North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#31

Post by nuyt » 29 Nov 2022, 11:49

The Japanese attack on Birma only started IRL after the fall of Malaya, so when Malaya does not fall, will this attack still go ahead mid January 42 or will part of these troops be sent down to Malaya to help?

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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#32

Post by Kingfish » 29 Nov 2022, 12:19

nuyt wrote:
29 Nov 2022, 11:49
The Japanese attack on Birma only started IRL after the fall of Malaya, so when Malaya does not fall, will this attack still go ahead mid January 42 or will part of these troops be sent down to Malaya to help?
The latter, and I would add additional troops from other areas could be earmarked as well.

From the Japanese perspective the capture of the DEI oilfields was the highest priorities. An allied controlled Malaysia puts those fields within striking distance, and thus an unacceptable situation for them. I would expect the Japanese to throw everything and the kitchen sink at Malaysia. Troops earmarked for Burma, the Philippines or even PNG might find themselves heading there. This in turn spins off a whole new set of WIs.
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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#33

Post by EwenS » 29 Nov 2022, 13:39

Fatboy Coxy wrote:
29 Nov 2022, 00:44
Thanks Gooner1, well I knew they lost a lot, but not that many. Do you know how many were Gunboat or Destroyer size and above.

So my hypothesis of a strategic plan of withdrawing, leaving a garrison in Tobruk, like they did in 41, would now be modified to just the retreat, given how the RN is being asked to provide more ships for the Far East theatre.

Of course, any suggestion of a strategic retreat, has to overcome Churchill, I wonder how well that would go?

So it would seem, by default, that they remain where they were historically, except the Battle of Gazala in May 42, may be an even bigger loss, given a continued sucking of resources to the Far East that didn't happen historically due to the loss of Singapore and Java in February and March respectively.
On looking deeper the 70th infantry division was also pulled out of North Africa and sent to defend India / Ceylon in late Feb 1942. But it had been sent back to the Canal Zone to recuperate and replace its losses after Op Crusader. The orders for the move were issued on 17th Feb, two days after the fall of Singapore and it was out of Egypt by the end of the month. That redeployment looks like a reaction to the deteriorating position in the Far East and the increasing threat to India/Ceylon. It is interesting to look at the timing however as it more or less coincides with the movement of 6th Australian Div. I’ll need to dig deeper to determine how the London / Canberra relationship affected these moves. But would that occur if Singapore doesn’t fall?


But why so keen to strip North Africa? This wasn’t the 8th Army of Second El Alamein. Although fairly evenly balanced with the enemy in terms of overall numbers of troops, look at the order of Battle at the start of Op Crusader in Nov 1941.

The Axis Forces comprise 7 Italian Divisions (1 Armoured, 2 motorised, 4 Infantry) and 3 German (2 Panzer & 1 Infantry).

Against that the 8th Army comprised 1 Armoured div (with 3 Brigades of tanks, one of which went to Burma early 1942 as previously noted), 2 tank brigades (Valentines and Matildas), 5 Infantry divisions and 3 extra infantry brigade equivalents. Not all the units were at full strength.

1st South African Div for example only had 2 brigades and little in the way of support troops. It only reached full strength in mid-1942 using that part of 2nd SA div not lost in Tobruk in June 1942.

9th Australian div was in Syria and wouldn’t return until June 1942. 50th div was scattered between Cyprus and the Canal Zone. 10th Armoured was in Palestine. 1st Armoured only arrived in ME in Nov 1941. 8th Armoured, 44th & 51st Infantry Divisions didn’t leave the U.K. until May / June 1942.

Both sides reinforced their armies in N.A. during 1942. So there doesn’t seem to be a lot spare that could be moved to the Far East.

