Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

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paulrward
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#16

Post by paulrward » 22 Jun 2022, 01:06

Hello All :

It's always amusing to hear the comments of those who know nothing of Wargaming.
They seem to ignore that fact that since the turn of the last century, the USN has constantly used
Wargaming as a tool to develop Strategies and Tactics- in fact, Admiral Nimitz stated that, because
of what he had learned wargaming at the Naval War College and participating in the Fleet Problems
of the 1920s and 30s, the only things that surprised him during WW2 were the Kamikazes and the
Atomic Bomb. That's right - he wasnt surprised by Pearl Harbor. It had been fortold by Captain
Ernest King in a Fleet Problem !

The U. S. Army has used wargaming since WW2 - in fact, several Army Officers worked with SPI
in the 1960s and 1970s to develop two wargames, one called The Year of the Rat, based on the
fighting in VietNam, and the other called Oil War, based on hypothetical scenarios for U.S.
involvement in Middle East Oil Wars.

Simulations Publications, Incorporated, ( SPI ) was started by a group of ex military types and
military historians to develop accurate war games based on both historical wars and possible
future conflicts. Many of the games were studied, and some have been used as training aids
by the U.S. Military. In fact, the current generation of Marine Officers are finally being introduced
to Wargaming !

When I read such comments as :
#10 by T. A. Gardner » 21 Jun 2022 13:34
.....Aside from that, how accurate could using Axis and Allies be for
determining the outcome...? :lol:
I realize how ignorant of modern wargaming many people really are.


OK. Time for your lesson:

In 1974, SPI had produced War in the East, a "monster" wargame (having more than 1000
counters) that simulated the Eastern Front conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union
from "Operation Barbarossa" to 1945.
In 1976, SPI published War in the West, which covered the Allied-German conflict in Western
Europe and North Africa.
Later the same year, SPI published War in Europe, which combined
War in the East and War in the West.
In 1977. SPI added War in the Pacific, allowing the Pacific Theater to be simulated, and
the three Monster Games can be combined.


War in Europe consists of :

Nine 22" x 34" paper hex grid maps scaled to 33 km (22.5 mi) per hex

4000 die-cut counters that represented individual capital ships, aircraft units, army corps,
divisions, brigades, and regiments.

4 rulebooks: Standard Rules, Rules for War in the East 2nd Edition, War in the West, and
War in Europe, along with Various game aids and Combat Result Tables

Average Playing Time for four players: 200 Hours

War in the Pacific consists of :

Seven 22"x44" paper hex grid maps that cover the Pacific Theater

3600 die cut counters that represented individual capital ships, aircraft units reprsenting aircraft,
army corps, divisions, brigades, and regiments.

Rules booklet (56 pages ) , Scenarios booklet (12 pages), Two charts and tables booklets (16 pages)

Each turn represented 1 week of time, which consisted of 3 naval and air phases, and one land phase.

Average Playing Time for four players: 200 hours.


Each game consists of nothing but Cardboard and Paper, and Each Game Weighs FIVE POUNDS !

Here is a photo of the two games to give you some idea of the level of complexity of the games :
SPI War In the World.jpg
SPI War In the World

Just to give you some idea of scale: In the photo of the Map for War in the Pacific, you can see the
Game Box and one of the Rules Booklets. The Rules are printed on 8 1/2" x 11" paper.

The two games set up together cover the floor of two average sized bedrooms. And it took us four
weekends to do the scenario, which we did NOT play to the end, as it was obvious after the fall of
the Soviet Union that the war was effectively over.


So, Mr. Gardner, this isn't a Children's Game - it is the type of Simulation created by Military Professionals
for other Military Professionals - and for people who are VERY dedicated to studying military history.


Mr. Gardner also posted :
#12 by T. A. Gardner » 21 Jun 2022 14:14
The Soviets never let their strength in the Far East and Asia really fall at all. Instead,
each time they withdrew a unit to move to fight Germany, a new one was stood up
and received the equipment the old one had. The unit shipped to Europe was then
issued new equipment to fight with in route to the front.
Let me see: The USSR is at war in the West, and suddenly, in September, the Japanese being making
air attacks and artillery barrages. There are minor incursions by tank units. In effect, the East has
now gone to war. So, Mr. Gardner, exactly how are the Soviets going to withdraw units from the front,
send the men West, and then train new soldiers on the equipment that was left behind, while these units
are engaged in sporadic fighting ?


