Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

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Peter89
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#31

Post by Peter89 » 22 Jun 2022, 21:31

Takao wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 21:03
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 16:54
That question has been raised many times. The answers devolve into complexities of Yamamoto & his staffs thinking. One example is his dispersal of a portion of his forces to the Alteutians operation. He clearly wanted a decisive battle, but then approves a diversion op that places useful naval forces where they cant support the main fleet. I am not smart enough to understand that.
The invasion of the Aleutians was the cost of doing business.

Neither Naval GHQ or the Army wanted to do Midway. To get their approval, Yamamoto had to include the Aleutians into his plan or their would be no Midway Operation. So, to keep Midway on track Yamamoto approved the Aleutians.
And the Coral sea?
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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T. A. Gardner
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#32

Post by T. A. Gardner » 22 Jun 2022, 22:05

The Aleutians operation, other than being a decoy for Midway was in part done as a precaution against the US launching air strikes against Northern Japan from there. Whether that was possible or not, the Japanese had at least some belief and concern it could happen so they tried to preempt it.

That whole operation was just a drain on Japanese resources and the IJA units involved suffered badly from privation and weather while IJN units adjacent to them faired much better. One of the oddities of the two being virtually separate in every way with little cooperation.


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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#33

Post by glenn239 » 22 Jun 2022, 22:29

Takao wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 15:00
Hardly interesting, as the wargame was pro forma. Yamamoto wanted the operation to go forward, and it went forward, regardless of gaming outcomes.
We once war gamed a return attack by Kido Butai on Hawaii in January 1942 using an updated iteration of the old Avalon Hill Midway game. As GM, I can tell you I wasn't at all interested in the outcome of the battle, I was interested in the command choices of the players. For example, the US player, with 3 carriers decided to split his carriers into three task forces covering the three approach routes to Hawaii. What happened when he did that was just rolling dice. The interesting part is that the for all its crudeness, the game simulated the situation accurately enough that it predicted something that would have been a big mistake for the USN to make, (IMO, the proper solution was all three carriers within supporting distance of each other and Oahu).

Similarly, Ugaki won't have cared what the game delivered in terms of battle results, (in fact the game seems to have wildly overrated the combat effectiveness of MIdway air forces, for example). What caught his attention was that the in the game the US player did something he was not expecting, and looked dangerous. The game had served its function, which was to tweak the plan to adjust for possible contingencies. The fascinating question is why the two HQ's, with the USN's actual gambit detected during play, failed to take adequate precautions despite the matter having some staff work of both HQ's applied to it.

[
Last edited by glenn239 on 22 Jun 2022, 23:01, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#34

Post by glenn239 » 22 Jun 2022, 22:35

Huszar666 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 21:18
3, What would Japan gain by attacking the SU instead of the UK and NEI? The only thing worth for them was the oil on Sahalin, and guess what, the soviets were already selling that to Japan...
The gain in attacking the Soviet Union was the direct coordination of the two primary Axis powers against the one enemy they were able to isolate. If the Soviet Union were to defeat Germany then the entire basis of Japanese foreign policy would collapse, whether Japan held the NEI or not. The risk, that the USSR and USA would fight Japan on two fronts, this was the natural outcome to the defeat of Germany anyways.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#35

Post by Takao » 22 Jun 2022, 23:14

Peter89 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 21:31
And the Coral sea?
IIRC, were not the Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu all undergoing yard periods after their return from Operation C.

