Kriegsmarine surface ships are more aggressive in the Atlantic.

[T. A. Gardner]

The fragments I have on the USNs plans for the Atlantic & east Atlantic littorals would be: First was updating WP GRAY to extend to the Azores. After that came up grading the Marine Expeditionary Brigade on the east coast from a planned division air ground team to a a corps size ground force and a designated fleet group together into what eventually was designated Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet in 1942. In the earlier iterations of 1941 the Army 1st Division was paired off with the Marines & continued the amphib training the Army revived at the end of 1939. By 1942 the plans were more ambitious & included more ambitious plans like RUBBER and corps size exercises. Other Army formations were attached to Amphib Forces Atlantic Fleet including the 9th Infantry Division. There was a similar effort on the west coast that included expanding the Marine brigade there to a full division and a air wing with support regiment or group. The Army 3rd Division started its first Divisionn sized Amphib exercise at the end of 1939. The 2d MarDiv contributed a combined arms brigade to the Iceland occupation in mid 1941 & the 3rd ID was moved to the Atlantic US coast to reinforce. The 5th Inf Div replaced the the Marines on Iceland a little later in 1941.

Anyway the Army & Navy were spinning up two amphibious groups to deploy corps size ground forces from early 1940. Unfortunately I lack detail on the complete array of fleet, air, and ground units involved. The mobilization as executed 1940-1942 had some sort of allowance for expeditionary forces, but again the details escape me.

In any case, the Americans had to have a springboard, a base of operations. A port/network that could handle cca. 5-10,000 t / day of cargo.

What base of operations were planned & used for the GYMNAST and TORCH operations? Those had extended distances to the objective from ports of embarkation and subsequent LoC

Torch relied heavily on Gibraltar and the weakness of the Vichy forces. It was a first step of a learning curve, the Torch landings occured mostly without organized resistance. If they'd attack into NW Europe as per Marshall's wish, they'd probably be defeated.

We had a long thread some years ago on this, and a Torch landing in Southern France likely would have worked if the Allies got ashore and established a defensive perimeter to build up forces in rather than try and go on the offensive immediately after landing. German forces in France were at a low, the Atlantic Wall didn't exist, and much of the coast was defended very thinly by overstretched infantry divisions.

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=143090

[Peter89]

The fragments I have on the USNs plans for the Atlantic & east Atlantic littorals would be: First was updating WP GRAY to extend to the Azores. After that came up grading the Marine Expeditionary Brigade on the east coast from a planned division air ground team to a a corps size ground force and a designated fleet group together into what eventually was designated Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet in 1942. In the earlier iterations of 1941 the Army 1st Division was paired off with the Marines & continued the amphib training the Army revived at the end of 1939. By 1942 the plans were more ambitious & included more ambitious plans like RUBBER and corps size exercises. Other Army formations were attached to Amphib Forces Atlantic Fleet including the 9th Infantry Division. There was a similar effort on the west coast that included expanding the Marine brigade there to a full division and a air wing with support regiment or group. The Army 3rd Division started its first Divisionn sized Amphib exercise at the end of 1939. The 2d MarDiv contributed a combined arms brigade to the Iceland occupation in mid 1941 & the 3rd ID was moved to the Atlantic US coast to reinforce. The 5th Inf Div replaced the the Marines on Iceland a little later in 1941.

Anyway the Army & Navy were spinning up two amphibious groups to deploy corps size ground forces from early 1940. Unfortunately I lack detail on the complete array of fleet, air, and ground units involved. The mobilization as executed 1940-1942 had some sort of allowance for expeditionary forces, but again the details escape me.

In any case, the Americans had to have a springboard, a base of operations. A port/network that could handle cca. 5-10,000 t / day of cargo.

What base of operations were planned & used for the GYMNAST and TORCH operations? Those had extended distances to the objective from ports of embarkation and subsequent LoC

Torch relied heavily on Gibraltar and the weakness of the Vichy forces. It was a first step of a learning curve, the Torch landings occured mostly without organized resistance. If they'd attack into NW Europe as per Marshall's wish, they'd probably be defeated.

We had a long thread some years ago on this, and a Torch landing in Southern France likely would have worked if the Allies got ashore and established a defensive perimeter to build up forces in rather than try and go on the offensive immediately after landing. German forces in France were at a low, the Atlantic Wall didn't exist, and much of the coast was defended very thinly by overstretched infantry divisions.