#8 by T. A. Gardner » 21 Jun 2022 13:16
If Japan invaded the DEI and Malaysia without attacking Hawaii or the Philippines,
the US would have still unilaterally declared war on Japan.
Mr. Gardner, that's YOUR opinion. You cannot provide any evidence for it. In fact, the historical record
shows that you are just flat out wrong. The Germans invaded lots of nations in Europe, and all the U.S.
did was impose trade sanctions. The Japanese invaded China, and bombed and sank a U.S. warship.
More trade sanctions. The Japanese attacked the Russians. More Trade Sanctions. The Japanese
invaded French IndoChina. More Trade Sanctions.

If the Japanese had invaded the NEI ( but NOT Malaya ! ) with NO attack on the Philippines and no attacks
on American Shipping, there is no Day of Infamy. No thundering Speeches. Just more....... Trade Sanctions.....


In fact, if you read And I Was There, by Admiral Layton, it is fairly obvious that the United States would
NOT have gone to war if the Japanese invaded the NEI - we were NOT going to be ready until the middle
of 1942 at the earliest - that was why we were flying unarmed B-17s out to Manilla as fast as they could
go ! The United States was NOT ready to go to war in 1941, and the first six months of 1942 shows exactly
what would have happened to us if we did. What is more important, the American People did NOT want
to go to war, and if Freewheelin' Franklin had unilaterally started a war on his own, and promptly suffered
a few defeats, you might have the Republicans rising up to call for his impeachment and removal from
office.

Without a Day of Infamy, there is no Unity of the American People in favor of a War. And
that means that there are going to be a LOT of Senators and Congresscritters who will be adamantly
opposed to fighting. Remember: Freewheelin' Franklin had campaigned on a Promise of never sending
American Boys overseas to fight in Foreign Wars. A Japanese invasion of the NEI, with the authorization
of the Dutch Government in the Hague and Berlin, has just enough veneer of legality to give American
politicians the cover they need to oppose a war to stop it.


Finally, a last comment about Wargaming:
#9 by Takao » 21 Jun 2022 13:32
Ah yes, the Kobayashi Maru scenario...
Although, I would replace the word "GAMING" with "RIGGING."

Mr. Takao, in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, the IJN did numerous wargames to simulate the
attack. As a result, they increased the number of Aircraft Carriers from four to six, to improve their
odds of success. Still, in one game, they suffered a counter attack which cost them two carriers,
As a result, Nagumo, after his first two strikes, recovered his aircraft and fled the scene as fast
as he could steam.

Nagumo followed the results of the pre-war Wargame.

In the months before Midway, the Midway Campaign was gamed on board the Yamato. Admiral
Yamamoto presided, and Nagumo observed. During the course of the game, two IJN Carriers
were ' disabled ', and a third Carrier was ' sunk '. However the Umpires over ruled the results
of the game, and all three IJN Carriers were put back on the playing table.

The IJN ignored the results of the Wargame.


Mr. Takao, would you care to tell us all how well that worked out for them at Midway ?


Military Historians who don't wargame have, at best, a limited understanding of the mechanisms
and mechanics of warfare.


Respectfully

Paul R. Ward
Last edited by paulrward on 22 Jun 2022, 08:42, edited 2 times in total.
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T. A. Gardner
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#17

Post by T. A. Gardner » 22 Jun 2022, 01:17

glenn239 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 00:08
T. A. Gardner wrote:
21 Jun 2022, 23:14
So, when the Japanese initiate hostilities with the Russians, they find the IJAAF units facing them are slowly decimated to nothing while on the ground their divisions are being eaten up under a steady barrage of artillery fire and tank attacks.

If the US and Dutch have to the middle of, or late 1942, to continue building up their militaries in Asia, the Japanese are now faced with no possible way to take the Philippines or DEI.
Simply not signing the non-aggression pact in 1941 should serve to fix more Soviet formations in the Far East into 1942. In terms of order of attack, it's Philippines and NEI first, then war with Soviet Union second, in the spring or summer of 1942, as the 2nd Phase operation.
As it was, the Soviets maintained anywhere from about a 3 to 1 to an 8 to 1 advantage in forces in the Far East and Asia facing Japan throughout the war. How much more would they need?

