Blowing the Kerch Causeway?

[mezsat2]

It is perfectly known that NATO possesses weapons which can reach from Ukrainian held territory to the bridge. This bridge
is vital to Russian interests both in the Crimea and Southern Ukraine.

The ultimate question is will NATO provide these weapons (e.g. - long range ATACMS)? What would Putin's response be?

Would Putin then nuke Kiev and perhaps Kharkiv? Is this the slippery slope to WW III?

Perhaps it could be executed by a group of "commandos" who would then be expropriated from Ukrainian service. Basically a suicide mission.

[mezsat2]

Perhaps Putin will hold this causeway "hostage" for replenishment of Russian gas to Europe this winter?

[Peter89]

It is questionable how important that bridge is, besides, there is practically zero chance for a NATO attack into Russian territory. A commando attack is also questionable because the bridge now lies deep in Russian territory and the area is full of soldiers and police forces. Not to mention that permanent damage to a bridge can only be achieved by blowing up the pillars, which require a lot of explosives and / or drilling, neither of which is likely to succeed.

If Ukraine obtained rockets like that, I also believe they'd use them against actual troop concentrations or objects with operational importance, and not against a target that might (!) hinder Russian logistics (in an area which is not even contested).

[mezsat2]

It is questionable how important that bridge is, besides, there is practically zero chance for a NATO attack into Russian territory. A commando attack is also questionable because the bridge now lies deep in Russian territory and the area is full of soldiers and police forces. Not to mention that permanent damage to a bridge can only be achieved by blowing up the pillars, which require a lot of explosives and / or drilling, neither of which is likely to succeed.

If Ukraine obtained rockets like that, I also believe they'd use them against actual troop concentrations or objects with operational importance, and not against a target that might (!) hinder Russian logistics (in an area which is not even contested).

The key in this battle from now until the new year will be Ukraine's success in driving the Russians out of Kherson, hermetically seal the Crimea at the slender neck, and drive straight to Melitipol. From these positions, they could easily reach both Sevastopol and many of the ports on the Black and Azov sea with missiles, thereby neutralizing the Black Sea fleet (to a large extent). That causeway can then be blown either from missile or an attack by Crimean insurgents.

What's left then is more clear-cut. A long term insurgency war in Crimea and stalemate in the Donbas. These may yet be ambitious goals for Ukraine, but certainly feasible. I think they can take Kherson, but it will be tough sledding to Melitipol without more tanks and attack aircraft.

[Peter89]

It is questionable how important that bridge is, besides, there is practically zero chance for a NATO attack into Russian territory. A commando attack is also questionable because the bridge now lies deep in Russian territory and the area is full of soldiers and police forces. Not to mention that permanent damage to a bridge can only be achieved by blowing up the pillars, which require a lot of explosives and / or drilling, neither of which is likely to succeed.

If Ukraine obtained rockets like that, I also believe they'd use them against actual troop concentrations or objects with operational importance, and not against a target that might (!) hinder Russian logistics (in an area which is not even contested).

The key in this battle from now until the new year will be Ukraine's success in driving the Russians out of Kherson, hermetically seal the Crimea at the slender neck, and drive straight to Melitipol. From these positions, they could easily reach both Sevastopol and many of the ports on the Black and Azov sea with missiles, thereby neutralizing the Black Sea fleet (to a large extent). That causeway can then be blown either from missile or an attack by Crimean insurgents.

What's left then is more clear-cut. A long term insurgency war in Crimea and stalemate in the Donbas. These may yet be ambitious goals for Ukraine, but certainly feasible. I think they can take Kherson, but it will be tough sledding to Melitipol without more tanks and attack aircraft.

I asked a few days back why Ukraine doesn't push to the Dniepr line and improve its strategic position. To fight for the Donbass is futile: it is exposed and not quite inhabited by Ukrainians. However, I seriously doubt that the Ukrainian army possess the capacity for the operations you described. Improving the defensive line or getting rid of beachheads is different than large scale offensives.

