At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[Aida1]

P.S. Stop insinuating the preferences of others just because they disagree with your views based on two books (Dunning-Kruger effect, perhaps). Writing about "your Wehrmacht" and suggesting that the user Aida1 is some kind of sympathizer of the Nazi army is not only childish, but simply rude. I am surprised by the lack of response from the moderators.

His main problem is projecting his own opinions about the conduct of operations which are very amateurish in the minds of german commanders who did not share them. And clearly having prejudices about german commanders given his gloryhunting comments.
He may believe that HE would not have tried to go fro Moscow in august 1941 because of his opnions but german commanders would have if allowed and could conceivably have succeeded. The historical fact about the will of german commanders to go for Moscow should not be up for discussion. That is a historical fact .Anybody can discuss at will about the possibility of success . That is a totally different matter.

[MarkF617]

Curiousone.

I think some of your confusion comes from your reading of the term the army group's 3 Army's. You have interpreted it to mean fourth army and the two Panzer groups, whereas he was referring to the 4 Armys of AG Centre or 2nd, 9th and 4th Panzer.
Hope this makes thinks a bit clearer.

Thanks

Mark.

[Aida1]

Seriously? I am giving evidence for my point of view and all I'm getting back is unsourced opinion. You may have better information than I do and may not have researched as much as you but all I'm getting back is zero evidence just assertions that the generals said they could attack so Moscow was doomed.

Very simplistic. The fact is german commanders would have attacked because they have different opnions than you about the readiness to do so.
You reject sources that contain an opinion that contradicts you. :roll:You should simply agree to disagree. :roll:

[MarkF617]

I never said they couldn't attack, I said they would fail. I don't hate German Generals I just don't rate them as high as you do. Your problem is you assume because professional soldiers said it could be done it would happen if allowed even when they have had information. They had no idea what the Red Army was capable of and assumed they would conquer my

[Aida1]

I never said they couldn't attack, I said they would fail. I don't hate German Generals I just don't rate them as high as you do. Your problem is you assume because professional soldiers said it could be done it would happen if allowed even when they have had information. They had no idea what the Red Army was capable of and assumed they would conquer my

You said they were gloryhunters. :roll: A professional soldier saying it could be done is at least an expert opinion. And operationally speaking the red army in 1941 still had a lot to learn which is why it suffered all the defeats it did. So german officers had reasons to be confident to deal with red army countermeasures. Actually Wageners scenario includes strong red army counterattacks against Army group north and particularly Army Group south with serious setbacks and german retreats but the German high command keeps its head and does not deviate from its purpose to surround Moscow.

[ljadw]

I don't know how many ted I have to repeat this but Moscow was not the objective of Barbarossa, only in the glory seeking generals minds.

A stupid comment. It was the german high command which wanted to go for Moscow as a means to defeat the enemy army.

PROVE IT

[ljadw]

Glanz's source for daily requirement is "AOK 4, Oberquartiermeister, memo, on conference with Army Group (Centre), 13 July 41," in AOK 4 1756/13. Foot note 9 and also the Halder Diary (unabridged) for this period, which provides many numbers and figures pertaining to logistical support, communications routes, and problems with both. Footnote 10

Thanks

Mark.

Thanks, I am pretty familiar with Halder Diary, though.

You are ?
You know that he implicitly admitted in his diary in July 1941 that Barbarossa had failed, thus that an advance to and capture of Moscow had no longer any sense and was also impossible ?

[ljadw]

From the Barbarossa Forum :
Christian Gerlach :Operative Planungen der Wehrmacht für den Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion

''Tatsächlich das Oberkommando des Heeres,Hitler folgend ,bereits am 21.August 1941 davon aus,Moskau würde nicht unbedingt 1941 erobert werden,und am 13 .September 1941 gab man dort den Gedanken auf,man könne den Krieg an der Ostfront noch in 1941 beenden . ''
''The OKH ( = Halder ) followed the opinion of Hitler ( ! ) and was convinced on 21 August ( after 2 months of fighting ! ) that there was no longer any certainty that Moscow could be conquered/captured in 1941 and on 13 September, the OKH gave up the idea that the war in the East could be finished in 1941 .''
As Barbarossa was planned as a short campaign,to be finished before the Autumn,this means that after 2 months of fighting Halder admitted that Barbarossa had failed .
The apologists will of course deny this ,but no one takes them seriously .

