Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Locked
paulrward
Member
Posts: 665
Joined: 10 Dec 2008, 21:14

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#91

Post by paulrward » 25 Jun 2022, 06:24

Hello All ;

Mr. Gardner and Mr OpanaPointer have made the statement that the Red Hill Oil Facility could have
been used, and that it's construction could have been hastened.

Wrong. There were over 3900 workers involved in building Red Hill, and after December 7th, they
worked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. You simply could not put more men into the construction,
because it was all going on underground. Packing more men into a mine will NOT make the digging
go any faster.

And, with all that work, the first tank was not completed until mid 1942, and because of the way
the facility was constructed, they could not begin filling the tanks until September 1943, when the
facility was officially opened. And, minor construction continued well into 1944, so it would have
been absolutely impossible to get Red Hill into service any faster than they actually did.



As for Mr OpanaPointer's statement about filling ships directly from tankers, THAT HAS BEEN MY
WHOLE POINT !
Imagine, if you can, that you live in a small town that is three hundred miles
from the nearest other town. There is ONE gas station in the town. Every week, a tanker truck
comes in and refills the underground tanks, and everyone fills their cars up all week. The Gas Station
is, in effect, serving as the Fuel Storage Buffer for the town.

Now, imagine that the Gas Station Blows UP ! NO MORE GAS STATION. You have two choices:
You can drive a six hundred mile round trip each week to fill your car. Which burns all the gas
going to and fro. Or, you can wait for that Tanker Truck, which comes in once per week, and
fill directly from the Tanker Truck. Which means that, ALL the cars in town will be lined up,
waiting for that tanker truck to arrive, and all will have to fuel up at the same time. Consider
the nightmarish confusion, the inconvenience, and inefficiency.

Now, replace the Small Town with Hawaii, the Gas Station with the Tank Farm, the Tanker Truck
with the fleet of Oil Tankers, and the automobiles with the Pacific Fleet. That should give
you some idea of why Admiral Chester Nimitz said:
"We had about 4.5 million barrels of oil out there and all of it was vulnerable
to .50-caliber bullets. Had the Japanese destroyed the oil, it would have prolonged
the war another two years..."
- Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet

Guys, you can argue about it all you want. But both Husband Kimmel and Chester Nimitz had
commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet - They were the real experts ! They knew what they were
talking about !


Finally a note for Mr. OpanaPointer, who apparently knows little about the history of American Politics:
The GOP was NOT the party of the KKK - the GOP was the party of Abraham Lincoln, who emancipated
the Slaves. The Party of the KKK was the DEMOCRATS , especially the Southern ' Dixie-crats ' often called
' Blue Dog Democrats ', who were the party of Racism and Bigotry. It was Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat,
who re-instituted the Jim Crow Laws in Washington D.C. during his Administration, after nearly 50 years
of our nation's capitol being fully integrated. It was Woodrow Wilson who described the motion picture,
'Birth of a Nation', a racist history of the KKK, as " HIstory Written with Lightening ! " and recomended
that all his friends go to see it !

And it wasn't towns in Indiana, it was towns in the Southern United States, dominated by the Democrats, which had signs saying, " Don't let the sun set on you in this town, N@##%r ! "

George Wallace was a Democrat. Lester Maddox was a Democrat. Strom Thurman and Jesse Helms
were both Southern Democrats. When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, a higher percentage
of Republicans voted for this landmark bill than Democrats in both the U.S. House (80% vs. 61%) and
U.S. Senate (82% vs 69%). Plus, Southern Democrats led the 74-day Filibuster that opposed this legislation.

Mr. OpanaPointer, it is one thing to study history. It is another to try to re-write it.


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#92

Post by ljadw » 25 Jun 2022, 06:55

Takao wrote:
24 Jun 2022, 22:47
ljadw wrote:
24 Jun 2022, 22:23
The same Stalin sold the Eastern Chinese Railway to Japan ,
Proving?
ljadw wrote:
24 Jun 2022, 22:23
and his pilots ( whose activities were mainly propaganda ) were withdrawn in 1939 .
A lie. They were hardly there for propaganda. Nor were they withdrawn in 1939.
ljadw wrote:
24 Jun 2022, 22:23
There was also a German military mission in China and Germany also was selling weapons to the KMT, for only one reason : to make money .
Um no. Germany was not making money selling weapons to China. You see, you cannot make money, when you are not being paid in money.
From Wiki :
'' However,since the beginning of 1939,the Soviet Union's aviation volunteer team in China had been inactive. It was withdrawn in batches in 1940.By the beginning of 1941,the Soviet Union had withdrawn all its volunteer teams . ''
The Soviet volunteer teams were withdrawn,because Stalin 's opinion was that China was not worth the risk of a war with Japan .
And I did not say that these teams were in China for propaganda. I said that their activities were mainly propaganda .
About the Germans : it is not needed to be paid in money,to make money .
Germany had to sell weapons to foreign states,because its domestic market was too small : the more weapons you can sell,the lower the average production price .If Lockheed could only produce for the US Air Force,its aircraft would cost too much .


ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#93

Post by ljadw » 25 Jun 2022, 07:21

Takao wrote:
24 Jun 2022, 22:31




Opportunities are irrelevant without motive.



ljadw wrote:
24 Jun 2022, 22:00
The only reason why Stalin attacked Japan in 1945 was that Japan was already defeated and that he wanted his part of the
booty .
Japan was not yet defeated...If Japan was defeated, they would have surrendered and the war would be over.

ljadw wrote:
24 Jun 2022, 22:00
If Japan had won,Stalin would do nothing .
If there was no PH Stalin would do nothing : he would not attack Japan .
Neither are provable, because such events never transpired. Thus, it is all pure speculation on your part.
1 Motive is irrelevant without opportunities
2 I see : you deny that Japan was already defeated in 1945 .
Nice .
3 There was no PH before December 7 1941,but still Stalin did not attack Japan before December 7 1941 .Thus : no speculation .
4 The insignificant help from Stalin to the KMT had as reason to make continue the Chinese war . The longer Chinese and Japanese were killing each other, the better for the Soviet Union .
No one could have prevented Stalin to attack Japan before June 22 1941 .But still ,he didn't do it .The reason was that
1 there was no need to attack Japan before June 1941
2 That such an attack ,if it failed, would be very bad for the USSR and that,if it was successful,it would not be good for the USSR .
Stalin did not trust his henchmen in the Kremlin, he did not trust his henchmen in Europe, he did not trust Mao or any Chinese . China had 400 million inhabitants, the USSR only 180 million,China was a potential dangerous rival .
And the facts prove(d) that Stalin was right .

Huszar666
Member
Posts: 255
Joined: 18 Dec 2021, 15:02
Location: Budakeszi

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#94

Post by Huszar666 » 25 Jun 2022, 07:27

Im not the expert on the Eastern Front, and failed to retain notes, but I have read analysis of this question. The answer lies in a confusion of what "Siberia" is. That huge ill defined region is often conflated soley with the Far Eastern or Maritime provinces of the USSR. Siberian in Soviet administration had no clear boundaries or define administrative purpose. its just a general label of all that territory to the east.

In that context the 'Siberian Divisions' were mostly formed from reservists mobilized from the industrial & agricultural settlements between the Urals and Omsk. A region unarguably in 'Siberia' but nowhere near the Soviet Far Eastern provinces or Manchuria. Some were drawn from settled regions further east, and as far as the Maritime provinces, but those were a minority.
No, I'm not talking about "Sibirian" troops (and I have found very few of them in Winter 1941 on the frontlines as it is), but about the Far Eastern Front. Facing Japanese territories. http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... front.html
Everyone always talk about how the soviets pulled out troops from the Far Eastern Front because of the non-aggression pact, and sent them to the front. It was said in this thread multiple times, and a lot of authors say the same.

But the question remains:
Which divisions were pulled out from the Far Eastern Front 1941 or 1942 or whenever?

I did check a few years back, and have found exactly zero divisions (that is NONE) that were pulled out and sent to the West.

I may have overlooked some or in the few years since then new info came to light, but the question still remains:
Which divisions were pulled out from the Far Eastern Front 1941 or 1942 or whenever?
I would be interested in the answer, simply on academic grounds.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#95

Post by ljadw » 25 Jun 2022, 10:24

glenn239 wrote:
23 Jun 2022, 22:10
ljadw wrote:
23 Jun 2022, 19:40
If the Soviets defeated the Germans, the Soviets would then attack the Japanese. So Japan attacking the USSR in 1942 was a pre-emptive war.
This is wrong .
From Peter Hende '' The Axis Powers,Japan and the Soviet Union "
''Die UdSSR hatte gar kein Interesse an einer schnellen Beilegung des Pazifischen Krieges,wollte sie doch ihren Anteil an der Beute sichern .''
Translation : The USSR was not interested in a quick end of the Pacific War, but it wanted to save guard its part of the booty.
Thus : the claim that the USSR would attack Japan after it had defeated Germany,is not correct .
It must be :
If there was a war between the USSR and Germany which ended in a German defeat and capitulation AND also a war between Japan and the USA and Britain,in which war Japan was defeated,but still had not capitulated, the USSR would intervene to have its part of the booty .
Stalin would do what Mussolini did in June 1940 .
This means also that Stalin had not decided in 1941 or 1942 to attack Japan as soon as possible : there were too many imponderabilia Stalin could not foresee .