By mid-1942 the Philippines would have been unassailable by the Japanese. The DEI is the same way by late 1942.


glenn239
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#18

Post by glenn239 » 22 Jun 2022, 01:59

T. A. Gardner wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 01:17

As it was, the Soviets maintained anywhere from about a 3 to 1 to an 8 to 1 advantage in forces in the Far East and Asia facing Japan throughout the war. How much more would they need?
An attack by Japan on the Soviet Union would at least coordinate the Axis into a cohesive strategy against one enemy. If it succeeded then Japan might be able to extract itself from the war on the basis of Germany's enhanced position in Europe. If it failed then Japan would be fighting a losing war on three fronts - Manchuria, China, and the Pacific. Japan would be in a hopeless military situation, but diplomatically, the advances of the Red Army give Washington an incentive to bargain Japan's surrender terms better for Tokyo in order to end the war before the Soviets advanced too far.
By mid-1942 the Philippines would have been unassailable by the Japanese. The DEI is the same way by late 1942.
As stated, the order is Philippines and NEI first in December 1941, then the attack on the Soviet Union second in the spring or summer of 1942 after the 1st Phase objectives were complete. It cannot be reversed for the reasons you mention.

Peter89
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#19

Post by Peter89 » 22 Jun 2022, 08:56

Japan's true contribution to the German campaign in the Soviet Union would be the closing of the LL Pacific route.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Takao
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#20

Post by Takao » 22 Jun 2022, 11:53

paulrward wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 01:06
Finally, a last comment about Wargaming:
#9 by Takao » 21 Jun 2022 13:32
Ah yes, the Kobayashi Maru scenario...
Although, I would replace the word "GAMING" with "RIGGING."

Mr. Takao, in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, the IJN did numerous wargames to simulate the
attack. As a result, they increased the number of Aircraft Carriers from four to six, to improve their
odds of success. Still, in one game, they suffered a counter attack which cost them two carriers,
As a result, Nagumo, after his first two strikes, recovered his aircraft and fled the scene as fast
as he could steam.

Nagumo followed the results of the pre-war Wargame.
Yes? And? Near about everybody crucifies Nagumo for not finishing the job he started. Wargaming fail.
paulrward wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 01:06
In the months before Midway, the Midway Campaign was gamed on board the Yamato. Admiral
Yamamoto presided, and Nagumo observed. During the course of the game, two IJN Carriers
were ' disabled ', and a third Carrier was ' sunk '. However the Umpires over ruled the results
of the game, and all three IJN Carriers were put back on the playing table.

The IJN ignored the results of the Wargame.


Mr. Takao, would you care to tell us all how well that worked out for them at Midway ?
Yes, and you are the umpire putting the Japanese carriers back in the game.. You are changing the Rules to achieve your favorable outcome..

I would think you would have learned, from all your supposed wargaming experience, that rigging the game to achieve your favorable outcome,, will bite you in the butt.

paulrward wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 01:06
Military Historians who don't wargame have, at best, a limited understanding of the mechanisms
and mechanics of warfare.


Respectfully

Paul R. Ward
And Military Historians who rig games to achieve a desired outcome, have even less of a limited understanding...All they know how to do are rig games.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#21

Post by OpanaPointer » 22 Jun 2022, 13:14

Wargames are for what-iffing. Naval War College has had a few fun ones in the past.
Come visit our sites:
hyperwarHyperwar
World War II Resources

Bellum se ipsum alet, mostly Doritos.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#22

Post by glenn239 » 22 Jun 2022, 14:38

Takao wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 11:53
And Military Historians who rig games to achieve a desired outcome, have even less of a limited understanding...All they know how to do are rig games.
The wargame served its function - it identified a flanking carrier ambush as an operational consideration. The interesting part was not that two IJN carriers were refloated, (this wasn't the first wargame where they'd lost carriers then refloated them). No, the interesting part is how Combined Fleet and 1st Air Fleet HQ's had already identified the problem and still managed to have it doom the operation.

