At what point did Germany lose WW2?
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
All claims should be provided with a source, that goes for all.
/Georg
/Georg
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
1) Do you ever bothered yourselft to read my article, which is linked above? It mentions David Glantz, David Stahel and other Eastern Front historians. Does he talk rubbish? Many of his opinions lack analytical basis (f.e. the Red Army marching to the English Channel without the material help of the Western Allies in When Titans Clashed; "Left to their own devices, Stalin and his commanders might have taken 12 to 18 months longer to finish off the Wehrmacht; the ultimate result would probably have been the same, except that Soviet soldiers could have waded at France's Atlantic beaches") and he is no expert on Wehrmacht.Rubbish ? You ever heard of David Glantz ? Does he talk rubbish ?
You know the distance from the Polish border to Moscow ?
You know the population of Moscow ?
You know what happened at Stalingrad and Leningrad ?
The conquest of Moscow would tie AGC and prevent its advance east of the capital .
At a certain moment Stalin had decided to give up the capital ,but to continue the war . His train was ready to leave but at the last moment he changed his mind .
The loss of a city does not decide the outcome of a war . Thus there was no need for the Germans to conquer Moscow and they could not do it .
2) Do you know the distance from Smolensk to Moscow?
3) What's the point here?
4) Yes, I know that Leningrad was never completely cut off, thus the city and its citizens managed to survive, but at incredibly high price of human lives. The Stalingrad example is out of place, since the Moscow was planned to be siezed by closing the encirclement around it (like many other cities, including Kyiv).
5) It is obvious.
6) I would love to see how Stalin manages the war from Kuibyshev and what effect it would have on the morale of the Red Army. Have you ever heard of The Moscow Crisis of October 1941?
7) I will leave this without further comments, because it is a waste of my time.
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
On August 11 ,the Russians had to be on the run and the Germans had to be close of the AA line (See Wolf-Dieter Dorn ),the same day Halder admitted that the Russians were stronger than in July ,this means that Barbarossa had failed .curiousone wrote: ↑22 Dec 2022, 15:59You are not impressed, because of what? Are you allowed to break the forum rules? Are you under some kind of protection?ljadw wrote: ↑22 Dec 2022, 15:34I am not impressioned by your threaths .curiousone wrote: ↑22 Dec 2022, 15:13This is your pure falsification, especially the second part. Cite the exact page of his War Diary or I will report you for deliberate misrepresentation.
General Halder wrote in his diary (https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... 3973/rec/5; p. 199) on July 3, "It is thus probably no overstatement to say that the Russian Campaign has been won in the space of two weeks".
On 11 August Halder wrote the following in his war diary ;
'' We have underestimated the Russian colossus ....Whenever a dozen divisions are destroyed the Russians replace them with another .''
At that moment, the Russians had to be on the run, Moscow had to be captured and the Ostheer had to be close to the AA line .
The Russians were not on the run:they killed,wounded every day 7000 Germans, Moscow was still safe and there was no hope to be
at the AA line .
Thus Barbarossa had failed.
First of, this excerpt is from August, not July.
Secondly, where is the fragment in which Halder "implicitly admitted in his diary in July 1941 that Barbarossa had failed, thus that an advance to and capture of Moscow had no longer any sense and was also impossible"?
He talks only about underestimating the Red Army.
The rest is your interpretation and thus it is invalid.
And to use a typo as argument ,is a sign of weakness.
Other point :already in July ,Hitler doubted that Barbarossa would be successful.
From Gerlach in Forum Barbarossa : on 25 July ( after one month and 3 days of fighting ) ,Keitel visited Bock and told him what Hitler had told him : Hitler hoped on a quick intervention by Japan.
Why ?Because Germany was too weak to defeat the Soviets on its own .
And Hitler told Keitel also that a quick collaps of the USSR was needed,as Germany could not conquer the USSR .
This was on 25 July .
Two weeks before, Halder had jubilated that the war was over .
