No Tunisgrad

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

A couple of points.

1) Most of the inexperienced US divisions in France were follow-up formations, often directly from the USA.

2) Even they benefitted from feedback from US divisions that had already seen combat.

3) Certainly many German divisions had no previous combat experience but they benefitted from being part of a Wehrmacht that had masses of it.

4) The Canadians, who did not have the benefit of serving in North Africa, sent two divisions to Italy precisely so that some of their troops had some extended combat experience before their armuy landed on D-Day. Before that, if I remember correctly, all they had were a few hours of distinctly unpleasant experience at Dieppe and a few days in Hong Kong, where every man was lost. So clearly this matter of seasoning elements of Allied armies on actual operations was a recognized factor.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hi ljadw,

A couple of points.

1) Most of the inexperienced US divisions in France were follow-up formations, often directly from the USA.

2) Even they benefitted from feedback from US divisions that had already seen combat.

I used to think this, but have found the transmission of experience was a lot more uneven than what one would think. A specific example would be the US artillery. In 1944 the battalion & group leaders of the divsion & corps artillery arriving in Europe were using the same methods laid out in 1941 with little refrence to information sent back from Europe. Given that I would also note the greenest of US artillery units had a overall superiority to their German peers. The latter suffered from numerous material and training deficiencies in 1944 and a typical German corps of 1944 had only half to two thirds the effective fire power in its artillery as a US Corps. Even the well train artillery of the German mechanized divisions suffered from far larger ammunition shortages and lacked reliable replacement equipment.

Drawing from the combat experince in Africa & Italy the Director of the US artillery training concluded few significant improvements were necessary in the equipment and doctrine. That in effect froze the artillery training at the state of 1941-42. Similar conclusions occured across the board. ie: The M4 Medium tank was satifactory & could provide superiority over German armored forces; The fire power of the US infantry was superior to the German and required no major improvement; anti tank doctrine & equipment was mostly satisfactory and with some changes should provide superiority to German armored forces.

As often as not the wrong conclusions were drawn by the leaders at AGF & the doctrines, training, & equipment of the combat forces working up in the US not improved in many cases, or taking the wrong direction in some. Improvements in US Army methods occured first in the combat experienced units and usually started taking significant effect after thirty to sixty days in combat within those units, tho some of the most important changes did not take hold until 120 days or longer.

[BDV]

Callous as it may sound, the most important learning was not necessarily for the troops (who will mosly do the dying), but for the officers and commanding staff. E.g., reading the excellent I Remeber site, I got the particular impression that not ability to shoot at oncoming germans lacked in the RKKA ranks, but being placed in the position to do so and given the appropriate support by the superiors.

So learning how to deal with a german force on the defensive was important for all western staffs involved in the Tunisia theater - an opportunity obviously lacking if all that Italian-German forces offer is a quick scorched-earth raid then quickly falling back on Tunis, then Sirte, and then further east towards Benghazi.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Unlike the Navy and Army airforces the Army Ground forces did not have a organized program for bringing experinced leaders. staff, and shooters back to the US to lead and train new air units. A handfull of gnerals and a few more field grade officers did find their way back to the US and in command of a french unit. Far to few to make a difference outside their specific formation. MaNair & Co in charge of Army Ground Forces thought reports from the front and a trickle of veterans returning to the training commands in 1943 would suffice.

Callous as it may sound, the most important learning was not necessarily for the troops (who will mosly do the dying), but for the officers and commanding staff. E.g., reading the excellent I Remeber site, I got the particular impression that not ability to shoot at oncoming germans lacked in the RKKA ranks, but being placed in the position to do so and given the appropriate support by the superiors.

"... but for the officers and commanding staff. E.g., reading the excellent I Remeber site, I got the particular impression that not ability to shoot at oncoming germans lacked in the RKKA ranks, but being placed in the position to do so and given the appropriate support by the superiors."

Indeed. That sort of experince counts for much. Yet it can mislead one as well. Note that the completely untested US 36th & 45th Infantry Divisions survived fairly well at Salerno & Gela. Unlike with the US 1st Armored in Tunisia they had steady leadership veteran or not from the corps & army level as well as within the division. Both took the best the Germans had to offer and won their first battle. Conversely the German armored forces that opposed them saw their experience fail them in the face of fire support they had never seen before. The best their combat experience could tell them was they were beaten & to cut the losses.

