MacArthur dies 1938

[Carl Schwamberger]

You can't mobilize your forces (including 100000 civilians ),impose martial law and disrupt the economy because someone is saying :

The US Mobilized over 1,600,000 men for the US Army and more for the Navy & disrupt the economy in the autumn of 1940, without any war warning, or immediate threat from anyone. Ordering 300,000+ National Guards & Army/Navy Reservists into active Federal Service & reviving conscription was not popular but it was done without much fuss in 1940.

[ljadw]

US and the Philippines were two totally different worlds .The Philippines were still living in the Middle Ages.52 % of the population was illiterate and only 27 % of a population of 17 million could speak English .
To mobilize 100000 men who could speak English and could read or write would result in very big problems for the economy of the Philippines . And ,who would pay for this mobilization . There were no replacements for these 100000 .
Besides :why should one mobilize them ?
Saying that Japan could attack at any moment,is not a valid reason ;a proof that Japan would attack would be a reason, but there was no such proof .
Putin can also attack at any moment, but without a proof that he will attack, no country will mobilize .

[Takao]

US and the Philippines were two totally different worlds .The Philippines were still living in the Middle Ages.52 % of the population was illiterate and only 27 % of a population of 17 million could speak English .

You do not need to be literate to know what end of the gun the bullet comes out of.

You also do not need to be literate to know how to aim a rifle.

Of course, we must question the literacy rate...52% is that the literacy rate in English only? Or is 52%, 25% literate in English, 25% literate in Tagalog, 2% literate in Spanish?
A 52% literacy rate is meaningless without context.


What good is speaking English, if your Filipino instructor speaks only Tagalog?

To mobilize 100000 men who could speak English and could read or write would result in very big problems for the economy of the Philippines .

Again, who said only English speakers were mobilized?
Do you have any proof this was so?

And ,who would pay for this mobilization .

Who would pay for the mobilization? The US and the Philippines would would...Duh!...The money came from the President's Emergency Fund, and the Sugar Excise fund, as well as other funds specified for military use by the Philippines.

To mobilize 100000 men who could speak English and could read or write would result in very big problems for the economy of the Philippines . There were no replacements for these 100000 .

100,000 men would cause big problems with the economy?
Huh? 100,000 men is less than 2.5% of the population.
Where is your proof of these alleged "big economic problems"?

Besides :why should one mobilize them ?
Saying that Japan could attack at any moment,is not a valid reason ;a proof that Japan would attack would be a reason, but there was no such proof .

As has been said before, one does not need a War Warning to mobilize.

If you knew your Pacific War history...You would know that Dugout Doug mobilized the Philippine Army on September 1, 1941.
Now, can ljadw produce a "War Warning" for August 25, 1941?
August 15, 1941? July 25, 1941?
Can ljadw produce a "War Warning" for any time prior to September 1, 1941?

[T. A. Gardner]

US and the Philippines were two totally different worlds .The Philippines were still living in the Middle Ages.52 % of the population was illiterate and only 27 % of a population of 17 million could speak English .

For an infantryman, illiteracy was an irrelevancy. Infantry at least through 1945 could be trained by rote and little more. Sure, literate soldiers were better and could do more, but infantry could be trained to be effective in combat without that.
The problem wasn't literacy for the PA, it was that units were slapped together without regard for language. Had those running the show taken action to put troops with the same language or dialect into separate units, be they at the battalion or whatever level, that problem could have been largely avoided.

To mobilize 100000 men who could speak English and could read or write would result in very big problems for the economy of the Philippines . And ,who would pay for this mobilization . There were no replacements for these 100000 .
Besides :why should one mobilize them ?
Saying that Japan could attack at any moment,is not a valid reason ;a proof that Japan would attack would be a reason, but there was no such proof .
Putin can also attack at any moment, but without a proof that he will attack, no country will mobilize .

These troops weren't being asked to quote Shakespeare, they were to be infantry for the most part. You take the smartest ones and stick them in positions that require more intellect. Those that can read and write get put in positions requiring those skills. The illiterate and stupid become rifle toting cannon fodder.

There are plenty of stories from the early 1940's of illiterate sergeants in the US Army, holdovers from peacetime. They knew their job inside and out and relied on a company or platoon clerk to get the paperwork done. There is no reason the PA couldn't have been managed better and trained sufficiently to carry out their operations successfully. The biggest roadblock to that was time, not the quality of the recruits.