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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#34

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 29 Nov 2022, 14:05

OldBill wrote:
29 Nov 2022, 03:17
Do the Allies place forces on Timor as IRL? This would also mean the Japanese will react as in OTL, with an invasion. How likely is it that Portugal can be brought into the Allied fold?
I don't see any change to Portugal's stance here, remain neutral, and they might be left alone. The alternative just offers up their colony, there's very little militarily they can do.
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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#35

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 29 Nov 2022, 14:31

Strategically, holding Malaya and the major DEI islands leaves Britain in a mess, historically, their early fall saved Churchill and the CoS from some very difficult choices.

They have to hold a line in North Africa as far west as they can, if for no other reason than to help supply Malta, which is key to limiting Axis success in North Africa.

Secondly, there is now an increasing concern about the Germans advancing down towards the Caucasus, and then onto the oil in the Middle East, which only underlines the need to keep the Soviet Union in the war.

Australia is now threatened, and has committed almost all her forces to the Middle East, on the promise that the Navy will come and save Singapore, assurances have to be honoured. The Royal Navy will have to do more, a lot more.

With Malaya and the DEI not conveniently falling, now the Allies, and I say that because the US has to contribute here, have to reinforce and supply, especially in Air Forces and Navy.

The USA is somewhat limited in what it can send in land forces, it can supply aircraft more that air forces, but it does have a very large navy
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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#36

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 29 Nov 2022, 14:42

EwenS wrote:
28 Nov 2022, 13:36
North Africa needs to be looked at separately from the “Middle East” which covered everything from Libya to the Persian Gulf and down into East Africa.

There is another way of looking at how North Africa is potentially affected by a change in the Far East in this What If. Where exactly did the units that were redeployed historically come from.

Firstly, the decision to move the Australians didn’t occur until late Dec 1941 / early Jan 1942. That in itself was affected by the speed of the Japanese advance right across the East Indies.

7th Australian Div - Having taken part in the invasion of Syria in 1941, it moved from Syria to Palestine to Suez to embark for Australia, but due to troop shipping shortages it had to move in stages. First convoy left on 30 Jan 1942. Some elements diverted to Java, with early plans calling for the whole division to go there. Following the fall of Singapore there was a furious row between London & Canberra as to where it should go - Rangoon or Australia. It wasn’t reunited as a division until mid-March.

6th Australian Div - based Syria, before being withdrawn to return to Australia. 19th Brigade was first to arrive back in Australia on 10 March. The following two brigades didn’t leave until mid-March and were then diverted to defence of Ceylon until July then back to Australia. Finding the troop shipping to move them is again the big issue.

7th Armoured Brigade - had been severely mauled during Operation Crusader and was resting and re-equipping in the Canal Zone. 2 of its 3 Armoured regiments were sent east. Planned for Singapore, diverted to Rangoon, arriving 20 Feb 1942.

18th Infantry Div - this unit had been earmarked as a reinforcement for the Middle East (sources vary as to whether that meant the Middle East or North Africa. It was diverted to Singapore at the end of Dec 1941.

Hurricane squadrons - In late 1941, 7 Hurricane squadrons were shipped out from Britain destined for the Middle East, for a planned operation over southern Russia. En route some of the aircraft & pilots were diverted in Nov 1941 to Malta. Of the remainder, Indomitable transported 2 squadrons (258 & 232) to Java in Jan 1942. They had been offloaded at Takoradi and flown across Africa and picked up new aircraft before embarking. Another 3 squadrons ended up in India / Burma in Feb 1942.

On her second trip in late Feb / early March, Indomitable took another 2 squadrons intended for Java, 261 and 30, but they were diverted while en route to Ceylon instead. Only 30 squadron was withdrawn from North Africa. 261 came from Iraq / Palestine.

803 & 806 squadrons FAA, which had been operating as part of the RN Fighter Squadron along the North African coast, were only withdrawn in Feb to re-equip before going to Ceylon in March.

Back in Britain at the beginning of 1942, 2 squadrons of Beauforts were earmarked to be sent to the Far East. Initially their departure was delayed, but then many of the aircraft and crews were hijacked in the Med to augment the anti-shipping Forces there.