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Takao
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#23

Post by Takao » 22 Jun 2022, 15:00

glenn239 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 14:38
Takao wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 11:53
And Military Historians who rig games to achieve a desired outcome, have even less of a limited understanding...All they know how to do are rig games.
The wargame served its function - it identified a flanking carrier ambush as an operational consideration. The interesting part was not that two IJN carriers were refloated, (this wasn't the first wargame where they'd lost carriers then refloated them). No, the interesting part is how Combined Fleet and 1st Air Fleet HQ's had already identified the problem and still managed to have it doom the operation.
Hardly interesting, as the wargame was pro forma. Yamamoto wanted the operation to go forward, and it went forward, regardless of gaming outcomes.

More interesting is looking at why Yamamoto wanted the Midway operation so badly.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#24

Post by Peter89 » 22 Jun 2022, 15:07

Takao wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 15:00
glenn239 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 14:38
Takao wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 11:53
And Military Historians who rig games to achieve a desired outcome, have even less of a limited understanding...All they know how to do are rig games.
The wargame served its function - it identified a flanking carrier ambush as an operational consideration. The interesting part was not that two IJN carriers were refloated, (this wasn't the first wargame where they'd lost carriers then refloated them). No, the interesting part is how Combined Fleet and 1st Air Fleet HQ's had already identified the problem and still managed to have it doom the operation.
Hardly interesting, as the wargame was pro forma. Yamamoto wanted the operation to go forward, and it went forward, regardless of gaming outcomes.

More interesting is looking at why Yamamoto wanted the Midway operation so badly.
Indeed, why?

Why he didn't wait a few months to have vastly superior forces?
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#25

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 22 Jun 2022, 16:54

Takao wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 15:00
...Hardly interesting, as the wargame was pro forma. Yamamoto wanted the operation to go forward, and it went forward, regardless of gaming outcomes.

More interesting is looking at why Yamamoto wanted the Midway operation so badly.
That question has been raised many times. The answers devolve into complexities of Yamamoto & his staffs thinking. One example is his dispersal of a portion of his forces to the Alteutians operation. He clearly wanted a decisive battle, but then approves a diversion op that places useful naval forces where they cant support the main fleet. I am not smart enough to understand that.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#26

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 22 Jun 2022, 17:11

Peter89 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 15:07

Why he didn't wait a few months to have vastly superior forces?

They were running out of fuel. Prewar calculations suggested a year at maximum of fuel for unrestricted Fleet operations, & possibly as little as six months. As it was even with the capture of the Dutch petroleum a year was overly optimistic. Yamamoto had reserve for one full size fleet op May-July. After than restrictions and conservation measures are necessary & in the autumn a full fleet operation is no longer practical. Routine fleet ops and lesser ops were drawing down the fuel stocks, and there was the cargo fleet returning to industrial traffic, further drawing on fuel sources for non military ops. Correct or not Yamamoto calculated he had to get a complete defeat of the USN NLT July & preferably a lot sooner.

A secondary factor is that the full carrier fleet would not have been combat capable in a few months. Japanese training methods produced a strong razor sharp weapon in their carrier wings, but it took a year or more to build that. Even with veteran cadres they had difficulty rebuilding the carrier air groups fast enough.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#27

Post by T. A. Gardner » 22 Jun 2022, 19:43

paulrward wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 01:06
Hello All :

It's always amusing to hear the comments of those who know nothing of Wargaming.
They seem to ignore that fact that since the turn of the last century, the USN has constantly used
Wargaming as a tool to develop Strategies and Tactics- in fact, Admiral Nimitz stated that, because
of what he had learned wargaming at the Naval War College and participating in the Fleet Problems
of the 1920s and 30s, the only things that surprised him during WW2 were the Kamikazes and the
Atomic Bomb. That's right - he wasnt surprised by Pearl Harbor. It had been fortold by Captain
Ernest King in a Fleet Problem !
Got news for you, I know far more about wargaming than you do. I've been both a board and miniatures wargamer for over half-a-century. I've designed wargames and participated in professional ones at the Naval War College. In the 1920's and 30's the NWC games were very much like more complex versions of Fletcher Pratt's Naval Wargame (in part, that game was used as the basis for AH's Jutland BTW).
The U. S. Army has used wargaming since WW2 - in fact, several Army Officers worked with SPI
in the 1960s and 1970s to develop two wargames, one called The Year of the Rat, based on the
fighting in VietNam, and the other called Oil War, based on hypothetical scenarios for U.S.
involvement in Middle East Oil Wars.

