Imperial Germany and the US go to war in 1912

[Geoffrey Cooke]

More of a WWI era for a change. I was interested to find out recently that due to tensions with the US (primarily about the Pacific) the Germans went as far as drawing up invasion plans of the USA around 1900.

Drachinifel talked about the naval aspect of this kind of scenario extensively on his drydock Q&As awhile back.

https://youtu.be/hJzRlTPT3sc at 19:52

https://youtu.be/pz-1cu5EUkM at 23:27 and 56:26

I thought of a scenario about a war between the two that seems more practical in my mind however.

It is mid-August 1912: a third Samoan civil war has broken out. Germany and the US get into another tiff over it again as they did the previous times but unlike before German and American naval vessels/gun boats get into a stand off resulting in a fire fight where the Americans sink the German gun boats just off the Samoan coast. Germany uses this as a pretext to launch a war (its own version of the “Spanish-American War”) to acquire the American Pacific colonies, especially the Philippines, but also American Samoa, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Wake Island, etc. Obviously this ends up as a primarily naval war given the contested region.

Note that the Anglo-German Naval arms race has recently come to a close for the most part, so Germany isn’t trying to keep up capital ship numbers with Britain anymore as directly anymore.

How does each side fair? I’ll say that on quick examination at the naval aspect things at first don’t look good for the US Navy especially in terms of cruisers and torpedo boats compared to the Kaiserliche Marine, but closer inspection reveals a lesser inferiority in major units than I first thought.

Looking at the battle wagons;

USA

Pre-Dreadnought Battleships
—
2x Indiana class
1x Iowa class
2x Kearsarge class
3x Illinois class
3x Maine class
5x Virginia class
6x Connecticut
2x Mississippi
Total: 24

Dreadnought Battleships
—
2x South Carolina class
2x Delaware class
2x Florida class
Total: 6

Germany

Pre-Dreadnought Battleships
—
2x Brandenburg class
4x Kaiser Friedrich III class
4x Wittelsbach class
5x Braunschweig class
5x Deutschland class
Total: 20

Dreadnought Battleships
—
4x Nassau class
4x Helgoland class
1x Kaiser class
Total: 9


Battlecruisers
—
1x Von der Tann class
2x Moltke class
Total: 3

In terms of pre-dreadnoughts the Americans have a thin advantage in numbers (the Germans had sold two of their Brandenburgs to the Ottoman Empire at this point), but more importantly their pre Dreadnoughts are generally better. The Braunschweigs and Deutschlands are up to the task of fighting their American equivalents, but the Wittelsbach’s and KF III’s with their biggest guns being only 9.4”, are not.

As far as the dreadnoughts: the Germans have just commissioned SMS Kaiser, the lead of a new class, and she may need additional training and sea trials. The US is about to commission two more in the form of USS Wyoming and USS Arkansas, while the Germans have to wait several weeks longer for the addition of Friedrich der Grösse to their fleet. The German battleships are generally better armored but all of the American battleships have 12” guns while just over half of the German battleships do, the rest have 11” guns.

The Germans have a stronger fleet overrall, but considering the odds are better for them at this point concerning a more limited war over colonies then they were pre-1906 when they were considering an “invasion of America”, it’s quite shocking Kaiser Bill was so gung-ho.

The complicating factor in favor of the Germans is, admittedly, their battlecruisers. They are just as well armored as any of the American battleships but are far faster, in fact the USN has nothing to really counter them at all unless a German version of Beatty blunders into a US battle-line, so the US fleet-screens are going to be taking a beating in any action without much hope for reciprocation. Also, after Wyoming and Florida, the next American battleships aren’t going to come online until spring of 1914, where as in the next 11 months after Friedrich der Grösse commissions the Germans have the remaining 3x Kaiser class battleships coming into service and also the battlecruiser Seydlitz.

I don’t know enough about the Army aspect but I don’t think the US does very well in that comparison.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The Germans have a difficult problem here, actually several. The technical problem is the German fleet is coal fueled & they have no major coaling stations in the Western Hemisphere. The size and location of these coaling stations has sifignificant effects on how many ships can be deployed, where, and how long they can steam about before RTB to refuel. AExamining those questions are as important as it affects both strategy and local operations.

