Market Garden Plus

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Sheldrake
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Re: MARKET GARDEN PLUS

#61

Post by Sheldrake » 14 Mar 2023, 18:17

ljadw wrote:
14 Mar 2023, 16:48
Sheldrake wrote:
14 Mar 2023, 14:18
ljadw wrote:
20 Oct 2014, 21:11
I don't think thay you are approaching the problem from the right direction:MG could only succeed if the Germans collapsed/were collapsing,if this happened,the logistical problem for advancing through Germany would not exist : a few batallions always could be supplied,and a few batallions only would be needed .
Gosh a zombie thread arises....

I can offer two thpughts about Op Market Garden.

!. ljadw is probably correct to beleive that the plan would only succeed if Germany was at the point of collapse. But how would the allies know if Germany was at the point of collapse without attempting a coup de main of some sort? After all Germany calledfor an armistice in 1918 before any enemy soldiers entered German soil. The collapse in 1944 in France was worse than in 1918, and the attempted coup on 20th July was evidence that at least some Germans had had enough. So Market Garden - or something like it was worth trying (Upper rhine by Sixth Army Group- Middle Rhine by Patton - An airborne drop on Berlin?)

2. The operation was ill-conceived and poorly executed. It can best be explained by some of the sub optimal military activities as explained on post #4 of this thread https://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threa ... bs.166064/. (Note/ARRSE uses rude words and err barrack room language and is unsuitable for those easily offended.
1 How would the Allies know if Germany at the point of collapsing ? This question did not arise in September 1944 : In August and the start of September, all reports mentioned that ''The Hun was on the run '',but every one knew that this would not last and that the windows of opportunity would close very fast .
When the Hun was on the run, MG was out of the question,because the Allies were still in France .
2 That's why the operation was improvised:because time was running against the Allies .
A lot of people from Bangor to Seattle claimed afterwards that the operation was ill-conceived and poorly executed and that this was the reason why MG failed.
Their criticism is not valid,because
a a better conceived and better executed MG could happen only weeks after the real MG was planned and executed : in October or November ,and it would have even less chance to succeed than the real MG .
b MG did not fail because it was ill-conceived and poorly executed (it was not possible to conceive and execute it better in September ) ,but because of the German recovery :the windows of opportunity were already closed .
c the real MG could have succeeded,even with the use of less forces,IF the Germans surrendered when the first paratroopers landed .
Last point : the decision to execute MG was justified,as there was a ( little ) chance that it could succeed and that a success could result in the collapse of Germany .
It would have been criminal not to do MG .
Re your first point. The only way the Allies could know if Germany at the point of collapsing was to try to force a collapse - as per Montgomery's preferred narrow front stratgy or Op Market Garden. I think we are largely in agremeemt. It would have been criminal not to at least try to win the war in'44

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Re: Market Garden Plus

#62

Post by ljadw » 14 Mar 2023, 18:20

Delta Tank wrote:
14 Mar 2023, 15:56
ljadw wrote:
14 Mar 2023, 09:05
From Logistical Support of the Armies Volume 2 P 124

In December 1944 1,555,819 tons of supplies arrived in liberated French and Belgian ports,of which 427,592 in Antwerp
1945
January 1,501,269 Antwerp 433,094
February : 1,735,502 Antwerp 473,463
March : 2,039,778 Antwerp 558,066
April : 2,025,142 Antwerp 628,227

The problem was not the discharge but the clearance and the clearance capacity determined the discharge capacity .
In December 1944 only 315000 tons of supplies left Antwerp ,some 75 % of what arrived ,45 % by rail, 15 % only by barge (the expectations were much higher ) and 40 % by truck : 126000 tons in 31 days = some 4000 tons per day .
And, not all supplies were going to the frontline . A lot were for the support units, others for the civilians and also to repair bridges, rail, ...Even coal was imported .
So, an increase in Port capacity is good or is it bad?
An increase in Port capacity 90-100 miles from the front is good or bad?
An increase in Port capacity closer to the front which reduces travel time, fuel expenditure, wear and tear on all vehicles, truck or train, is good or bad?
So, a lot of Port capacity was used to support civilians, repair bridges, import coal so that trains could run more efficiently, to run power plants and provide heat to all and provide needed supplies to support units; so we would be better off if we did not have this additional Port capacity?