Oh, as for pay, Congress authorized $52 million out of excise taxes to pay for it. $32 million was to go to raising and paying the PA, while the other $20 million was for raising an air force and infrastructure. So, the money was there.

[ljadw]

Money does not mean resources .Notwithstanding these $32 million (when was it authorized and available ? ) the PA still used the 1903 Springfield and 1914 Enfield rifles (and was there enough ammunition for these rifles ? )
Everything the PA needed had to be produced in the US and transported from the US to the Philippines, thousands of km away . In November, 1100000 tons of equipment with as destination the Philippines,were still piled up in the US ports. Most of them never arrived at their destination .

[T. A. Gardner]

Money does not mean resources .Notwithstanding these $32 million (when was it authorized and available ? ) the PA still used the 1903 Springfield and 1914 Enfield rifles (and was there enough ammunition for these rifles ? )
Everything the PA needed had to be produced in the US and transported from the US to the Philippines, thousands of km away . In November, 1100000 tons of equipment with as destination the Philippines,were still piled up in the US ports. Most of them never arrived at their destination .

Rifles and ammunition for them were one of the few things not in short supply to the PA. In this respect, the US could have supplied more obsolescent equipment to the PA than they did. There were barely sufficient machineguns (older model Brownings but the US could have shipped a quantity of the old Colt "Potato Diggers" or even the nasty Chauchats they had lying about to help). There was one BAR per platoon in 1941.
The old Brandt 3" mortar was issued to the PA and there were 75mm field guns available but not in sufficient quantity to fully outfit every division.
The other shortage was in motor vehicles. I would think that a combination of impressing civilian vehicles and using horse drawn equipment could have made some of that up, but it was definitely a problem.

The problem in getting stuff to the PI was mainly one of how the US Army was procuring shipping space. They were buying this from what little excess existed in the US market at the time and didn't want to impact civilian shipping space prior to the outbreak of the war. This meant that there were relatively few merchant ships available to haul military goods and those that were were doing it at a premium.
The US government could have just appropriated more shipping space, but they didn't. Again, peacetime thinking interfered here.

[Takao]

Money does not mean resources .

You asked "And ,who would pay for this mobilization ."
Which means money.

You did not ask "And, how was it going to be done?"
Which means resources.

Notwithstanding these $32 million (when was it authorized and available ? ) the PA still used the 1903 Springfield and 1914 Enfield rifles (and was there enough ammunition for these rifles ? )

Yes, the funds were authorized and available. The President's Emergency Fund was available immediately and was used until the rest of the funding was authorized and available.

The 1903 & the M1917 Enfield both used .30-06 ammunition of which there was more than plenty. The Philippines also had the Lewis machine-gun which also used .30-06.

Everything the PA needed had to be produced in the US and transported from the US to the Philippines, thousands of km away . In November, 1100000 tons of equipment with as destination the Philippines,were still piled up in the US ports. Most of them never arrived at their destination .

Yes.

Lend-Lease was underway, so shipping space was at a premium, especially long-haul shipping. Don't forget that the Philippines were not the only place that needed supplies. In the beginning, Hawaii was given precedence for supplies, this was later changed to the Philippines being given priority.


Again, I am still waiting for your "PROOF" of a WAR WARNING being sent to MacArthur prior to September 1, 1941.

[Carl Schwamberger]

It looks to me like theres a false premise in the last page or two of this discussion. That is MacArthur had the unilateral power to mobilize the Philippines Army in 1940 or 1941. During most of that time he worked for the PI government. In practical terms the US Congress had divested PI & Roosevelts actions reflected that policy. Quezon & the rest of the policy makers in PI understood perfectly the USN assessment that PI was indefensible, and they understood the implication of War Plan ORANGE, and the RAINBOW plans. That left them with the rather desperate hope they could claim neutrality and avoid a Japanese invasion. That is Quezons government had two really bad choices & not much else.

Mac did in the closing months of 1941 reacquire some power independent of Queszon, specifically after appointment as commander of US forces in the region, and those forces becoming something more than the PI Scouts Regiment. In practical terms his ability to mobilize those US forces was confined to badgering Stimson for more and faster reinforcement and supplies. He had some limited options in increasing training for the US forces but that was it. On the side of the PI military he was constrained by the policy of Quezons government. That in both broad and limited terms a political minefield of extreme complexity. But, the bottom line is the PI government did nothing effective to mobilize their army beyond what they did OTL. Bottom line here mobilization was not Macs decision.