Leaving aside the nuances of combat preperation; The original Brimstone 7 Husky operation plans revolved around the use of the two British/Commonwealth armys present in the Mediterranian, and not the two US Army corps at hand. Any Allied operations kicking off in March or May would have used the US corps in a supporting role. For better or worse Monty's veteran 8th Army and the corps from Anderson's would have been the point and foreblade, whatever Patton might have thought of it. In that context a discussion of the British ability & especially the units of the 8th Army might be more usefull.

[BDV]

But with Rommel and Italians supplied/supported better during ElAlamein and follow-up, the state of the 8th British army would be somewhat worse. So even if North Africa is cleared somewhat sooner - say by end of March, the ATL Husky likely happens in June at the earliest, and against more experienced and less demoralized italian troops.

Also if better airsupply and more armor improves the Axis Ostfront situation to the point say Little Saturn cannot be launched/is defeated, would also improve the Italian morale and troop situation without the loss of majority of 8th Italian army's veterans.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Carl,

You write "Improvements in US Army methods occured first in the combat experienced units....."

I would suggest that this emphasises the value of first operational experience being gathered in North Africa, where there was plenty of depth for the Anglo-Americans to fall back on to recover from early miscarriages. There could be no second chance if things went wrong on a Sicilian beach.

Take away all the combat experience gained in North Africa between January 1941 and May 1943, and the Western Allies would have been left with only about three and a half divisions that had gained combat experience against the main foe in that time - all of it disasterous - one Canadian at Dieppe and one Australian, one New Zealand and a British armoured brigade in Greece. In division/months this amounted to the equivalent of one division for two months!

The North African theatre provided a vital proving ground for the Anglo-American armies before they were committed to Europe.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hi Carl,

You write "Improvements in US Army methods occured first in the combat experienced units....."

I would suggest that this emphasises the value of first operational experience being gathered in North Africa, where there was plenty of depth for the Anglo-Americans to fall back on to recover from early miscarriages. There could be no second chance if things went wrong on a Sicilian beach.

Take away all the combat experience gained in North Africa between January 1941 and May 1943, and the Western Allies would have been left with only about three and a half divisions that had gained combat experience against the main foe in that time - all of it disasterous - one Canadian at Dieppe and one Australian, one New Zealand and a British armoured brigade in Greece. In division/months this amounted to the equivalent of one division for two months!

The North African theatre provided a vital proving ground for the Anglo-American armies before they were committed to Europe.

That paragrapgh leaves me wholly confused about what you are refering to. The ideas here have proposed the Axis evacuating Africa in very late 1942 or very early 1943. In that case why would there only be "three and a half divisions" with combat experience? The Brit 8th Army had accumulated two years of combat experience to the proposed PoDs in this thread. If you are proposing a entierly different PoD then that escaped me entirely.

You also seem to be hanging on to the idea the combat experience of the handfull of US Army units in Africa were tranfered to the rest of the US Army. I've found very little evidence of it. The examples of my earlier post are major ways in which the non veteran units did not benefit from the experience of the veteran units.

....The North African theatre provided a vital proving ground for the Anglo-American armies before they were committed to Europe.

In the case of the US Army this simply was not true. I gave several examples of where the wrong conclusions were drawn from reports and observation. And, there is the problem of no systematic transfer of the veteran leaders into green units. The USAAF & USN did return in a organized manner veterans to the US to train fresh units and command them. The US Army Ground Forces did not.

If you study the Normandy battle or the Op. Overlord campaign across France you will see the green US Army units benefitted little from the experience accululated in Africa or in Italy. That experince largely remained there and the mistakes the 29th, 90th, 4th Divisions made, as well as fresh corps commanders & staffs showed a uncomfortablly close resemblance to those made in the early days of the Tunisian campaign.

Hi Carl,

You write "Improvements in US Army methods occured first in the combat experienced units....."

