Market Garden Plus

Discussions on WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic.
Aber
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by Aber » 05 Feb 2015 23:29

Looking at Google maps, there isn't one at Pannerden.

IIRC Arnhem and Wesel were the existing bridges, and so the obvious targets for a rapid crossing of the Rhine, by aerial assault. A prepared assault would of course be less dependent on existing bridges.

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 06 Feb 2015 18:40

Exactly, and if the airborne landings at Nijmegen and Arnhem stirred up the proverbial "hornet's nest" (although this took several days to form) surely the likelihood is that any airborne troops landing at Wesel would have faced an even greater and much more rapid build up of resistance. If the drop at Wesel was phased in over several days then the only result would have been even greater casualties and a much more rapid disintegration.

That's even before we consider the viability of the ground route from the Escaut bridgehead to Wesel. 8O

Regards

Tom

dweb6
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by dweb6 » 17 Mar 2015 16:57

Pannerden had no bridge but a commercial ferry.
Rather crucial to the 10th SS since it was the only way to reenforce its defence of Nijmegen while frost blocked the Arnhem bridge.
the germans also installed an additional ferry. Luckily both were too light for the Tiger II tanks arriving by train in nearby Zevenaar. Sofar I never found any wartime pictures of this decisive crossing of the Pannerdens Canal (Lower Rhine).

pre-jump
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by pre-jump » 25 Feb 2023 13:51

nl11279 wrote:
27 Dec 2014 09:10
The decision making process and Market Garden itself are prominently covered in my second book "Little Sense of Urgency".

See http://marketgarden1944-2014.pre-jump.nl

With regards,
RG Poulussen
Self-publishing author
Holland
New and improved website. 😉 https://pre-jump.nl

Delta Tank
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by Delta Tank » 13 Mar 2023 19:34

To All,

William F. Buckingham wrote another book on Operation Market Garden a couple of years ago.

https://www.amazon.com/Arnhem-Complete- ... _author_dp

Mike

ljadw
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by ljadw » 13 Mar 2023 21:10

The importance of Antwerp has been very much exaggerated:the supplies arriving in Antwerp were always only a part of the total supplies,besides the presence of supplies in Antwerp did not help the Allies,the problem was to bring these supplies to the frontline, and till the end of the Ardennes offensive,this could not be done sufficiently ,due to the chaotic situation of the Belgian railways,of the waterways,of the roads. Thus,it is not only unfair but unjust to attack Montgomery for the failure to capture Antwerp before it was captured .

Delta Tank
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by Delta Tank » 14 Mar 2023 00:09

ljadw wrote:
13 Mar 2023 21:10
The importance of Antwerp has been very much exaggerated:the supplies arriving in Antwerp were always only a part of the total supplies,besides the presence of supplies in Antwerp did not help the Allies,the problem was to bring these supplies to the frontline, and till the end of the Ardennes offensive,this could not be done sufficiently ,due to the chaotic situation of the Belgian railways,of the waterways,of the roads. Thus,it is not only unfair but unjust to attack Montgomery for the failure to capture Antwerp before it was captured .
I think you are wrong. Antwerp was so close to the front lines that it help alleviate the truck shortage. Of course as you mentioned there were other problems. Antwerp to Aachen Germany is about 90 miles.

Mike

ljadw
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by ljadw » 14 Mar 2023 07:11

So close means that there was not enough road space .Besides,railways were more important than trucks for the transport of supplies .

ljadw
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by ljadw » 14 Mar 2023 08:05

From Logistical Support of the Armies Volume 2 P 124

In December 1944 1,555,819 tons of supplies arrived in liberated French and Belgian ports,of which 427,592 in Antwerp
1945
January 1,501,269 Antwerp 433,094
February : 1,735,502 Antwerp 473,463
March : 2,039,778 Antwerp 558,066
April : 2,025,142 Antwerp 628,227

The problem was not the discharge but the clearance and the clearance capacity determined the discharge capacity .
In December 1944 only 315000 tons of supplies left Antwerp ,some 75 % of what arrived ,45 % by rail, 15 % only by barge (the expectations were much higher ) and 40 % by truck : 126000 tons in 31 days = some 4000 tons per day .
And, not all supplies were going to the frontline . A lot were for the support units, others for the civilians and also to repair bridges, rail, ...Even coal was imported .