Simulations Publications, Incorporated, ( SPI ) was started by a group of ex military types and
military historians to develop accurate war games based on both historical wars and possible
future conflicts. Many of the games were studied, and some have been used as training aids
by the U.S. Military. In fact, the current generation of Marine Officers are finally being introduced
to Wargaming !
Not true. SPI was formed by two enlisted men in the Air Force in Japan, Christopher Wagner and Lyle Smethers who were hobbists with an interest in wargaming because of Avalon Hill. S&T didn't take off until James Dunnigan and Redmond Simonsen took the reins (both non-military). From there, other companies were formed, primarily by wargamers who wanted to expand the hobby, like Conflict Games, Games Designer Workshop, etc.
When I read such comments as :
#10 by T. A. Gardner » 21 Jun 2022 13:34
.....Aside from that, how accurate could using Axis and Allies be for
determining the outcome...? :lol:
I realize how ignorant of modern wargaming many people really are.
The ignorance is yours for not recognizing that as the biting sarcasm it was intended to be.

OK. Time for your lesson:

In 1974, SPI had produced War in the East, a "monster" wargame (having more than 1000
counters) that simulated the Eastern Front conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union
from "Operation Barbarossa" to 1945.
In 1976, SPI published War in the West, which covered the Allied-German conflict in Western
Europe and North Africa.
Later the same year, SPI published War in Europe, which combined
War in the East and War in the West.
In 1977. SPI added War in the Pacific, allowing the Pacific Theater to be simulated, and
the three Monster Games can be combined.


War in Europe consists of :

Nine 22" x 34" paper hex grid maps scaled to 33 km (22.5 mi) per hex

4000 die-cut counters that represented individual capital ships, aircraft units, army corps,
divisions, brigades, and regiments.

4 rulebooks: Standard Rules, Rules for War in the East 2nd Edition, War in the West, and
War in Europe, along with Various game aids and Combat Result Tables

Average Playing Time for four players: 200 Hours

War in the Pacific consists of :

Seven 22"x44" paper hex grid maps that cover the Pacific Theater

3600 die cut counters that represented individual capital ships, aircraft units reprsenting aircraft,
army corps, divisions, brigades, and regiments.

Rules booklet (56 pages ) , Scenarios booklet (12 pages), Two charts and tables booklets (16 pages)

Each turn represented 1 week of time, which consisted of 3 naval and air phases, and one land phase.

Average Playing Time for four players: 200 hours.


Each game consists of nothing but Cardboard and Paper, and Each Game Weighs FIVE POUNDS !

Here is a photo of the two games to give you some idea of the level of complexity of the games :

SPI War In the World.jpg


Just to give you some idea of scale: In the photo of the Map for War in the Pacific, you can see the
Game Box and one of the Rules Booklets. The Rules are printed on 8 1/2" x 11" paper.

The two games set up together cover the floor of two average sized bedrooms. And it took us four
weekends to do the scenario, which we did NOT play to the end, as it was obvious after the fall of
the Soviet Union that the war was effectively over.
I own those, along with about 90% of all the titles SPI released (I had a lifetime subscription to the magazine back then). War in the East quite frankly sucks compared to the GDW version Fire in the East and Scorched Earth that are magnitudes more accurate. If you know what you're doing, the opening turns of the game can be made to pretty closely parallel the original campaign unlike the SPI game where getting that result is impossible.
Those two games are part of GDW's Europa series, again I have most of that set too.
So, Mr. Gardner, this isn't a Children's Game - it is the type of Simulation created by Military Professionals
for other Military Professionals - and for people who are VERY dedicated to studying military history.
I have you beat in spades on that. By the way, this is my last published military history article:

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-hi ... retro-bomb

My current project is a history of Surface to Air Missile development from 1940(ish) to 1955 when the first ones when operational. As a tease, it shows that the Germans were neither the progenitors of SAM weapons and that their developments to 1945 were pretty crappy and largely ignored or tested for only very short and unsuccessful periods postwar before being totally abandoned.

