Destroyer500 wrote: ↑
13 Jun 2022 22:17
Peter89 wrote: ↑
13 Jun 2022 21:56
If we take a look at the German rocket programs, they put their best minds and resources behind offensive weapons and not behind defensive weapons. The same idea prevailed through the whole development field. This is a common ww2 fallacy; Germany didn't choose to defend, it was forced to defend. And even then, they often attacked with incredibly pathetic means, like when they "attacked the Soviet industry". These weapon systems required years to be developed, and Germany didn't realize its grave situation before 1943. There was simply no time to develop new defensive technologies from scratch.
Also... if the Germans would be more successful in defending the Reich's airspace with AA/SAM that would mean they'd send their air units to the peripheries. Every fifth of the new planes would crash in ferry flight...
Again I doubt that if Harris didn't ruin German cities the war lasted any longer.
They were confident at first and sucess was what they were getting.Barbarossa ruined them.The best choise would be taking N Africa and the Middle East and knocking Britain out resource wise.
Then even if the UK didnt surrender a better and most propably sucessfull Barbarosa would occur.Offense isnt bad as long as you dont lose momentum and as long as you can continiou doing it.
Im not proposing that they wake up in 43 and say "Well time for defense" but rather put all those minds and resources from the time the new goverment takes control to make a countrywide defense possible but Maginot Line like.Of course some anexes and maybe an invasion will happen here and there but as carefully as possible.If Britain is pulled in then playing def till they dont want to take more loses will be the only option.
The more I study the subject, the more I believe it is a literary invention based on a few snaps from Mussolini, Raeder and a few others who had little to no understanding of the strategic situation.
First of all, the North African and Middle Eastern theatre was not a very good place for Germany to fight Britain. Logistics and other military items are just one thing, but in reality the whole area was hardly kept under control and experienced a population boom that lasts to this very day. And the indication that the German alignment was better than the British or French would not last long either; there were serious signs that these countries craved independence and not another colonial overlord. It is also questionable whether Germany did or did not possess the capability to project power on the wrong side of the sea, and the answer is probably no. And wartime Germany was in no position to placate these nations with good trade offers; let alone to develop them. Hitler (and half the Orientkenner diplomats) was all but hesitant to give full support for Arab nationalism. They saw it as a tool to weaken the British (they did the same with India in WW1).
Second, there were no raw materials in the NA / ME that would knock the British out of the war. In fact it was Churchill's decision to give battle to the Axis in this region because he realized this is an ideal battleground for the British / Commonwealth forces and a nightmare to the Axis forces. Interservice cooperation, logistics and a keen diplomatic touch were all the weak points of the Axis and the strong points of the British. It is also very much likely that the British sacrificed a disproportionate amount of forces (naval forces included) to maintain their positions in the theater, so if the British lose the MTO, they most likely don't lose Singapore and the Japanese could hardly break into the Indian Ocean.
In my opinion (consistent with many historians like Citino) the German army would continue to attack until ten past midnight, until it exhausted itself. They did this in every campaign (sometimes victory came sooner than exhaustion). They never really gave a thought about good management and rationalization. If they would allocate resources to something, it would be offense (even in the form of retrbution) and not defense.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."