I very seriously doubt it, because the Germans diverted essential forces to NA between November 1942-May 1943; also the Allies' air superiority was very questionable or straight impossible in Southern France, the U-boat threat was not brought under control and the British alone could not have invaded Italy to force the Germans to divert forces there. Although we can not say for sure what would have happened, but in my estimation most of the prerequisites of a successful invasion of the mainland were missing in late 1942 or in early 1943. I do not doubt that they could land, but the Germans would probably shift their forces there and in time they could build up their forces faster than the Allies.

[T. A. Gardner]

I very seriously doubt it, because the Germans diverted essential forces to NA between November 1942-May 1943; also the Allies' air superiority was very questionable or straight impossible in Southern France, the U-boat threat was not brought under control and the British alone could not have invaded Italy to force the Germans to divert forces there. Although we can not say for sure what would have happened, but in my estimation most of the prerequisites of a successful invasion of the mainland were missing in late 1942 or in early 1943. I do not doubt that they could land, but the Germans would probably shift their forces there and in time they could build up their forces faster than the Allies.

We discussed this at length in that earlier thread. The Germans have quite literally nothing to stop an invasion of Southern France at Quiberon Bay late in 1942. The US and British wouldn't have the forces for a major offensive once ashore, but the Germans haven't got the forces to defeat the landings. A single, weak bodenstande infantry division (the 333rd) isn't going to stop a multi-division landing by the Western Allies. Spread out like it is, it gets defeated in detail and the Germans are left scrambling to deal with a wide-open front in France.

The biggest bonus that comes out of this is the U-boat war in the Atlantic takes a gigantic hit with the loss of bases in France to send boats to sea from. It doesn't matter if the Allies physically take the ports right away so long as they threaten them and step up ASW efforts right off them due to having a beachhead and ports in France as a result of their landings.

I'd say such a landing would result in a static front situation for about a year, give or take, where the Allies don't or can't launch any major offensives. But the drain on German forces would be dramatic. The Germans would still lose in N. Africa. They'd still be ground down by the Russians. An invasion of Italy might not be necessary either but would still be a drain on German manpower to defend.

[PunctuationHorror]

The Germans have quite literally nothing to stop an invasion of Southern France at Quiberon Bay late in 1942.

I agree. The WAllies could land.

But how would the US and British accomplish the landings and what forces would they use? When would they invade? Can't really invade there in autumn and winter because of the weather: Storms, strong surf. Let's say they pull it off in August or September: In response, Hitler would panic and then redeploy some divisions to France. Forces would be taken from Russia and from the replacements that are bound for North Africa. Depending on when that happens, the Eastern Front might collapse OR Stalingrad and Caucasus overstretch might not happen at all because they will have to withdraw their forces as early as September 1942.

Then WAllied troops would be sitting in Brittany with no prospects of significant reinforcements. Couldn't do an offensive because they lack the forces. Also, how would they supply their troops? Which ports would they use for their logistics? How would they conquer them?

[T. A. Gardner]

The Germans have quite literally nothing to stop an invasion of Southern France at Quiberon Bay late in 1942.

I agree. The WAllies could land.

But how would the US and British accomplish the landings and what forces would they use? When would they invade? Can't really invade there in autumn and winter because of the weather: Storms, strong surf. Let's say they pull it off in August or September: In response, Hitler would panic and then redeploy some divisions to France. Forces would be taken from Russia and from the replacements that are bound for North Africa. Depending on when that happens, the Eastern Front might collapse OR Stalingrad and Caucasus overstretch might not happen at all because they will have to withdraw their forces as early as September 1942.

Then WAllied troops would be sitting in Brittany with no prospects of significant reinforcements. Couldn't do an offensive because they lack the forces. Also, how would they supply their troops? Which ports would they use for their logistics? How would they conquer them?

That all too was in that earlier thread. The landings I proposed used the same forces as the historical Torch landings with some small additions. Weather for such a landing could be predicted as the Allies have good access to that information. Since the Allies take a couple of moderate sized ports immediately upon landing, they can supply and reinforce their forces ashore.
With a major crimp in U-boat activity, the Allies will also lose fewer merchant ships meaning there will be more shipping capacity down the road.

Read the earlier thread. All of this is in it and it's hard to argue that it wouldn't have worked.

[PunctuationHorror]

To bring this topic back on track:

I remember this came up some time ago on the navweaps forums.
https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warship ... -s210.html

Solandarman makes a good argument that after the loss of Bismarck, for example, they should have retained their ships in the Atlantic rather than the (admittedly successful) Channel dash gambit.