I would suggest that this emphasises the value of first operational experience being gathered in North Africa, where there was plenty of depth for the Anglo-Americans to fall back on to recover from early miscarriages. There could be no second chance if things went wrong on a Sicilian beach.

Things did go very wrong on a Siclian beach, and the 45th Division handled it. That unit arrived in Africa just a few days before the assualt, and spent its entire three days ashore repacking its equipment from the trans Altantic cargo ships to the amphibious fleet. It had zero time to asorb any lessons from the veteran units let alone talk to the already embarked veterans. Still the 45th Infantry Div managed to get ashore in the face of a Axis counter attack and hold it's beachhead.

The one significant lesson of the tunisian campaign that was taken to heart concerned the senior Allied leaders. Neither Fredendall nor Anderson remained in a combat command.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Carl,

I was just looking at "Draftee Division" about the US 88th Infantry Division. Apparently men experienced in combat from the North African campaign were sent to assess it and give advice on combat techniques even before it left the USA. It seems likely that this was the rule, rather than the exception.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Sid... I was aware of that program. Overall it and the printed training material produced by the combat in Africa seems to have had far less effect than hoped. Better than no program, but I cant see the US Army that landed in France in 1944 being 'veteran' due to its African or Italian experience. Having combat veterans give some lectures or assist in training exercises does not seem to have been as effective as the transfer of combat experienced leaders to 'green' units. A close look at the differences in performance between the US 1st & 29th Infantry Div. on the 6th, 7th, & 8th June shows where the previous training suceeded or failed in comparison to a few weeks of actual combat experience. Extending that inspection several weeks into the campaign also shows how fast the combat experince accumulated. For a US Army division in 1944 the difference between veteran and green was a matter of just a few weeks.

Overall the units throughness of training, and the skill of its leaders seem to be the difference in its performance in its first few days/weeks of combat

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Carl,

I don't think anybody is contending that the North African Campaign turned most of the Anglo-American armies into "veteran" formations.

My point is that without the North African campaign all the US Army would have been "raw" when it first landed on continental Europe and the British might have been even worse off, given that, although their army had had a brief experience of continental warfare in France and Greece in 1940-41, this experience was one of defeat. Neither would have had a significant accumulation of combat experience, let alone positive combat experience.

Given what happened to both British and US forces when they first met German armoured counter-attacks in North Africa, one can only be thankful that they didn't suffer similar debacles on a beach in continental Europe. At least they had strategic depth to fall back on in North Africa. A beachead wouldn't have afforded this luxury.

Cheers,

Sid

[Von Bock]

This topic continues to interest me. It is also addressed in several other threads.

viewtopic.php?t=164367&start=30

viewtopic.php?f=56&t=237275&start=225

I would like to give a brief overview of all the pros and cons for the Axis:

Pros:

1. It seems likely that Sicily would be attacked sooner than in the OTL.
2. Torch did not open the Mediterranean to traffic or save shipping—instead, the need to support the Tunisian front cost the Allies shipping.
3. The 100000+ captured Italians were certainly not 'useless' but it is also not a strange thought to assume that some of these troops would probably have surrendered in Sicily after all. In that sense, the numbers are somewhat misleading. In the OTL there were more than 200000 Italians in Sicily and a lot of them were immediately surrendering. (although these divisions were of lesser quality)
4. It is not therefore unlikely that the losses of Tunisgrad would have moved to Sicily. In the OTL the Axis pulled off a quite succesful evacation of around 100000 troops from Sicily (operation Lehrgang) but to evacuate three times as much troops would probably have been impossible. So: Less losses in Africa means probably more losses in Sicily.
5. Sicily was poorly defended (very little coastal defences) and even 200000 extra troops in December 1942 could not have changed that.

