Chamberlain REFUSES to declare war on September 3 1939

[wm]

Perhaps someone can explain why if the Wehrmacht was not ready for war it went through the Polish army like a knife through butter and followed that up with the French army. The guarantee was given because in 1939 the British were worried about Germany dominating Eastern Europe. In 1940 it achieved European domination.

Of course Stachiewicz meant the emerging French-British-Polish anti-Nazi alliance.
Polish generals well understood that Poland alone couldn't achieve anything against mighty Germany. Especially Stachiewicz, a graduate of the prestigious Ecole Superieure de Guerre.
The idea they didn't and wanted to fight German tanks with sabers is straight from Polish jokes.

“Hitler was bluffing by doing what?” I don't understand the question because I said Hitler was not bluffing.

OK, but existing evidence doesn't support the idea he was bluffing, or alternatively, that he was serious about the war with Poland.
A leader wanting to gain concessions doesn't kneecap himself by declaring that in no circumstances he won't resort to force.

Count Lubienski had been head of the Danzig section of the Foreign Ministry till 1936 when he then became Beck's Chef de Cabinet. Government ministers cannot do everything themselves they stand at the top of a pyramid, so for example I'm sure that Beck did not empty the waste bins in the Ministry.

It doesn't matter. A war with Germany was way too serious not to require Beck's full attention.
He didn't, proving it was unimportant to him and the Polish leaders.

The two sides were still talking until March 26 when Lipski gave Ribbentrop the official Polish reply to German demands that Ribbentrop had made about a week earlier. After stripping away the flimflam the answer was a no to what Ribbentrop wanted to hear. Ribbentrop warned Lipski that the Fuhrer could conclude that it was impossible to reach an agreement with Poland, adding that the Fuhrer wished to avoid such a conclusion. As the Poles would not concede what Hitler wanted that was the end of negotiations.

Still, there were a few more meetings, so "Hitler wanted that was the end of negotiations" isn't correct.
Actually, a week later, Hitler again solemnly promised that as long as he was Chancellor, there would be no war.

[Steve]

The following comes from Ian Kershaws biography of Hitler.

On March 25 Hitler indicated that he did not want to solve the Danzig question by force to avoid driving the Poles into the hands of the British. The previous evening he had remarked to Goebbels that he hoped the Poles would respond to pressure, “but we must bite into the sour apple and guarantee Poland’s borders”. It would seem that a peaceful resolution of the issues was still possible until March 25.

Ribbentrop and Lipski met on March 26. Apparently Ribbentrop had been hoping for a visit from Beck but Lipski took his place and brought a memorandum from Beck. The German proposals were rejected and Ribbentrop was reminded of Hitler’s verbal assurances given in a speech on February 20 1938. Ribbentrop lost his temper and said that any Polish aggression against Danzig would be treated as aggression against the Reich. Lipski replied that any furtherance of German plans directed at the return of Danzig to the Reich meant war with Poland. On the evening of March 28 Beck told the German ambassador in Warsaw that if Germany used force to alter the status of Danzig there would be war. Clearly the negotiations were now over.

At the end of March (I don’t have the exact date) Hitler had indicated to the head of the army that he would use force against Poland if diplomacy failed. On March 31 Chamberlain made his speech in parliament. On hearing of the British guarantee Hitler flew into a rage thumping the table in his study. By April 3 the directive for Case White was ready.

Here is a link to a speech Hitler made on April 1 in Wilhelmshaven there is no mention of Poland. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp

There are a couple of sentences in the speech that may indirectly refer to Poland –

The German Reich is, however, in no case prepared permanently to tolerate intimidation, or even a policy of encirclement.

Do not deceive yourselves regarding the most important prerequisite which exists in life, namely, the necessary power at one's own disposal. He who does not possess power loses the right to live!

[wm]

Ribbentrop was reminded of Hitler's verbal assurances given in a speech on February 20 1938.

