Rommels Advice Rejected

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Carl Schwamberger
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Rommels Advice Rejected

#1

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 28 Jul 2022, 07:24

In December/January 1943-44 Rommel on orders from OKW/Hitler made a inspection tour of OB West, specifically the defenses against invasion of the French or Low Countries coasts. Rommels report to Hitler rejected the long existent strategy of OB West to defend & deny ports to a invader & destroy a invader inland by assembling a powerful mobile army & counterattacking. Rommel instead recommended defeating the enemy on the beach by concentrating all available ground forces on the NW coast of France/Belgium, and protecting them with as much fortification as could be build in a few months. Hitler endorsed Rommels proposal and directed his Army Group HQ take over the 7th and 15th Armies of OB West, to enforce the execution of this plan. Over the next four months the beaches from Brest to the Scheldt saw a large scale construction of defense works and the movement of 'mobile' formations to the coast from their inland reserve positions.

Was rereading Zuehlkes book 'Juno Beach' and began reflecting on the difference in the defense the Canadians found in 1944 & what existed in June or December 1943. That led to consideration of what changes would have occurred in Operations NEPTUNE & OVERLORD had Rommels ideas of forward defense never been considered. That is the previous plan under Rundsteadts regime continued to May/June 1944. That is the beaches lightly defended, the ports defended, and mobile forces, including the horse equipped infantry divisions positioned for a battle of annihilation inland.

It seems to me the changes would go beyond just comparing the Allied assault as executed to far less well defended beaches. Since the Allies started adapting the details of NEPTUNE/OVERLORD as soon as they detected the change in German doctrine Its likely the Allied pan would have adapted in a different direction than OTL. Im still composing my own thoughts on this, but am curious what others suggest would have been the differences had the Canadians @ JUNO Beach & 21 Army Group in General, prepared for invading across beaches with far weaker defenses and the bulk of the enemy inland.

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T. A. Gardner
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Re: Rommels Advice Rejected

#2

Post by T. A. Gardner » 28 Jul 2022, 19:16

The result would be the Allies get ashore with fewer casualties, move inland, set up a defensive line, then build up faster than the Germans could. The Allies bring the two Mullberry harbors into position and start dumping huge amounts of supplies into France. The Germans find that their counterattacks get pummeled into ruin each time they throw one at the Allied lines.
By the end of July, the Allies in France greatly outnumber the defending Germans whose units are now badly depleted from a combination of Allied offensive actions and their own attempts to break the Allied lines. Cherbourg is on the verge of loss, and after it falls, even (and this is historical) with the--by German estimates--complete destruction of the harbor, the Allies will open the port in less than 60 days to traffic, and in 90 will exceed its capacity pre-war.
A month later, the Allies invade in Southern France.

The US - British / Commonwealth superiority in forces by mid-1944 was utterly and completely beyond anything the Germans could stop. Germany was doomed! Doomed I tell you!


Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Rommels Advice Rejected

#3

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 28 Jul 2022, 19:56

T. A. Gardner wrote:
28 Jul 2022, 19:16
The result would be the Allies get ashore with fewer casualties, move inland, set up a defensive line, then build up faster than the Germans could.
This I suppose is the early set of departures. Getting ashore with fewer casualties. I've never tried to game it out in any detail. Partly because I never did useful research on the exact details of the defense before Rommels policy change & construction. ut that also implies 21 Army Group has a different assault plan. The change to a low tide assault was the result of a close look at the obstacles suddenly under construction in January. In the Mediterranean assaults starting hours before dawn were the norm. First wave on the beach at a one am high tide gives the assault a extra few hours to advance inland and consolidate the first day. But, the reasoning behind the selection of high tide hour had many influences. We might see a entire chapter just on that subject.


...then build up faster than the Germans could.

Schweppenberg, the commander of Panzer Gruppe West seems to have expected to have his two corps in position and ready to attack on D+3 at the latest. Ive wondered how well & how far in advance 21 AG understood that. Or if they had solid intel on that plan at all. In this alternate case its a lot more likely the Brits are in Caen on D +2, or +3 at the latest. 21 Pz & the SS Pz Div would not have been relocated close enough to interfere the first day, more likely well inland. That allows the Brits to have a defense zone south of Caen with better communications, and the city not yet bombed to rubble. OTL Schweppenbergs counter attack was bombed into repeated delays, with the last attempt scheduled for the 11th June, D +5. Rommel canceled that as impractical & the Pz Gap never came closer to executing its intended mission. I suspect it will be the same ATL. Thats another one I've not tried to game out, a couple Pz corps attacking the lodgment on D +2 or +3.