[Cult Icon]

The first two days of the offensive has seen little gains with a confused reporting environment. There are viral videos of Ukrainian infantry and tanks trying to cross open fields and hedges, and getting struck. The Ukrainian general staff has gone silent, the Russian MOD claims:

The effective actions of the Russian group of troops destroyed 48 tanks, 46 infantry fighting vehicles, 37 other armored fighting vehicles, 8 pickups with large-caliber machine guns and more than 1200 Ukrainian servicemen during the day.

When repelling the enemy offensive, Russian troops defeated the units of the 128th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine transferred from western Ukraine to participate in the operation. Five members of the brigade laid down their arms and surrendered.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c7mdRM3RWgw&t=28s

However, there are concentrations of Ukrainian forces at Izyum and Kharkiv. Later I will post Russian formations in the rear and front of Kherson Oblast. This counterattack isn't over yet.

This attack is probably the most prepared Ukrainian attack at Kherson. For weeks they used long range strikes to damage Russian communications and logistics, leading to an increase in Russian engineering/repair activity and shifting of forces there. Also, they stored up what artillery/mlrs they had and expended it against the Russians in prep fire.

[Cult Icon]

8/31

Deepest Ukr penetration of the frontline, Rybar:



Battle for Kherson: situation on the Andriyivskyi section
as of 8:30 p.m. on August 31, 2022

The Armed Forces of Ukraine nevertheless expanded the zone of control at Sukhoi Stavka and, having occupied Kostroma, reached the south-western outskirts of the village of Bruskinskoye, through which the group is supplied in Davydovy Brod.

Russian troops are counterattacking on concentrations of manpower and equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the northern outskirts of Sukhoi Stavka and Kostromka.

Biggest Russian MOD claim of the war that I've ever seen 8/30-8/31:

During two days of unsuccessful attacks on Mykolaiv-Kryvyi Rih and other areas, Ukrainian troops lost four combat aircraft: two Su-25, one Su-24 and one MiG-29. Three Ukrainian Mi-8 helicopters were shot down in mid-air. Russian troops destroyed 63 Ukrainian tanks, 59 infantry fighting vehicles, 48 other armored fighting vehicles, 14 pickups with large-caliber machine guns and more than 1700 Ukrainian servicemen.

[Cult Icon]

Ending of the 3rd day of the Ukrainian counteroffensive 8/29-8/31. Ukrainian General Staff once again silent:

[Cult Icon]

Russian frontline units first echelon, Kherson Oblast 8/14 East to West:

205th SMRB, 22nd AC
Electronic warfare unit (unknown)
10th SSPB GRU
34th SMRB, 22nd AC
247th GAAR, 7th GMAAD
VKS UAV Recon
171st SAABn, 97th GAAR, 7th GMAAD
108th GAAR, 7th GMAAD
255th MRR, 20th GMRD
126th SCDB, 22nd AC
4th GMB, 58th CAA
127th SRB, 22nd AC

Russian frontline units second echelon, Kherson Oblast 8/14 East to West:

234th GAAR, 76th GALD
104th GAAR, 76th GALD
124th STBn, 76th GALD
11th GAAB, 49th CAA
90th AAMB, 49th CAA
1096th AAMR, Black Sea Fleet
Company, Redut VDV BTG PMC
Electronic Warfare Unit (unknown)

[Cult Icon]

Russian rear units, South of Kherson/Dnipio, Kherson Oblast 8/14 East to West:

54th C4IB, 35th CAA
82nd SRRBn WMD
107th MB, 35th CAA
165th AB, 35th CAA
69th SCB, 35th CAA
64th SMRB, 35th CAA
38th SGMRB, 35th CAA

127th MRD with 7 combat battalions
32nd Sapper, 49th CAA

104th C4IB EMD
101st MTO
16th SGSPB GRU
200th AB, 29th CAA
36th SGMRB, 29th CAA
305th AB EMD
338th GRAB EMD

106th ABD with 3 combat battalions
1182 GAR, 106th GABD
217th GABR, 98th GABD
66th C4IB EMD
8th IAR, Baltic Sea Fleet
227th AB, 49th CAA
358th GAAMR, 20th GMRD
944th GAAMR, 20th GMRD
244th AR, 20th GMRD

So in the Kherson Oblast front there are approximately 16 combat battalions.