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Aida1
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by Aida1 » 14 Mar 2023 10:03

ljadw wrote:
14 Mar 2023 07:11
So close means that there was not enough road space .Besides,railways were more important than trucks for the transport of supplies .
As always denying everything. :roll: :roll:

ljadw
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by ljadw » 14 Mar 2023 13:14

Go back to school and learn there that 45 % of 315000 is bigger than 40 % of 315000 .

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Sheldrake
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Re: MARKET GARDEN PLUS

Post by Sheldrake » 14 Mar 2023 13:18

ljadw wrote:
20 Oct 2014 20:11
I don't think thay you are approaching the problem from the right direction:MG could only succeed if the Germans collapsed/were collapsing,if this happened,the logistical problem for advancing through Germany would not exist : a few batallions always could be supplied,and a few batallions only would be needed .
Gosh a zombie thread arises....

I can offer two thpughts about Op Market Garden.

!. ljadw is probably correct to beleive that the plan would only succeed if Germany was at the point of collapse. But how would the allies know if Germany was at the point of collapse without attempting a coup de main of some sort? After all Germany calledfor an armistice in 1918 before any enemy soldiers entered German soil. The collapse in 1944 in France was worse than in 1918, and the attempted coup on 20th July was evidence that at least some Germans had had enough. So Market Garden - or something like it was worth trying (Upper rhine by Sixth Army Group- Middle Rhine by Patton - An airborne drop on Berlin?)

2. The operation was ill-conceived and poorly executed. It can best be explained by some of the sub optimal military activities as explained on post #4 of this thread https://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threa ... bs.166064/. (Note/ARRSE uses rude words and err barrack room language and is unsuitable for those easily offended.

Delta Tank
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by Delta Tank » 14 Mar 2023 14:56

ljadw wrote:
14 Mar 2023 08:05
From Logistical Support of the Armies Volume 2 P 124

In December 1944 1,555,819 tons of supplies arrived in liberated French and Belgian ports,of which 427,592 in Antwerp
1945
January 1,501,269 Antwerp 433,094
February : 1,735,502 Antwerp 473,463
March : 2,039,778 Antwerp 558,066
April : 2,025,142 Antwerp 628,227

The problem was not the discharge but the clearance and the clearance capacity determined the discharge capacity .
In December 1944 only 315000 tons of supplies left Antwerp ,some 75 % of what arrived ,45 % by rail, 15 % only by barge (the expectations were much higher ) and 40 % by truck : 126000 tons in 31 days = some 4000 tons per day .
And, not all supplies were going to the frontline . A lot were for the support units, others for the civilians and also to repair bridges, rail, ...Even coal was imported .
So, an increase in Port capacity is good or is it bad?
An increase in Port capacity 90-100 miles from the front is good or bad?
An increase in Port capacity closer to the front which reduces travel time, fuel expenditure, wear and tear on all vehicles, truck or train, is good or bad?
So, a lot of Port capacity was used to support civilians, repair bridges, import coal so that trains could run more efficiently, to run power plants and provide heat to all and provide needed supplies to support units; so we would be better off if we did not have this additional Port capacity?

From the book entitled “The Siegfried Line Campaign” you can read it here: https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/Sie ... d-ch09.htm

“Even before the landings in Normandy, the Allies had eyed Antwerp covetously. While noting that seizure of Le Havre would solve some of the problems of supplying Allied armies on the Continent, the pre-D-Day planners had predicted that "until after the development of Antwerp, the availability of port capacity will still limit the forces which can be maintained."1 By the time the Allies had broken their confinement in Normandy to run footloose across northern France, the desire for Antwerp had grown so urgent that it had strongly influenced General Eisenhower in his decision to put the weight of the tottering logistical structure temporarily behind the thrust in the north.2”

Mike

ljadw
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Re: MARKET GARDEN PLUS

Post by ljadw » 14 Mar 2023 15:48

Sheldrake wrote:
14 Mar 2023 13:18
ljadw wrote:
20 Oct 2014 20:11
I don't think thay you are approaching the problem from the right direction:MG could only succeed if the Germans collapsed/were collapsing,if this happened,the logistical problem for advancing through Germany would not exist : a few batallions always could be supplied,and a few batallions only would be needed .
Gosh a zombie thread arises....

I can offer two thpughts about Op Market Garden.

!. ljadw is probably correct to beleive that the plan would only succeed if Germany was at the point of collapse. But how would the allies know if Germany was at the point of collapse without attempting a coup de main of some sort? After all Germany calledfor an armistice in 1918 before any enemy soldiers entered German soil. The collapse in 1944 in France was worse than in 1918, and the attempted coup on 20th July was evidence that at least some Germans had had enough. So Market Garden - or something like it was worth trying (Upper rhine by Sixth Army Group- Middle Rhine by Patton - An airborne drop on Berlin?)

