Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

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ljadw
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#121

Post by ljadw » 26 Jun 2022, 15:00

The Soviet Union was neutral after PH, thus why should Japan antagonize a neutral country ?
The Pacific LL supplies for the USSR were used to fight against Germany, not against Japan .
The fact that the Soviets could not defeat Japan before 1944 ( and also after 1944 ) does not mean that a war with the Soviets was good for Japan .

glenn239
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#122

Post by glenn239 » 26 Jun 2022, 15:50

Peter89 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 08:54
June 1941 would be the worst date for Japan to attack the SU. The Soviet Far Eastern forces gradually weakened between June 1941 and June 1942 and most likely the Japanese would lose against the Soviets in June 1941. It is also questionable how much impact could the Japanese have on the German operations in the SU.
A Japanese attack on the USSR in June 1941 means that Japan does not occupy Southern Indochina. The diplomatic repercussions with the US from this move not happening could be profound, as it was the occupation of the remainder of Indochina that set the US and Japan on a collision course for war. I doubt Japanese war with the USSR would have as profound an impact on US opinion. And, furthermore, since Japanese forces in China would have to be drawn down for war against the Soviets, the Japanese could ease tensions with the US by withdrawing from parts of China even while reinforcing in the north.

What effect a Japanese war would have on the German offensive can be questioned, but the fact will be that the German offensive will be more successful, at least to some degree.


Peter89
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#123

Post by Peter89 » 26 Jun 2022, 16:50

glenn239 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 15:50
Peter89 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 08:54
June 1941 would be the worst date for Japan to attack the SU. The Soviet Far Eastern forces gradually weakened between June 1941 and June 1942 and most likely the Japanese would lose against the Soviets in June 1941. It is also questionable how much impact could the Japanese have on the German operations in the SU.
A Japanese attack on the USSR in June 1941 means that Japan does not occupy Southern Indochina. The diplomatic repercussions with the US from this move not happening could be profound, as it was the occupation of the remainder of Indochina that set the US and Japan on a collision course for war. I doubt Japanese war with the USSR would have as profound an impact on US opinion. And, furthermore, since Japanese forces in China would have to be drawn down for war against the Soviets, the Japanese could ease tensions with the US by withdrawing from parts of China even while reinforcing in the north.

What effect a Japanese war would have on the German offensive can be questioned, but the fact will be that the German offensive will be more successful, at least to some degree.
I doubt that in 1941 the US would be able to stay neutral for long: it started deliveries to Britain and the Soviets already. What the Axis diplomacy could achieve was delaying the American military appearence by maybe a year.

Thus when Hitler rolled the dice and attacked the Soviet Union, nothing but a quick and complete victory would suffice.

If Japan would be able to pin down substantial Soviet forces, the Germans could still not win. The problem lay in the distances and resources involved; the former was too large, the latter was too little for the Germans. Even if the last major effort of 1941 was successful (Moscow encircled), Leningrad, Sevastopol, the Caucasus, the Urals, etc. would still stand and even if the Soviet attack doesn't crush them, their troops would be exhausted and depleted by the spring. Barbarossa was simply a bad plan and Japan could not make it right.

But yes, Japan could help the Germans to some degree. It is very much interesting how little the Axis cooperated and there was certainly a huge potential in that.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Huszar666
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#124

Post by Huszar666 » 26 Jun 2022, 16:59

A Japanese attack on the USSR in June 1941 means that Japan does not occupy Southern Indochina. The diplomatic repercussions with the US from this move not happening could be profound, as it was the occupation of the remainder of Indochina that set the US and Japan on a collision course for war. I doubt Japanese war with the USSR would have as profound an impact on US opinion. And, furthermore, since Japanese forces in China would have to be drawn down for war against the Soviets, the Japanese could ease tensions with the US by withdrawing from parts of China even while reinforcing in the north.

What effect a Japanese war would have on the German offensive can be questioned, but the fact will be that the German offensive will be more successful, at least to some degree.
1, there was NOTHING as raw materials in the soviet Far East, only that little bit of oil on Sakhalin - and stalin already sold a good part of that to the Japanese
2, Japan could not win against the soviets. Not in 1939, not in 1940, 1941, 1942 or whenever. Even after redeploying a FEW divisions to the West, the soviets were STILL stronger than Japan could possibly throw against them
3, there was NO meaningfull redeployment to the West, not in 1941 or later

Japan attacking the soviets would net them exactly zero gains, only problems and further strain on their ressources. Japan attacking the soviets would influence the main Front and the Germans only in a miniscule way.

Even IF we assume, that the Japanese did not occupy French Indochina and thus weren't put on a "collision course" with the US, that would be only temporary. IF and WHEN the US found a way to enter the war, Japan would be in no position to do anything - everything would be tied up in China and the su.
The US could reenact Perry for all that would remain.
Even if the US did not enter the war, and "just" put an oil embargo in effect for whatever reason, Japan would be f***ed. With everything tied up in China and the su, they would not be able to try a quick grab in the South...