Kaga was supposed to have joined Shokaku & Zuikaku. Although, her hull repairs were hurried up, they still were not completed in time to join the Twins.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#36

Post by Peter89 » 22 Jun 2022, 23:15

glenn239 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 22:35
Huszar666 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 21:18
3, What would Japan gain by attacking the SU instead of the UK and NEI? The only thing worth for them was the oil on Sahalin, and guess what, the soviets were already selling that to Japan...
The gain in attacking the Soviet Union was the direct coordination of the two primary Axis powers against the one enemy they were able to isolate. If the Soviet Union were to defeat Germany then the entire basis of Japanese foreign policy would collapse, whether Japan held the NEI or not. The risk, that the USSR and USA would fight Japan on two fronts, this was the natural outcome to the defeat of Germany anyways.
German goals were far from clear in the Soviet Union, and light years away from reality. They counted too much on the collapse of the Soviets, and didn't want to share the spoils. Japan had little to gain there, and exactly no intention to let another European player into the Pacific - the one which trained the Chinese, and whose colonies they took in the Great War -, so it is no wonder they didn't coordinate their strategy.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#37

Post by Peter89 » 22 Jun 2022, 23:17

Takao wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 23:14
Peter89 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 21:31
And the Coral sea?
IIRC, were not the Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu all undergoing yard periods after their return from Operation C.

Kaga was supposed to have joined Shokaku & Zuikaku. Although, her hull repairs were hurried up, they still were not completed in time to join the Twins.
Thanks, I didn't know that.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#38

Post by T. A. Gardner » 22 Jun 2022, 23:59

glenn239 wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 22:29
Takao wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 15:00
Hardly interesting, as the wargame was pro forma. Yamamoto wanted the operation to go forward, and it went forward, regardless of gaming outcomes.
We once war gamed a return attack by Kido Butai on Hawaii in January 1942 using an updated iteration of the old Avalon Hill Midway game. As GM, I can tell you I wasn't at all interested in the outcome of the battle, I was interested in the command choices of the players. For example, the US player, with 3 carriers decided to split his carriers into three task forces covering the three approach routes to Hawaii. What happened when he did that was just rolling dice. The interesting part is that the for all its crudeness, the game simulated the situation accurately enough that it predicted something that would have been a big mistake for the USN to make, (IMO, the proper solution was all three carriers within supporting distance of each other and Oahu).

Similarly, Ugaki won't have cared what the game delivered in terms of battle results, (in fact the game seems to have wildly overrated the combat effectiveness of MIdway air forces, for example). What caught his attention was that the in the game the US player did something he was not expecting, and looked dangerous. The game had served its function, which was to tweak the plan to adjust for possible contingencies. The fascinating question is why the two HQ's, with the USN's actual gambit detected during play, failed to take adequate precautions despite the matter having some staff work of both HQ's applied to it.

[
Actually, the best strategy would have been for the US player to avoid combat altogether and conserve the carriers while letting the Japanese take more losses trying for another strike on Pearl Harbor. They really weren't going to do much more damage than had already been inflicted, and the losses they would take--much heavier than the first two strikes since the US would now be fully alert and ready with what remained--would be hard to replace.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#39

Post by Kingfish » 23 Jun 2022, 01:30

T. A. Gardner wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 23:59
They really weren't going to do much more damage than had already been inflicted
Any guess as to the effect a third strike aimed at PH's oil tanks would have had on US operations?
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#40

Post by T. A. Gardner » 23 Jun 2022, 01:54

Kingfish wrote:
23 Jun 2022, 01:30
T. A. Gardner wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 23:59
They really weren't going to do much more damage than had already been inflicted
Any guess as to the effect a third strike aimed at PH's oil tanks would have had on US operations?
It might have had a short-term effect, but I'd fully expect the US to quickly repair the tanks that were damaged recover a good portion of the fuel once the fires were out, and then bring in more to replace the losses.

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#41

Post by OpanaPointer » 23 Jun 2022, 01:55

Look up the debate between the Northern Resources Area and the Southern Resources Area. Link provided if you don't find the document I'm referring too. ("Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War", five parts.)
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#42

Post by OpanaPointer » 23 Jun 2022, 02:02

Kingfish wrote:
23 Jun 2022, 01:30
T. A. Gardner wrote:
22 Jun 2022, 23:59
They really weren't going to do much more damage than had already been inflicted
Any guess as to the effect a third strike aimed at PH's oil tanks would have had on US operations?
The tanks weren't very vulnerable to attack from the air. IJN pilots couldn't tell which ones had fuel. The fuel, Bunker B, had to be heated to 135° before it would burn at all. The tanks had floating caps that reduced available oxygen to tiny amounts. The tanks had berms around them so any rupture would be contained. There were firefighting gear at each tank. The tanks were .5 inches thick at the top and 1.5 inches at the bottom. The Zeros didn't have guns that were loaded with rounds that would penetrate those tanks. The tankers could have replaced all the fuel in 90 days, 9 could do it in thirty days.