2. The operation was ill-conceived and poorly executed. It can best be explained by some of the sub optimal military activities as explained on post #4 of this thread https://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threa ... bs.166064/. (Note/ARRSE uses rude words and err barrack room language and is unsuitable for those easily offended.
1 How would the Allies know if Germany at the point of collapsing ? This question did not arise in September 1944 : In August and the start of September, all reports mentioned that ''The Hun was on the run '',but every one knew that this would not last and that the windows of opportunity would close very fast .
When the Hun was on the run, MG was out of the question,because the Allies were still in France .
2 That's why the operation was improvised:because time was running against the Allies .
A lot of people from Bangor to Seattle claimed afterwards that the operation was ill-conceived and poorly executed and that this was the reason why MG failed.
Their criticism is not valid,because
a a better conceived and better executed MG could happen only weeks after the real MG was planned and executed : in October or November ,and it would have even less chance to succeed than the real MG .
b MG did not fail because it was ill-conceived and poorly executed (it was not possible to conceive and execute it better in September ) ,but because of the German recovery :the windows of opportunity were already closed .
c the real MG could have succeeded,even with the use of less forces,IF the Germans surrendered when the first paratroopers landed .
Last point : the decision to execute MG was justified,as there was a ( little ) chance that it could succeed and that a success could result in the collapse of Germany .
It would have been criminal not to do MG .

ljadw
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Re: Market Garden Plus

Post by ljadw » 14 Mar 2023 16:00

Delta Tank wrote:
14 Mar 2023 14:56
ljadw wrote:
14 Mar 2023 08:05
From Logistical Support of the Armies Volume 2 P 124

In December 1944 1,555,819 tons of supplies arrived in liberated French and Belgian ports,of which 427,592 in Antwerp
1945
January 1,501,269 Antwerp 433,094
February : 1,735,502 Antwerp 473,463
March : 2,039,778 Antwerp 558,066
April : 2,025,142 Antwerp 628,227

The problem was not the discharge but the clearance and the clearance capacity determined the discharge capacity .
In December 1944 only 315000 tons of supplies left Antwerp ,some 75 % of what arrived ,45 % by rail, 15 % only by barge (the expectations were much higher ) and 40 % by truck : 126000 tons in 31 days = some 4000 tons per day .
And, not all supplies were going to the frontline . A lot were for the support units, others for the civilians and also to repair bridges, rail, ...Even coal was imported .
So, an increase in Port capacity is good or is it bad?
An increase in Port capacity 90-100 miles from the front is good or bad?
An increase in Port capacity closer to the front which reduces travel time, fuel expenditure, wear and tear on all vehicles, truck or train, is good or bad?
So, a lot of Port capacity was used to support civilians, repair bridges, import coal so that trains could run more efficiently, to run power plants and provide heat to all and provide needed supplies to support units; so we would be better off if we did not have this additional Port capacity?

From the book entitled “The Siegfried Line Campaign” you can read it here: https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/Sie ... d-ch09.htm

“Even before the landings in Normandy, the Allies had eyed Antwerp covetously. While noting that seizure of Le Havre would solve some of the problems of supplying Allied armies on the Continent, the pre-D-Day planners had predicted that "until after the development of Antwerp, the availability of port capacity will still limit the forces which can be maintained."1 By the time the Allies had broken their confinement in Normandy to run footloose across northern France, the desire for Antwerp had grown so urgent that it had strongly influenced General Eisenhower in his decision to put the weight of the tottering logistical structure temporarily behind the thrust in the north.2”

Mike
Port Capacity on itself is totally meaningless .
The Allied advance was stopped,NOT because Antwerp was not captured .
WW2 in Europe could have ended before the first tons of supplies left Antwerp ,but this depended on the Germans .
And you can't use the predictions of the pre-D-Day planners , because at the end of August,the situation was totally different from the predictions of the planners .
At the end of August ,the Germans were on the run and the Allies advanced without the benefit of an operational Antwerp .
A month later,the Allied advance was stopped ,NOT because Antwerp was not captured, but because the Germans had recovered .
The Germans started an offensive in the Ardennes ,while the Allies had the benefit of Antwerp .And this offensive failed,NOT because Antwerp was functioning,it would also have failed if Antwerp was still in German hands .

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