1943: The Allied victory that never was.

[Richard Anderson]

LCT-4's were used at Dieppe, as well as LCA's and LCM's. None were optimal, but their defects were not the reason why the raid failed,

Sorry glenn, but no LCT-IV were used at Dieppe. They were all LCT-II and LCF. There were only 6 LCT-IV in service by 6 October, and 2 LCT-5. The LCT-II was suitable at Dieppe because all the beaches were steep, most of them around 1:35, which was perfect for them.

[Richard Anderson]

I've seen a lot of idiotic posts over the last 20-odd years at AHF but the wrongheadedness of some posters in this thread wins hands down. Anyone who thinks anyone ever argued that the LCT-IV and LCT-5 designs - along with the LCT-6 for that matter - were unsuitable for the Normandy beaches is either a troll or is congenitally incapable of following an argument, or both.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I've seen a lot of idiotic posts over the last 20-odd years at AHF but the wrongheadedness of som...

Easy there Rich. Take a deep breath, exhale, now another. Calm, Center

[Richard Anderson]

I've seen a lot of idiotic posts over the last 20-odd years at AHF but the wrongheadedness of som...

Easy there Rich. Take a deep breath, exhale, now another. Calm, Center

Yeah, I know, but some things take the cake.

[Kurt_S]

Oh the anger here... Some people cannot forgive another for being right...

Anderson is, I am sure, working up that explanation of why it was good military/strategic practice for the Allies not even to have a contingency plan for a 1942 landing until March 1942.

[David Thompson]

Kurt S -- You wrote:

There's a lot of nonsense in this thread but, given the tone of moderators here, I'm not inclined to devote a ton more effort...

You may act as you please, as long as you comply with our rules.

[Kurt_S]

Kurt S -- You wrote:

There's a lot of nonsense in this thread but, given the tone of moderators here, I'm not inclined to devote a ton more effort...

You may act as you please, as long as you comply with our rules.

Thank you

[ljadw]

There was no danger of a big German offensive after the front was stabilized,thus these divisions were not needed .Besides, if there was such German offensive, these three divisions would not make a difference .
Allied forces were strong enough to hold the frontline against a German offensive, but not strong enough to launch a big offensive that would end the war . Such offensive could happen only in 1945 .

[Onslow]

Oh the anger here... Some people cannot forgive another for being right...

Anderson is, I am sure, working up that explanation of why it was good military/strategic practice for the Allies not even to have a contingency plan for a 1942 landing until March 1942.

Since you have been totally wrong and transparently dishonest, you're certainly not right. The fact that you have been shown to be so completely wrong on your false claims about the LCT(4) shows that you're not even clever at trolling.

Now, you have said you will follow the rules. So why don't you follow the rules and do as the rules say and show us in detail how the UK could have practically built enough LCTs for their part of Sledgehammer without major and unfavourable impacts on their war effort.

[Onslow]

I've seen a lot of idiotic posts over the last 20-odd years at AHF but the wrongheadedness of some posters in this thread wins hands down. Anyone who thinks anyone ever argued that the LCT-IV and LCT-5 designs - along with the LCT-6 for that matter - were unsuitable for the Normandy beaches is either a troll or is congenitally incapable of following an argument, or both.

Particularly since at least three of us were saying, in detail and specifically, that the LCT(4) WAS suitable for the Channel beaches. In contrast, Kurt had been saying that the invasion should go ahead with men and machines being offloaded into water over their head from LCT(2) and (3)s. Either he doesn't understand the basic mathematics that men and machines getting off a craft drawing 7ft on a flat beach will go over their head, or he fantasisis about seeing the Allies drown because an Allied defeat suits his political orientation. Given the way he has abused historical figures, forum members and historians one assumes that it's the latter.

[Kingfish]

There was no danger of a big German offensive after the front was stabilized,thus these divisions were not needed .

Was this conclusion derived from the same intelligence sources that failed to detect Wacht am Rhein?

Besides, if there was such German offensive, these three divisions would not make a difference .

Right, the US 2nd ID made no difference to the defense of the twin villages and Elsenborn ridge.

The Germans casually strolled into St. Vith and Wiltz because the US 29th ID made no difference there either.

During this time the US 8th ID held the line near Bergstein, which according to you made no difference to the rapid redeployment of reserve formations being sent into the fighting further south.

Allied forces were strong enough to hold the frontline against a German offensive,

Which explains why on Dec 16th the frontline was along the Our river, and a week later was near Celles.

[Asher S.]

There was no danger of a big German offensive after the front was stabilized,thus these divisions were not needed .

Was this conclusion derived from the same intelligence sources that failed to detect Wacht am Rhein?

Besides, if there was such German offensive, these three divisions would not make a difference .

Right, the US 2nd ID made no difference to the defense of the twin villages and Elsenborn ridge.