I can go on, but Alan Zimm does it better.
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#43

Post by paulrward » 23 Jun 2022, 02:57

Hello All :

Mr. Gardner Posted :

#27 Post by T. A. Gardner » 22 Jun 2022 10:43

Got news for you, I know far more about wargaming than you do.
You just think you do.

I've been both a board and miniatures wargamer for over half-a-century.
I haven't been gaming that long, I only started board and miniature wargaming in
the mid 1960s - Oh - wait - Damn! That's over fifty years.......

I've designed wargames and participated in professional ones at the Naval War College.
I've designed wargames, and participated in professional ones at both the Presdio in
San Francisco, and Fort Ord in Monterey,

In the 1920's and 30's the NWC games were very much like more complex versions of
Fletcher Pratt's Naval Wargame (in part, that game was used as the basis for AH's Jutland BTW).
And who designed AH's Jutland? Jim Dunnigan, who founded SPI.....

Not true. SPI was formed by two enlisted men in the Air Force in Japan,
Christopher Wagner and Lyle Smethers who were hobbists with an interest in wargaming
because of Avalon Hill. S&T didn't take off until James Dunnigan and Redmond Simonsen
took the reins (both non-military

WRONG ! The Magazine Strategy and Tactics was founded by Wagner and Smethers. Redmond
Simonsen went to work for them as Art Director. When they ran into financial problems,
Jim Dunnigan, who served in the Army, and then had gotten his BA in History with a Minor in
Business, founded Poultroon Press, and purchased the Magazine from them for $ 1 in 1970.
He then founded SPI to be a Shell Company to control both S&T, Poultroon Press ( printing books)
and the Game Publishing section. So, three of the four 'founding members' of SPI had military
experience, as well as a deep knowledge of military history.

The ignorance is yours for not recognizing that as the biting sarcasm it was intended
to be.
Next time leave an Emoji.....

I own those, along with about 90% of all the titles SPI released (I had a lifetime
subscription to the magazine back then).
OK, how many times did you play them ? Owning a Wargame is like owning a book- you
have to read a book to get anything out of it, and you have to play the Wargame to
understand it.......

War in the East quite frankly sucks compared to the GDW version Fire in the East
and Scorched Earth that are magnitudes more accurate.
That's your opinion. And the GDW games date from the 1980s - we did our scenario
in the 1979.

Those two games are part of GDW's Europa series, again I have most of that set too.
But you still haven't said that you've played them.........

I have you beat in spades on that......
Only in your own mind.......Oh, yeah - and in case you lost track, the last bid was Four Diamonds !

I am correct. See for example The Red Army Order of Battle in the Great Patriotic War,
Poirier and Conner. Gantz's later publications show the same thing.
Bow down, everyone ! Mr. Gardner has SPOKEN, and HE IS CORRECT !

You just believe you are, because you are relying on a book, and not doing a lot of critical thinking.
The Japanese divisions in Manchukuo were few in number, all infantry formations
(until late in the war when they formed an ad hoc armored division there) and poorly
equipped by comparison to the Red Army they faced. Their air force was relatively small,
and because of their pilot training and replacement system, very brittle to losses as Nomohan
proved.

The Japanese made some impressive gains early in the fighting on the Nomonhan, until the USSR
reinforced the Far East Armies. If the Soviets are fighting for their lives against the Germans, there
will be no reinforcements.
As for the IJAAF, if you add in some air units from the IJN, including making a number of carrier
strikes against shore installations, I think you will find that it is the Soviets who prove to be brittle.
As a Final Note: Just to prove to everyone how Impressed Stalin was at the initial performance of his
Far Eastern Army, when the fighing was over, he had the General who had initially commanded the
Far Eastern Army liquidated.......

