How reliable was the Tiger 2?

[Michael Kenny]

The Allieds often had replacement tanks ready and tanks with even minor damage were often scrapped entirely.

Its slightly more complex than that. At 'Last Light' every day a Regiment had to tally its tanks and record them in 3 categories
1) 'Fit' meaning fully functioning and ready for use
2) 'Needing repairs' but expected to be fit in under 24 hours. minor damage.
3) Needing major repairs that will take longer than 24 hours plus all tanks known to be destroyed.

The Regiment would strike all of '3' from its books and that tank would be a 'Total Loss' to the Unit and it could get a replacement.
All tanks in '3' would be a Unit total loss but they were not all be destroyed tanks. Those tanks were transferred to the workshops and it was there that they would be examined and a decision made if they could be repaired or had to be written off and scrapped.

Most German 'ace validating' accounts normally uses the last light numbers of a Regiment in order to say 'Kills were confirmed by Allied Unit records' but that is not what they show. If a Unit shows 50 in 'fit', 8 in 'Under 24 hours' and 15 in 'over 24 hours' it does not mean they had 23 tanks destroyed. It means they suffered 23 tank casualties of which 8 were minor repairs and 15 were sent to the rear to see how many were repairable. It is possible(though highly unlikely) that all 15 of the major repair tanks could be fixed and returned to a Unit.
The Commonwealth had a large park of replacement tanks and thus could keep Units pretty much at full strength and the workshops had a large backlog of repairs building up so damaged tanks could spend weeks waiting to be inspected and repaired. Commonwealth 'destroyed tank' totals were not done daily and were complied only a few times during the campaign so they lagged far behind events and are totally useless for working out daily or even monthly losses. Despite Zetterling explaining this in his 2000 'Normandy' book (footnote 33 Chapter 6) people still like to use the last light numbers because they give an inflated count of Allied losses.

[ThatZenoGuy]

Didn't the 150km statistic come from postwar French usage, and no official German documents repeat such numbers?

[Don Juan]

That's what I thought so I asked an expert

(see ltdan's post #24)

[ThatZenoGuy]

That's what I thought so I asked an expert

(see ltdan's post #24)

>As far as the final drives are concerned: According to Ralf Rahts (Munster tank museum) the wear limit was given as 150km.

I'm going to have some skepticism about this, the actual people operating vehicles often make gigantic mistakes on the capabilities of said vehicles. Yet alone people who just operate museums. Nobody is perfect and I have a bit of uhh, hesitancy to trust museum staff.

The final drives were 100% the weakest link, not only was there potential quality-control issues, the actual design of them was not built up to snuff for a tank of it's size and power. Granted it also made said final drives a fair bit cheaper, but did that balance it out?

Replacing the final drives is considerably easier than replacing the transmission as well.

[Don Juan]

On yeah, I find the 150 km figure for the final drives extraordinarily difficult to believe, but until I come across a credible source that gives a better figure, that's what I'm going to have to stick with.

[Erik1]

I don't know anything for sure myself, I'm not an expert, but It's been said here and elsewhere that in 1944 German tanks will look worse for several reasons, all as an outcome of the worsening situation.

Some reasons I recall are:
1. Germany's increasing tank shortage means that they try to repair damaged tanks more often, including badly damaged ones, and this keeps them in the records. The Allieds often had replacement tanks ready and tanks with even minor damage were often scrapped entirely.
2. Commanders of tank units were hesitant to hand over badly damaged tanks to repair units out of fear that when repaired they'd be given to other units and not be replaced. They drag these tanks with themselves, hoping for a lull in the fighting where they can be repaired.
3. The increasingly desperate fighting means tank units are sometimes getting adequate breaks for maintenance. They also start to keep an increasing amount of old and worn out tanks in service, which should've normally been scrapped or sent away for major overhaul.
4. The crews are becoming increasingly less trained: bad drivers, badly done maintenace, etc.
5. Quality control issues in manufacturing are increasing, not just of armor plate but the quality of metal and rubber of internal systems. An unknown amount of sabotage is also definitely going on.
6. Supply difficulties with spare parts and the manufacturing of too few spare parts on purpose as a desperate trade off for manufacturing more tanks.