On 25 July the disillusionment came : one needed the Japanese .
17 days later,when Bock had to be at the AA line,but was still east of Moscow ,even Halder admitted the reality ,saying : we ( he meant of course FHO ,the search for a scapegoat had started )have underestimated the Russians .
Hitler was the first to admit reality, Halder, living in an ivory tower,followed,very quickly .
Why did Halder say that the Germans ( = FHO ) had underestimated the Soviets ?
1 To have an excuse for the failure of Barbarossa ( this excuse was false as the underestimating of the Soviets had nothing to do with the failure ),he could not admit that the Russian ''Untermenschen '' were stronger than the German Herrenvolk .
2 To have a scapegoat : the commander of FHO .
The distance Smolensk-Magnitogorsk is 2000 km ,thus an advance to the AA line against an undefeated Soviet army was out of the question .
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
I have read chapter 6-7-8 of the Halder Diaries a few times and I tend to agree with ljadw that in late July Halder was writing that Barbarossa as envisioned had failed. That is not to say that the war was lost, simply the war would not be over as quickly as planned.
Before you make too much of that however, during Typhoon (right before he was thrown from his horse and the diary stops for a bit), he also makes the claim that Moscow is as good as surrounded and will fall.
So I am not too sure what value or point is being made by continuing to use Halder's opinions on either side.
As for Moscow or Kiev...
Kiev was the safer option, never hurts to clear you flanks. I am of the opinion that it was the right decision with two changes. After Vyazma they halt for the winter and the two PD's taken from AGN should have been sent through Demjansk to Bologoye (that should be left for another thread).
Advocating for a mad dash to Moscow is risky, the exposed flanks are inviting counter attacks, supply for the tip would be a disaster. All for the gamble that Russia would just give up. Not saying it wouldn't work, but I am comfortable enough to say that I just don't know.
Merry Christmas,
KP
Before you make too much of that however, during Typhoon (right before he was thrown from his horse and the diary stops for a bit), he also makes the claim that Moscow is as good as surrounded and will fall.
So I am not too sure what value or point is being made by continuing to use Halder's opinions on either side.
As for Moscow or Kiev...
Kiev was the safer option, never hurts to clear you flanks. I am of the opinion that it was the right decision with two changes. After Vyazma they halt for the winter and the two PD's taken from AGN should have been sent through Demjansk to Bologoye (that should be left for another thread).
Advocating for a mad dash to Moscow is risky, the exposed flanks are inviting counter attacks, supply for the tip would be a disaster. All for the gamble that Russia would just give up. Not saying it wouldn't work, but I am comfortable enough to say that I just don't know.
Merry Christmas,
KP
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
Curious one,
Can you please give me the page number for the quote about reaching the Atlantic. I wish to read the whole passage.
Thanks
Mark.
Can you please give me the page number for the quote about reaching the Atlantic. I wish to read the whole passage.
Thanks
Mark.
You know you're British when you drive your German car to an Irish pub for a pint of Belgian beer before having an Indian meal. When you get home you sit on your Sweedish sofa and watch American programs on your Japanese TV.
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
The irony is that you are showing the same risk averseness as Hitler himself who also quickly got worried and diverted forces from AGC to help AGN and AGS. Typical for somebody who at the end of the day is only a civilian playing at general. His commanders were far more agressive and would accept flank threats which could be dealt with by having the Army Groups working togetherinstead of moving away from each other . The big aim of destroying large enemy forces could not be obtained without taking risks. German operational thinking is far from risk averse.Konig_pilsner wrote: ↑22 Dec 2022, 19:40I have read chapter 6-7-8 of the Halder Diaries a few times and I tend to agree with ljadw that in late July Halder was writing that Barbarossa as envisioned had failed. That is not to say that the war was lost, simply the war would not be over as quickly as planned.