Actually, Ribbentrop was reminded of Hitler's statement during his meeting with Beck on January 8, 1939 (that something new should be sought through the creation of a certain organism (Körper).)

Ribbentrop lost his temper

Not true. Lipski's report merely says Ribbentrop "mentioned." And it ends with:

I wish to point out that, despite the fact that Mr. von Ribbentrop was evidently cool at the outset of our conversation, he then in the course of a wider conversation took up a tone indicative of a willingness to overcome Polish-German difficulties. He kept repeating that there are psychological moments here which statesmen are called to overcome.

Lipski replied that any furtherance of German plans directed at the return of Danzig to the Reich meant war with Poland.

Not true, Lipski never said that, and anything even vaguely similar. It seems Mr. Kershaw "improved" history quite a bit in his book. This is why Polish history is so misunderstood in the West - Western historians never use (quite massive) Polish sources.

At the end of March (I don't have the exact date) Hitler had indicated to the head of the army that he would use force against Poland if diplomacy failed.

Actually, on the twenty-fifth, Hitler reassured General von Brauchitsch that he did not intend to use force against Poland.

[ljadw]

These negotiations were not secret (The Times knew about them ),the request came not from Beck (Poland did not need a treaty with a country that could not help her ) and they had no importance at all .

Poland wasn't interested in British help. Poland was interested in creating a credible deterrence against Hitler's designs by peaceful means.

The only credible deterrence against Hitler's designs was the continuation of the hostility between Germany and the Soviets and the public declaration from the Soviets that ,if Hitler attacked Poland,they would advance trough Poland to the German border,and the Polish declaration that they would accept this advance .

[ljadw]

That Poland didn't use both arguments (we need Danzig badly + Danzig shouldn't return) means that Poland didn't use both arguments. As simple as that.
It doesn't mean that Poland didn't believe the arguments were false. The arguments were merely ineffective.

Obviously, Britain couldn't stop Hitler from conquering Poland, so help wasn't even possible. But a wider coalition led by Britain could stop Hitler from starting the war.
Britain and Poland believed a sane leader wouldn't trigger a European or even world war for a provincial town, as Hitler called Danzig.
Britain and Poland believed that, in this case, deterrence was possible.

Such a wider coalition is an illusion ,especially a coalition led by a country that could commit only 2 divisions,after one month .
And the claim of what Britain and Poland believed is wrong :both knew very well what Hitler wanted, which was the elimination of Poland as an independent state .
Poland objected to this .
Britain did not care (Poland had no strategic importance ) as long as it happened without fighting .
And it could only happen without fighting if Poland capitulated without fight or if Britain could deter Hitler from attacking Poland ,and Hitler would only be deterred if Poland capitulated without fighting .
All the rest is the Churchillian blah blah myth.

[wm]

On the evening of March 28 Beck told the German ambassador in Warsaw that if Germany used force to alter the status of Danzig there would be war.

Mr. Kershaw is creative here too.

from the point of view of international law, I must declare on behalf of my Government that any intervention by the German Government to change the existing status quo in Danzig will be considered by the Polish Government as an act of aggression.
...
Nevertheless ... the Polish Government has no intention of committing an act of violence against the Free City, and it is still of the opinion that the fate of this state must be settled by agreement between the Polish Government and that of the Reich.

His creativeness is more visible if we notice that Ribbentrop's "any Polish aggression against Danzig would be treated as aggression against the Reich" wasn't a wanton threat.
It was made in response to Polish "mobilization directives" and "troop movements in Polish Pomerania" (Lipski didn't deny it.)
Ribbentrop then said that his offer on 21 March was responded by issuing military directives (Lipski responded that "our measures are perfectly natural in the existing situation.")