Pz III or IV might never have been as reliable as the Sherman but comparing 1944 German figures to Allied ones to get a picture of the inherent performance difference for the tanks is probably really unfair, if this is true.

The Western Allies did NOT scrap tanks "with even minor damage" and any "historian" who is spreading this nonsense needs their backsides kicking. The Allies only scrapped tanks if they were write-offs, and even then these would be pooled for cannibalisation, because as the automotive components of these vehicles (engines, gearboxes, final drives) generally had tremendous durability they could be re-used even if the rest of the tank was a wreck. The British were even sending Meteor engines from written-off Cromwells in Normandy back to England to be installed in new production tanks.

Otherwise, the whole issue of the degradation of German tank performance is a chicken-and-egg situation. The final drives of a Sherman or a Cromwell were expected to last a minimum of 3000 miles (5000 km) under constant severe usage. Therefore the theoretical (not actual) spares requirement for these items from wear and tear across the whole of NWE during 1944 and 1945 would have been pretty much nil. This wasn't true in reality of course, but the inherent durability of these components meant that there was never likely to be a spares shortage because the spares required would have been easily controllable. Compare that with a Panther where the final drives generally needed to be checked and have new components fitted every 150 km (I can scarcely believe this but I am assured it is true).

If you produce tanks that eat up spares, you cannot then complain that the tanks would be reliable "if only" the spares were available. If you don't produce enough spares because you are desperate to produce new spares-eating tanks then the problem still lies with the nature of the tanks. The same applies if you are having to produce spares with lower quality materials because so many are wanted. Also if the tanks constantly need new spares fitting then they are going to require more fitters and mechanics than Allied tanks, and so be a drain on manpower - after all those skilled men could be doing something far more useful, such as crewing tanks!

This is a systemic problem that cannot be analysed from one direction (i.e. the tanks were good "if only"). German tanks were as much a burden on the system that supported them as vice-versa.

I guess the situation between us is a difference in which historians we've listened to.

For example, Bruce Newsome said that no Soviet and Western Allied tank ever reached a 5000 km overhaul figure in combat and that the highest he found was a Sherman type which reached 2800 km, and that in his research he sees it a lot that Western Allied tanks were written off completely for minor damage. Of course he could be dead wrong, I'm not saying that I think he is right regading this when you say he is wrong because of the historians you've read, I'm saying that have no way of knowing that or which opinions are correct or not, so maybe we should leave it at there and I'll pay attention to more criticisms of Bruce Newsome.

About the Panther final drive's 150 km lifespan, it's surprising to see that Ralf Rath's says that this was for sure the case - maybe it was, but I've always read online that this figure is never seen in German service, only the French post-war report about their Panthers. While I've never seen a German figure for the average lifespan of the final drive myself, I remember a report from 1944 that said something about the final drive life span: it said that the average distance between overhauls for their Panthers was, I don't remember exactly, but a little over 1000 km, like 1200 or 1300. They said that there continues to be a problem with final drive breakdowns and that in half their Panthers either one or both final drives broke down before reaching the overhaul figure. So clearly problematic and they said so, but as you can see it's much less bad than the French figure of 150 km average.

There's also a Jagdpanther report that says that with the newly recieved reinforced final drive they have driven 500 km without breakdowns, and to be sure they're reliable they stressed the final drives extra on purpose when driving. The Jagdpanther used the same final drive as the Panther.

[Don Juan]

IIRC there was an improved final drive for the Jagdpanther towards the end of the war that was apparently very good, and was due to be back-rationalised onto the Panther, although the war ended before that could happen. As for the French figure of 150 km, who knows really? If the Germans were getting better figures for the final drives on their Panthers, it may have been because they were driving them incredibly slowly on route marches, while the French were trying to drive them "normally". But that's just speculation on my part - it's best to view the French figure simply as a piece of information that needs more information to emerge to put it in better context.