[curiousone]

Glanz's source for daily requirement is "AOK 4, Oberquartiermeister, memo, on conference with Army Group (Centre), 13 July 41," in AOK 4 1756/13. Foot note 9 and also the Halder Diary (unabridged) for this period, which provides many numbers and figures pertaining to logistical support, communications routes, and problems with both. Footnote 10

Thanks

Mark.

Thanks, I am pretty familiar with Halder Diary, though.

You are ?
You know that he implicitly admitted in his diary in July 1941 that Barbarossa had failed, thus that an advance to and capture of Moscow had no longer any sense and was also impossible ?

This is your pure falsification, especially the second part. Cite the exact page of his War Diary or I will report you for deliberate misrepresentation.

General Halder wrote in his diary (https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... 3973/rec/5; p. 199) on July 3, "It is thus probably no overstatement to say that the Russian Campaign has been won in the space of two weeks".

[ljadw]

From the same Barbarossa Forum :
Wolf-Dieter Dorn : Das operative Scheitern des '' Unternehmens Barbarossa '' im Sommer 1941 als Folge der bisherigen deutscchen Kriegsführung und Aussenpolitik .
"In den Planungen zum Ostkrieg gingen die Generalität und die politische Führung des DRitten Reiches von einem weiteren schnellen Feldzug aus,der in wenigen Wochen und am spätestens im Frühherbst1941 mit Erreichen der Linie Archangelsk-Astrachan abgeschlossen sei .''
''The military ( also Halder ! ) and Hitler started from the idea of another fast campaign which would/should be finished in a few weeks and at last in the early Autumn at the Archangelsk-Astrachan line .''
As after almost 2 months of fighting and a few weeks before the start of the Autumn,the Ostheer was still far away west of Moscow,this means that an advance to Moscow before the Autumn was senseless,unneeded and impossible .Even if the advance succeeded, it would still be only a wast of time and resources .
The fall of Moscow would not mean the end of the war in the East ,even an advance to the AA line would not mean the end of the war in the East .Only the collaps of the Soviet regime would have as result the end of the war in the East .
The comparison with the war in Ukraine is striking .

[curiousone]

From the Barbarossa Forum :
Christian Gerlach :Operative Planungen der Wehrmacht für den Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion

''Tatsächlich das Oberkommando des Heeres,Hitler folgend ,bereits am 21.August 1941 davon aus,Moskau würde nicht unbedingt 1941 erobert werden,und am 13 .September 1941 gab man dort den Gedanken auf,man könne den Krieg an der Ostfront noch in 1941 beenden . ''
''The OKH ( = Halder ) followed the opinion of Hitler ( ! ) and was convinced on 21 August ( after 2 months of fighting ! ) that there was no longer any certainty that Moscow could be conquered/captured in 1941 and on 13 September, the OKH gave up the idea that the war in the East could be finished in 1941 .''
As Barbarossa was planned as a short campaign,to be finished before the Autumn,this means that after 2 months of fighting Halder admitted that Barbarossa had failed .
The apologists will of course deny this ,but no one takes them seriously .

"Tatsächlich das Oberkommando des Heeres,Hitler folgend ,bereits am 21.August 1941 davon aus,Moskau würde nicht unbedingt 1941 erobert werden,und am 13 .September 1941 gab man dort den Gedanken auf,man könne den Krieg an der Ostfront noch in 1941 beenden".

means in English that:

"In fact, the High Command of the Army, following Hitler, already assumed on August 21, 1941 that Moscow would not necessarily be conquered in 1941, and on September 13, 1941 they gave up the idea that the war on the Eastern Front could be ended in 1941".

Certainty (your translation) does not mean necessity (original meaning). It is obvious. And your quote is not taken from Halder War Diary, which you have just referred and implied that I have not read it. Pathetic.

The conclusion is that you are again falsifying the quote to fit your agenda of "they could not have captured Moscow" (a ridiculous obsession of yours).

[ljadw]

Glanz's source for daily requirement is "AOK 4, Oberquartiermeister, memo, on conference with Army Group (Centre), 13 July 41," in AOK 4 1756/13. Foot note 9 and also the Halder Diary (unabridged) for this period, which provides many numbers and figures pertaining to logistical support, communications routes, and problems with both. Footnote 10

Thanks

Mark.

Thanks, I am pretty familiar with Halder Diary, though.