Cons:

1. The number of troops lost would have been certainly lower with an early withdrawal/partial evacuation in November 1942. It remains a bit unclear how many Axis troops were in Africa in November 1942, but certainly not 350000. About half the Axis troops at Alamein had been killed or captured in the battle and the long retreat to Tunisia. Over 80 percent of the Axis soldiers in Tunisia had been shipped in after the Alamein battle and they were lost almost to a man, mostly captured.
2. Evacuation from Tripoli would have cost the Germans dearly but we have seen other examples (the evacuation of the Crimea in 1944, operation Hannibal in the Baltics) of quite succesful Axis evacuations. To me, it seems likely that an early evacuation in November/December from Tripoli would have saved at least a part of the Afrika Korps.
3. The loss of aircraft has been barely mentioned but was way too high for the Axis. They lost more than 2000 aircraft compared to just 900 for the Allies. Definitely not worth it.
4. All these troops and aircraft would have made the fight for Sicily a lot harder for the Allies.

I would like to conclude that the best scenario for the Axis would have been: Send some reinforcements to Tunisia and make a good evacuation plan. Try to delay the Allies but not at the cost of 300000 troops.

[Peter89]

This topic continues to interest me. It is also addressed in several other threads.

viewtopic.php?t=164367&start=30

viewtopic.php?f=56&t=237275&start=225

I would like to give a brief overview of all the pros and cons for the Axis:

Pros:

1. It seems likely that Sicily would be attacked sooner than in the OTL.
2. Torch did not open the Mediterranean to traffic or save shipping—instead, the need to support the Tunisian front cost the Allies shipping.
3. The 100000+ captured Italians were certainly not 'useless' but it is also not a strange thought to assume that some of these troops would probably have surrendered in Sicily after all. In that sense, the numbers are somewhat misleading. In the OTL there were more than 200000 Italians in Sicily and a lot of them were immediately surrendering. (although these divisions were of lesser quality)
4. It is not therefore unlikely that the losses of Tunisgrad would have moved to Sicily. In the OTL the Axis pulled off a quite succesful evacation of around 100000 troops from Sicily (operation Lehrgang) but to evacuate three times as much troops would probably have been impossible. So: Less losses in Africa means probably more losses in Sicily.
5. Sicily was poorly defended (very little coastal defences) and even 200000 extra troops in December 1942 could not have changed that.

Cons:

1. The number of troops lost would have been certainly lower with an early withdrawal/partial evacuation in November 1942. It remains a bit unclear how many Axis troops were in Africa in November 1942, but certainly not 350000. About half the Axis troops at Alamein had been killed or captured in the battle and the long retreat to Tunisia. Over 80 percent of the Axis soldiers in Tunisia had been shipped in after the Alamein battle and they were lost almost to a man, mostly captured.
2. Evacuation from Tripoli would have cost the Germans dearly but we have seen other examples (the evacuation of the Crimea in 1944, operation Hannibal in the Baltics) of quite succesful Axis evacuations. To me, it seems likely that an early evacuation in November/December from Tripoli would have saved at least a part of the Afrika Korps.
3. The loss of aircraft has been barely mentioned but was way too high for the Axis. They lost more than 2000 aircraft compared to just 900 for the Allies. Definitely not worth it.
4. All these troops and aircraft would have made the fight for Sicily a lot harder for the Allies.

I would like to conclude that the best scenario for the Axis would have been: Send some reinforcements to Tunisia and make a good evacuation plan. Try to delay the Allies but not at the cost of 300000 troops.

The fundamental problem was that the Germans fought on the wrong side of the sea. Then they waited for El-Alamein after Barbarossa clearly derailed. They should have evacuated Africa well before the last moment, in the spring of 1942 the latest. Everything comes from that bad decision. The Germans sent quite a lot reinforcements into Africa, a lot of which was lost en route anyway, so it's not just sheer numbers of losses, but also attrition.

Besides this good evacuation of Africa is not really corresponding actual history. Neither Hitler nor Mussolini would allow it.

[Von Bock]

This topic continues to interest me. It is also addressed in several other threads.

viewtopic.php?t=164367&start=30

viewtopic.php?f=56&t=237275&start=225

I would like to give a brief overview of all the pros and cons for the Axis:

Pros:

1. It seems likely that Sicily would be attacked sooner than in the OTL.
2. Torch did not open the Mediterranean to traffic or save shipping—instead, the need to support the Tunisian front cost the Allies shipping.
3. The 100000+ captured Italians were certainly not 'useless' but it is also not a strange thought to assume that some of these troops would probably have surrendered in Sicily after all. In that sense, the numbers are somewhat misleading. In the OTL there were more than 200000 Italians in Sicily and a lot of them were immediately surrendering. (although these divisions were of lesser quality)
4. It is not therefore unlikely that the losses of Tunisgrad would have moved to Sicily. In the OTL the Axis pulled off a quite succesful evacation of around 100000 troops from Sicily (operation Lehrgang) but to evacuate three times as much troops would probably have been impossible. So: Less losses in Africa means probably more losses in Sicily.
5. Sicily was poorly defended (very little coastal defences) and even 200000 extra troops in December 1942 could not have changed that.