[Erik1]

IIRC there was an improved final drive for the Jagdpanther towards the end of the war that was apparently very good, and was due to be back-rationalised onto the Panther, although the war ended before that could happen. As for the French figure of 150 km, who knows really? If the Germans were getting better figures for the final drives on their Panthers, it may have been because they were driving them incredibly slowly on route marches, while the French were trying to drive them "normally". But that's just speculation on my part - it's best to view the French figure simply as a piece of information that needs more information to emerge to put it in better context.

Are you sure that the Jagdpanther had a different final drive than the Panther? I don't remember Jentz's book saying anything about that but I don't remember it so well either.

As training tanks, is it possible that the French Panthers were being driven more often in aggressive and otherwise demanding ways than the Panthers were in combat, because drivers are practising the more difficult kinds of driving?

Btw, about the 5000 km overhaul distances for the British tanks, does these figures come from combat reports?

[Don Juan]

I'm not sure about the Jagdpanther - it may have been the case that it was the reinforced final drives for this vehicle that were to be be back-rationalised onto the Panther. I just remember that its final drives were improved, that's all.

With regard to the French Panthers, there are lots of ways to speculate how they were used. It may have been the case that the drivers were more uncaring because they knew the Panthers were only a temporary asset and would soon be replaced by Allied or domestic French designs. But I doubt any of this can be definitely proved.

The 5000 km overhaul distance is from British Field Trial Reports, the field trials for Cruiser and Medium tanks being for 3000 miles. It's notable that for the whole of the Northwest European campaign, the maximum distance achieved for any British tanks over the full eleven months from June 1944 to May 1945 was about 2000 miles (~3200 km). And this was despite the fact that British and American tanks travelled on their tracks all the time, and not by train as usually did the Tigers and Panthers. This is one of the reasons why I highly doubt any combat reports for the Tiger confirm a 5000 km overhaul life, because I seriously doubt that any Tiger accumulated anything like that distance in operations, as most of their long-distance travel was by rail. Also combat reports only relate to specific short operational periods, and not to the whole operational life of a tank.

As an example, 5000 km is Normandy to Smolensk and back again, so for a combat report, or any kind of report, to confirm a 5000 km overhaul life it would need to encompass a couple of years of intensive usage over extremely long road runs with no rail travel being involved. It is more plausible to believe that Newsome just took this figure from the Tigerfibel and that the alleged combat reports that support this figure simply don't exist.

[Michael Kenny]

For example, Bruce Newsome said that no Soviet and Western Allied tank ever reached a 5000 km overhaul figure in combat and that the highest he found was a Sherman type which reached 2800 km, and that in his research he sees it a lot that Western Allied tanks were written off completely for minor damage. Of course he could be dead wrong, I'm not saying that I think he is right regading this when you say he is wrong because of the historians you've read, I'm saying that have no way of knowing that or which opinions are correct or not, so maybe we should leave it at there and I'll pay attention to more criticisms of Bruce Newsome.

Newsome is (yet again) talking rubbish. Perhaps if he spent less time parading his politics (he is an vociferous 'anti-woke' warrior)and more time researching he would discover the truth. Believing the US scrapped tanks with 'minor damage' is an absurd claim. They had a significant tank-shortage well into 1945 and simply could not afford to waste even 1 tank.

[Denniss]

The Panther got 5-8 tonnes heavier than the final drives were designed for. The final drives were never properly adapted for the higher weight, just some minor tunings were made but without great effect.
I believe the original Tiger had better final drives that were designed for its weight, I don't know how good or bad those for the Tiger II/Jagdtiger were adapted for the massive weight increase.

[Erik1]

I'm not sure about the Jagdpanther - it may have been the case that it was the reinforced final drives for this vehicle that were to be be back-rationalised onto the Panther. I just remember that its final drives were improved, that's all.