[ljadw]

Not that I have much sympathy for Kershaw, but he is not creative .
Poland said that a unilateral change of the status quo in Danzig is an act of aggression .An act of aggression means war .
Poland said also that the status quo could not be changed without her consent .
Ribbentrop's warning that a Polish attack on Danzig meant war ,was something meaningless .Poland did not plan an attack against Danzig, because it knew that such an attack would result in war with Germany and that Britain and France would not help her,because Poland would be the aggressor .
What some people still not understand and never will understand,is that Poland wanted only to conserve the status quo,because a change of the status quo, even without war,would mean the end of Poland .Poland could not afford to win a war .
The Polish troop movements were not directed against Danzig, but had as only aim to create a war atmosphere ,and as Germany would do nothing ( it had not the intention to attack Poland at that moment ) Poland and Britain could say that they had obtained a psychological victory and that they had humiliated Hitler who had only a big mouth .Such a psychological victory ( putting Germany in her place ) would help the Tories to win the elections who were scheduled for November .And the Polish leaders could exclaim : we are not like these cowards from Prague .And the OUN would be calm .

[ljadw]

The following comes from Ian Kershaws biography of Hitler.

On March 25 Hitler indicated that he did not want to solve the Danzig question by force to avoid driving the Poles into the hands of the British. The previous evening he had remarked to Goebbels that he hoped the Poles would respond to pressure, “but we must bite into the sour apple and guarantee Poland’s borders”. It would seem that a peaceful resolution of the issues was still possible until March 25.

Ribbentrop and Lipski met on March 26. Apparently Ribbentrop had been hoping for a visit from Beck but Lipski took his place and brought a memorandum from Beck. The German proposals were rejected and Ribbentrop was reminded of Hitler’s verbal assurances given in a speech on February 20 1938. Ribbentrop lost his temper and said that any Polish aggression against Danzig would be treated as aggression against the Reich. Lipski replied that any furtherance of German plans directed at the return of Danzig to the Reich meant war with Poland. On the evening of March 28 Beck told the German ambassador in Warsaw that if Germany used force to alter the status of Danzig there would be war. Clearly the negotiations were now over.

At the end of March (I don’t have the exact date) Hitler had indicated to the head of the army that he would use force against Poland if diplomacy failed. On March 31 Chamberlain made his speech in parliament. On hearing of the British guarantee Hitler flew into a rage thumping the table in his study. By April 3 the directive for Case White was ready.

Here is a link to a speech Hitler made on April 1 in Wilhelmshaven there is no mention of Poland. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk20.asp

There are a couple of sentences in the speech that may indirectly refer to Poland –

The German Reich is, however, in no case prepared permanently to tolerate intimidation, or even a policy of encirclement.

Do not deceive yourselves regarding the most important prerequisite which exists in life, namely, the necessary power at one's own disposal. He who does not possess power loses the right to live!

That Hitler flew into rage thumping the table in his study is unproved and thus a fable .It is the equivalent of the fable of Adolf der Teppichfresser.
That the directive for Fall Weiss was ready on April 3 is totally meaningless :the execution of Fall Weiss depended
a on successful negotiations with the Soviets
b on the refusal of Poland to give up without war
And on April 3 there was no certitude at all that a and b would happen .

[wm]

Ribbentrop lost his temper and said that any Polish aggression against Danzig would be treated as aggression against the Reich. Lipski replied that any furtherance of German plans directed at the return of Danzig to the Reich meant war with Poland.

I found the part in "Hitler" by Ian Kershaw. And there is another one:

Hitler, he told Lipski that any Polish action against Danzig (of which there was no indication) would be treated as aggression against the Reich.

Actually, the Polish partial mobilization against Germany, although purely defensive in nature, could have been interpreted as an action against Danzig.
"No indication" is clearly incorrect too.

And there is no source given for all the incorrect statements.