The Soviets could easily hold their front against the Japanese who lacked the
logistic system to support units that might engage the Soviets over something close to
80% of that front. Again, Nomohan proved that, and the Japanese never got better at
logistics support.
In the meantime, the Japanese would have to pull units from fronts in China and elsewhere
to shore up their forces in Manchukuo.
That's right. Now you are thinking. The Japanese put Chancre Jack on hold, and move some of
the armies that are giving him a shellacking into Manchuria, along with the forces that they
historically used in Malaya and the Philippines. That includes some light tanks, lots of air power,
and some really bad transport and logistical support.

So, yes, the Soviets could still pull from the Far East while fighting a static war
of attrition with Japan--a war Japan can't win.

The Soviets could NOT pull from the Far East if the Japanese have carried out air strikes on
the TSR, knocking it out of commission. If that happens, the Soviet Infantry divisions are going
to be walking across Siberia......

And, your final clause proves you haven't thought it through. THE JAPANESE DON'T HAVE TO WIN !
They don't even have to break even ! They just have to keep the Soviets from sending armies West
to Moscow. Keep them engaged, Knock out the railways, Block the Lend Lease through Vladivostock,
and Stalin has a severe pain in his nether regions !

I showed quite clearly earlier that US public opinion was in favor of a war
with Japan.
No you haven't. You showed NOTHING OF THE SORT !
All you listed were things that Freewheelin' Franklin was doing to get us ready for War - you have
left out the fact that Lindbergh was addressing cheering crowds in the tens of thousands in his
America First Campaign. And, while you may make a big deal about our sending generals and
admirals to deal with foreign officers, those are NOT Treaties ! The Congress did not support
them, and in most cases, did not even KNOW about them !

Churchill knew the score. All through 1940 and 1941, he had tried to get Roosevelt to make a
commitment in writing to fight alongside Britain. Roosevelt refused, again and again, because
he knew that the Congress would NOT go along, and the American people wouldn't either. How
many American Mothers would be willing to support a politician who wanted to send their sons
to Asia to fight for the Colonial Posessions of a Nation, The Netherlands, WHICH NO LONGER
EXISTED, AND WAS MERELY A PUPPET STATE OF NAZI GERMANY ?


About 2 out of 3 Americans were in favor of one should it start.
Yes. If the Japanese attacked the United States, then the War would start. But if the Japanese
occupied the NEI, IN EXACTLY THE SAME WAY THEY OCCUPIED FRENCH INDOCHINA, then there
would be no war! Especially if the Isolationist Mid-Western Newspapers, like the Chicago
Tribune, have front page stories showing that the Dutch Government in The Hague, has authorized
the Japanese to move forces into the NEI for the duration of the war, to protect them from
foreign interference.


“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said
this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into
any foreign wars."

- FDR, October 1940


Mr. Gardner, the text of the Budapest Memorandum committed the United States, along with
Britain, to defending the Ukraine from foreign aggression. Mr. Gardner: Do you see any U. S.
Armed Forces fighting in the Ukraine at this moment ? It is my feeling that, had the Japanese
invaded the NEI, the United States would have sent Tokyo a VERY STIFF Diplomatic Note, and
imposed more ...... Trade Sanctions....... And that would have been it......

And those with limited amateur wargaming experience (you) shouldn't be presupposing
they have some advantage over other posters.
Check the mirror. Mr. Gardner.


Respectfully:

Paul R. Ward
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#44

Post by paulrward » 23 Jun 2022, 03:33

Hello All :

Mr. OpanaPointer posted :
#42 by OpanaPointer » 22 Jun 2022 17:02
The tanks weren't very vulnerable to attack from the air. IJN pilots couldn't tell which ones
had fuel. The fuel, Bunker B, had to be heated to 135° before it would burn at all. The tanks
had floating caps that reduced available oxygen to tiny amounts. The tanks had berms around
them so any rupture would be contained. There were firefighting gear at each tank. The tanks
were .5 inches thick at the top and 1.5 inches at the bottom. The Zeros didn't have guns that
were loaded with rounds that would penetrate those tanks. The tankers could have replaced
all the fuel in 90 days, 9 could do it in thirty days.