Before you make too much of that however, during Typhoon (right before he was thrown from his horse and the diary stops for a bit), he also makes the claim that Moscow is as good as surrounded and will fall.
So I am not too sure what value or point is being made by continuing to use Halder's opinions on either side.
As for Moscow or Kiev...
Kiev was the safer option, never hurts to clear you flanks. I am of the opinion that it was the right decision with two changes. After Vyazma they halt for the winter and the two PD's taken from AGN should have been sent through Demjansk to Bologoye (that should be left for another thread).
Advocating for a mad dash to Moscow is risky, the exposed flanks are inviting counter attacks, supply for the tip would be a disaster. All for the gamble that Russia would just give up. Not saying it wouldn't work, but I am comfortable enough to say that I just don't know.
Merry Christmas,
KP
Last edited by Aida1 on 23 Dec 2022, 10:01, edited 1 time in total.
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
It should never be up for discussion that the OKH always wanted to focus on Moskau as a means to destroy large enemy forces. The differences of opinion with Hitler about which objectives to go for already started in the planning phase and continued into the summer. They are well documented. See for example Mokau 1941 Wagener pp 31-36. He makes the following comment:" But the fluctuating in the objectives, , making these dependent on the enemy, aim for several objectives at the same time, to operate off center and without focal point, to seek economical interests instead of the destruction of the enmy forces- those were the cardinal errors of the german plan of campaign against Russia.
And in the course of the campaign Hitler would more and more get lost in this false concept, this conglomerate of several political and economical objectives aimed for at the time , so that he went so far as the grotesk sentence in the order of 21 august 1941 "The most important objective to be reached before winter is not the taking of Moscow".
Only at the end of the year 1941 ,in october did Hitler let the OKH its will. But it was too late. Two months too late."
The OKH memorandum of 18.8 explains again the reasons why the OKH wanted to attack towards Moskau(quoted in Wagener Moskau 1941 p 47-48). Hitler rejected the proposal on 21.8( quoted in Wagener Moskau 1941 p 48).
And in the course of the campaign Hitler would more and more get lost in this false concept, this conglomerate of several political and economical objectives aimed for at the time , so that he went so far as the grotesk sentence in the order of 21 august 1941 "The most important objective to be reached before winter is not the taking of Moscow".
Only at the end of the year 1941 ,in october did Hitler let the OKH its will. But it was too late. Two months too late."
The OKH memorandum of 18.8 explains again the reasons why the OKH wanted to attack towards Moskau(quoted in Wagener Moskau 1941 p 47-48). Hitler rejected the proposal on 21.8( quoted in Wagener Moskau 1941 p 48).
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
Not exactly. The Erste Ausstattung was the prescribed load carried by a unit, including with the soldier/weapon, the Troß of the unit, and the ammunition supply Kolonne. For most divisions it averaged around 700 tons. However, it was not necessarily what would be required for a combat-engaged army...it is as confusing a term as "unit-of-fire". In intense situations an army might be expected to utilize multiple 1. Muni-Ausstattung in any one period. There is an excellent Bundeswehr study of the subject but I am away from home for the holidays so away from my source but I will try to remember to revisit this in the New Year.curiousone wrote: ↑21 Dec 2022, 22:42First of, "only one load of ammunition" was a standard load of ammunition that a combat-engaged German army would have on hand. Whole Operation Barbarossa started with roughly 2 Ausstattung of ammunition at Army Group Center's level (per Alfred Toppe's P-190 study for FMS).
Exactly. I suspect Glantz either mixed up his terminology in the translation and meant to say there was X VS on hand and just used days of POL or did some off the cuff calculation of availability versus average advance rate, which would have been an odd thing to do without explaining in a footnote.Secondly, Wehrmacht's logisticians had their Verbrauchssatz term for the amount of POL required to move one's formation's vehicles on the distance of 100 km. In Soviet Union, this perimeter has decreased first to 70 and then to about 50 km. There was no such a thing as "days of POL" as a measurement.