[ljadw]

It looks to me like theres a false premise in the last page or two of this discussion. That is MacArthur had the unilateral power to mobilize the Philippines Army in 1940 or 1941. During most of that time he worked for the PI government. In practical terms the US Congress had divested PI & Roosevelts actions reflected that policy. Quezon & the rest of the policy makers in PI understood perfectly the USN assessment that PI was indefensible, and they understood the implication of War Plan ORANGE, and the RAINBOW plans. That left them with the rather desperate hope they could claim neutrality and avoid a Japanese invasion. That is Quezons government had two really bad choices & not much else.

Mac did in the closing months of 1941 reacquire some power independent of Queszon, specifically after appointment as commander of US forces in the region, and those forces becoming something more than the PI Scouts Regiment. In practical terms his ability to mobilize those US forces was confined to badgering Stimson for more and faster reinforcement and supplies. He had some limited options in increasing training for the US forces but that was it. On the side of the PI military he was constrained by the policy of Quezons government. That in both broad and limited terms a political minefield of extreme complexity. But, the bottom line is the PI government did nothing effective to mobilize their army beyond what they did OTL. Bottom line here mobilization was not Macs decision.

The conclusion is that it is wrong to say that MacArthur was responsible for everything that was going wrong .

[Carl Schwamberger]

I was referring specifically to the 'mobilization' of PI & US military.

[ljadw]

Money does not mean resources .

You asked "And ,who would pay for this mobilization ."
Which means money.

You did not ask "And, how was it going to be done?"
Which means resources.

Notwithstanding these $32 million (when was it authorized and available ? ) the PA still used the 1903 Springfield and 1914 Enfield rifles (and was there enough ammunition for these rifles ? )

Yes, the funds were authorized and available. The President's Emergency Fund was available immediately and was used until the rest of the funding was authorized and available.

The 1903 & the M1917 Enfield both used .30-06 ammunition of which there was more than plenty. The Philippines also had the Lewis machine-gun which also used .30-06.

Everything the PA needed had to be produced in the US and transported from the US to the Philippines, thousands of km away . In November, 1100000 tons of equipment with as destination the Philippines,were still piled up in the US ports. Most of them never arrived at their destination .

Yes.

Lend-Lease was underway, so shipping space was at a premium, especially long-haul shipping. Don't forget that the Philippines were not the only place that needed supplies. In the beginning, Hawaii was given precedence for supplies, this was later changed to the Philippines being given priority.


Again, I am still waiting for your "PROOF" of a WAR WARNING being sent to MacArthur prior to September 1, 1941.

$ 32 million or $ 20 million are meaningless figures :$ 32 million does not result in more resources than $ 20 million, it could be the opposite .
It took months to decide what and how much would be produced.
It took months and a lot of political intrigues to decide who would produce what .
It took months to produce what was decided .
It took months to transport everything to the Philippines.
It took months to learn illiterate soldiers, NCOs and officers how to use these weapons nobody had ever seen : most soldiers had never seen a functioning artillery piece .
The commander of the 31st Philippine ID said the following :
The enlisted men are proficient in only 2 things
1 When an officer appears,to yell ''attention '' in a loud voice,jump up and salute
2 to demand three meals per day .
MacArthur commanded 16643 American soldiers and some 120000 Philippine soldiers .
But of course,for the Mac Arthur haters,everything that went wrong,was the fault of MacArthur. And when he left the Philippines on the order of FDR, he was a coward :Dugout Doug .
No other general would have done better than MacArthur in the Philippines .

[LineDoggie]

There were barely sufficient machineguns (older model Brownings but the US could have shipped a quantity of the old Colt "Potato Diggers" or even the nasty Chauchats they had lying about to help).

There were very few CSRG Mle. 1915 8mm and later Model 1917 .30 Chauchats still in possession by the USA in 1940-41. those still in inventory were at APG as samples for Ordnance testing.

The problem with shipping potato diggers and chauchats lying about is that automatic weapons need spare parts and your talking about 2 systems which went out of US Inventory in 1919.

[Takao]

$ 32 million or $ 20 million are meaningless figures :$ 32 million does not result in more resources than $ 20 million, it could be the opposite .

Only in ljadw's Opposite World...However, this is not taking place in ljadw's Opposite World.

It took months to decide what and how much would be produced.
It took months and a lot of political intrigues to decide who would produce what .
It took months to produce what was decided .