But even earlier in the war they could have benefitted I think. The order for anything smaller than a Bismarck-class battleship to avoid action with a British battleship escort being toned back to allow for actions to distract a battleship while the other ship attacked the convoy (as Scharnhorsts captain suggested to Adm Lütjens during its encounter with HMS Ramillies during operation BERLIN) would have helped a lot. Readers original plan was to have a fast naval task force operating in the Atlantic and targeting convoys guarded by old R/QE class British battleships, he abandoned it after Bismarck was intercepted by the home fleet, but that was a fluke based on its interception in narrow waters rather than the open Atlantic thanks to Swedish intelligence informing the Brits of the sortie.

It at least would have led to some notable KM vs USN engagements. Like what was discussed here…
https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warship ... 7-s70.html

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warship ... 42346.html

Ok. Let's assume Bismarck will make it to Brest. What's next? She sails togeter with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. They raid a convoy, sink an old British battelship and about 20 merchants without suffering damage. Return to Brest. Get bombed there and get damaged. One or two get tugged to St. Nazaire for repairs. Get bombed there too. More repairs. The undamaged one moves to Bordeaux to avoid aircraft. Meanwhile, Tirpitz is ready, is lucky and joins the party at the côte atlantique. They finally pull off a convoy raid, sink 10 transports and split up in two equal groups. Sink more merchants and escape the RN sucessfully. They manage to return safely to port, whilst Royal Navy and USN concentrate forces, send carriers, and sink two German battleships in port or damage them heavily. The remaining two return to Germany. One is lost on the way to mines and aircraft, the other makes it and will be scuttled in 1945 after getting its artillery cannibalized.

Not worth it. A handful of uboats could do the same and would be much, much cheaper.

-----
Imagine the St Nazaire raid with one of the four battleships in the Normandie dockyard. Or the British bombing campaign on the French ports which were suitable for battleships. Would the Germans build massive battleship bunkers next to their sub pens? Would there be enough concrete?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Gibraltar had what port capacity??? Or depot capacity? All thee TF of TORCH assembled in British or US ports and went directly to the their objectives.

[Richard Anderson]

We discussed this at length in that earlier thread. The Germans have quite literally nothing to stop an invasion of Southern France at Quiberon Bay late in 1942. The US and British wouldn't have the forces for a major offensive once ashore, but the Germans haven't got the forces to defeat the landings. A single, weak bodenstande infantry division (the 333rd) isn't going to stop a multi-division landing by the Western Allies. Spread out like it is, it gets defeated in detail and the Germans are left scrambling to deal with a wide-open front in France.

Not going to waste my time wading through that discussion but if someone thought there was just a "single, weak bodenstande infantry division (the 333rd)" in Brittany they were wrong.

As of "late 1942" the 333. Infanterie-Division was being upgraded to a Angriffs-Division for the Ostfront, which is where it went in February 1943. Brittany and the Bordeaux coast including Quiberon Bay down to Lorient was the zone of XXV. Armee-Korps, which also included 709. Infanterie-Division, 343. Infanterie-Division, 257. Infanterie-Division (another Angriffs-Division from the Ostfront being rebuilt), 335. Infanterie-Division (another divsion being expanded to the status of an Angriffs-Division for the Ostfront), 346. Infanterie-Division (completing organization), 17. Infanterie-Division (another Angriffs-Division from the Ostfront being rebuilt), 182. Infanterie-Division, Brigade "Hermann Göring" (organizing before it was committed to North Africa in December), and 6. Panzer-Division (yet another Ostfront division completing its refit in France).

This goofy notion is almost as weird as the idea that an "aircraft carrier" dependent on an unworkable catapult system for air group operations by a handful of aircraft could change the dynamic of the war in the Atlantic.

Good to see that the what if section is still hard at work killing zombies with giant weed eaters.

[EwenS]

Gibraltar had what port capacity??? Or depot capacity? All thee TF of TORCH assembled in British or US ports and went directly to the their objectives.

What Gibraltar did have was an airfield. Without that there would have been no Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons flying into Algeria in the few days following the Torch invasion.

70 Spitfires & 27 Hurricanes arrived by ship on 15 Sept. Another 116 Spitfires and 13 Hurricanes arrived by ship on 28 Oct. All assembled by an RAF Special Erection Party. And yet more arrived a few days later.

Every operational carrier the Allies had in the Atlantic took part in providing air cover for the Torch Operation. Only the USS Chenango acted as a ferry to take P-40s to Morocco.