Excellent work! I wish we could have found that level of detail for the Ardennes when we did the ACSDB but it was only fragmentary.Thirdly, In the last month, I've been working on digitized German documents regarding Eisenbahn, which can be read at wwii.germandocsinrussia.com. I found in them daily reports with recorded numbers of trains (Versorgungszüge) arriving at the supply base of Army Group Center Minsk-Molodechno. Definitely many more than "only 5-6 trains" were arriving during this period. To be precise,
1) from July 13 to July 31 on average (counting only Heer supply trains!) 12,63 trains were arriving daily in Minsk-Molodechno base;
2) from August 1 to August 16 on average 22,13 trains were arriving daily;
3) from August 17 to August 22 on average 25,33 trains were arriving daily;
4) from August 23 to September 4 on average 29,92 trains were arriving daily;
5) from September 5 to September 19 on average 31,87 trains were arriving daily.
It is not that Aida1 is a Nazi sympathizer that is the problem with other posters and why I have him on ignore. It is that his posts are solely fact-free opinion without any meaningful analysis or sources...and he is simply the most recent of many avatars of the same poster who has been banned for good reason here multiple times. Why this iteration has survived so long is a good question that could be asked of ljadw as well.Writing about "your Wehrmacht" and suggesting that the user Aida1 is some kind of sympathizer of the Nazi army is not only childish, but simply rude. I am surprised by the lack of response from the moderators.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
Detailed results on the supply of the 25th Motorized Division for the period from June 22 to August 31, 1941.
(Translated from German into Russian) Quantity and weight (cartridges, shells, fuel, food), kilometers, ton-kilometers and a lot of other details about the work of the rear and management services of this division.
There are similar ones for the 11th Infantry and 14th Tank divisions.
(Translated from German into Russian) Quantity and weight (cartridges, shells, fuel, food), kilometers, ton-kilometers and a lot of other details about the work of the rear and management services of this division.
There are similar ones for the 11th Infantry and 14th Tank divisions.
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Re:
Too much heat, light, and smoke over Russia in 1941: just because Germany failed to knock out the Soviets in 1941 didn't mean they couldn't do it in 1942. In my mind there were larger mistakes made by Germany that had a greater strategic impact than the failure before Moscow in 1941:LZ X-ray wrote: ↑21 Sep 2002, 22:38Definitely the day that Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, which they did not have to do. Even though a pact was signed with Japan, the Japanese acted unilaterally in their attack on US, British, and Dutch forces in the Pacific. Hitler could have balked at committing Germany to war against the US, and this would have been generally viewed as perfectly justified.
Without the increased logistical support provided, and military entrance into Europe of the US, Germany would have prevailed, even with it's two-front war. The Soviets would have collapsed first, and then Britain would've exited the war from sheer exhaustion of men and materiel.
Failure by Germany to take Gibralter/Suez; if they had done this no 'third front' in the Med and lots more men/material for Russian front
Declared war on US, as stated above; ***** This was the greatest blunder in my mind*******
Uboat failures, which I think was related to US involvement.
ULTRA; forewarned is forearmed.
Failure by Germany for total war economy until 1943/1944
Too reliant on the biggest tank; lots of PZKW IV and V would have been better that a handful of Tigers; V weapons were a total waste of resources
Re: Re:
Would have required an approach with one clear objective and very aggressive operations pushing the red army further back in 1941 than was actually the case.fletcher_101 wrote: ↑29 Dec 2022, 00:54Too much heat, light, and smoke over Russia in 1941: just because Germany failed to knock out the Soviets in 1941 didn't mean they couldn't do it in 1942.LZ X-ray wrote: ↑21 Sep 2002, 22:38Definitely the day that Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, which they did not have to do. Even though a pact was signed with Japan, the Japanese acted unilaterally in their attack on US, British, and Dutch forces in the Pacific. Hitler could have balked at committing Germany to war against the US, and this would have been generally viewed as perfectly justified.