[Steve]

Lipski’s version of his meeting with Ribbentrop on March 26 differs from what the German Foreign Ministry files say. Cienciala who was a big fan of Jozef Beck used these and not Lipski’s version (I wonder why?) when she wrote with regard to what Ribbentrop said: - “He warned Lipski, however, that on the basis of his reply the Chancellor might conclude that it was impossible to reach an understanding with Poland; the Fuhrer, he said, wished to avoid having to reach such a conclusion.” Sounds like the famous Godfather film threat I’m gonna make him an offer he can’t refuse.

For the same meeting Kershaw used German author Max Demarus as a source.

“Actually, on the twenty-fifth, Hitler reassured General von Brauchitsch that he did not intend to use force against Poland.” He may well have done as the 25th came before the March 26 meeting.

Cienciala gives the date of the Beck Moltke meeting as the March 29 not the 28. She says Beck used the words Casus Belli which means an act or situation that provokes or justifies a war. Again she preferred to use German Foreign Ministry files. Kershaw again uses Max Demarus.

I have to agree with Ijadw that Kershaw is not “creative” and on the very very remote chance that he will read these posts I think wm that you should have a grovelling apology ready.

Ijadw wrote “What some people still not understand and never will understand,is that Poland wanted only to conserve the status quo,because a change of the status quo, even without war,would mean the end of Poland .Poland could not afford to win a war.” From Poland’s point of view of course it wanted to preserve the status quo but that was no longer possible in 1939. That it was no longer possible does not seem to have been a factor in Polish thinking. Knowing at the end of March that the British guarantee was coming down the road probably emboldened the Poles in their determination to maintain the status quo with disastrous consequences.

The source for Hitler thumping the table is Admiral Canaris who was present when Hitler received the news of the UK/ Poland agreement to sign a pact.

Fall Weiss did not depend on the Nazi Soviet agreement. The April 3 directive said that preparations were to be made so that it could be carried out at any time from September 1. At a meeting with top military leaders on May 23 Hitler outlined his strategy. He wanted to isolate Poland and keep the west out of it but if that proved impossible he would attack in the west and finish Poland off at the same time. The German army was confident it would be a quick campaign. They had tested Polish sabres against their tanks armour and concluded they had nothing to worry about. Watch the film Lotna by Andrzey Wajda for indisputable proof of Polish cavalry charging tanks.

[wm]

Lipski’s version of his meeting with Ribbentrop on March 26 differs from what the German Foreign Ministry files say. Cienciala who was a big fan of Jozef Beck used these and not Lipski’s version (I wonder why?) when she wrote with regard to what Ribbentrop said: - “He warned Lipski, however, that on the basis of his reply the Chancellor might conclude that it was impossible to reach an understanding with Poland; the Fuhrer, he said, wished to avoid having to reach such a conclusion.” Sounds like the famous Godfather film threat I’m gonna make him an offer he can’t refuse.

That's incorrect and she is mistaken. Actually, Ribbentrop advised ( - the exact word used by Lipski) on March 21:

that the talk should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his offers.

But on March 26, Ribbentrop basically backed down. And Lipski noted that:

I wish to point out that, despite the fact that Mr. von Ribbentrop was evidently cool at the outset of our conversation, he then in the course of a wider conversation took up a tone indicative of a willingness to overcome Polish-German difficulties. ...
This time his tone departed from that of the conversation of 21 March.

She says Beck used the words Casus Belli which means an act or situation that provokes or justifies a war.

Not true. Beck merely repeated Ribbentrop's words, leveled the playing field. Ribbentrop said (from the official record) "comme une agression contre l'Allemagne," and Beck responded "comme une aggression contre la Pologne."
"aggression" isn't "Casus Belli", even in French! "Casus Belli" here is basically a manipulation.

I have to agree with Ijadw that Kershaw is not “creative” and on the very very remote chance that he will read these posts I think wm that you should have a grovelling apology ready.

I'm not going to agree with chaotic walls of unsupported opinions. But facts are always welcomed.
Kershaw published blatant mistakes, proving he was sloppy in his research.

From Poland’s point of view of course it wanted to preserve the status quo but that was no longer possible in 1939.