Peter89
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#125

Post by Peter89 » 26 Jun 2022, 17:10

Huszar666 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 16:59
3, there was NO meaningfull redeployment to the West, not in 1941 or later
Why do you keep repeating this? It is not true.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Takao
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#126

Post by Takao » 26 Jun 2022, 17:42

Peter89 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 17:10
Huszar666 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 16:59
3, there was NO meaningfull redeployment to the West, not in 1941 or later
Why do you keep repeating this? It is not true.
Might want to read this. 11 Divisions were transferred in June, 1941. Many were either in transit or already had the orders for transit when the Germans invaded. So, a Japanese "phoney war" would not affect them. The other mass move ment was 9 divisions in October. Of the Divisions sent West, only 4 participated in the defence of Moscow.

https://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the ... n-1941-42/

Peter89
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#127

Post by Peter89 » 26 Jun 2022, 18:04

Takao wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 17:42
Peter89 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 17:10
Huszar666 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 16:59
3, there was NO meaningfull redeployment to the West, not in 1941 or later
Why do you keep repeating this? It is not true.
Might want to read this. 11 Divisions were transferred in June, 1941. Many were either in transit or already had the orders for transit when the Germans invaded. So, a Japanese "phoney war" would not affect them. The other mass move ment was 9 divisions in October. Of the Divisions sent West, only 4 participated in the defence of Moscow.

https://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the ... n-1941-42/
Yes I know this site, but it is obviously wrong, like ljdaw's source. For example, it does not list the 112th Tank Division, which fought in the Battle of Moscow and were transferred from the far east. Most of these demystifying sources do not have any solid references to tank and artillery units or archival sources so I'd take them with a bucket of salt.

Moreover, we are talking about "divisions" here; a term I battled many times in TMP's era too. AFAIK quite a lot of the transfers from the "Siberian" units actually meant stripping eastern units of men and matériel, and not the transfer of the "whole division" staff units.

Once I had a debate about this with a Russian friend of mine, who pretty thoroughly convinced me that enormous redeployment of force actually happened for one year and the quality and equipment of the eastern forces got back to its june 1941 level about two years later.

I think we all lack access to relevant papers, but even if it was easy, there would be little chance to double-check and cross-reference the said sources. I also think that it is very problematic to say that X division did not participate in the battle of Moscow so it didn't matter. But the core of the problem remains: one group says that the arrival of the Siberian forces turned the tide of the Battle of Moscow, and probably the entire campaign, thus maybe the entire war. The other group says that there were practically or literally no Siberian forces in the Battle of Moscow.

I believe both groups are wrong. The Germans could not win the Battle of Moscow, and even if they could, they could not win the campaign. But yes, substantial forces and equipment arrived from the eastern districts, which would be missed by the Soviets if they had to be used against the Japanese.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#128

Post by Huszar666 » 26 Jun 2022, 18:21

Yes I know this site, but it is obviously wrong, like ljdaw's source. For example, it does not list the 112th Tank Division, which fought in the Battle of Moscow and were transferred from the far east.
No, it was not. The 100-Series Tank Divisions were war-raised, and in case of the 112th it was converted from parts of the 239th motRD - which in turn was redeployed to the west in November 1941. So, you are counting it double.
From the 17 RDs of the Far Eastern Front, only 4 were transfered, from the 5 fast divisions 2 were redeployed early and 2 in October/November.
From the 4 RDs of TRansbaikal MD 3 were redeployed, from the 5 fast divisions 2 were redeployed.
None of the Fortified Regions were redeployed.
But yes, substantial forces and equipment arrived from the eastern districts, which would be missed by the Soviets if they had to be used against the Japanese.
And even so, there was still enough to thwart any Japanese excursion at any given time.

Peter89
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#129

Post by Peter89 » 26 Jun 2022, 18:52

Huszar666 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 18:21
Yes I know this site, but it is obviously wrong, like ljdaw's source. For example, it does not list the 112th Tank Division, which fought in the Battle of Moscow and were transferred from the far east.
No, it was not. The 100-Series Tank Divisions were war-raised,
So what? Was it raised in the east during the war, or in the west?
Huszar666 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 18:21
and in case of the 112th it was converted from parts of the 239th motRD - which in turn was redeployed to the west in November 1941.
So it was an eastern division deployed to the west before the battle of Moscow?
Huszar666 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 18:21
So, you are counting it double.


Why would I double count 1 division as 1 division?
Huszar666 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 18:21
From the 17 RDs of the Far Eastern Front, only 4 were transfered, from the 5 fast divisions 2 were redeployed early and 2 in October/November.
From the 4 RDs of TRansbaikal MD 3 were redeployed, from the 5 fast divisions 2 were redeployed.
None of the Fortified Regions were redeployed.
I don't have the exact numbers at hand, and like I wrote, I think nobody really does. I also wrote that "division" is a hollow term; there were subunit-transfers and other transfers than Rifle divisions and "fast divisions".