The point about these redeployments between theatres is threefold:-
1. Very little is being withdrawn from the forces assembled in North Africa fighting Rommel. Rather, they are being diverted from garrison units in the Middle East or operations planned as a precaution for what might happen elsewhere. Without substantial withdrawals from North Africa life goes on as historical.
2. Note how much was diverted to Ceylon, India or Burma because of the speed with which everything happened in the DEI/Malaya. This was done to reinforce pressing issues (Burma) or because there was no point in throwing more force into lost causes. In this What If what goes where and when if the Allied position proves substantially better than historical.
3. The speed with which anything can be moved across the Indian Ocean is limited by the huge distances involved and the shortage of troop shipping available in this time of crisis.

Stopping the Japanese in Malaya does nothing to delay the more southerly thrusts. Once the Japanese arrive on Java, Malaya becomes virtually impossible to defend unless substantial reinforcements can be put on the island to slow their westward advance. Back to shipping the 7th Australian Div. So long as Southern Malaya is held no meaningful invasion of Sumatra or western Java can take place.

What happens to Burma and the reinforcements directed there, very much depends on how much resource the Japanese need to devote to capturing Singapore.

As for oil, the big prizes are the refineries at Palembang in southern Sumatra.
You've nicely noted what major reinforcements went to the Far East, and perhaps with it not falling, they might be enough to hold things, especially when you look at what the Royal Navy was able to assemble in the Indian Ocean in March 42. To say they didn't effect the North African Campaign would be wrong, them being there at the time of Gazala might have made a big difference.

The question I'm asking is this, until they can stop the Japanese advances, and move into a period of stalemate, they're going to need more, and despite the Middle East command stripping itself of all the major garrison units that were in refit, it might be asked to do more. If a stalemate had be had in North Africa, maybe they can. Is the line at Gazala, the place to make that defensive stand?
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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#37

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 29 Nov 2022, 14:57

nuyt wrote:
29 Nov 2022, 11:49
The Japanese attack on Birma only started IRL after the fall of Malaya, so when Malaya does not fall, will this attack still go ahead mid January 42 or will part of these troops be sent down to Malaya to help?
I'm writing a "What If" on holding Malaya, see my signature for the link, but am only on the months previous to the Japanese attack at the moment. My conjecture on Japanese capabilities after their initial assault on Malaya is, their Naval forces have suffered heavy casualties, and quite a large number of transports. The IJAAF is taking quite a knocking to. They will still advance along the alternative routes, but diminished numbers of transports, and escorting naval forces, mean these attacks are increasingly delayed, thus allowing a "window of opportunity" for the Allies to reinforce and organise.

But the main purpose of this thread is to examine what options the British have in North Africa, with all this happening.
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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#38

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 29 Nov 2022, 15:09

Fatboy Coxy wrote:
27 Nov 2022, 22:10


I'd be interested in knowing what more the USA could give in this theatre. For them too, strategy has to change, does the USN pacific campaign become more contorted with resources being sucked into defending the eastern DEI and sea lanes to Australia
Most obvious would be Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet. That group which had been training for a year was busy rehearsing for a invasion of Brazil (Plan RUBBER) February & March. A decision at the top to forgo the Germany first policy (via Latin America) would have allowed the option of sending the amphibious fleet, 1 Marine Division, and 9th Inf Div or 1st Inf Div. Both of the the latter had been part of and training with AF Atlantic Fleet. Id have to check the status of the 2d Marine div on the west coast. It had been reduced in strength and disrupted by the separation of the Icelandic Brigade in May 1941. The 5th Inf Div was in Iceland & very unlikely to be sent anywhere else. The 3rd Division was on the West Coast and been doing amphibious training since December 1939. It was scheduled to provide cadres for the 81st Inf Division so that activation might have to be altered or postponed. It looks like the 7th ID was about to separate a cadre as well, for the 95th & 94th ID altering those activations later in 1942. The 8th & 9th ID appear to be separating cadres to four new divisions by January 1942, so they would not have been ready of overseas service in January of February. The 1st & Second Cavalry status is not clear to me. I don't know if they had converted from horse cavalry by this time, or were otherwise ready for overseas service. The national Guard Divisions were hit or miss. Some like the 29th had severe problems long after mobilization, others like the 32d or 41st went overseas relatively early in 1942 & managed despite senior officers mismanagement.