For the rear 8/14 there are approximately 23 combat battalions.

[Cult Icon]

The fourth day of the counteroffensive ended with a weaker attack and with few results. It remains to be seen if this is a 'long term' counteroffensive (a lot of weak attacks, expending their assault reserve including units pulled out from the frontline) against the Kherson bridgehead.

The Russian mod claim for 9/2 has dropped:

In just a day of fighting in this direction, the enemy lost 13 tanks, 19 infantry fighting vehicles, 12 other armored fighting vehicles, 11 pickups with large-caliber machine guns and more than 330 servicemen. Two militants were captured.

This ends Russian claims for August 29- September 1st as : 2500 Ukrainian casualties, 94 tanks, 81 IFV, over 100 vehicles of different types, 4 aircraft, 3 helicopters. This is probably their largest claim of the war.

According to open sources so far it appears that the Russians are mainly defeating their attacks with artillery and counterattacks. But primarily the former. If the Ukrainians keep on attacking, without regard to their own losses, they might be able to recover a bit more terrain in the short-term. But probably not Kherson. There are too many Russian reserves south of the Dnipro.

The Ukrainians claim to have struck several Russian ammo dumps and one pontoon bridge. It is unclear to me what the Russian ammo situation is. 2 months of strikes against Russian ammo dumps with HIMARs etc has not seriously degraded Russian defense capabilities for 4 days of Ukrainian offensive. It looks like any Ukrainian success of significance would rely on a temporary shortage of Russian ammo, through expending it in defensive fire and loss from ammo dump strikes. This would require many more days of ruthless commitment.

[Cult Icon]

Probably? staged footage in the Kherson Oblast frontline, appeared about 1-2 weeks ago. Perhaps it is how the Russian defenders engage their opponent if they get close enough. The Russians are also known to perform a maneuver called 'feigned retreat'. The ground forces pull back and create a salient-like perimeter around the attacking Ukrainians, using artillery and airpower to do the fighting. Then after the Ukrainians had enough they retake the lost ground with the ground forces.

[Aida1]

The fourth day of the counteroffensive ended with a weaker attack and with few results. It remains to be seen if this is a 'long term' counteroffensive (a lot of weak attacks, expending their assault reserve including units pulled out from the frontline) against the Kherson bridgehead.

The Russian mod claim for 9/2 has dropped:

In just a day of fighting in this direction, the enemy lost 13 tanks, 19 infantry fighting vehicles, 12 other armored fighting vehicles, 11 pickups with large-caliber machine guns and more than 330 servicemen. Two militants were captured.

This ends Russian claims for August 29- September 2nd as : 2500 Ukrainian casualties, 94 tanks, 81 IFV, over 100 vehicles of different types, 4 aircraft, 3 helicopters. This is probably their largest claim of the war.

According to open sources so far it appears that the Russians are mainly defeating their attacks with artillery and counterattacks. But primarily the former. If the Ukrainians keep on attacking, without regard to their own losses, they might be able to recover a bit more terrain in the short-term. But probably not Kherson. There are too many Russian reserves south of the Dnipro.

The Ukrainians claim to have struck several Russian ammo dumps and one pontoon bridge. It is unclear to me what the Russian ammo situation is. 2 months of strikes against Russian ammo dumps with HIMARs etc has not seriously degraded Russian defense capabilities for 4 days of Ukrainian offensive. It looks like any Ukrainian success of significance would rely on a temporary shortage of Russian ammo, through expending it in defensive fire and loss from ammo dump strikes. This would require many more days of ruthless commitment.

Typical prorussian spin as usual.

[Aida1]

HIMARS is very effective against bridges.
https://youtu.be/hDFs-CYm5pM

[Cult Icon]

Today the Russians counterattacked and rolled back the deepest Ukrainian penetration, apparently with success.