Without the increased logistical support provided, and military entrance into Europe of the US, Germany would have prevailed, even with it's two-front war. The Soviets would have collapsed first, and then Britain would've exited the war from sheer exhaustion of men and materiel.
Re: Re:
Gibraltar and Suez had only a very minor importancefletcher_101 wrote: ↑29 Dec 2022, 00:54Too much heat, light, and smoke over Russia in 1941: just because Germany failed to knock out the Soviets in 1941 didn't mean they couldn't do it in 1942. In my mind there were larger mistakes made by Germany that had a greater strategic impact than the failure before Moscow in 1941:LZ X-ray wrote: ↑21 Sep 2002, 22:38Definitely the day that Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, which they did not have to do. Even though a pact was signed with Japan, the Japanese acted unilaterally in their attack on US, British, and Dutch forces in the Pacific. Hitler could have balked at committing Germany to war against the US, and this would have been generally viewed as perfectly justified.
Without the increased logistical support provided, and military entrance into Europe of the US, Germany would have prevailed, even with it's two-front war. The Soviets would have collapsed first, and then Britain would've exited the war from sheer exhaustion of men and materiel.
Failure by Germany to take Gibralter/Suez; if they had done this no 'third front' in the Med and lots more men/material for Russian front
Declared war on US, as stated above; ***** This was the greatest blunder in my mind*******
Uboat failures, which I think was related to US involvement.
ULTRA; forewarned is forearmed.
Failure by Germany for total war economy until 1943/1944
Too reliant on the biggest tank; lots of PZKW IV and V would have been better that a handful of Tigers; V weapons were a total waste of resources
The DOW on the US was logical as war with the US was inevitable
The importance of the U Boat War is very much exaggerated
The same for Ultra
Total war economy was not delayed til 1943
Less Tiger tanks do no mean more PZ4 and PZ 5
As the Soviets were stronger in 1942 and the Germans weaker ,victory in the East in 1942 was an illusion .
Re: Re:
Contradicting everything as always.ljadw wrote: ↑29 Dec 2022, 08:47Gibraltar and Suez had only a very minor importancefletcher_101 wrote: ↑29 Dec 2022, 00:54Too much heat, light, and smoke over Russia in 1941: just because Germany failed to knock out the Soviets in 1941 didn't mean they couldn't do it in 1942. In my mind there were larger mistakes made by Germany that had a greater strategic impact than the failure before Moscow in 1941:LZ X-ray wrote: ↑21 Sep 2002, 22:38Definitely the day that Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, which they did not have to do. Even though a pact was signed with Japan, the Japanese acted unilaterally in their attack on US, British, and Dutch forces in the Pacific. Hitler could have balked at committing Germany to war against the US, and this would have been generally viewed as perfectly justified.
Without the increased logistical support provided, and military entrance into Europe of the US, Germany would have prevailed, even with it's two-front war. The Soviets would have collapsed first, and then Britain would've exited the war from sheer exhaustion of men and materiel.
Failure by Germany to take Gibralter/Suez; if they had done this no 'third front' in the Med and lots more men/material for Russian front
Declared war on US, as stated above; ***** This was the greatest blunder in my mind*******
Uboat failures, which I think was related to US involvement.
ULTRA; forewarned is forearmed.
Failure by Germany for total war economy until 1943/1944
Too reliant on the biggest tank; lots of PZKW IV and V would have been better that a handful of Tigers; V weapons were a total waste of resources
The DOW on the US was logical as war with the US was inevitable
The importance of the U Boat War is very much exaggerated
The same for Ultra
Total war economy was not delayed til 1943
Less Tiger tanks do no mean more PZ4 and PZ 5
As the Soviets were stronger in 1942 and the Germans weaker ,victory in the East in 1942 was an illusion .