The more important problem is that of cargo shipping to transfer these ground forces, and any air forces. I don't know what the actual cargo fleet of the Allies was in early 1942, but I do know they did not know. Allied planning and scheduling of cargo shipping had fallen into chaos and was getting worse. On paper a couple corps and their air support were available to send somewhere from the US, but strategic and shipping plans interfered with that. Probably adding some Auxilliaries to the Amphibious fleet Atlantic would have allowed it to up anchor and wander off to the S Pacific. Perhaps shipping could have been organized for another ground combat division & appropriate corps support. But, there also the requirements for transporting the ground element of a larger Far Eastern Air Force, and increased supply requirements.

War Plan ORANGE. its reiteration in the RAINBOW plan, and the other planning in 1941 did not allow for a major US campaign in the S Pacific and trying to set that up added to the confusion & severe waste of 1942.
I'm writing a "What If" on holding Malaya, see my signature for the link, but am only on the months previous to the Japanese attack at the moment. My conjecture on Japanese capabilities after their initial assault on Malaya is, their Naval forces have suffered heavy casualties, and quite a large number of transports. The IJAAF is taking quite a knocking to. They will still advance along the alternative routes, but diminished numbers of transports, and escorting naval forces, mean these attacks are increasingly delayed, thus allowing a "window of opportunity" for the Allies to reinforce and organise.

But the main purpose of this thread is to examine what options the British have in North Africa, with all this happening.
The most important change I see there, in the autumn of 1941 planning, is to unsnarl current problems in cargo shipping and do something to prevent deterioration in 1942. That means among other things making some tough choices in Joint strategy and focusing on fewer tasks for 1942. Does anyone have the nerve to leave Lend lease to the USSR at 1941 levels so the cargo ships can be used to support Africa, or a probable Pacific war?

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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#39

Post by nuyt » 29 Nov 2022, 15:56

Fatboy Coxy wrote:
29 Nov 2022, 14:57
nuyt wrote:
29 Nov 2022, 11:49
The Japanese attack on Birma only started IRL after the fall of Malaya, so when Malaya does not fall, will this attack still go ahead mid January 42 or will part of these troops be sent down to Malaya to help?
I'm writing a "What If" on holding Malaya, see my signature for the link, but am only on the months previous to the Japanese attack at the moment. My conjecture on Japanese capabilities after their initial assault on Malaya is, their Naval forces have suffered heavy casualties, and quite a large number of transports. The IJAAF is taking quite a knocking to. They will still advance along the alternative routes, but diminished numbers of transports, and escorting naval forces, mean these attacks are increasingly delayed, thus allowing a "window of opportunity" for the Allies to reinforce and organise.

But the main purpose of this thread is to examine what options the British have in North Africa, with all this happening.
Understood, sounds plausible, thanks!

IRL the DEI sent forward air force units and their relatively large submarine forces, that were depleted during the Japanese campaigns in Malaya and Borneo. A small commando force of COIN operatives was also sent from Sumatra to wage guerilla war against the enemy in Malacca (and who made quite an impression on an Australian unit with their jungle fighting skills).

I can imagine, when Sumatra and Java are really safe by mid March or so (and protected by USAAF and USN), and the fighting in Malacca is still fierce, that land forces can also be sent. For instance an ad hoc DEI brigade made up of mountain/pack artillery, (pack) anti tank artillery, two light infantry battalions (all specializing in much needed "off road" warfare), plus a tank unit (Marmon-Herringtons and/or M3s that would arrive by March) as well as light AA and support troops. All professionals.