Mike
These are wrong questions,as
an increase in Port capacity is good nor bad, but neutral,because an increase in Port capacity does not mean that more supplies will be discharged,the opposite is even possible and an increase of discharged supplies is also neutral as this does not mean that more supplies will leave the port and if more supplies are leaving the port,this does not mean that the front units will receive more supplies and if the front units receive more supplies,that thus not mean that the situation on the front will be better .This situation can also become better without an increase of supplies to the front units .
The northern continental ports received in July 620000 tons of supplies, in August 940000, in September 890000, in October 785000 , in November 860000 .
Were the Allied successes in November smaller than in October,and in October smaller than in September ? If so,was this caused by the amount of discharged supplies ?
It is the same for an increase in Port capacity if the port is closer to the frontline .Such an increase does not mean that more supplies (absolute or percentage ) will leave this port .
What was the importance of Antwerp at a distance of 90 miles of Aachen ? Aachen was captured 5 weeks before Antwerp started to function .
A distance of 100 miles means that you have a bigger road space than can give a distance of 50 miles and thus the possibility for more trucks using the bigger road space . It is not so that a smaller distance means automatically more supplies .The opposite is also possible.
The US army captured Aachen in October ,without the benefit of Antwerp.There is no proof that if Antwerp was functioning in September (which was also impossible ) the US forces could have captured Aachen in September .
To focus on supplies and to search for scapegoats ( Monty ) is to neglect totally the fact that there were also German soldiers who were fighting .
About the amount of supplies for support units and civilians, my point is that one can not use the amount of supplies that arrived at a port and left a port to argue that an increase would give the front troops more resources . The opposite is also possible .
In December 427000 tons arrived at Antwerp and 315000 left Antwerp (recipients are not known )
In January 433000 tons arrived at Antwerp ( number of tons that left the port and recipients are unknown ),but it is possible that in January less supplies left the port than in December and that the front units received more supplies than in December .
You need 2 to win or to lose .Every victory is also influenced/decided by the loser and every defeat is also influenced decided by the winner .
There is no automatism in war .


Delta Tank
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Re: Market Garden Plus

#63

Post by Delta Tank » 17 Mar 2023, 19:51

ljadw wrote:
14 Mar 2023, 18:20
Delta Tank wrote:
14 Mar 2023, 15:56
ljadw wrote:
14 Mar 2023, 09:05
From Logistical Support of the Armies Volume 2 P 124

In December 1944 1,555,819 tons of supplies arrived in liberated French and Belgian ports,of which 427,592 in Antwerp
1945
January 1,501,269 Antwerp 433,094
February : 1,735,502 Antwerp 473,463
March : 2,039,778 Antwerp 558,066
April : 2,025,142 Antwerp 628,227

The problem was not the discharge but the clearance and the clearance capacity determined the discharge capacity .
In December 1944 only 315000 tons of supplies left Antwerp ,some 75 % of what arrived ,45 % by rail, 15 % only by barge (the expectations were much higher ) and 40 % by truck : 126000 tons in 31 days = some 4000 tons per day .
And, not all supplies were going to the frontline . A lot were for the support units, others for the civilians and also to repair bridges, rail, ...Even coal was imported .
So, an increase in Port capacity is good or is it bad?
An increase in Port capacity 90-100 miles from the front is good or bad?
An increase in Port capacity closer to the front which reduces travel time, fuel expenditure, wear and tear on all vehicles, truck or train, is good or bad?
So, a lot of Port capacity was used to support civilians, repair bridges, import coal so that trains could run more efficiently, to run power plants and provide heat to all and provide needed supplies to support units; so we would be better off if we did not have this additional Port capacity?