The second problem is political. Germany is already in its naval race with Britain, and otherwise crossways with that empire. Aside from the possibility of Britain intervening it also affects the fuel question. Earlier the USN had twice drawn on British expertise and resources, in the Spanish American War, and in the Great White Fleet parade around the globe. While the US had a credible battle fleet in 1898 it was heavily dependent on its home bases for coal and other services. Britain had five decades of keeping a global fleet in coal, Germany and the US did not. Admiral Dewys Asian branch of the US fleet contracted its coal supply and some base services from the British companies that supplied the RN in Asia/Pacifica. When the Goat White Fleet did its circumnavigation it contracted British companies to organized and ship the coal to the many coaling station needed around the globe. It was those two experiences that helped push the USN to conversion to oil fuel over the next couple decades. & it influenced after 1907 the earliest iterations of planning for war with Japan.

Its certainly not impossible for Germany to obtain the necessary base/s & coal supply, tho its not very practical overnight or even in a couple months. In my version of this Reich/US war I solved it with a marriage alliance between the Reich and Spanish empires from around 1875 -1890. That gives time for a solid base structure to be developed in the western hemisphere.

A few other technical questions would revolve around the sea keeping ability of the German fleet. Many of the ships of OTL were designed for the Baltic and North Sea. They were not the best Atlantic designs. The US fleet of 1912 did include feature for weathering Atlantic storms and Caribbean Hurricanes & its still had difficulties with those. Some German designs were not the best for such a deployment.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I don’t know enough about the Army aspect but I don’t think the US does very well in that comparison.

The US had in simple terms: A regular Army of around 100,000, with a officers corps of perhaps 12,000. the latter were reasonably trained in small unit tactics, but had less than 2000 trained or experienced in modern staff work. None of the commanders had any real experience in army, corps, division operations outside the Philippines insurrection, and few had any school room training. There was little in the way of a Federal Army Reserve. just a list of former officers and enlisted who could be shanghaied back into service in a emergency. Many of the officers & NCO on that list had taken positions in the local states militia thus reducing the actual reserve pool. The state militias varied wildly in training and capability. All were badly equipped, training varied from bad to average, The officer corps was ridden with local politics. Many regiments were not much more than social clubs for men from the 'right' families, and with heavy political overtones.

The Imperial German Army was primarily reservist. A cadre of full time officers trained a huge mass of reservist and landwehr officers and enlisted. it was well organized, drilled, and staffed. The General Staff system provided a comparative surfiet of field grade and general officers well drilled in executing brigade corps, and army operations under peace time training conditions. The down side was this army had zero combat experience since 1872. It many aspects its doctrines and tactics/drill were badly outdated. The exception was the tiny number of soldiers deployed to the African colonies. That handful had experience fighting local armies during the subjugation of those nations. Reading up on the destruction of the Herero state. is illustrative.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1n2ttxm

[dgfred]

Good stuff Carl! Still... 'invasion' plans?

[T. A. Gardner]

Some questions, and a few comments...

Where do the Germans turn to to get steel and food? Both are major imports from the US, and without them, Germany is hosed.

Look at the range of the German ships. Then consider they have ZERO fleet train to refuel and replenish at sea. Sure, they can send merchant ships with coal and supplies, but they need either a port or calm seas and no opposition for days to do a replenishment.

The US has a fleet train available. Not the greatest at that point, but at least they've thought through how to move a fleet across the Atlantic or Pacific and support it without a major port being available.

I would expect the US to take every German colony in Asia in short order.

At home, the US has a considerable set of coast defenses covering every major port on both coasts, particularly the Atlantic. A German coup de main to take one would likely end in disaster even if unopposed by the USN. The Germans simply don't have the resources to mount a major amphibious assault. So, what do they do?

I would expect the US to turn to commerce raiding instantly. The US has a history of that were as Germany, at that time, didn't.

[Geoffrey Cooke]

The Germans have a difficult problem here, actually several. The technical problem is the German fleet is coal fueled & they have no major coaling stations in the Western Hemisphere. The size and location of these coaling stations has sifignificant effects on how many ships can be deployed, where, and how long they can steam about before RTB to refuel. AExamining those questions are as important as it affects both strategy and local operations.

The second problem is political. Germany is already in its naval race with Britain, and otherwise crossways with that empire. Aside from the possibility of Britain intervening it also affects the fuel question. Earlier the USN had twice drawn on British expertise and resources, in the Spanish American War, and in the Great White Fleet parade around the globe. While the US had a credible battle fleet in 1898 it was heavily dependent on its home bases for coal and other services. Britain had five decades of keeping a global fleet in coal, Germany and the US did not. Admiral Dewys Asian branch of the US fleet contracted its coal supply and some base services from the British companies that supplied the RN in Asia/Pacifica. When the Goat White Fleet did its circumnavigation it contracted British companies to organized and ship the coal to the many coaling station needed around the globe. It was those two experiences that helped push the USN to conversion to oil fuel over the next couple decades. & it influenced after 1907 the earliest iterations of planning for war with Japan.