Do we have evidence that Poland wanted to preserve the status quo?
Which Polish politician said that and when? Because in January 1939:

Minister Beck said that since Mr. von Ribbentrop speaks of the matter openly, he also prefers to treat it entirely openly, because it is preferable to speak frankly than to engage in false courtesy.
If Germany were to propose a truly balanced arrangement, Minister Beck would not fear to present it to the public opinion in Poland.

Beck was ready to accept the agreement but not the unilateral concessions asked by Hitler. That was the official position, the need for a balanced agreement not the status quo.
Although Beck rejected the impossible extraterritorial road, he still offered the most favorable transport facilitations instead.
The Poles conducted extensive research in this regard culminating in a note "Possible solutions of the highway problem" from March 1939, where several solutions were discussed, including multiple transit roads instead of the extraterritorial road.

Watch the film Lotna by Andrzey Wajda for indisputable proof of Polish cavalry charging tanks.

Are you really serious? To offer as "indisputable proof" a communist movie made by a darling of the regime.

[ljadw]

Lipski’s version of his meeting with Ribbentrop on March 26 differs from what the German Foreign Ministry files say. Cienciala who was a big fan of Jozef Beck used these and not Lipski’s version (I wonder why?) when she wrote with regard to what Ribbentrop said: - “He warned Lipski, however, that on the basis of his reply the Chancellor might conclude that it was impossible to reach an understanding with Poland; the Fuhrer, he said, wished to avoid having to reach such a conclusion.” Sounds like the famous Godfather film threat I’m gonna make him an offer he can’t refuse.

For the same meeting Kershaw used German author Max Demarus as a source.

“Actually, on the twenty-fifth, Hitler reassured General von Brauchitsch that he did not intend to use force against Poland.” He may well have done as the 25th came before the March 26 meeting.

Cienciala gives the date of the Beck Moltke meeting as the March 29 not the 28. She says Beck used the words Casus Belli which means an act or situation that provokes or justifies a war. Again she preferred to use German Foreign Ministry files. Kershaw again uses Max Demarus.

I have to agree with Ijadw that Kershaw is not “creative” and on the very very remote chance that he will read these posts I think wm that you should have a grovelling apology ready.

Ijadw wrote “What some people still not understand and never will understand,is that Poland wanted only to conserve the status quo,because a change of the status quo, even without war,would mean the end of Poland .Poland could not afford to win a war.” From Poland’s point of view of course it wanted to preserve the status quo but that was no longer possible in 1939. That it was no longer possible does not seem to have been a factor in Polish thinking. Knowing at the end of March that the British guarantee was coming down the road probably emboldened the Poles in their determination to maintain the status quo with disastrous consequences.

The source for Hitler thumping the table is Admiral Canaris who was present when Hitler received the news of the UK/ Poland agreement to sign a pact.

Fall Weiss did not depend on the Nazi Soviet agreement. The April 3 directive said that preparations were to be made so that it could be carried out at any time

The source for Hitler thumping the table is not Canaris, but Abwehr people who said, without giving any proof,that Canaris told them this . .
Fall Weiss did depend on an agreement between Germany and the Soviets, because Hitler knew,as did Poland,that Stalin would never admit that Germany would occupy the whole of Poland .
And this was the only way for Poland to survive .
Hitler also would never admit that Stalin would occupy the whole of Poland,including the border regions where did live a lot of Germans .
Germany and the Soviets were neutralizing each other,if one of them was out, it was over for Poland .
Hitler attacked Poland on 1 September, the Soviets intervened on 17 September .
Why did Stalin not attack Poland on 1 September and Hitler on 17 September ?
The reasons are obvious : the main one was that the occupation of Poland with its 30 million inhabitants would not benefit the USSR, but would hurt her .Stalin had already sufficient problems with the non Russians in the USSR .
And : preserving the status quo was still possible for Poland in 1939 . Till the news of the German-Soviet pact .That day ( 25 August ),war was not only likely ,but inevitable . A Polish capitulation on 25 August would still result in a German attack .