The Germans casually strolled into St. Vith and Wiltz because the US 29th ID made no difference there either.

During this time the US 8th ID held the line near Bergstein, which according to you made no difference to the rapid redeployment of reserve formations being sent into the fighting further south.

Allied forces were strong enough to hold the frontline against a German offensive,

Which explains why on Dec 16th the frontline was along the Our river, and a week later was near Celles.

Right on the money Kingfish.

Although for technicality purposes, it was the 28th ID deployed in front of Wiltz and Clerf along the Our and not the 29th, which wasn’t directly involved in the Bulge and played a role more like the 8th ID.

[ljadw]

There was no danger of a big German offensive after the front was stabilized,thus these divisions were not needed .

Was this conclusion derived from the same intelligence sources that failed to detect Wacht am Rhein?

Besides, if there was such German offensive, these three divisions would not make a difference .

Right, the US 2nd ID made no difference to the defense of the twin villages and Elsenborn ridge.

The Germans casually strolled into St. Vith and Wiltz because the US 29th ID made no difference there either.

During this time the US 8th ID held the line near Bergstein, which according to you made no difference to the rapid redeployment of reserve formations being sent into the fighting further south.

Allied forces were strong enough to hold the frontline against a German offensive,

Which explains why on Dec 16th the frontline was along the Our river, and a week later was near Celles.

The Ardennes offensive started only in the second half of December and failed on day one .
And its possible ,but unlikely success did not depend on the presence /absence on 16 December of the divisions committed to the liberation of Lorient and Saint Nazaire .
The best use for these divisions was to liberate Lorient and Saint Nazaire, which would make the allied supply situation better,and then to remain in the Paris region, which also would make the supply situation better,as it was easier to supply a division that was in Paris than a division remaining idle in the Ardennes or in the Alsace .
The allied forces were strong enough til the Ardennes offensive to hold the front against a German offensive and the farther the Germans were going,the weaker they became .The aim of the offensive was Antwerp ,in the wrong assumption that the fall of Antwerp would result in the collaps of the allied frontline from the Northsea to the Mediterranean .The truth is that Antwerp was never in danger .
Celles is a few km away from Dinant and 125 km away from Antwerp and no one is going to Antwerp via Dinant .The only way to go to Antwerp was to advance east and west of Liege and this advance failed already the first day of the offensive .
The allied error was to have too many divisions on the front in December 1944 where their presence was not needed : the transfer of Patton's units to the Ardennes did not cause a successful German attack on his previous frontline, proving that the presence of these forces who were waging a war of attrition in the Alsace,was unneeded and a wast of resources .
It is better to have your reserves concentrated than to disperse them over a distance of 1500 km .
As there was no possibility for the Allies to be in Berlin in 1944 , the only sound policy was to have as less as forces possible at the frontline .

[ljadw]

There was no danger of a big German offensive after the front was stabilized,thus these divisions were not needed .

Was this conclusion derived from the same intelligence sources that failed to detect Wacht am Rhein?

Besides, if there was such German offensive, these three divisions would not make a difference .

Right, the US 2nd ID made no difference to the defense of the twin villages and Elsenborn ridge.

The Germans casually strolled into St. Vith and Wiltz because the US 29th ID made no difference there either.

During this time the US 8th ID held the line near Bergstein, which according to you made no difference to the rapid redeployment of reserve formations being sent into the fighting further south.

Allied forces were strong enough to hold the frontline against a German offensive,

Which explains why on Dec 16th the frontline was along the Our river, and a week later was near Celles.

Right on the money Kingfish.

Although for technicality purposes, it was the 28th ID deployed in front of Wiltz and Clerf along the Our and not the 29th, which wasn’t directly involved in the Bulge and played a role more like the 8th ID.

If the 28th ID was not deployed at Wiltz and Clerf, an other division would have stopped the Germans ,and if not, The Germans still could not capture Antwerp ,their forces were too weak .

[MikeMeech]

Hi
According to the 'Battle Summary No. 39, Operation "Neptune" Landings in Normandy June, 1944', the appendices of which list the vessels that took part, LCT 3, 4 and 5 were used, LCT (4) being the most common. For example "K" LCT Squadron had four Flotillas the 4th LCT Flot. had 12 LCT (3), the 102 LCT Flot. had 12 LCT (5) the other two had 12 LCT (4) each, these landed a JUNO. Also on this beach was "N" LCT Squadron with 11th LCT Flot. with 12 LCT (3) and 106th LCT Flot. with 12 LCT (5) the other two with LCT (4). An example for GOLD is "L" LCT Squadron with 12th LCT Flot. with 12 LCT (3) with the other three with 12 LCT (4) each. Obviously the LCT (3)s used at Normandy could land on French beaches.

Mike