Mike
These are wrong questions,as
an increase in Port capacity is good nor bad, but neutral,because an increase in Port capacity does not mean that more supplies will be discharged,the opposite is even possible and an increase of discharged supplies is also neutral as this does not mean that more supplies will leave the port and if more supplies are leaving the port,this does not mean that the front units will receive more supplies and if the front units receive more supplies,that thus not mean that the situation on the front will be better .This situation can also become better without an increase of supplies to the front units .
The northern continental ports received in July 620000 tons of supplies, in August 940000, in September 890000, in October 785000 , in November 860000 .
Were the Allied successes in November smaller than in October,and in October smaller than in September ? If so,was this caused by the amount of discharged supplies ?
It is the same for an increase in Port capacity if the port is closer to the frontline .Such an increase does not mean that more supplies (absolute or percentage ) will leave this port .
What was the importance of Antwerp at a distance of 90 miles of Aachen ? Aachen was captured 5 weeks before Antwerp started to function .
A distance of 100 miles means that you have a bigger road space than can give a distance of 50 miles and thus the possibility for more trucks using the bigger road space . It is not so that a smaller distance means automatically more supplies .The opposite is also possible.
The US army captured Aachen in October ,without the benefit of Antwerp.There is no proof that if Antwerp was functioning in September (which was also impossible ) the US forces could have captured Aachen in September .
To focus on supplies and to search for scapegoats ( Monty ) is to neglect totally the fact that there were also German soldiers who were fighting .
About the amount of supplies for support units and civilians, my point is that one can not use the amount of supplies that arrived at a port and left a port to argue that an increase would give the front troops more resources . The opposite is also possible .
In December 427000 tons arrived at Antwerp and 315000 left Antwerp (recipients are not known )
In January 433000 tons arrived at Antwerp ( number of tons that left the port and recipients are unknown ),but it is possible that in January less supplies left the port than in December and that the front units received more supplies than in December .
You need 2 to win or to lose .Every victory is also influenced/decided by the loser and every defeat is also influenced decided by the winner .
There is no automatism in war .
Trucks to haul supplies from ports far from the front can now be used for port clearance. How many ships were off the coast waiting to be off loaded but they could not be off loaded because we did not have the port capacity. Plus, Antwerp was not destroyed when the Germans retreated, and IIRC the some of the dock workers were available to assist.
I can not find the letter or was it a message(?) that Eisenhower sent to Montgomery which said “we must have Antwerp”.
My comments have nothing to do with success on the ground, they deal with logistics. Having adequate or an abundance of beans, bullets and fuel does not ensure tactical success on the ground but if you don’t have the logistics to support and exploit a successful operation.. .

Mike

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Re: Market Garden Plus

#64

Post by ljadw » 17 Mar 2023, 22:47

9000 civilians worked at the port ,they needed resources .Thousands of military were stationed in Antwerp,they also needed resources .
The number of trucs that could be used for port clearance is limited by the distance :less trucks could drive on the distance between Antwerp and Aachen (90 miles ) than on the distance between Le Havre and Aachen .
Besides : Aachen was captured on 21 October after 12 days of fighting and on that day Antwerp was still not operational and there is no proof that if Antwerp was operational in October, Aachen would have been captured after less fighting .
More supplies does not mean less fighting and a quicker victory, because there is always the opponent .
Every success is also caused by the defeat of the enemy and every defeat is also caused by the victory of the enemy .
In December 1,555,000 tons were discharged,of which 427000 in Antwerp
January :1,501,000 and 433000 in Antwerp .
February :1,735,000 and 473000 in Antwerp
March : 2,039,000 and 558000 in Antwerp
April : 2,025,000 of which 628,000 in Antwerp .
But discharged does not mean left Antwerp and we don't know what was the part of supplies that left Antwerp that was going to the frontline .
There is no proof that the German Ardennes offensive would have succeeded if Antwerp was not operational .
And in September less supplies were discharged than in December ,but the result was that the Allies advanced faster than in December .
The role of the enemy was /is as /more important than the number of supplies that arrived at the front .
The number of supplies that were discharged at the Northern continental ports (source is Ruppenthal ) was
in July :621000 tons
in August :940000 tons
in September :890000 tons
in October :785000 tons
in November 860000 tons
but the advance of the Northern AG was not determined by the number of supplies . Less supplies in September than in August does not mean that the advance was slower in September .
The big problem is that there is no such thing as a minimum of supplies that is needed to have,support and exploit a successful operation .
It is not so that Patton was stopped because he had not enough supplies : he could have gone to Berlin with much less supplies if the Germans collapsed .
Market did not fail because the airborne units were to weak/had not enough supplies, but because the Germans fought back .
Garden did not fail because of the water ways (Eindhoven and Nijmegen were successes ) but because the Germans fought back .
MG was started with the forces and supplies that were available . More forces and supplies would have resulted in a delay of MG and the weather would have made the operation impossible .
After the failure and even today,Anglo Saxon historians and media were/still are searching for scapegoats to deny the Germans their victory .
30 years before the Germans did the same after the failure of the Marne battle .
The Frech did it after their defeat in 1940, the Germans still do it for their defeat in WW2 .