Cons:

1. The number of troops lost would have been certainly lower with an early withdrawal/partial evacuation in November 1942. It remains a bit unclear how many Axis troops were in Africa in November 1942, but certainly not 350000. About half the Axis troops at Alamein had been killed or captured in the battle and the long retreat to Tunisia. Over 80 percent of the Axis soldiers in Tunisia had been shipped in after the Alamein battle and they were lost almost to a man, mostly captured.
2. Evacuation from Tripoli would have cost the Germans dearly but we have seen other examples (the evacuation of the Crimea in 1944, operation Hannibal in the Baltics) of quite succesful Axis evacuations. To me, it seems likely that an early evacuation in November/December from Tripoli would have saved at least a part of the Afrika Korps.
3. The loss of aircraft has been barely mentioned but was way too high for the Axis. They lost more than 2000 aircraft compared to just 900 for the Allies. Definitely not worth it.
4. All these troops and aircraft would have made the fight for Sicily a lot harder for the Allies.

I would like to conclude that the best scenario for the Axis would have been: Send some reinforcements to Tunisia and make a good evacuation plan. Try to delay the Allies but not at the cost of 300000 troops.

The fundamental problem was that the Germans fought on the wrong side of the sea. Then they waited for El-Alamein after Barbarossa clearly derailed. They should have evacuated Africa well before the last moment, in the spring of 1942 the latest. Everything comes from that bad decision. The Germans sent quite a lot reinforcements into Africa, a lot of which was lost en route anyway, so it's not just sheer numbers of losses, but also attrition.

Besides this good evacuation of Africa is not really corresponding actual history. Neither Hitler nor Mussolini would allow it.

Well, Hitler certainly allowed troops to evacuate on the Eastern Front regularly (Kuban bridgehead, for example) so it wouldn't be unique. The biggest problem might have been the victory at Ghazala and Tobruk in 1942. Even the Allies would have never evacuated their troops after such a victory and I don't think many of us would. So the OTL (with the pursuit to El Alamein) makes kind of sense, although it was the worst possible decision in hindsight.

[Peter89]

Well, Hitler certainly allowed troops to evacuate on the Eastern Front regularly (Kuban bridgehead, for example) so it wouldn't be unique. The biggest problem might have been the victory at Ghazala and Tobruk in 1942. Even the Allies would have never evacuated their troops after such a victory and I don't think many of us would. So the OTL (with the pursuit to El Alamein) makes kind of sense, although it was the worst possible decision in hindsight.

Hitler never really allowed to evacuate because of rational reasons, he was always forced to do it; usually left it either to the last second or even later. To give up the Axis presence in Africa would be impossible for him.

The Allied evacuation after Gazala-Tobruk was impossible, because where woud they "evacuate"? They controlled almost all of Africa and the whole Middle East already. The Suez base provided some 5000 t/d supplies while the Axis had about 2000 t/d supplies. The Allies were winning the war.

[Gooner1]

An evacuation of Tunisia means an earlier invasion of Sicily, which entails an earlier invasion of Italy and downfall of Mussolini.

Assuming a tougher fight in Sicily but an earlier invasion of the mainland, say July, does Germany have the forces available to execute Operation Achse?

As it was most of the German divisions involved in the defence of Italy AIUI were 'Stalingrad' divisions and other divisions refitting after service on the Eastern Front.
Even if Operation Achse was executed as effectively, the Allies have probably an extra two months of good weather campaigning in Italy whilst being able to retain many of the divisions and landing craft needed for NWE longer also.

Doubtful the Allies could be held south of Rome for the winter IMO.