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Re: Rommels Advice Rejected

#4

Post by Aber » 30 Jul 2022, 11:10

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
28 Jul 2022, 19:56
T. A. Gardner wrote:
28 Jul 2022, 19:16
The result would be the Allies get ashore with fewer casualties, move inland, set up a defensive line, then build up faster than the Germans could.
This I suppose is the early set of departures. Getting ashore with fewer casualties.
I don't think it's the casualties, it's the timing.

In 1943 the planners chose Normandy over Pas de Calais and IIRC the critical part of the assessments around the German defences was beach exits; if you can get of the beach faster, you can get stronger forces further inland on D-Day.

I'd have to dig back into sources, but I thought the decision for a daylight landing was based on the need for a well-organised landing, given the size of forces involved and likelihood of a rapid German counterattack - Salerno will be more relevant as an example than Torch or Sicily.

I'm not sure there'd be much change in the organisation of assault waves, except that less engineers would be needed.

Weaker German defences would result in faster surrenders of the units at the coast and no D-Day counterattacks; but with some new forces in position to counterattack at brigade/divisional strength at the start of D+1.

Odds are that the Allies would reach the OTL D-Day objective line, and be ready for further advances at the start of D+1.

On expected German counterattacks, OTL planning was for by dusk on D+1 ie ready for attack D+2
2 coastal divisions - which would be the only initial defences in this ATL
2 field divisions (inc 352)
5 Panzer divisions 21, 116, Lehr, 12SS, 17SS
ie your couple of Pz corps

Therefore OTL Allied planning would match what is being thrown at them, where IIRC the assumption was a focus west of Caen, towards Bayeux with the Canadian 3rd Division being beefed up with anti-tank weaponry to deal with it.

The uncertain element is what happens on D+1 - do the Allies keep pushing, and engage the arriving units piecemeal, do the Allies shift to a defensive posture, do the Germans push units into the line as they arrive or just put screening forces in place?

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Rommels Advice Rejected

#5

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 30 Jul 2022, 14:40

Aber wrote:
30 Jul 2022, 11:10
.. In 1943 the planners chose Normandy over Pas de Calais and IIRC the critical part of the assessments around the German defences was beach exits; if you can get of the beach faster, you can get stronger forces further inland on D-Day.
Part of it. There was a desire to secure the Atlantic ports as fast as possible, so land closer to them. The Cotientin & Calvados coasts were the best sheltered. In 1942 a British staff group planned for a autum invasion of NW Europe & choose the Cotientin beaches for the same reasons, close to Cherbourg, and better shelter from the Atlantic storms.


{quote]I'd have to dig back into sources, but I thought the decision for a daylight landing was based on the need for a well-organised landing, given the size of forces involved and likelihood of a rapid German counterattack - Salerno will be more relevant as an example than Torch or Sicily.[/quote]


Part of it. A combination of low tide landing, desire for daylight, Moon illumination, timing for crossing the Channel, including a dawn landing means a larger portion of the crossing is during night. If conditions change, priority change & optimal time for the landing shifts around.

I'm not sure there'd be much change in the organisation of assault waves, except that less engineers would be needed.

Id think the engineers mission would also change to earlier road & depot construction. The follow up waves on D-0 might include more artillery

On expected German counterattacks, OTL planning was for by dusk on D+1 ie ready for attack D+2
2 coastal divisions - which would be the only initial defences in this ATL
2 field divisions (inc 352)
5 Panzer divisions 21, 116, Lehr, 12SS, 17SS
ie your couple of Pz corp

Therefore OTL Allied planning would match what is being thrown at them, where IIRC the assumption was a focus west of Caen, towards Bayeux with the Canadian 3rd Division being beefed up with anti-tank weaponry to deal with it.

The uncertain element is what happens on D+1 - do the Allies keep pushing, and engage the arriving units piecemeal, do the Allies shift to a defensive posture, do the Germans push units into the line as they arrive or just put screening forces in place?
A closer look at Rundsteadts deployments before that up start Rommel interfered might help clarify that. Better would be any surviving documents on plans for deploying newly arriving units in the spring, and the concepts for counter attacks by OB West & its subordinate armies. All I have on the shelf here is a brief description of a January 1944 map rehearsal of the expected action by Schweppenbergs Pz Grp West.

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