Production

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Globalization41
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Production

#1

Post by Globalization41 » 31 Jan 2023, 16:14

How many U-boats or torpedo-carrying biplanes could be produced for the same cost as a battleship? How many cheap drones could be produced for the same cost as an expensive fighter-bomber?

Globalization41.

Peter89
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Re: Production

#2

Post by Peter89 » 14 Feb 2023, 10:00

Globalization41 wrote:
31 Jan 2023, 16:14
How many U-boats or torpedo-carrying biplanes could be produced for the same cost as a battleship? How many cheap drones could be produced for the same cost as an expensive fighter-bomber?

Globalization41.
Could you please specify the U-boat type and the torpedo-carrying biplanes?

The battleships, approximately:
Bismarck: 197 MRm
Tirpitz: 181 MRm
Scharnhorst 146 MRm
Gneisenau 143 MRm

The U-Boat prices highly depended on the length of the serial production - even on the shipyard. The following prices are indicative of the height of the mass production (about 1943).

VII: 2 MRm
IX: 2.9 MRm
XXI: 4.6 MRm

As for the aircrafts, the costs are even more confusing. Neither the He 59 nor the He 115 went into a full scale serial production, thus their price apiece did not sink sufficiently. Also the cost of the torpedo they carried were on the comparable level as the aircraft itself. I'd guesstimate the aircraft prices around 100,000 RM and I know the torpedoes costed about 25,000 RM. Given the 20-40% hit rate, I wouldn't care too much about the cost of the aircrafts. But then again, by mid-1940, the vast majority of the German torpedo stock was captured French torpedoes for nil production cost, so it is not a simple question.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."


Globalization41
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Re: Production

#3

Post by Globalization41 » 14 Feb 2023, 14:43

Hi Pete. Please correct me if I'm incorrect. ... Roughly (or strategically), there were about a hundred U-boats operating in the Atlantic in '41. Instead of the battleship Bismarck, the Germans could have built a couple hundred more U-boats. Cheap U-boats were strangling the British economy in 1941. A couple hundred more subs could have made a big difference. ... How many aircraft were being produced? Would a couple thousand more planes have been better than a battleship? ... In standard chess strategy, overextended powerful pieces (tanks, battleships, aircraft carriers for example) are subject to attack from cheap pawns. Drones are cheap. ... Evil dictators are sometimes prone to overextension--Stalin in Finland, Hitler in Russia, Mussolini in Albania, or Tojo in Hawaii might be good examples. ... A cheap Swordfish Torpedo plane crippled an expensive overextended battleship Bismarck. Cheap Japanese dive-bombers easily sunk expensive battleships. ... The Communist invaders in Vietnam and Cambodia flooded the region with cheap AK-47s and improvised weapons. Strategically speaking, expensive U.S. forces were vulnerable to constant terrorist attacks from cheap pawns. The same thing happened on 9/11. About 19 sacrificial cheap pawns wiped out the two largest buildings in the world, dented the Pentagon, downed four jumbo jet air busses, and killed a couple of thousand wealth-producing citizens.

Globalization41.

Peter89
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Re: Production

#4

Post by Peter89 » 06 Mar 2023, 17:34

Globalization41 wrote:
14 Feb 2023, 14:43
Hi Pete. Please correct me if I'm incorrect. ... Roughly (or strategically), there were about a hundred U-boats operating in the Atlantic in '41. Instead of the battleship Bismarck, the Germans could have built a couple hundred more U-boats. Cheap U-boats were strangling the British economy in 1941. A couple hundred more subs could have made a big difference. ... How many aircraft were being produced? Would a couple thousand more planes have been better than a battleship? ... In standard chess strategy, overextended powerful pieces (tanks, battleships, aircraft carriers for example) are subject to attack from cheap pawns. Drones are cheap. ... Evil dictators are sometimes prone to overextension--Stalin in Finland, Hitler in Russia, Mussolini in Albania, or Tojo in Hawaii might be good examples. ... A cheap Swordfish Torpedo plane crippled an expensive overextended battleship Bismarck. Cheap Japanese dive-bombers easily sunk expensive battleships. ... The Communist invaders in Vietnam and Cambodia flooded the region with cheap AK-47s and improvised weapons. Strategically speaking, expensive U.S. forces were vulnerable to constant terrorist attacks from cheap pawns. The same thing happened on 9/11. About 19 sacrificial cheap pawns wiped out the two largest buildings in the world, dented the Pentagon, downed four jumbo jet air busses, and killed a couple of thousand wealth-producing citizens.