[T. A. Gardner]

We discussed this at length in that earlier thread. The Germans have quite literally nothing to stop an invasion of Southern France at Quiberon Bay late in 1942. The US and British wouldn't have the forces for a major offensive once ashore, but the Germans haven't got the forces to defeat the landings. A single, weak bodenstande infantry division (the 333rd) isn't going to stop a multi-division landing by the Western Allies. Spread out like it is, it gets defeated in detail and the Germans are left scrambling to deal with a wide-open front in France.

Not going to waste my time wading through that discussion but if someone thought there was just a "single, weak bodenstande infantry division (the 333rd)" in Brittany they were wrong.

As of "late 1942" the 333. Infanterie-Division was being upgraded to a Angriffs-Division for the Ostfront, which is where it went in February 1943. Brittany and the Bordeaux coast including Quiberon Bay down to Lorient was the zone of XXV. Armee-Korps, which also included 709. Infanterie-Division, 343. Infanterie-Division, 257. Infanterie-Division (another Angriffs-Division from the Ostfront being rebuilt), 335. Infanterie-Division (another divsion being expanded to the status of an Angriffs-Division for the Ostfront), 346. Infanterie-Division (completing organization), 17. Infanterie-Division (another Angriffs-Division from the Ostfront being rebuilt), 182. Infanterie-Division, Brigade "Hermann Göring" (organizing before it was committed to North Africa in December), and 6. Panzer-Division (yet another Ostfront division completing its refit in France).

This goody notion is almost as weird as they idea that an "aircraft carrier" dependent on an unworkable catapult system for air group operations by a handful of aircraft could change the dynamic of the war in the Atlantic.

Good to see that the what if section is still hard at work killing zombies with giant weed eaters.

But, of those divisions, only the 333rd was in a position to repel an invasion immediately. As you should be aware, no German infantry division--not a single one--proved capable of going on the offensive against a US or UK/ Commonwealth division and winning with the exception of the defeat of the 106th US ID in the Ardennes.
So, trying to claim that a single German infantry division, of whatever quality it was, is going to stop the Allied landings is absurd.

[Peter89]

We discussed this at length in that earlier thread. The Germans have quite literally nothing to stop an invasion of Southern France at Quiberon Bay late in 1942. The US and British wouldn't have the forces for a major offensive once ashore, but the Germans haven't got the forces to defeat the landings. A single, weak bodenstande infantry division (the 333rd) isn't going to stop a multi-division landing by the Western Allies. Spread out like it is, it gets defeated in detail and the Germans are left scrambling to deal with a wide-open front in France.

Not going to waste my time wading through that discussion but if someone thought there was just a "single, weak bodenstande infantry division (the 333rd)" in Brittany they were wrong.

As of "late 1942" the 333. Infanterie-Division was being upgraded to a Angriffs-Division for the Ostfront, which is where it went in February 1943. Brittany and the Bordeaux coast including Quiberon Bay down to Lorient was the zone of XXV. Armee-Korps, which also included 709. Infanterie-Division, 343. Infanterie-Division, 257. Infanterie-Division (another Angriffs-Division from the Ostfront being rebuilt), 335. Infanterie-Division (another divsion being expanded to the status of an Angriffs-Division for the Ostfront), 346. Infanterie-Division (completing organization), 17. Infanterie-Division (another Angriffs-Division from the Ostfront being rebuilt), 182. Infanterie-Division, Brigade "Hermann Göring" (organizing before it was committed to North Africa in December), and 6. Panzer-Division (yet another Ostfront division completing its refit in France).

This goody notion is almost as weird as they idea that an "aircraft carrier" dependent on an unworkable catapult system for air group operations by a handful of aircraft could change the dynamic of the war in the Atlantic.

Good to see that the what if section is still hard at work killing zombies with giant weed eaters.

But, of those divisions, only the 333rd was in a position to repel an invasion immediately. As you should be aware, no German infantry division--not a single one--proved capable of going on the offensive against a US or UK/ Commonwealth division and winning with the exception of the defeat of the 106th US ID in the Ardennes.
So, trying to claim that a single German infantry division, of whatever quality it was, is going to stop the Allied landings is absurd.

I never meant the landing itself, and nobody seems to argue with it either. But the question whether the Allies could hold or even expand the bridgehead is depending on forces and supplies: and the Germans simply had better cards in both regards. How many large-capacity ports could the Allies take at the first stroke? What kind of shipping resources did they possess? What's the quality of their paratroopers? What exactly was their NGFS doctrine and could they really coordinate it between the RN and the USN in late 1942? What about the U-boats? What kind of landing equipment did they possess? These are all very important details given that Germany could transit forces on the rail network essentially uninterrupted to Southern France.