[wm]

Hitler knew,as did Poland,that Stalin would never admit that Germany would occupy the whole of Poland .

Do we have evidence for that?

The reasons are obvious : the main one was that the occupation of Poland with its 30 million inhabitants would not benefit the USSR, but would hurt her .

When did Stalin say that?
Because according to Russian historians, the only reason was to avoid the appearance of a military alliance with Nazi Germany. Stalin didn't want to be seen as an ally of Hitler.
Additionally, although the Germans were ready to invade, the Soviets weren't (for obvious reasons) and needed time to mobilize their 2.6 million soldiers.

[Steve]

There is obviously a difference in what the German diplomatic files say and what Lipski says, but Anita Cienciala who was Polish used the German files.

“Not true. Beck merely repeated Ribbentrop's words, leveled the playing field. Ribbentrop said (from the official record) "comme une agression contre l'Allemagne," and Beck responded "comme une aggression contre la Pologne."
"aggression" isn't "Casus Belli", even in French! "Casus Belli" here is basically a manipulation.”

Seems to be some confusion here as I am referring to the meeting Beck had with ambassador Moltke on March 28 or 29 not a meeting with Ribbentrop. Or is wm saying that Beck repeated the words Ribbentrop used at a previous meeting with him to Moltke?

“Do we have evidence that Poland wanted to preserve the status quo?” Yes Poland did not agree to Hitler’s proposals to change the status quo.

“Beck was ready to accept the agreement but not the unilateral concessions asked by Hitler.” If Beck would not agree to make the concessions Hitler wanted how was it possible to accept the agreement offered?

Ijadw can find everything he wants know about the background to Case White here. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judpolan.asp

Wm again attacks Ian Kershaw with “Kershaw published blatant mistakes, proving he was sloppy in his research”. He also now attacks a Polish cultural icon Andrzej Wajda by accusing him of being a darling of the communist regime. In 2011 Wajda was awarded the Order of The White Eagle the highest award that can be given to a Polish civilian. Where will this end I say, will we be told next that Lech Walesa was really a communist stooge?

[wm]

Seems to be some confusion here as I am referring to the meeting Beck had with ambassador Moltke on March 28 or 29 not a meeting with Ribbentrop. Or is wm saying that Beck repeated the words Ribbentrop used at a previous meeting with him to Moltke?

In his demarche on March 28, Beck cited Ribbentrop's words from March 26 first and then reused them by merely replacing Germany with Poland.
So obviously, he didn't want to aggravate the issue and merely responded with a tit-for-tat.
As Ribbentrop responded to Polish, threatening Danzig troop movements, so really, the entire affair wasn't even a storm in a teacup; it was a mere misunderstanding.

“Do we have evidence that Poland wanted to preserve the status quo?” Yes Poland did not agree to Hitler’s proposals to change the status quo.

It's evidence of a negotiation failure, not of a lack of effort.

“Beck was ready to accept the agreement but not the unilateral concessions asked by Hitler.” If Beck would not agree to make the concessions Hitler wanted how was it possible to accept the agreement offered?

Obviously, Beck needed a balanced agreement acceptable to the Polish public opinion.

Wm again attacks Ian Kershaw with “Kershaw published blatant mistakes, proving he was sloppy in his research”. He also now attacks a Polish cultural icon Andrzej Wajda by accusing him of being a darling of the communist regime.

Yes, Wajda was a cultural icon during the communist era. Communist media were full of him.
He made movies for the communists during the murderous Stalinist period, and he made them for the oppressive Gomółka regime.
It wasn't like the communists gave him millions for his movies because he was against them. All his movies had to be accepted by government censors and then by the party.

It's the fallacy of appeal to false authority anyway; Wajda wasn't a historian but a film director.