Globalization41.
I don't know if "overextended" is the correct word here.

Battleships were meant for one thing, U-boats were meant for another. Aircrafts were meant for another yet again. Also to produce 1000 tons of U-boat is not the same as to produce 1000 tons of battleship; the former's proportional complexity is way higher than that of the latter. In my opinion it is much more correct to say that with 50 U-boats instead of 1 battleship, you can always have some operational U-boat out in the seas doing some damage, while if you have one battleship and that battleship has any malfunctions or damage, it will cause exactly zero damage (like Tirpitz).

Also it was not cheap U-boats that were strangling the British economy in 1941, but a series of factors; one of which were undoubtedly the cheap U-boats. But U-boats did not operate in a vacuum. The answer for the Condor threat, the KG 26 & KG 30 threat, the U-boat threat, the Luftwaffe threat was an integrated system of defense; the offensive equivalent of which the Germans never developed. In fact, they frittered away their meager resources at hand.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Globalization41
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Re: Production

#5

Post by Globalization41 » 07 Mar 2023, 01:19

Hey Pete. I'm just generalizing. Before even the invasion of Russia, the British had lost over a 1,000 merchant ships. ... The strategic significance of expensive battleships being obsolete to torpedo planes and divebombers was not fully realized until after Pearl Harbor. Building U-boats instead of the Bismarck, Graf Spee, and Tripitz would have resulted in more shipping losses for the British, whose economy was in bad shape by 1941. ... More Stukas for infantry support instead of battleships or U-boats would have been even more strategic for Hitler, whose land-locked dream all along was to exploit the Ukraine for living space and natural resources. The British were just a minor nuisance until a grouchy Hitler declared war on the U.S. as his war machine stalled before Moscow.

Globalization41.

Peter89
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Re: Production

#6

Post by Peter89 » 14 Mar 2023, 23:34

Globalization41 wrote:
07 Mar 2023, 01:19
Hey Pete. I'm just generalizing. Before even the invasion of Russia, the British had lost over a 1,000 merchant ships. ... The strategic significance of expensive battleships being obsolete to torpedo planes and divebombers was not fully realized until after Pearl Harbor. Building U-boats instead of the Bismarck, Graf Spee, and Tripitz would have resulted in more shipping losses for the British, whose economy was in bad shape by 1941. ... More Stukas for infantry support instead of battleships or U-boats would have been even more strategic for Hitler, whose land-locked dream all along was to exploit the Ukraine for living space and natural resources. The British were just a minor nuisance until a grouchy Hitler declared war on the U.S. as his war machine stalled before Moscow.

Globalization41.
I see your point, parts of which I shared for a time, but it is not that simple.

Controlling sea lanes is a markedly different way of thinking and strategy than the tonnage war.

It is no wonder why the SKL was the most active German organ in strategy making; they realized that continental Europe needed secure sea lanes to feed its population and industry. It is also no wonder why Raeder opposed the Barbarossa: the alternative was to gain these resources from the East, for which no navy was needed, as they first thought.

Controlling sea lanes meant that Germany closes the Mediterranean the same fashion as the Baltic sea, and projects power to the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. A cooperation on whatever scale with the Italians and the Vichy French (and later on, the Japanese) would ensure that Britain's resources would be spread too thin. Germany couldn't do that with submarines - only with a surface fleet.

The downside of such a strategy would be the acknowledgement of the sea lanes operated by Britain, and the security of the Home Isles. The latter was an undisputable fact, independently of the KM, so the other strategy focused on the former.

The tonnage war or trade interdiction is a curious thing. I have doubts that Britain could be torpedoed into submission. To control sea lanes, you need battleships; to protect sea lanes, you need destroyers and maritime patrols. The former is slower, more costly and more rigid. For example, the USA quickly offered destroyers for bases, but I do not think that they'd do the same with battleships. Also, it was much more complicated to operate battleships than destroyers. A surface force, even if mooring at a base, can trigger a disproportionate response, while maintaining the possibility for future or local domination of bodies of water. U-boats, while also effective in triggering a disproportionate response, had no such ability.