Delta Tank
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Re: Market Garden Plus

#65

Post by Delta Tank » 17 Mar 2023, 23:14

ljadw wrote:
17 Mar 2023, 22:47
9000 civilians worked at the port ,they needed resources .Thousands of military were stationed in Antwerp,they also needed resources .
The number of trucs that could be used for port clearance is limited by the distance :less trucks could drive on the distance between Antwerp and Aachen (90 miles ) than on the distance between Le Havre and Aachen .
Besides : Aachen was captured on 21 October after 12 days of fighting and on that day Antwerp was still not operational and there is no proof that if Antwerp was operational in October, Aachen would have been captured after less fighting .
More supplies does not mean less fighting and a quicker victory, because there is always the opponent .
Every success is also caused by the defeat of the enemy and every defeat is also caused by the victory of the enemy .
In December 1,555,000 tons were discharged,of which 427000 in Antwerp
January :1,501,000 and 433000 in Antwerp .
February :1,735,000 and 473000 in Antwerp
March : 2,039,000 and 558000 in Antwerp
April : 2,025,000 of which 628,000 in Antwerp .
But discharged does not mean left Antwerp and we don't know what was the part of supplies that left Antwerp that was going to the frontline .
There is no proof that the German Ardennes offensive would have succeeded if Antwerp was not operational .
And in September less supplies were discharged than in December ,but the result was that the Allies advanced faster than in December .
The role of the enemy was /is as /more important than the number of supplies that arrived at the front .
The number of supplies that were discharged at the Northern continental ports (source is Ruppenthal ) was
in July :621000 tons
in August :940000 tons
in September :890000 tons
in October :785000 tons
in November 860000 tons
but the advance of the Northern AG was not determined by the number of supplies . Less supplies in September than in August does not mean that the advance was slower in September .
The big problem is that there is no such thing as a minimum of supplies that is needed to have,support and exploit a successful operation .
It is not so that Patton was stopped because he had not enough supplies : he could have gone to Berlin with much less supplies if the Germans collapsed .
Market did not fail because the airborne units were to weak/had not enough supplies, but because the Germans fought back .
Garden did not fail because of the water ways (Eindhoven and Nijmegen were successes ) but because the Germans fought back .
MG was started with the forces and supplies that were available . More forces and supplies would have resulted in a delay of MG and the weather would have made the operation impossible .
After the failure and even today,Anglo Saxon historians and media were/still are searching for scapegoats to deny the Germans their victory .
30 years before the Germans did the same after the failure of the Marne battle .
The Frech did it after their defeat in 1940, the Germans still do it for their defeat in WW2 .
Okay! I am done! You are arguing with who? Not me! I have no idea why you keep bring up ground combat victories or losses before and after the opening of Antwerp!! You obviously did not do well at Staff College!

Mike

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Re: Market Garden Plus

#66

Post by ljadw » 18 Mar 2023, 08:21

You said that Eisenhower told Montgomery : we need Antwerp .
I gave the proofs that before Antwerp was operational,the Allies advanced faster than after the opening of Antwerp .
You said that logistics are essential to support and exploit a victorious operation .
I say that this is something meaningless ,as it ignores the role of the enemy in the support and exploitation of a victorious operation .
Antwerp was irrelevant for the success or failure of Market Garden ,thus one can question the remark of Eisenhower ,the Allied advance to and in Germany could also have happen without the use of Antwerp .
Did the Allies need Antwerp ?

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Aida1
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Re: Market Garden Plus