If someone wants to make a case that the siberian troops played little to no part in the battle of Moscow, he has to give the number of soldiers and the quality/quantity of the matériel transferred from the east to the west.
Huszar666 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 18:21
And even so, there was still enough to thwart any Japanese excursion at any given time.
I am no expert of the opposing armies, but it doesnt really seem to be an in-depth analysis.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

historygeek2021
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#130

Post by historygeek2021 » 26 Jun 2022, 19:21

Peter89 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 18:04
AFAIK quite a lot of the transfers from the "Siberian" units actually meant stripping eastern units of men and matériel, and not the transfer of the "whole division" staff units.
Can you give a source for this?

Also, it would help the conversation if you stopped conflating "Siberian" with "Far East". The Soviet Far Eastern forces (not the Siberian forces) were the ones deployed against Japan. The Siberian forces were in a separate internal military district.

If a division was raised in the Far East after Barbarossa and sent west, that doesn't detract from the pre-Barbarossa strength of the Far Eastern forces, which was more than adequate to fend off the Japanese.

Peter89
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#131

Post by Peter89 » 26 Jun 2022, 19:33

historygeek2021 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 19:21
Peter89 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 18:04
AFAIK quite a lot of the transfers from the "Siberian" units actually meant stripping eastern units of men and matériel, and not the transfer of the "whole division" staff units.
Can you give a source for this?

Also, it would help the conversation if you stopped conflating "Siberian" with "Far East". The Soviet Far Eastern forces (not the Siberian forces) were the ones deployed against Japan. The Siberian forces were in a separate internal military district.

If a division was raised in the Far East after Barbarossa and sent west, that doesn't detract from the pre-Barbarossa strength of the Far Eastern forces, which was more than adequate to fend off the Japanese.
I'm gonna take a look into it. (Now I'm in Freiburg and gonna be on the road until mid July so I can't assemble my computer until then.) IIRC there were a lot of improvisations, like a June 1941 division gave up part of its equipment and cadre to the newly formed units, then those units were sent to the west. Sometimes the equipment was taken to the west for newly formed units.

Btw I am open to be convinced that this has not happened because the last time I had this debate we concluded that there is no definitive and direct source that could prove the Soviet railway cargo and the transfer of men. Thus even the primary sources are indirect. Maybe Art or Yuri or someone who's educated on Russian sources could help us here.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

ljadw
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#132

Post by ljadw » 26 Jun 2022, 20:01

Peter89 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 18:52


If someone wants to make a case that the siberian troops played little to no part in the battle of Moscow, he has to give the number of soldiers and the quality/quantity of the matériel transferred from the east to the west.


[/quote]

The transfer of men and material from the ''east ''(what is the east ?) to the ''west ''(what is the west ? ) does not mean that these men and this material were deployed in the Moscow region and ,if they were deployed there, that they played part in the Battle of Moscow .
Besides :there were 2 Battles of Moscow :the defensive one (October-December 1941) which was a Soviet success and the offensive one (December 1941-March 1942 ) which was a Soviet failure .
Last point : if one looks at the population figures for ''west '' and ''east '''it is obvious that the overwhelming part of the forces who fought in the Battles of Moscow,came from the ''west''(= the region west of the Urals )

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T. A. Gardner
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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#133

Post by T. A. Gardner » 26 Jun 2022, 20:28

Here's the real question for a Sino-Soviet war.

In all of this, What does Japan stand to gain--FOR CERTAIN--from engaging in a war with Russia? That is, there is no clear or compelling reason for the Japanese to go to war with Russia just to help the Germans potentially win their war with Russia.
Japan gains no real, viable resources from it.
The theater of operations is by its geography alone hostile to a Japanese offensive.
Japan still risks losing access to vital resources in SE Asia.
Japan is still stuck in a war with China that's draining serious resources.
Germany cannot offer anything up front to really help Japan economically or militarily.

So, what possible reason--from the Japanese standpoint--should Japan support Germany in a war against Russia?

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#134

Post by ljadw » 26 Jun 2022, 20:37

Nigel Askey gives for the Far Eastern Front the following strength
23 divisions ,of which 3 tank and 2 mechanized ones,with 3200 tanks and a manpower of 500000 men .

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Re: Best Japanese strategic choice with hindsight

#135

Post by ljadw » 26 Jun 2022, 20:46

glenn239 wrote:
26 Jun 2022, 15:50


but the fact will be that the German offensive will be more successful, at least to some degree.
Why :
Initially : Hitler ordered not to inform Japan of Barbarossa .
When Barbarossa had failed in the Summer, he desperately hoped for a Japanese intervention .
If the 150 German divisions needed the help of a few Japanese divisions to defeat the 400 + Soviet divisions ,this was a proof that it was over for the Germans .

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