Its certainly not impossible for Germany to obtain the necessary base/s & coal supply, tho its not very practical overnight or even in a couple months. In my version of this Reich/US war I solved it with a marriage alliance between the Reich and Spanish empires from around 1875 -1890. That gives time for a solid base structure to be developed in the western hemisphere.

A few other technical questions would revolve around the sea keeping ability of the German fleet. Many of the ships of OTL were designed for the Baltic and North Sea. They were not the best Atlantic designs. The US fleet of 1912 did include feature for weathering Atlantic storms and Caribbean Hurricanes & its still had difficulties with those. Some German designs were not the best for such a deployment.

hi Carl. All excellent points, but mitigated somewhat:
1. "The technical problem is the German fleet is coal fueled & they have no major coaling stations in the Western Hemisphere. "
True, and one reason why Germany's earlier idea of simply sailing a fleet isolated from supply except some coaling ships holding New York hostage is pretty absurd. But since neither America nor Germany have a way to reliably supply a fleet on the respective opposite side of the Atlantic, and what each side wants from each other is more influence in the Asia-Pacific region and taking Pacific colonies, its not going to be a major theater to begin with other than some cruiser raids like what Karl Muller did in WWI. Undoubtedly what is going to happen is a race for the Germans to deploy their fleet east where they have quite a few bases along the way (Togoland, Kamerun, Sud-West Afrika, Ost Afrika) of the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, assuming the British aren't going to allow them through Suez, and the third largest merchant fleet in the world. It's far more practical than what the Russians did against Japan a decade earlier, by far. The US of course has the shorter route to redeploy its Atlantic ships around Cape Horn (the Panama canal isnt going to be finished for a couple years). Both have extensive colonial holdings in close proximity to each other. Germany has it's Kiachau-Tsingtao concession in China, almost all of the Micronesia region, a large holding in New Guinea, the Bismarck archipelago and half of the Solomons. I already mentioned the American Pacific holdings.

The question is whether the German East Asia Squadron (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and a number of protected cruisers) can hold on long enough against whatever US naval forces are already in the Pacific for a sizeable chunk of the German fleet to arrive from Europe. Neither the US nor the Germans had any dreadnoughts in the Pacific, but I'm not sure about the pre-dreadnoughts.

2. Germany is obviously in big trouble if Britain joins, and by association Japan. But without a likely Franco-Russian involvement , no neutral Belgium to make a moral stand for, and Italy more likely to stay true the triple alliance with Germany and AH, wouldn't it like to abstain? Remember that this is post-Haldane mission, which although technically it failed at least assured Britain that Germany wasn't trying to dethrone its naval status anymore.

[Geoffrey Cooke]

Good stuff Carl! Still... 'invasion' plans?

Yes, Kaiser Bill had a silly notion of holding New York hostage around the turn of the century because he was irritated with American colonial posturing in the areas he was interested. I’d imagine for there to be even a remotely plausible capacity of success for that a “drang nach Amerika” you’d need have some sort of stepping stone, like Carribean islands or something, not to mention you need to beat the US fleet to a pulp and conduct in a timely manner before the naval yards pump out a replacement fleet. This just was not a likely thing for the Germans to attempt if a war occurred to be honest, more realistic in my mind for a “what-if” is a war for colonial possessions which seems to have been an obsession of Wilhelm’s.

[Geoffrey Cooke]

Some questions, and a few comments...

Where do the Germans turn to to get steel and food? Both are major imports from the US, and without them, Germany is hosed.

Look at the range of the German ships. Then consider they have ZERO fleet train to refuel and replenish at sea. Sure, they can send merchant ships with coal and supplies, but they need either a port or calm seas and no opposition for days to do a replenishment.

The US has a fleet train available. Not the greatest at that point, but at least they've thought through how to move a fleet across the Atlantic or Pacific and support it without a major port being available.

I would expect the US to take every German colony in Asia in short order.

At home, the US has a considerable set of coast defenses covering every major port on both coasts, particularly the Atlantic. A German coup de main to take one would likely end in disaster even if unopposed by the USN. The Germans simply don't have the resources to mount a major amphibious assault. So, what do they do?

I would expect the US to turn to commerce raiding instantly. The US has a history of that were as Germany, at that time, didn't.

I think you might have misunderstood me a bit. I don’t think “drang nach Amerika”/German landing in New York was a very likely course of action in a war despite the goofy German plan made a decade earlier. which was made at a time when Germany actually had a numerically weaker fleet than the US anyways , so no coastal defenses of the US coast immediately necessary, unless it went on long enough I guess.