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
There was nothing valuable in the ME that could be transported to Germany ,besides Germany had already sufficient fuel in 1942 .The fuel problems were caused by transport shortages ,not by production shortages
There was already a war de facto between the US and Germany as the Atlantic Fleet was already before 11 December chasing the U Boats
Except for oil and a few other things ,Britain did not depend on imports from America for its survival,besides the U Boats had no chance at all to defeat the UK :they were doomed to fail as in WW1 ,besides less tankers lost does not mean that more fuel would arrive at Liverpool and British military operations were not canceled because of fuel problems
There were periods with an active Ultra and few MV losses and periods with an inactive Ultra and big MV losses
Total war economy was activated in September 1939
The plants who made Tigers did not make Pz4 and PZ5 ,besides more tanks is totally meaningless unless you have the needed crew for these additional tanks and the needed infantry and artillery to protect them and it is very doubtful that the Reichsbahn could transport additional tanks.Pz4 and 5 in plants in Germany were useless .
The Ostheer was weaker in 1942 and it was farther from its supply sources . 6th Army was already in big supply problems before Uranus .
There was already a war de facto between the US and Germany as the Atlantic Fleet was already before 11 December chasing the U Boats
Except for oil and a few other things ,Britain did not depend on imports from America for its survival,besides the U Boats had no chance at all to defeat the UK :they were doomed to fail as in WW1 ,besides less tankers lost does not mean that more fuel would arrive at Liverpool and British military operations were not canceled because of fuel problems
There were periods with an active Ultra and few MV losses and periods with an inactive Ultra and big MV losses
Total war economy was activated in September 1939
The plants who made Tigers did not make Pz4 and PZ5 ,besides more tanks is totally meaningless unless you have the needed crew for these additional tanks and the needed infantry and artillery to protect them and it is very doubtful that the Reichsbahn could transport additional tanks.Pz4 and 5 in plants in Germany were useless .
The Ostheer was weaker in 1942 and it was farther from its supply sources . 6th Army was already in big supply problems before Uranus .
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Re: Re:
There is a book out there called '1941: The Year Germany Lost the War' and it argues all the major events in that year, Barbarossa, the failure of Barbarossa, the war declaration against the US, was what did it. I agree with LZ X-ray; when you distill it all down, if Germany never declared war against US (I don't know if war was inevitable, but it took the US 3 years in WWI before they finally got into it, maybe a delay of several years would have helped Germany), I think that would have made a tremendous difference. I think it was Khrushchev who later admitted without the American assistance, the Russians would have lost the war and if that occurred, could a second front have ever occurred?fletcher_101 wrote: ↑29 Dec 2022, 00:54Too much heat, light, and smoke over Russia in 1941: just because Germany failed to knock out the Soviets in 1941 didn't mean they couldn't do it in 1942. In my mind there were larger mistakes made by Germany that had a greater strategic impact than the failure before Moscow in 1941:LZ X-ray wrote: ↑21 Sep 2002, 22:38Definitely the day that Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, which they did not have to do. Even though a pact was signed with Japan, the Japanese acted unilaterally in their attack on US, British, and Dutch forces in the Pacific. Hitler could have balked at committing Germany to war against the US, and this would have been generally viewed as perfectly justified.
Without the increased logistical support provided, and military entrance into Europe of the US, Germany would have prevailed, even with it's two-front war. The Soviets would have collapsed first, and then Britain would've exited the war from sheer exhaustion of men and materiel.
Failure by Germany to take Gibralter/Suez; if they had done this no 'third front' in the Med and lots more men/material for Russian front
Declared war on US, as stated above; ***** This was the greatest blunder in my mind*******
Uboat failures, which I think was related to US involvement.
ULTRA; forewarned is forearmed.
Failure by Germany for total war economy until 1943/1944
Too reliant on the biggest tank; lots of PZKW IV and V would have been better that a handful of Tigers; V weapons were a total waste of resources
As to Suez and Gibraltar, bottling off the Med would have helped Germany tremendously simply by neutralizing that area.