#67

Post by Aida1 » 18 Mar 2023, 08:52

Delta Tank wrote:
17 Mar 2023, 23:14
ljadw wrote:
17 Mar 2023, 22:47
9000 civilians worked at the port ,they needed resources .Thousands of military were stationed in Antwerp,they also needed resources .
The number of trucs that could be used for port clearance is limited by the distance :less trucks could drive on the distance between Antwerp and Aachen (90 miles ) than on the distance between Le Havre and Aachen .
Besides : Aachen was captured on 21 October after 12 days of fighting and on that day Antwerp was still not operational and there is no proof that if Antwerp was operational in October, Aachen would have been captured after less fighting .
More supplies does not mean less fighting and a quicker victory, because there is always the opponent .
Every success is also caused by the defeat of the enemy and every defeat is also caused by the victory of the enemy .
In December 1,555,000 tons were discharged,of which 427000 in Antwerp
January :1,501,000 and 433000 in Antwerp .
February :1,735,000 and 473000 in Antwerp
March : 2,039,000 and 558000 in Antwerp
April : 2,025,000 of which 628,000 in Antwerp .
But discharged does not mean left Antwerp and we don't know what was the part of supplies that left Antwerp that was going to the frontline .
There is no proof that the German Ardennes offensive would have succeeded if Antwerp was not operational .
And in September less supplies were discharged than in December ,but the result was that the Allies advanced faster than in December .
The role of the enemy was /is as /more important than the number of supplies that arrived at the front .
The number of supplies that were discharged at the Northern continental ports (source is Ruppenthal ) was
in July :621000 tons
in August :940000 tons
in September :890000 tons
in October :785000 tons
in November 860000 tons
but the advance of the Northern AG was not determined by the number of supplies . Less supplies in September than in August does not mean that the advance was slower in September .
The big problem is that there is no such thing as a minimum of supplies that is needed to have,support and exploit a successful operation .
It is not so that Patton was stopped because he had not enough supplies : he could have gone to Berlin with much less supplies if the Germans collapsed .
Market did not fail because the airborne units were to weak/had not enough supplies, but because the Germans fought back .
Garden did not fail because of the water ways (Eindhoven and Nijmegen were successes ) but because the Germans fought back .
MG was started with the forces and supplies that were available . More forces and supplies would have resulted in a delay of MG and the weather would have made the operation impossible .
After the failure and even today,Anglo Saxon historians and media were/still are searching for scapegoats to deny the Germans their victory .
30 years before the Germans did the same after the failure of the Marne battle .
The Frech did it after their defeat in 1940, the Germans still do it for their defeat in WW2 .
Okay! I am done! You are arguing with who? Not me! I have no idea why you keep bring up ground combat victories or losses before and after the opening of Antwerp!! You obviously did not do well at Staff College!

Mike
He is not to be taken seriously. Always contradicting everything. :lol: :lol:

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Aida1
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Re: Market Garden Plus

#68

Post by Aida1 » 18 Mar 2023, 08:54

ljadw wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 08:21
You said that Eisenhower told Montgomery : we need Antwerp .
I gave the proofs that before Antwerp was operational,the Allies advanced faster than after the opening of Antwerp .
You said that logistics are essential to support and exploit a victorious operation .
I say that this is something meaningless ,as it ignores the role of the enemy in the support and exploitation of a victorious operation .
Antwerp was irrelevant for the success or failure of Market Garden ,thus one can question the remark of Eisenhower ,the Allied advance to and in Germany could also have happen without the use of Antwerp .
Did the Allies need Antwerp ?
As always contradicting the obvious. Antwerp was important.You clearly do not understand military operations.

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Re: Market Garden Plus

#69

Post by ljadw » 18 Mar 2023, 09:28

Aida1 wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 08:54
ljadw wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 08:21
You said that Eisenhower told Montgomery : we need Antwerp .
I gave the proofs that before Antwerp was operational,the Allies advanced faster than after the opening of Antwerp .
You said that logistics are essential to support and exploit a victorious operation .
I say that this is something meaningless ,as it ignores the role of the enemy in the support and exploitation of a victorious operation .
Antwerp was irrelevant for the success or failure of Market Garden ,thus one can question the remark of Eisenhower ,the Allied advance to and in Germany could also have happen without the use of Antwerp .
Did the Allies need Antwerp ?
Antwerp was important.
1 No one said that Antwerp was not important .
2 Le Havre was also important .
3 ''Important '' is a meaningless concept .
4 Why was Antwerp important ?
5 When was Antwerp important ?
6 How much was Antwerp important ?