You are ?
You know that he implicitly admitted in his diary in July 1941 that Barbarossa had failed, thus that an advance to and capture of Moscow had no longer any sense and was also impossible ?

This is your pure falsification, especially the second part. Cite the exact page of his War Diary or I will report you for deliberate misrepresentation.

General Halder wrote in his diary (https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... 3973/rec/5; p. 199) on July 3, "It is thus probably no overstatement to say that the Russian Campaign has been won in the space of two weeks".

I am not impressioned by your threaths .
On 11 August Halder wrote the following in his war diary ;
'' We have underestimated the Russian colossus ....Whenever a dozen divisions are destroyed the Russians replace them with another .''
At that moment, the Russians had to be on the run, Moscow had to be captured and the Ostheer had to be close to the AA line .
The Russians were not on the run:they killed,wounded every day 7000 Germans, Moscow was still safe and there was no hope to be
at the AA line .
Thus Barbarossa had failed.

[Georg_S]

Glanz's source for daily requirement is "AOK 4, Oberquartiermeister, memo, on conference with Army Group (Centre), 13 July 41," in AOK 4 1756/13. Foot note 9 and also the Halder Diary (unabridged) for this period, which provides many numbers and figures pertaining to logistical support, communications routes, and problems with both. Footnote 10

Thanks

Mark.

Thanks, I am pretty familiar with Halder Diary, though.

You are ?
You know that he implicitly admitted in his diary in July 1941 that Barbarossa had failed, thus that an advance to and capture of Moscow had no longer any sense and was also impossible ?

Hello

You questioning the claim, so please provide a source that proof your claim, as one of the rules of AHF.

Regards
Georg

[curiousone]

Glanz's source for daily requirement is "AOK 4, Oberquartiermeister, memo, on conference with Army Group (Centre), 13 July 41," in AOK 4 1756/13. Foot note 9 and also the Halder Diary (unabridged) for this period, which provides many numbers and figures pertaining to logistical support, communications routes, and problems with both. Footnote 10

Thanks

Mark.

Thanks, I am pretty familiar with Halder Diary, though.

You are ?
You know that he implicitly admitted in his diary in July 1941 that Barbarossa had failed, thus that an advance to and capture of Moscow had no longer any sense and was also impossible ?

This is your pure falsification, especially the second part. Cite the exact page of his War Diary or I will report you for deliberate misrepresentation.

General Halder wrote in his diary (https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... 3973/rec/5; p. 199) on July 3, "It is thus probably no overstatement to say that the Russian Campaign has been won in the space of two weeks".

I am not impressioned by your threaths .
On 11 August Halder wrote the following in his war diary ;
'' We have underestimated the Russian colossus ....Whenever a dozen divisions are destroyed the Russians replace them with another .''
At that moment, the Russians had to be on the run, Moscow had to be captured and the Ostheer had to be close to the AA line .
The Russians were not on the run:they killed,wounded every day 7000 Germans, Moscow was still safe and there was no hope to be
at the AA line .
Thus Barbarossa had failed.

You are not impressed, because of what? Are you allowed to break the forum rules? Are you under some kind of protection?

First of, this excerpt is from August, not July.

Secondly, where is the fragment in which Halder "implicitly admitted in his diary in July 1941 that Barbarossa had failed, thus that an advance to and capture of Moscow had no longer any sense and was also impossible"?

He talks only about underestimating the Red Army.

The rest is your interpretation and thus it is invalid.

[curiousone]

Curiousone.

I think some of your confusion comes from your reading of the term the army group's 3 Army's. You have interpreted it to mean fourth army and the two Panzer groups, whereas he was referring to the 4 Armys of AG Centre or 2nd, 9th and 4th Panzer.
Hope this makes thinks a bit clearer.

Thanks

Mark.

It is not about my confusion, because his estimates are based solely on Halder War Diary and there is no chance to calculate such a high daily supply demands using Wagner's computations included in this primary source.

Glantz is rather clear in his statements such as "the actual daily supply requirements of the Forth Army's two Panzer groups was 2000 tons of ammunition or four trains, 4,000 tons o go POL ot right trains, and 450 tons of rations or one train, for a total of 13 trains per day" or "the army group's 3 Armie's needed 33 railroad supply trains daily to mount such an offensive".

33 supply trains daily was equivalent to about 14,850 metric tons.