I'm not saying that this or that option was the best. I'm saying that the combination of all three (sea lane control, trade interdiction and naval aviation) was probably the optimal course of action; all of them being a part of a grand strategy that never existed in the first place.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Globalization41
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Re: Production

#7

Post by Globalization41 » 15 Mar 2023, 17:41

Nobody knew what Hitler's plans were in the 1930s. Increasing Naval resources would have meant controlling the Med., the British Isles, but not much else close to Germany. Hitler could have done that with what he already had. But all along, he wanted to invade and exploit the East. Most German officials felt it was more strategic to maintain friendly trade relations with the Russians. Without Hitler, there would not have been an invasion of the U.S.S.R. (or even Poland). A worldwide naval strategy for Germany would not have been that strategic (due to overextension), unless they were just going to rely on peaceful trade. ... The British Isles were alone before the invasion of Russia. With Britian's overextended sea lanes under attack, they might or might not have held out. The British after the invasion of Russia were still way short of resources until Pearl Harbor eased the pressure.

Globalization41.

Peter89
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Re: Production

#8

Post by Peter89 » 15 Mar 2023, 20:20

Globalization41 wrote:
15 Mar 2023, 17:41
Nobody knew what Hitler's plans were in the 1930s. Increasing Naval resources would have meant controlling the Med., the British Isles, but not much else close to Germany. Hitler could have done that with what he already had. But all along, he wanted to invade and exploit the East. Most German officials felt it was more strategic to maintain friendly trade relations with the Russians. Without Hitler, there would not have been an invasion of the U.S.S.R. (or even Poland). A worldwide naval strategy for Germany would not have been that strategic (due to overextension), unless they were just going to rely on peaceful trade. ... The British Isles were alone before the invasion of Russia. With Britian's overextended sea lanes under attack, they might or might not have held out. The British after the invasion of Russia were still way short of resources until Pearl Harbor eased the pressure.

Globalization41.
The "Med" was the key sea lane that connected almost every resource Germany needed to wage war indefinately (the sole exception was natural rubber).
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Globalization41
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Re: Production

#9

Post by Globalization41 » 15 Mar 2023, 21:23

If Hitler had added Malta, Gibraltar, and the Suez to Crete he could have combined with Italy and bottled up the Med. Churchill, Stalin, and many others thought it was a good strategy. To Stalin it was simple, why should Hitler choke on the Soviet Union when cherry picks were available in the Med.? Churchill would have been in big trouble had Hitler pursued the Med. strategy. The British lost four destroyers and two cruisers in the Battle of Crete. Hitler could have reinforced Rommel in North Africa. Stalin felt safe. Hitler had plenty of appealing options other than invading Russia. Meanwhile, the Japanese were eyeing the South Pacific. ... Hitler might have jumped into a quagmire when he invaded Russia, but he gave up his option to a limited conflict when he declared war on the U.S.

Globalization41.

Peter89
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Re: Production

#10

Post by Peter89 » 15 Mar 2023, 22:15

Globalization41 wrote:
15 Mar 2023, 21:23
If Hitler had added Malta, Gibraltar, and the Suez to Crete he could have combined with Italy and bottled up the Med. Churchill, Stalin, and many others thought it was a good strategy. To Stalin it was simple, why should Hitler choke on the Soviet Union when cherry picks were available in the Med.? Churchill would have been in big trouble had Hitler pursued the Med. strategy. The British lost four destroyers and two cruisers in the Battle of Crete. Hitler could have reinforced Rommel in North Africa. Stalin felt safe. Hitler had plenty of appealing options other than invading Russia. Meanwhile, the Japanese were eyeing the South Pacific. ... Hitler might have jumped into a quagmire when he invaded Russia, but he gave up his option to a limited conflict when he declared war on the U.S.

Globalization41.
It is a very complicated question (no wonder Hitler let it go). First of all, there was no "Mediterranean strategy". Second, even if there was one, it is questionable whether it could bring down the British Empire. Third, the mutually beneficial reshaping of the colonial and semi-colonial world was very far from German interests and ideology.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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