Also, IRL a handful of British AA (heavy and light) regiments arrived on Java from their destination Singapore. These now stay in Malacca, so add another 80 or so 3,7 inch and 40mm Bofors to your inventory there.

Italian stuff captured in North Africa was also sent IRL to the Far East (both to the Dutch and Malaya), but some did not arrive in time. That's different now, so think of a Commonwealth manned Italian tank unit (enough to counter IJA armor), more artillery, etc.

The Dutch could scrape the manpower barrel and send a thousand men each from the West Indies and the UK to reinforce Java (including several professional units, like marines), plus dispatch those Dutchmen mobilized from South Africa, Canada and the US to Batavia instead of the UK (around 2000 men in total). That's 4000 in total or another brigade worth of troops for the DEI. Meanwhile much awaited equipment bought in or provided by the US keeps pouring in every week (tanks, 155mm artillery, at guns, vehicles, coast guns, etc).

Going back to your point about NA/ME: what other units can be spared, while thinking outside the Commonwealth? A Belgian-Congo brigade perhaps, what about the battle hardened 3rd brigade Force Publique/Openbare Weermacht under (Dutch speaking) General Gillaert? How about sending the Free French demi-brigade to the Far East (part was from the Pacific anyway), so they will be missed heroically defending that fortress at Bir Hakeim? Who will defend that place when they are gone?

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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#40

Post by Peter89 » 29 Nov 2022, 23:28

Fatboy Coxy wrote:
29 Nov 2022, 14:57

But the main purpose of this thread is to examine what options the British have in North Africa, with all this happening.
The British could hold the Suez base no matter what happened in the PTO in 1942. The British Empire was like an old, acidified spider which knit a web around an enemy which was too powerful to defeat directly, thus they occupied whatever they could from the IEA, the Vichy colonies, Iraq, the Levant, Iran and so on. Practically they confined the Axis into Europe, and it is questionable whether the Axis collapse in Africa was a result of US intervention in the MTO or was it simply brought forward in time by the US troops (I think the latter is the case).

Don't forget that the Axis completely lacked the logistical capability to field enough forces near Alexandria; Alexandria could only be taken if either A.) the British forces were defeated decisively beforehand or B.) if the main German effort in 1941 aims to build up another pronge from the east towards the Suez base. As neither was the case, both were extremely unlikely.

Minor issues like when or how the British could build up their forces in overwhelming numbers (and in a proper quality organization, which was a 2 years process) are irrelevant because the Germans were fighting for their survival on the Eastern Front. Experts on the issue like Porch and Playfair hint that the strategic aim of the German troops in NA was not to defeat the British but to "pin down" their forces to divert them from attacking mainland Europe until the bulk of the Wehrmacht settle matters with the SU. It is likely and historically proven that if the situation on the east deteriorated, the Germans pulled off their forces from the MTO, redirected reinforcements, etc. The only exception happened when OKW took over and poured immense resources to a lost cause to prolong the Italian support for the Axis effort.

Long story short: in your given timeframe, the Germans could not, and probably wanted not to "win" in NA. The time schedule might have been upset, but the fate of the Axis presence in NA would be the same in 1943.
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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#41

Post by Loïc » 30 Nov 2022, 03:06

How about sending the Free French demi-brigade to the Far East (part was from the Pacific anyway)
this seems a mix from various units and sizes...the only "half-brigade" with the Free French was the 13th Foreign Legion Half-Brigade who had nothing to do with the Pacific and coming from all but the Pacific,
among 70 000 men and 3 Free French Brigades c.1942 there were French metropolitan Marine Infantrymen and volunteers from French Oceania merged in the BIMP - the Marine Infantry and Pacific Battalion -

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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#42