Mr. Gardner also posted :
#12 by T. A. Gardner » 21 Jun 2022 14:14
The Soviets never let their strength in the Far East and Asia really fall at all. Instead,
each time they withdrew a unit to move to fight Germany, a new one was stood up
and received the equipment the old one had. The unit shipped to Europe was then
issued new equipment to fight with in route to the front.
Let me see: The USSR is at war in the West, and suddenly, in September, the Japanese being making
air attacks and artillery barrages. There are minor incursions by tank units. In effect, the East has
now gone to war. So, Mr. Gardner, exactly how are the Soviets going to withdraw units from the front,
send the men West, and then train new soldiers on the equipment that was left behind, while these units
are engaged in sporadic fighting ?
I am correct. See for example The Red Army Order of Battle in the Great Patriotic War, Poirier and Conner. Gantz's later publications show the same thing.
The Japanese divisions in Manchukuo were few in number, all infantry formations (until late in the war when they formed an ad hoc armored division there) and poorly equipped by comparison to the Red Army they faced. Their air force was relatively small, and because of their pilot training and replacement system, very brittle to losses as Nomohan proved.
The Soviets could easily hold their front against the Japanese who lacked the logistic system to support units that might engage the Soviets over something close to 80% of that front. Again, Nomohan proved that, and the Japanese never got better at logistics support.
In the meantime, the Japanese would have to pull units from fronts in China and elsewhere to shore up their forces in Manchukuo.

So, yes, the Soviets could still pull from the Far East while fighting a static war of attrition with Japan--a war Japan can't win.
#8 by T. A. Gardner » 21 Jun 2022 13:16
If Japan invaded the DEI and Malaysia without attacking Hawaii or the Philippines,
the US would have still unilaterally declared war on Japan.
Mr. Gardner, that's YOUR opinion. You cannot provide any evidence for it. In fact, the historical record
shows that you are just flat out wrong. The Germans invaded lots of nations in Europe, and all the U.S.
did was impose trade sanctions. The Japanese invaded China, and bombed and sank a U.S. warship.
More trade sanctions. The Japanese attacked the Russians. More Trade Sanctions. The Japanese
invaded French IndoChina. More Trade Sanctions.

If the Japanese had invaded the NEI ( but NOT Malaya ! ) with NO attack on the Philippines and no attacks
on American Shipping, there is no Day of Infamy. No thundering Speeches. Just more....... Trade Sanctions.....


In fact, if you read And I Was There, by Admiral Layton, it is fairly obvious that the United States would
NOT have gone to war if the Japanese invaded the NEI - we were NOT going to be ready until the middle
of 1942 at the earliest - that was why we were flying unarmed B-17s out to Manilla as fast as they could
go ! The United States was NOT ready to go to war in 1941, and the first six months of 1942 shows exactly
what would have happened to us if we did. What is more important, the American People did NOT want
to go to war, and if Freewheelin' Franklin had unilaterally started a war on his own, and promptly suffered
a few defeats, you might have the Republicans rising up to call for his impeachment and removal from
office.

Without a Day of Infamy, there is no Unity of the American People in favor of a War. And
that means that there are going to be a LOT of Senators and Congresscritters who will be adamantly
opposed to fighting. Remember: Freewheelin' Franklin had campaigned on a Promise of never sending
American Boys overseas to fight in Foreign Wars. A Japanese invasion of the NEI, with the authorization
of the Dutch Government in the Hague and Berlin, has just enough veneer of legality to give American
politicians the cover they need to oppose a war to stop it.
I showed quite clearly earlier that US public opinion was in favor of a war with Japan. About 2 out of 3 Americans were in favor of one should it start. The US had been mobilizing for war well before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor too. The Panay incident turned US public opinion against Japan and Japan immediately bent over backwards trying to apologize and make reparations for it.
Roosevelt started nationalizing the National Guard for service in August 1940 (18 infantry divisions) and doubled the authorized strength of the US Army at the same time. The US Navy already had a "Two-Ocean Navy" building plan in progress, and the US was building overseas infrastructure to support a foreign war.
On March 27th 1941, the US reached an agreement with Great Britian and the DEI to form a joint staff, the "ABC-1 Staff Agreement" that in the event of a war with Japan all three nations would coordinate their operations. A month later, a conference was held at Singapore between Air Chief Marshall Brook-Popham (British CinC in Asia), Vice Admiral Layton (Commander of British forces in China), Major General ter Poorten (Chief of Staff for the the DEI, Captain Purnell (CofS USN Asiatic Fleet), and representatives from India, New Zealand, and Australia to formalize a command structure in the even of war with Japan.
It's pretty damn clear that if Japan attacked any one of these entities the rest were going to jump in and stomp Japan into the ground.