I can go on, but Alan Zimm does it better.



The tanks weren't very vulnerable to attack from the air. The tanks were Big, White, and Round,
and had a VERY LOW TOP SPEED. That makes them like an anchored battleship - very vulnerable
to air attack.

The IJN pilots didn't need to know which ones were full. They could just bomb them all, and
let God sort them out......

Bunker B has to be heated to 135 C. Dynamite explodes at 1400 C. And the Burst effect converts
oil to a hot gas, which ignites. Just look at the photos of the Oil Storage Tanks at Ploesti, Dutch
Harbor, Darwin, and Midway. They all got bombed, they all lit on fire.

Oil Tank Fires.jpg
Oil Tank Fires


The Tanks had floating caps. So the bomb hits the outside of the tank, rips it open, and the oil is
spraying all over in a fine mist. And the atmosphere around the tank has LOTS of Oxygen -
in fact, nearly 20% of the Atmosphere is oxygen......

The Tanks had berms. The Photos of Pearl Harbor show that the Berms were only about two feet
high. And each tank had numerous pipes and lines running to them that, when ruptured by concusssion,
would flow oil like a firehose.

There was firefighting gear at each tank. And no one manning it. And if the tanks began to burn
and explode, no one would be stupid enought to try and put those fires out. Even today, the way
you put out an oil storage facility fire is to just stand back and let it burn out.

The tanks were .5 inches thick at the top, and 1.5 inches thick at the bottom. And the 20 mm cannon
on a Japanese Zero can penetrate 15mm of steel armor at 500 meters. 15 mm is greater than .5 inches.
And the cannon shells are explosive.....

The tankers could replace the fuel in 90 days, 9 could do it thirty days. OK, how are they
going to REPLACE IT ? If there is no tank farm, where will they put the oil ? Are they going to pump
it into Kīlauea Crater ? Or maybe put a big dam across the mouth of Pearl Harbor, and turn it into
a Giant LeBrea Tar Pit ?

OK, so Nagumo grows a pair, and spends the afternoon of December 7th lighting the Tank Farm on
Fire. Ninety percent of the tanks are damaged. All the Oil in them is gone. The rest of the tanks
cannot be filled, because the pumping stations, the oil lines, and the control valves are all destroyed
or damaged.
So, all these tankers come in to Pearl Harbor, loaded with Bunker B. NOW WHAT ? They can't discharge
their cargo, because there is NO TANK FARM ! So, they sit. And sit. AND SIT ! Waiting for ships to
come into Pearl Harbor with empty fuel bunkers, that they can discharge their cargo into. Pearl
Harbor has just lost any advantage it has as a forward base.


The Value of the Pearl Harbor Tank Farm was that it served as a Storage Buffer, like in a Computer -
Oil could come in and be held until needed. If you had extra oil, you put it in the Tank Farm. If
you needed more oil, you sent for more, and when it arrived, you put it in the Tank Farm.

If you have NO TANK FARM, then your tankers, instead of shuttling back and forth moving oil,
are going to be sitting like fat brown lumps in the harbor - doing nothing. Except being targets.

After the War, Admirals Kimmel, Nimitz, Layton, and Captain Pineau all unanimously agreed
that had the Japanese hit the Tank Farm on December 7th, it would have driven the USN back to
the California Coast.


I could go on, but in my opinion, Zimm is an idiot.