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Aida1
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Re: Market Garden Plus

#70

Post by Aida1 » 18 Mar 2023, 18:10

ljadw wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 09:28
Aida1 wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 08:54
ljadw wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 08:21
You said that Eisenhower told Montgomery : we need Antwerp .
I gave the proofs that before Antwerp was operational,the Allies advanced faster than after the opening of Antwerp .
You said that logistics are essential to support and exploit a victorious operation .
I say that this is something meaningless ,as it ignores the role of the enemy in the support and exploitation of a victorious operation .
Antwerp was irrelevant for the success or failure of Market Garden ,thus one can question the remark of Eisenhower ,the Allied advance to and in Germany could also have happen without the use of Antwerp .
Did the Allies need Antwerp ?
Antwerp was important.
1 No one said that Antwerp was not important .
2 Le Havre was also important .
3 ''Important '' is a meaningless concept .
4 Why was Antwerp important ?
5 When was Antwerp important ?
6 How much was Antwerp important ?
As usual just contradicting everybody. :lol: You could make an attempt at reading history books.
Last edited by Aida1 on 18 Mar 2023, 18:11, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Market Garden Plus

#71

Post by EwenS » 18 Mar 2023, 18:10

A plant was opened in Antwerp to assemble trucks delivered in knocked down form. It assembled some 35,500, 3/4 ton & 2.5 tons vehicles from Nov 1944 to the end of the war.

What gets little attention is how much effort went into clearing the Scheldt to allow shipping into the port, and I don't just mean grabbing the land along its length.

RN minesweeping efforts couldn't begin until the gun batteries at Zeebrugge & Knocke on the south side and Walcheren to the north had been captured. So clearance work couldn't begin until 3 Nov. It took until 26th Nov before it was safe for the first coasters to pass upriver to Antwerp and until 28th Nov for large merchant ships. At its peak there were 162 minesweepers plus support ships and smaller craft engaged in clearing the waters. During those operations they cleared 237 mines from the river itself plus another 51 in and around the lock entrances as well as searching four million square yards of quayside. And all this during some attrocious weather that prevented work on some days.

And although the main minesweeping effort went on until Christmas 1944, it had to continue at a lower level until the end of the war as the Germans sought to use E-boats, aircraft and midget subs to remine the estuary.

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Re: Market Garden Plus

#72

Post by ljadw » 18 Mar 2023, 18:54

Aida1 wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 18:10
ljadw wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 09:28
Aida1 wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 08:54
ljadw wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 08:21
You said that Eisenhower told Montgomery : we need Antwerp .
I gave the proofs that before Antwerp was operational,the Allies advanced faster than after the opening of Antwerp .
You said that logistics are essential to support and exploit a victorious operation .
I say that this is something meaningless ,as it ignores the role of the enemy in the support and exploitation of a victorious operation .
Antwerp was irrelevant for the success or failure of Market Garden ,thus one can question the remark of Eisenhower ,the Allied advance to and in Germany could also have happen without the use of Antwerp .
Did the Allies need Antwerp ?
Antwerp was important.
1 No one said that Antwerp was not important .
2 Le Havre was also important .
3 ''Important '' is a meaningless concept .
4 Why was Antwerp important ?
5 When was Antwerp important ?
6 How much was Antwerp important ?
As usual just contradicting everybody. :lol: You could make an attempt at reading history books.
Lost Victories and Panzerleader are not history books .

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Aida1
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Re: Market Garden Plus

#73

Post by Aida1 » 20 Mar 2023, 16:37

ljadw wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 18:54
Aida1 wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 18:10
ljadw wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 09:28
Aida1 wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 08:54
ljadw wrote:
18 Mar 2023, 08:21
You said that Eisenhower told Montgomery : we need Antwerp .
I gave the proofs that before Antwerp was operational,the Allies advanced faster than after the opening of Antwerp .
You said that logistics are essential to support and exploit a victorious operation .
I say that this is something meaningless ,as it ignores the role of the enemy in the support and exploitation of a victorious operation .
Antwerp was irrelevant for the success or failure of Market Garden ,thus one can question the remark of Eisenhower ,the Allied advance to and in Germany could also have happen without the use of Antwerp .
Did the Allies need Antwerp ?
Antwerp was important.
1 No one said that Antwerp was not important .
2 Le Havre was also important .
3 ''Important '' is a meaningless concept .
4 Why was Antwerp important ?
5 When was Antwerp important ?
6 How much was Antwerp important ?
As usual just contradicting everybody. :lol: You could make an attempt at reading history books.
Lost Victories and Panzerleader are not history books .
They were never meant to be but the insights of great commanders are very useful to read. Anyway, you refuse to read any book as shown by your ignorance.

ljadw
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Re: Market Garden Plus

#74

Post by ljadw » 21 Mar 2023, 23:02

Lost Victories and Panzer Leader are only lies from criminal defeated Hitler generals looking for scapegoats to explain the defeat to the German people.

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