Look at the range of the German ships. Then consider they have ZERO fleet train to refuel and replenish at sea. Sure, they can send merchant ships with coal and supplies, but they need either a port or calm seas and no opposition for days to do a replenishment.

I’m assuming you are referring to the aforementioned an Einmarsch in Amerika, in which case I agree. Anyways it is certainly not lost on me, that the German vessels are designed for shorter operational ranges, or that the main purpose of the German fleet for that matter was Tirpitz’ risk fleet strategy.

In the Pacific Ocean though they have a large network of anchorages and coaling stations. Kaiser Wilhelm II was also determined to gain Germany international prestige, which is evident in everything from his push to massively bulk up the navy to begin with, his over the top reaction to the Chinese siege of the Peking Legation, to his push for colonies when Bismarck was opposed to it.

[Carl Schwamberger]

2. Germany is obviously in big trouble if Britain joins, and by association Japan. But without a likely Franco-Russian involvement , no neutral Belgium to make a moral stand for, and Italy more likely to stay true the triple alliance with Germany and AH, wouldn't it like to abstain? Remember that this is post-Haldane mission, which although technically it failed at least assured Britain that Germany wasn't trying to dethrone its naval status anymore.

Getting Imperial Germany to war with the US though all that political forrest is tough. Its why I investigated the Spanish Alliance as a route. It circuitous but, has a degree of logic and somewhat less handwaving. It allows the possibility of German Naval bases in the western hemisphere, & a more direct confrontation with the US.

[Asher S.]

I’m assuming you are referring to the aforementioned an Einmarsch in Amerika, in which case I agree. Anyways it is certainly not lost on me, that the German vessels are designed for shorter operational ranges, or that the main purpose of the German fleet for that matter was Tirpitz’ risk fleet strategy.

In the Pacific Ocean though they have a large network of anchorages and coaling stations. Kaiser Wilhelm II was also determined to gain Germany international prestige, which is evident in everything from his push to massively bulk up the navy to begin with, his over the top reaction to the Chinese siege of the Peking Legation, to his push for colonies when Bismarck was opposed to it.

It’s not a surprise that Wilhelm was quoted in 1914 as saying: It would shame me more to surrender Tsingtao to the Japanese than Berlin to the Russians.

The abrasive nature of German diplomacy during this period should not be underestimated. Twice wars almost broke out over Morocco. Bull in a china shop is one way to describe it. That Wilhelmine Germany had an extremely aggressive foreign policy is putting it mildly.

[T. A. Gardner]

I think you might have misunderstood me a bit. I don’t think “drang nach Amerika”/German landing in New York was a very likely course of action in a war despite the goofy German plan made a decade earlier. which was made at a time when Germany actually had a numerically weaker fleet than the US anyways , so no coastal defenses of the US coast immediately necessary, unless it went on long enough I guess.[/quote]

Long Island was heavily defended by shore batteries. A landing against New York City would have to go through those.

https://cdsg.org/the-harbor-defenses-of ... and-sound/

[Peter89]

I think Carl has made the critical point here. The German fleet could not bring its full weight to the western side of the Atlantic, let alone to the Pacific. It would be a battle of ports, and coaling procedures, in which the alliances of the two powers would settle the matter.

[T. A. Gardner]

It’s not a surprise that Wilhelm was quoted in 1914 as saying: It would shame me more to surrender Tsingtao to the Japanese than Berlin to the Russians.

The abrasive nature of German diplomacy during this period should not be underestimated. Twice wars almost broke out over Morocco. Bull in a china shop is one way to describe it. That Wilhelmine Germany had an extremely aggressive foreign policy is putting it mildly.

Don't forget the almost war that happened in Apia Harbor at Guam where a US squadron was facing off against the German Pacific Squadron in 1889 (The Samoan Crisis). Only a typhoon that wrecked both squadrons prevented a war.

[Asher S.]

I think Carl has made the critical point here. The German fleet could not bring its full weight to the western side of the Atlantic, let alone to the Pacific.

Except that it’s not really a point that applies to the Pacific, at least as far as coaling and anchorage is concerned, unless you ignore they control hundreds of natural anchorages,coaling sites spread out over several million square miles of ocean, including Truk which was a sufficient anchorage for the Japanese a few decades later. Aside from the Pacific, their main existing naval base and the home base of the East Asia Squadron is a bit more separated at Tsingtao on the Yellow Sea and well defended. It goes without saying these were not meant to support a fleet the size of the HSF, so some dispersing in basing and coaling is called for.