Well, we do know these are all lies/figments of ljadw's imagination.

Why? Because ljadw told us so.

In November, 1100000 tons of equipment with as destination the Philippines,were still piled up in the US ports.

That's why.

Because 1,100,000 tons of equipment destined for the Philippines would not have been piled up in US Ports if his months, and months, and months, were true.

So, the question becomes...Why did ljadw contradict himself?

It took months to transport everything to the Philippines.

ljadw's only truthful statement.

It took months to learn illiterate soldiers, NCOs and officers how to use these weapons nobody had ever seen : most soldiers had never seen a functioning artillery piece .

Wonder why Dugout Doug thought he could hold the Philippines an defeat the Japanese then.

The commander of the 31st Philippine ID said the following :
The enlisted men are proficient in only 2 things
1 When an officer appears,to yell ''attention '' in a loud voice,jump up and salute
2 to demand three meals per day .

The "commanding officer" undoubtedly was an American who could neither read, write, or speak the local Philippine languages - Likely, he also made no effort to learn either.
Not much of a "commanding officer", if he cannot communicate with the men he is supposed to lead.

MacArthur commanded 16643 American soldiers and some 120000 Philippine soldiers .
But of course,for the Mac Arthur haters,everything that went wrong,was the fault of MacArthur. And when he left the Philippines on the order of FDR, he was a coward :Dugout Doug .
No other general would have done better than MacArthur in the Philippines .

Everything that went wrong? No, just those things that went wrong that MacArthur had control over.

No general could have done worse than MacArthur, some certainly would have done better.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Mr. Takao posted:

The "commanding officer" undoubtedly was an American who could
neither read, write, or speak the local Philippine languages - Likely, he also
made no effort to learn either.
Not much of a "commanding officer", if he cannot communicate with the
men he is supposed to lead.

In the Philippines of the 1930s, there were over 120 different languages spoken, many by the inhabitants
of just one or two of the smaller islands. Of these, Tagalog was the most common.

Spanish and English were also commonly spoken.

Of course, MacArthur spoke English, and wrote it. Fluently, and eloquently.

At West Point, MacArthur studied Spanish, and in fact, in the Pancho Villa expedition, conducted
interrogations of Mexicans in their own language.

As for Tagalog, one of his first assignments was in Army Engineering Projects in the Philippines, where
he learned a small amount of Tagalog which, with his Spanish, allowed him to converse with the
Filipino workers he employed.


Interestingly enough, after being in VietNam for four years, William Westmoreland STILL couldn't
correctly pronounce the name of Nguyen Van Thieu.........


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[T. A. Gardner]

It looks to me like theres a false premise in the last page or two of this discussion. That is MacArthur had the unilateral power to mobilize the Philippines Army in 1940 or 1941. During most of that time he worked for the PI government. In practical terms the US Congress had divested PI & Roosevelts actions reflected that policy. Quezon & the rest of the policy makers in PI understood perfectly the USN assessment that PI was indefensible, and they understood the implication of War Plan ORANGE, and the RAINBOW plans. That left them with the rather desperate hope they could claim neutrality and avoid a Japanese invasion. That is Quezons government had two really bad choices & not much else.

Mac did in the closing months of 1941 reacquire some power independent of Queszon, specifically after appointment as commander of US forces in the region, and those forces becoming something more than the PI Scouts Regiment. In practical terms his ability to mobilize those US forces was confined to badgering Stimson for more and faster reinforcement and supplies. He had some limited options in increasing training for the US forces but that was it. On the side of the PI military he was constrained by the policy of Quezons government. That in both broad and limited terms a political minefield of extreme complexity. But, the bottom line is the PI government did nothing effective to mobilize their army beyond what they did OTL. Bottom line here mobilization was not Macs decision.

I hindsight, I'd say that assessment was wrong. Had the PA been even moderately trained and equipped to reasonable standards--and that is clearly possible if you extend the period to say two or three years rather than 6 to 8 months--it would have defeated the Japanese on the beaches. The US clearly knew where landings were likely to take place and put PA and US units at those locations to defeat such an event. It was only the abysmal performance of the PA units that were poorly trained and equipped that allowed the Japanese to succeed.

The US could have forced mobilization and training since they were the ones paying for it regardless of what the Philippine government wanted.

I concur that the US really was almost disinterested in the Philippines and what happened there even in 1940-41.