room for the British/Canadians to have performed better in Normandy, which would have saved some lives and equipment, advanced some timelines, etc, but is there enough room for improvement there to create a scenario for a significantly different outcome? And we could say the same for the Americans. Had they done a little better, would it have significantly changed the courses of events?

The Canadians at least though, did seem to suffer from lack of experience and general competence at more senior levels of command, particular at Divisional command.


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Re: British/Canadian performance performance in Normandy

#3

Post by Michael Kenny » 06 Jun 2022, 04:27

Martin_Schenkel wrote:
05 Jun 2022, 21:32
I don't understand the nit-picking and finger-pointing arguments about the Normandy campaign, particularly the US vs British performance and commanders. ..............
Where have you been the last 70 years? This is not really an 'argument' in the sense that the two sides are engaged in a search for a consensus but rather a way for one side to criticise its ally, claim all the credit for every success and shift the blame for every setback in 1944-45 on the shoulders of one man. Now this is not always the case but a good 80% of those who post the mindless anti-Montgomery claptrap fall into that category. If you think you can solve it by sticking to facts and reasoned argument then you are fooling yourself. It is driven by a deep, unreasonable and uncompromising hatred of Montgomery that is visceral. You will get nowhere by being reasonable with such people. I find ridicule works best.

DeltaOne
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Re: British/Canadian performance performance in Normandy

#4

Post by DeltaOne » 05 Mar 2023, 09:44

The Canadians pushed the furthest inland on D-Day. My grandfather was one of those soldiers.
It was only the panzers that could stop the D-Day landings so the expectation was that the Germans would launch a massive panzer and mechanized (attack) on the flat ground north and west of Caen. The Canadians had the task of stopping the panzers from destroying the D-Day operation. The primary task in the days immediately after June 6 was not to capture huge swaths of territory, but to blunt the inevitable tank-driven counterattacks the Germans would inevitably launch following the D-Day landings. The Canadians had nearly twice as much artillery and heavy guns than any other unit.
I think the criticism is completely unfair. In regards to the Falaise Gap and the Canadians moving slowly, we have to remember the enemy was very well trained and formidable. The Canadians were constantly fighting and they were short of fuel and men, but they were still fighting hard. I know it was not ‘slow’ for the ones like my grandfather who were fully engaged in the battle.

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Re: British/Canadian performance performance in Normandy

#5

Post by Sheldrake » 05 Mar 2023, 19:32

All of this debate about the relative performance of the British/Canadians and US Forces in breaking out from Normandy ignores the biggest single factor in determining whether the breakout would happen on the Second British or First US Fronts. - Ze Germans.

Ze Germans decided where to deploy their troops and whether to place their main effort against the British or US Sector.

German doctrine stressed that the commander needed to decide the point of main effort - the Schwehrunkt., There HAD to be a point of main effort. The Germans did not simply divide up their troops along the front. Their commanders knew they were outnumbered and outgunned and eventually the line would break. From D Day onwards the Germans made their point of main effort the Caen-Falaise axis. Its in their reports and directives. Its where the bulk of the Armoured reserves and artillery deployed, It made operational sense for the Germans to place their main effort on the east. They could not afford for there to be a breakthrough by the British and Canadians as it would result in their army being trapped on the wrong side of their lines of communications and liable to be encircled with their back to the sea. An allied breakthrough on the west was less dangerous as there was the option to either pull back to the Seine or to launch a counter stroke, assuming they had the forces with which to do so.

The OP of the link claiming that there was little difference in fighting power between the 7th Army and Panzer Group West on 25th July is an idiot or wind up merchant. I can think of ruder words.

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Re: British/Canadian performance performance in Normandy

#6

Post by Michael Kenny » 06 Mar 2023, 01:15

Sheldrake wrote:
05 Mar 2023, 19:32


The OP of the link claiming that there was little difference in fighting power between the 7th Army and Panzer Group West on 25th July is an idiot or wind up merchant. I can think of ruder words.
The person who started the thread in the linked Forum is a member here but under an alias. He would never dare post that rubbish on AHF.

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Re: British/Canadian performance performance in Normandy

#7

Post by Westphalia1812 » 06 Mar 2023, 12:06

Sheldrake wrote:
05 Mar 2023, 19:32




The OP of the link claiming that there was little difference in fighting power between the 7th Army and Panzer Group West on 25th July is an idiot or wind up merchant. I can think of ruder words.
Arthur Gullachsen makes an interesting point noting that PzGr.West was much better off in terms of fuel and ammunition supply. This, as you pointed out, was a consequence of the German focus towards Caen/Falaise as their Schwerpunkt. HGr.B was in shook after OP GOODWOOD, fearing another heavy strike against Bourguébus and Verrières. Tactical performance aside, it were the CW operations that kept the Germans in place.