Finally, a last comment about Wargaming:

Military Historians who don't wargame have, at best, a limited understanding of the mechanisms
and mechanics of warfare.

Respectfully

Paul R. Ward
And those with limited amateur wargaming experience (you) shouldn't be presupposing they have some advantage over other posters.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#28

Post by Peter89 » 22 Jun 2022, 20:19

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 17:11
Peter89 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 15:07

Why he didn't wait a few months to have vastly superior forces?

They were running out of fuel. Prewar calculations suggested a year at maximum of fuel for unrestricted Fleet operations, & possibly as little as six months. As it was even with the capture of the Dutch petroleum a year was overly optimistic. Yamamoto had reserve for one full size fleet op May-July. After than restrictions and conservation measures are necessary & in the autumn a full fleet operation is no longer practical. Routine fleet ops and lesser ops were drawing down the fuel stocks, and there was the cargo fleet returning to industrial traffic, further drawing on fuel sources for non military ops. Correct or not Yamamoto calculated he had to get a complete defeat of the USN NLT July & preferably a lot sooner.

A secondary factor is that the full carrier fleet would not have been combat capable in a few months. Japanese training methods produced a strong razor sharp weapon in their carrier wings, but it took a year or more to build that. Even with veteran cadres they had difficulty rebuilding the carrier air groups fast enough.
I simply can not believe that sheer overconfidence led the Japanese to believe that they can afford to go to battle like this. They knew that the US has a lot of carriers, and before Coral sea none was lost (Saratoga was repaired). Thus theoretically they could encounter 4 carriers at any given time (Lexington, Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet). Given the disparities in air group sizes, keeping the 6 fleet carriers together would be essential.

I am also not sure that the air groups were depleted by the time of Coral sea or Midway; at the Aleutian campaign the Junyo carried 18 Zeroes and 18 Vals and the Ryujo 12 Zeroes and 18 Kates.

I believe there has to be some logical explanation for the apparent misjudgement of the situation. (It took me a really long time to understand the real reasons why the Germans attacked the Soviets, too.) I would be especially interested in the decision making process behind Yamamoto's strategy. What would Japan lose by waiting until, let's say, August? They could field 6 fleet carriers, 2 carriers and 2 light carriers against the USN's 5 fleet carriers with Coral sea, and 6 fleet carriers, 2 carriers and 3 light carriers vs 6 fleet carriers without it. I thought the Japanese were looking for a decisive battle.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Takao
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#29

Post by Takao » 22 Jun 2022, 21:03

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 16:54
That question has been raised many times. The answers devolve into complexities of Yamamoto & his staffs thinking. One example is his dispersal of a portion of his forces to the Alteutians operation. He clearly wanted a decisive battle, but then approves a diversion op that places useful naval forces where they cant support the main fleet. I am not smart enough to understand that.
The invasion of the Aleutians was the cost of doing business.

Neither Naval GHQ or the Army wanted to do Midway. To get their approval, Yamamoto had to include the Aleutians into his plan or their would be no Midway Operation. So, to keep Midway on track Yamamoto approved the Aleutians.

Huszar666
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#30

Post by Huszar666 » 22 Jun 2022, 21:18

Morning,

A few questions:

1, which were the pre-war soviet divisions from the Far East Front that were relocated to the Moscow line in Late 1941 or anywhere till around Mid 1942? I always hear, that they did that, but I never found out, which division were sent west. I have certainly haven't found ANY on the Moscow line. Please enlighten me.

2, what does wargaming (from the gaming companies) have anything to do with reality? They are certainly nice games, but only as accurate as the writes are aware of stuff (questionable, at best) and how they write the rules. And, of course, how you can play (or bend) said rules. You could probably bend the rules that the US isn't entering the war, even if Washington gets nuked. A Japanese attack on the UK and/or NEI would definately get the US into the war, Pearl harbour or not.

3, What would Japan gain by attacking the SU instead of the UK and NEI? The only thing worth for them was the oil on Sahalin, and guess what, the soviets were already selling that to Japan...

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