Getting there is troublesome, with frequent stops in Germanys African colonies first, and the existing Entappendienst wouldnt cut it for the trek over the Indian Ocean so they’d have to commandeer a larger portion of their quite large merchant marine, but it’s doable. Much more troublesome is repairing the ships damaged while in the Pacific. The dry docks that existed at Tsingtao (including a floating one) maybe sufficient, but I need to find more information myself. Otherwise that definitely requires the capture of some ports other than Tsingtao, like Manila.


The political ramifications though of such a deployment, that can definitely be argued, depending on the kind of influence Wilhelm exerts on the SKL of the Kaiserliche Marine.

The way I see it there are two points of departure with our timeline necessary for this what-if, the 1st is that there is a third crisis in Samoa and the 2nd is that Germany uses it to start a war for doubling its Pacific holdings. The rest is a debate about what the logical series of events would be after that.

Hilariously enough if OP had set the start date just two months earlier, SMS Moltke and her consort would have been stuck in New York from their visit at the time war was declared. The silly antics of that can be predicted.

[Asher S.]

Where do the Germans turn to to get steel and food? Both are major imports from the US, and without them, Germany is hosed.

A good thing to consider, the effect on international trade. Although I don’t agree with this specific remark. Germany was the worlds second largest producer of steel, after the USA. But due to greater domestic need in the US, Germany was the worlds largest steel exporter.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2120336

Most German iron ore was either domestic mining or from Scandinavian sources.

I skimmed through the figures available in
The Challenges of Globalization: Economy and Politics in Germany, 1860-1914 and I don’t see any indication they were dependent on American food or steel either.

However, more generally the US was still Germanys largest partner in trade as represented by monetary value, while Britain was second. Although much of that trade was luxury goods, investment and crediting and other not-bare-essentials for a war economy, it still has a tremendous effect on Germanys long-term economic prospects; the British Empire doesn’t need to join a war in order to punish Germany for it’s course of action in the form of embargos or ridiculously high tariffs. Of course that cuts both ways, but it has special significance to Germany since it was one of the worlds fastest growing economies at the time. Not that economic considerations ever stopped Wilhelm from taking brash actions, though.

Don't forget the almost war that happened in Apia Harbor at Guam where a US squadron was facing off against the German Pacific Squadron in 1889 (The Samoan Crisis). Only a typhoon that wrecked both squadrons prevented a war.

Good point. The OP is basically proposing a repeat situation many years later just without the hurricane bit. Would be interesting to have another What if thread about that subject, without the intervention of nature of course. Both countries had significantly smaller Pacific holdings in the 1880s.

But since neither America nor Germany have a way to reliably supply a fleet on the respective opposite side of the Atlantic, and what each side wants from each other is more influence in the Asia-Pacific region and taking Pacific colonies, its not going to be a major theater to begin with other than some cruiser raids like what Karl Muller did in WWI. Undoubtedly what is going to happen is a race for the Germans to deploy their fleet east where they have quite a few bases along the way (Togoland, Kamerun, Sud-West Afrika, Ost Afrika) of the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, assuming the British aren't going to allow them through Suez, and the third largest merchant fleet in the world. It's far more practical than what the Russians did against Japan a decade earlier, by far. The US of course has the shorter route to redeploy its Atlantic ships around Cape Horn (the Panama canal isnt going to be finished for a couple years). Both have extensive colonial holdings in close proximity to each other. Germany has it's Kiachau-Tsingtao concession in China, almost all of the Micronesia region, a large holding in New Guinea, the Bismarck archipelago and half of the Solomons. I already mentioned the American Pacific holdings.

Just because the Germans aren’t likely attempt an invasion of the USA doesn’t exclude the Atlantic from being a major theater. They had cruisers pre-positioned on a rotation basis in the Carribean, Western Atlantic, and Eastern Pacific in the event of a war with Britain, all with explicit instructions to attack commerce when war broke out. The same applies to a war with the states. Also the United States might even forego an immediate reinforcement of the Pacific to make a move on Germany’s West African colonies.

Also, although it may not look like it on a map, the sailing distance from Norfolk to Hawaii or Samoa is about the same from Wilhelmshaven to the south-central Pacific, it’s not “shorter” to go around the tip of South America. The difference is in the fleet train T.A. Gardner mentioned, which enables a more timely deployment than the sluggish movements of a HSF trying to redeploy, requiring frequent stops in Africa and at sea coaling in the North Atlantic and Indian Oceans.