Post by nuyt » 30 Nov 2022, 12:50

Loïc wrote:
30 Nov 2022, 03:06
How about sending the Free French demi-brigade to the Far East (part was from the Pacific anyway)
this seems a mix from various units and sizes...the only "half-brigade" with the Free French was the 13th Foreign Legion Half-Brigade who had nothing to do with the Pacific and coming from all but the Pacific,
among 70 000 men and 3 Free French Brigades c.1942 there were French metropolitan Marine Infantrymen and volunteers from French Oceania merged in the BIMP - the Marine Infantry and Pacific Battalion -
OK, thanks, how can we get a Free French brigade in the Far East? I meant this one, apart from the BIMP:

"décembre 1941 : la 1re DLFL, remaniée en 1re brigade française libre indépendante ou First Free French Brigade Group pour s'adapter à l'organisation militaire britannique, part pour le Western Desert"

from https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/1re_divis ... aise_libre

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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#43

Post by Gooner1 » 30 Nov 2022, 14:53

Fatboy Coxy wrote:
29 Nov 2022, 14:57
I'm writing a "What If" on holding Malaya, see my signature for the link, but am only on the months previous to the Japanese attack at the moment. My conjecture on Japanese capabilities after their initial assault on Malaya is, their Naval forces have suffered heavy casualties, and quite a large number of transports. The IJAAF is taking quite a knocking to. They will still advance along the alternative routes, but diminished numbers of transports, and escorting naval forces, mean these attacks are increasingly delayed, thus allowing a "window of opportunity" for the Allies to reinforce and organise.

But the main purpose of this thread is to examine what options the British have in North Africa, with all this happening.
Without the defeats in Malaya and Burma the British probably have 5 more, or at least the better part of, divisions in the Far East than in the OTL.
These being 9th and 11th Indian Divisions, 8th Australian Division, 18th British Division and 1st Burma Division plus various brigades.
It's possible that they wouldn't need any more transfers of divisions from MIddle East forces apart from the Australian divisions allowing 70th British Division to remain in the Middle East.

Armour and aircraft the Far East forces would need but, to me, the most likely reason for Britain to be able to hold onto Malaya is if, pre-invasion, there supply had at least an equal priority to the supply of tanks and aircraft to the Soviet Union so a log. chain would possibly already be in place.

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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#44

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 30 Nov 2022, 19:46

Theres a assumption here that holding Maylasia depends on additional British forces. That has some validity in a narrow sense, but it is a narrow view. A alternate course is Yamashita or a less capable commander screws the pooch and is operationally defeated early in the campaign. Perhaps holding only a enclave at the north end of Malaysia & Thailand. The Japanese operations in 1942 were mostly run on minimum forces with very thin reserves & margins for error. Does a stalled Japanese Army still at Kohta Baru in June 1942, without extra Brit effort, change any of the calculations above in the thread?

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Re: North African strategy if Britain does well in Far East in 42

#45

Post by jimmysanders » 30 Nov 2022, 20:06

Kingfish wrote:
29 Nov 2022, 12:19
nuyt wrote:
29 Nov 2022, 11:49
The Japanese attack on Birma only started IRL after the fall of Malaya, so when Malaya does not fall, will this attack still go ahead mid January 42 or will part of these troops be sent down to Malaya to help?
The latter, and I would add additional troops from other areas could be earmarked as well.

From the Japanese perspective the capture of the DEI oilfields was the highest priorities. An allied controlled Malaysia puts those fields within striking distance, and thus an unacceptable situation for them. I would expect the Japanese to throw everything and the kitchen sink at Malaysia. Troops earmarked for Burma, the Philippines or even PNG might find themselves heading there. This in turn spins off a whole new set of WIs.
By the way, this is an interesting point of view regarding the development of the world war.

Since, Japan would not mind gaining influence in the Eastern Hemisphere, and for this, the main priority is to capture all the deposits of the "economy", that is, minerals, etc.

So, your idea seemed interesting to me.

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