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#45

Post by paulrward » 23 Jun 2022, 05:10

Hello All :

Mr. Peter89 posted
#28Post by Peter89 » 22 Jun 2022 11:19
I simply can not believe that sheer overconfidence led the Japanese to believe that
they can afford to go to battle like this. They knew that the US has a lot of carriers,
and before Coral sea none was lost (Saratoga was repaired). Thus theoretically they
could encounter 4 carriers at any given time (Lexington, Yorktown, Enterprise and
Hornet). Given the disparities in air group sizes, keeping the 6 fleet carriers together
would be essential.

I am also not sure that the air groups were depleted by the time of Coral sea or Midway;
at the Aleutian campaign the Junyo carried 18 Zeroes and 18 Vals and the Ryujo 12 Zeroes
and 18 Kates.

I believe there has to be some logical explanation for the apparent misjudgement of
the situation. (It took me a really long time to understand the real reasons why the
Germans attacked the Soviets, too.) I would be especially interested in the decision
making process behind Yamamoto's strategy. What would Japan lose by waiting until,
let's say, August? They could field 6 fleet carriers, 2 carriers and 2 light carriers against
the USN's 5 fleet carriers with Coral sea, and 6 fleet carriers, 2 carriers and 3 light
carriers vs 6 fleet carriers without it. I thought the Japanese were looking for a decisive
battle.

Okay: Mr Peter89, Let me explain this to you.

There are things we know.
And there are things we don't know.
Now, there are things we know that we know,
but there are things we don't know that we know.
And, there are things we know that we don't know,
as well as things that we don't know that we don't know.
And, finally, there are things we know that we know, which are..... wrong......




Here is what the Japanese knew:

At the outbreak of the war, the USN had four fleet carriers: Lexington, Saratoga, Enterprise, and
Yorktown. There was also light carriers Ranger and Wasp, and the uncompleted fleet carrier
Hornet. This means that there were four fleet carriers and two light carriers, with the two CVLs
in the Atlantic, and the four CVAs in the Pacific.

Right after Pearl Harbor, a Japanese Submarine sank one of the Lexington Class. That leaves three.
Then, at the Coral Sea, the aircraft from the Zuikaku and Shokaku sank the other Lexington Class
carrier, and one of the two Enterprise class carriers. That leaves ONE Enterprise class carrier in
the Pacfic to oppose the Japanese attack on Midway.

This is what the Japanese knew. They did NOT know that the Saratoga had NOT been sunk.
They did NOT know that the Yorktown had NOT been sunk. And they did NOT know that the
Hornet was in the Pacific.

If they had waited, they might have run into four CVAs, and possibly even a CVL ( Wasp ) - along
with the Midway defenses, which were only going to get stronger with the passage of time.

Now, ignoring all the BS about the IJN wanting a decisive battle, What Could Yamamoto have
done to improve his chances? First, after Coral Sea, the Zuikaku was undamaged. If you
take all the aircraft from the damaged Shokaku, and transfer them and their crews to the
Zuikaku, you could put together a complete air group. ( I checked, you would have had some
aircraft to spare.)

Next, take the Zuiho and the Ryujo, and add them to the Kido Butai. Together, the two carriers
would have had about 45 aircraft, making them almost equal to a CVA. Finally, add the Chitose
and Chiyoda, and use their floatplanes as scouts each day to look for the lone USN carrier. Leave
the midget submarines in the Inland Sea. They aren't needed to take Midway. Add in all four
Kongo's, and the two Tone's, and you have a fast, ballanced force able to fight anything.

Next, take Junyo, Hosho, Taiyo, and Unyo if she is ready, and combine them into a second line
carrier squadron. They are carrying some obsolete aircraft, and they are slow, so you leave them
with the Invasion Force, escorting the transports and the supply ships. You can add Nishin to give
them some floatplane search capbility. The slower battleships will also be in this group.

This means that there will be no attack on the Aleutians. You will explain to the Army that this
will take place in July or August, after Midway is occupied.

Remind them of the passage from SunTzu - "The Tiger uses all of it's strength, even when attacking
the lowly rabbit."


That's the best way to improve your chances in the battle of Midway. Lots of Carriers, Lots of Floatplanes,
lots of options.

Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
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