With regard to the French Panthers, there are lots of ways to speculate how they were used. It may have been the case that the drivers were more uncaring because they knew the Panthers were only a temporary asset and would soon be replaced by Allied or domestic French designs. But I doubt any of this can be definitely proved.

The 5000 km overhaul distance is from British Field Trial Reports, the field trials for Cruiser and Medium tanks being for 3000 miles. It's notable that for the whole of the Northwest European campaign, the maximum distance achieved for any British tanks over the full eleven months from June 1944 to May 1945 was about 2000 miles (~3200 km). And this was despite the fact that British and American tanks travelled on their tracks all the time, and not by train as usually did the Tigers and Panthers. This is one of the reasons why I highly doubt any combat reports for the Tiger confirm a 5000 km overhaul life, because I seriously doubt that any Tiger accumulated anything like that distance in operations, as most of their long-distance travel was by rail. Also combat reports only relate to specific short operational periods, and not to the whole operational life of a tank.

As an example, 5000 km is Normandy to Smolensk and back again, so for a combat report, or any kind of report, to confirm a 5000 km overhaul life it would need to encompass a couple of years of intensive usage over extremely long road runs with no rail travel being involved. It is more plausible to believe that Newsome just took this figure from the Tigerfibel and that the alleged combat reports that support this figure simply don't exist.

In the Youtube discussion with Newsome he said that the Tigers would typically do a couple of hundred km every month and that the early Tigers started to reach 5000 km in mid or late 1943 iirc.

[Erik1]

The Panther got 5-8 tonnes heavier than the final drives were designed for. The final drives were never properly adapted for the higher weight, just some minor tunings were made but without great effect.
I believe the original Tiger had better final drives that were designed for its weight, I don't know how good or bad those for the Tiger II/Jagdtiger were adapted for the massive weight increase.

The Tiger II had, at least initially, severe issues with its final drives. It actually did not pass its reliability trials but was put in production anyway, which led to a rough start to say the least. The final drives as well as the steering system were the main causes of problems. These systems were the only major components newly designed for the Tiger II and its weight, so what probably happened was that because the engineers had no prior experience with tanks of this weight, designing these was a challenge, and they would've required to make tests and refinements over a period of time, but that was denied.

Henschel however worked very hard to solve the issues and had their people working closely with Tiger II crews, and it seems like the Tiger II was eventually regarded as reliable, though a skilled driver was absolutely essential to avoid breakdowns and it was sensitive like that.

[Erik1]

For example, Bruce Newsome said that no Soviet and Western Allied tank ever reached a 5000 km overhaul figure in combat and that the highest he found was a Sherman type which reached 2800 km, and that in his research he sees it a lot that Western Allied tanks were written off completely for minor damage. Of course he could be dead wrong, I'm not saying that I think he is right regading this when you say he is wrong because of the historians you've read, I'm saying that have no way of knowing that or which opinions are correct or not, so maybe we should leave it at there and I'll pay attention to more criticisms of Bruce Newsome.

Newsome is (yet again) talking rubbish. Perhaps if he spent less time parading his politics (he is an vociferous 'anti-woke' warrior)and more time researching he would discover the truth. Believing the US scrapped tanks with 'minor damage' is an absurd claim. They had a significant tank-shortage well into 1945 and simply could not afford to waste even 1 tank.

I'm aware that Newsome is "anti-woke", which is off-putting. About his research, I'll keep an eye out for sure if I see more criticisms of him and his work.

[Erik1]

I forgot to say, but I asked Nicholas Moran on tank-net (who watched the entire 2 hour stream with Newsome and Sofilein and is a tank researcher himself I believe, and knows a lot about tanks, though maybe that isn't really the case and if so this reply is meaningless) if he heard anything wrong or suspect with anything that Newsome said, he said no, he was just concerned that he read too much meaning into some of the things about the Tigers reliability.