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#96

Post by glenn239 » 25 Jun 2022, 16:11

ljadw wrote:
24 Jun 2022, 20:08
Japan was also doomed if Germany had defeated the Soviets .Hiroshima and Nagasaki had nothing to do with the outcome of Barbarossa .
Had Germany defeated the USSR all the initial A-bomb strikes would have been against Germany and not Japan.

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#97

Post by glenn239 » 25 Jun 2022, 16:19

OpanaPointer wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 01:04
Regarding fuel for the US Fleet at Oahu, tankers would have, if needed, directly fueled the ships. I mentioned the 30 day and 90 day resupplying of the tanks around Pearl. Two more on a continuous cycle could have been used for direct replenishment. Of course this would have been exploited after a crash program to finish it.
The battleship force was knocked out, so that freed up much of the oil demand. The replacement battleships would operate from California for the time being, or even could base in Hawaii to act as oil storage facilities for the rest of the fleet. Nimitz may have to cut back on his island raids in the first months of the war in order to conserve fuel, but this would open up the opportunity of better training of his carrier air wings in Hawaii.

The overall strategic effect of the loss of the oil tanks in the historical Japanese southern drive is minimal because the Japanese were not pressing eastwards immediately. Bombing the tanks would only have had a large operational effect had the Japanese gone for Hawaii at the start of the war. This was all covered 15 years ago in my thread, now buried in the back pages here somewhere. (I believe in the end moderator locked the thread because it kept resurfacing).

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#98

Post by glenn239 » 25 Jun 2022, 16:24

ljadw wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 07:21
.
No one could have prevented Stalin to attack Japan before June 22 1941 .But still ,he didn't do it .The reason was that
1 there was no need to attack Japan before June 1941
No, the reason was that the Soviets were afraid of a two front war with Japan and Germany. That's why we are discussing the premise of Japan attacking the USSR after securing oil supplies in the NEI, in order to bring about the 2 front war that the Soviets were afraid of.

historygeek2021
Member
Posts: 641
Joined: 17 Dec 2020, 07:23
Location: Australia

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#99

Post by historygeek2021 » 25 Jun 2022, 16:46

Huszar666 wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 07:27

Which divisions were pulled out from the Far Eastern Front 1941?
Walter Dunn lists the following divisions transferred from the Far Eastern Front in 1941 in Stalin's Keys to Victory, page 82:

21st Rifle Division (transferred to 7th Army facing the Finns in Sept 1941)
26th Rifle Division (transferred to 11th Army in Northwestern Front in Sept 1941)
32nd Rifle Division (transferred to Stavka Reserve 4th Army in Sept 1941)
78th Rifle Division (transferred to Western Front in Oct 1941)
413th Rifle Division (transferred to 50th Army in Bryansk Front in Oct 1941)
239th Rifle Division (transferred to 10th Army in Nov 1941)

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#100

Post by ljadw » 25 Jun 2022, 17:01

glenn239 wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 16:11
ljadw wrote:
24 Jun 2022, 20:08
Japan was also doomed if Germany had defeated the Soviets .Hiroshima and Nagasaki had nothing to do with the outcome of Barbarossa .
Had Germany defeated the USSR all the initial A-bomb strikes would have been against Germany and not Japan.
NO : if the war in Europe was going on in August 1945 ,even without a German or Soviet victory,Germany would be nuked .
And, if after the nuking of Germany,Japan refused to capitulate , it would be the turn of Japan to be nuked .

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#101

Post by ljadw » 25 Jun 2022, 17:11

glenn239 wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 16:24
ljadw wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 07:21
.
No one could have prevented Stalin to attack Japan before June 22 1941 .But still ,he didn't do it .The reason was that
1 there was no need to attack Japan before June 1941
No, the reason was that the Soviets were afraid of a two front war with Japan and Germany. That's why we are discussing the premise of Japan attacking the USSR after securing oil supplies in the NEI, in order to bring about the 2 front war that the Soviets were afraid of.
Thee is no proof for your claim that the Soviets were afraid of a two front war and there is also no proof that a war with Japan would result in a war with Germany .When there was border fighting between Japan and the USSR ,Hitler did not attack the Soviets .Besides : it would be suicidal for Japan to attack the SU, because Hitler would do nothing and Japan could not defend herself against the US,if it attacked the Soviets .