On 27 July, the Germans had six panzer divisions plus three s.Pz.Abt. SW and SE of Caen.

(1., 12., 9., 21. in line, 2.PzDiv as a tactical reserve, 116. PzDiv as operational reserve)
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Re: British/Canadian performance performance in Normandy

#8

Post by Sheldrake » 06 Mar 2023, 21:29

Westphalia1812 wrote:
06 Mar 2023, 12:06
Sheldrake wrote:
05 Mar 2023, 19:32




The OP of the link claiming that there was little difference in fighting power between the 7th Army and Panzer Group West on 25th July is an idiot or wind up merchant. I can think of ruder words.
Arthur Gullachsen makes an interesting point noting that PzGr.West was much better off in terms of fuel and ammunition supply. This, as you pointed out, was a consequence of the German focus towards Caen/Falaise as their Schwerpunkt. HGr.B was in shook after OP GOODWOOD, fearing another heavy strike against Bourguébus and Verrières. Tactical performance aside, it were the CW operations that kept the Germans in place.

On 27 July, the Germans had six panzer divisions plus three s.Pz.Abt. SW and SE of Caen.

(1., 12., 9., 21. in line, 2.PzDiv as a tactical reserve, 116. PzDiv as operational reserve)
Eberbach's memoir adds something to this. claims that Panzer Group West was at a disadvantage in that, as a purely operational grouping it was subordinate to and dependent on Seventh Army for supply. He goes on to say that in practice Seventh Army's supply lines were too extended for the horse drawn transport of Seventh Army's infantry supply columns. It was impossible for them to make a round trip to the railhead in the short summer nights and motorised transport was seconded from the Panzer Gruppe. Eberbach claims credit for re-organising the logistics of the Panzer Gruppe - which is probably one reason why it is renamed as a Panzer Army. THe problems he cites are a lack of organisation in the rear area as well as critical shortages e.g of tyres. The HQ of 16th Luftwaffe Division is re-rolled as the HQ for the new Fifth Panzer Army after the division is broken up following Op Goodwood. There is evidence from reports of German artillery activity that the artillery ammunition supply for the Panzer Army improved after mid July.

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Re: British/Canadian performance performance in Normandy

#9

Post by Westphalia1812 » 10 Mar 2023, 20:26

Sheldrake wrote:
06 Mar 2023, 21:29
Westphalia1812 wrote:
06 Mar 2023, 12:06
Sheldrake wrote:
05 Mar 2023, 19:32




The OP of the link claiming that there was little difference in fighting power between the 7th Army and Panzer Group West on 25th July is an idiot or wind up merchant. I can think of ruder words.
Arthur Gullachsen makes an interesting point noting that PzGr.West was much better off in terms of fuel and ammunition supply. This, as you pointed out, was a consequence of the German focus towards Caen/Falaise as their Schwerpunkt. HGr.B was in shook after OP GOODWOOD, fearing another heavy strike against Bourguébus and Verrières. Tactical performance aside, it were the CW operations that kept the Germans in place.

On 27 July, the Germans had six panzer divisions plus three s.Pz.Abt. SW and SE of Caen.

(1., 12., 9., 21. in line, 2.PzDiv as a tactical reserve, 116. PzDiv as operational reserve)
Eberbach's memoir adds something to this. claims that Panzer Group West was at a disadvantage in that, as a purely operational grouping it was subordinate to and dependent on Seventh Army for supply. He goes on to say that in practice Seventh Army's supply lines were too extended for the horse drawn transport of Seventh Army's infantry supply columns. It was impossible for them to make a round trip to the railhead in the short summer nights and motorised transport was seconded from the Panzer Gruppe. Eberbach claims credit for re-organising the logistics of the Panzer Gruppe - which is probably one reason why it is renamed as a Panzer Army. THe problems he cites are a lack of organisation in the rear area as well as critical shortages e.g of tyres. The HQ of 16th Luftwaffe Division is re-rolled as the HQ for the new Fifth Panzer Army after the division is broken up following Op Goodwood. There is evidence from reports of German artillery activity that the artillery ammunition supply for the Panzer Army improved after mid July.
Thanks for giving his comments. I didn't even know that he has written a memoir...
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