I also don't quite like this "division for division" approach. We had a fellow member here with whom I had lengthy debates about the idea of "a division". A German division in Normandy in mid-1944 is never going to be as strong as a German division in Southern France in late-1942; and an Allied division in a bridgehead in Southern France in late-1942 is simply never going to be as strong as an Allied division in Normandy in mid-1944. To paraphrase my favourite WW2 author, units did not operate in an empty space.

[Richard Anderson]

But, of those divisions, only the 333rd was in a position to repel an invasion immediately. As you should be aware, no German infantry division--not a single one--proved capable of going on the offensive against a US or UK/ Commonwealth division and winning with the exception of the defeat of the 106th US ID in the Ardennes.
So, trying to claim that a single German infantry division, of whatever quality it was, is going to stop the Allied landings is absurd.

And as you should be aware. when the Allies landed in Normandy in June 1944, they were working with the benefits of 18 months experience in seven major opposed and unopposed amphibious landings in the Mediterranean.

As you should be aware, in Normandy they were faced by parts of a single Angriffs-division and that it was days and weeks before other Angriffs-divisionen were able to intervene and yet much more experienced Allied troops were only able to advance incrementally over weeks. The lack of interdiction means 6. Panzer is three to five hours away at most from practicable beaches, while 7. Panzer in southern France is ten hours by rail from Nantes and 10. Panzer in northern France is eight hours away. All three would likely be able to intervene with 72 hours.

As you should be aware, the Allies had been effectively attacking the French rail and road infrastructure for two months prior to NEPTUNE with overwhelming air superiority, something for which they had zero experience and much less capability to do...and if they waited for two months to so they would be executing their landing in early January 1943 rather than early November 1942. You should be aware weather conditions in the Nay of Biscay are not ideal for extensive amphibious operations in that season.

As you should be aware, the lack of experience of USN boat crews resulted in large losses of assault craft in TORCH and badly delayed the landings of many elements that were virtually unopposed on the beaches. Coupled with the overall lack of landing craft, especially LCT capable of landing on other than highly sloped beaches, the Allied buildup of heavy equipment, especially since they will have no port, will be slow to say the least.

As you should be aware, the Quiberon Bay beaches consist of many disconnected strands, most with extensive shallows offshore. The two most practicable, Plage de Kermabec and Plage du Magouëro/Plage de Kerhillio are separated by 90 kilometers, while the latter are physically separated by the estuary of the Etel.

As you should be aware, the Biscay Coast from Brittany south was one of the more heavily fortified in German hands, since they protected Brest, Lorient, La Rochelle, and St Nazaire and that they had been strengthened since the St Nazaire Raid seven months earlier.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Good to see that the what if section is still hard at work killing zombies with giant weed eaters.

Thats a metaphor I'd never thought of.

[Richard Anderson]

I forgot to mention that you should also be aware that the Allies had little means other than LCM to get medium tanks onto anything other than a highly shelving beach. The LCT-I, LCT-II, and LCT-III all required a 1/35 beach slope or greater to beach, which type beach made landing the then available LCA, LCP, LCV, and LCM very dangerous, especially with the inexperienced crews available for TORCH.

Added to that, there were just 16 LCT-I, 56 LCT-II, and 34 LCT-III available worldwide to the RN as of c. 1 October 1942, while the Allies assumed that as of 1 October there would be 250 available including US production (203 LCT-5 launched and 162 commissioned as of 30 September by US yards the first six LCT-V from British yards launched 23 October 1942 - 22 January 1943 and were completed, commissioned, and finished working up c. March-April 1943), which could land up to 990 light and medium tanks. However, the LCT-I and II were actually considered too small and all the I and many of the II utilized vulnerable and thirsty gasoline engines. The III was larger but its greater length to width versus the I, II, and later IV designs caused issues with longitudinal strength.

Practically speaking, there were at most 162 LCT capable of operations on the Biscay Coast on any beach...and they all had to be transported from the US to Britain (over half were turned over to the RN after commissioning and were already in route to the UK) which would have had brand new crews with a few weeks experience working up in their new vessel and zero time for exercises. They would be supplemented by another 106 of very limited utility. The whole would then be committed to crossing the English Channel and entering the Bay of Biscay in November or later...good luck!

[Richard Anderson]

Good to see that the what if section is still hard at work killing zombies with giant weed eaters.

Thats a metaphor I'd never thought of.

I guess you missed viewtopic.php?f=11&t=268057?