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#102

Post by ljadw » 25 Jun 2022, 17:32

historygeek2021 wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 16:46
Huszar666 wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 07:27

Which divisions were pulled out from the Far Eastern Front 1941?
Walter Dunn lists the following divisions transferred from the Far Eastern Front in 1941 in Stalin's Keys to Victory, page 82:

21st Rifle Division (transferred to 7th Army facing the Finns in Sept 1941)
26th Rifle Division (transferred to 11th Army in Northwestern Front in Sept 1941)
32nd Rifle Division (transferred to Stavka Reserve 4th Army in Sept 1941)
78th Rifle Division (transferred to Western Front in Oct 1941)
413th Rifle Division (transferred to 50th Army in Bryansk Front in Oct 1941)
239th Rifle Division (transferred to 10th Army in Nov 1941)
I have different figures :from the Far East came
the following Rifle Divisions belonging to the 24 st Army
91
119
166
107
133
178
91 and 166 were destroyed in October and the others existed only in name in October .
Thus their role in the defensive battle of Moscow was almost non existent .
Source : the Siberian Divisions and the Battle for Moscow 1941-1942.

historygeek2021
Member
Posts: 641
Joined: 17 Dec 2020, 07:23
Location: Australia

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#103

Post by historygeek2021 » 25 Jun 2022, 17:42

ljadw wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 17:32


I have different figures :from the Far East came
the following Rifle Divisions belonging to the 24 st Army
91
119
166
107
133
178
91 and 166 were destroyed in October and the others existed only in name in October .
Thus their role in the defensive battle of Moscow was almost non existent .
Source : the Siberian Divisions and the Battle for Moscow 1941-1942.
These divisions were already assigned to the 24th Army on June 22, 1941. The 24th Army was not in the Soviet Far East, but was formed in the Siberian Military District and was already in the process of transferring to the Moscow Military District when the German invasion began, per orders issued on May 13, 1941.

http://www.soldat.ru/files/f/boevojsostavsa1941.pdf

Peter89
Member
Posts: 2369
Joined: 28 Aug 2018, 06:52
Location: Europe

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#104

Post by Peter89 » 25 Jun 2022, 17:55

glenn239 wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 16:19
OpanaPointer wrote:
25 Jun 2022, 01:04
Regarding fuel for the US Fleet at Oahu, tankers would have, if needed, directly fueled the ships. I mentioned the 30 day and 90 day resupplying of the tanks around Pearl. Two more on a continuous cycle could have been used for direct replenishment. Of course this would have been exploited after a crash program to finish it.
The battleship force was knocked out, so that freed up much of the oil demand. The replacement battleships would operate from California for the time being, or even could base in Hawaii to act as oil storage facilities for the rest of the fleet. Nimitz may have to cut back on his island raids in the first months of the war in order to conserve fuel, but this would open up the opportunity of better training of his carrier air wings in Hawaii.

The overall strategic effect of the loss of the oil tanks in the historical Japanese southern drive is minimal because the Japanese were not pressing eastwards immediately. Bombing the tanks would only have had a large operational effect had the Japanese gone for Hawaii at the start of the war. This was all covered 15 years ago in my thread, now buried in the back pages here somewhere. (I believe in the end moderator locked the thread because it kept resurfacing).
I really liked that thread!

In my opinion, the Japanese should have known by the example of Taranto (and by Mers el Kébir) that an attack on a battle fleet in a shallow harbor does not mean the end of the said battle fleet. Catastrophic explosions are hard to achieve (on anything but a British battlecruiser) so the only chance was to capture the port where the ships were hit.

So essentially Japanese chances boiled down to the swift capture of the Hawaii Islands.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
Member
Posts: 2369
Joined: 28 Aug 2018, 06:52
Location: Europe

Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#105

Post by Peter89 » 25 Jun 2022, 18:15

As for the Siberian units: the transfer of units from the Far Eastern, Transbaikal, etc. military districts were steady and enormous, I suggest to read this ( viewtopic.php?f=79&t=149223 ) and many other related threads.

Ljdaw's number is incorrect, 28 is the number of rifle and cavalry divisions, but there were others like the
58th Tank Division, 60th Tank Division and the 112th Tank Division; artillery regiments and other units; tens and hundreds of thousands of men and matériel.

Whether these units were decisive in the Battle of Moscow or not is questionable: the Wehrmacht was on its last legs anyway, but these units certainly contributed to the German defeat.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Locked

Return to “What if”