Suquence of events leading to Pearl Harbor.

Discussions on WW2 in the Pacific and the Sino-Japanese War.
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Japanese Army Warns Economic Freeze May Force Conflict

Post by Globalization41 » 10 Apr 2004 19:13

Tokyo, Wireless to The New York Times, By
Otto, D. Tolischus, Tuesday, September 2,
[Monday, U.S. time] Declaring that an
American, British, Chinese, and Netherland
encirclement movement was strangling Japan
and that Japan must break it
without delay, by diplomacy if possible,
Colonel Hayto Mabuchi, chief of the Japanese
Army press section of Imperial Headquarters
urged the Japanese people to prepare to defend
their country if necessary. ... His speech,
which was broadcast over a national radio
hookup [and] coming in the midst of the
Washington negotiations initiated by Premier
Prince Fumimaro Konoye's
message to
President Roosevelt, [was part of a memorial
for 100,000 who died in the 1923 Tokyo
He said America [and] Britain
froze Japanese assets, deprived Japan of raw
materials, [and forced] the Netherland Indies
and Thailand to do likewise. [Mabuchi]
declared: "If the sources of materials in
foreign countries are closed to us the
day will come when we will be at the end
of our domestic resources.
" [The militarists
failed to realize that they could have invaded
the Dutch Indies and gained an oil supply
without provoking war with America simply by
avoiding a direct confrontation with U.S. forces
and ignoring Roosevelt's provocations since
Congress did not want to declare war. The
British would have declared war, but they
would have been easy pickings while the U.S.
arms supplies to Britain would have been
acceptable compared to the alternative of a
fully mobilized and motivated America. ... ...
Similar tactics, that is not inciting America, if
utilized in the 1990s, would serve Muslim
fundamentalists in their religious struggle with
the Israelis. On the other hand, a sound
strategy for supporters of the Israeli viewpoint,
especially when survival is at stake, would be
to trick Muslims into inciting Americans,
thereby increasing U.S. support for the
... Therefore, Colonel Mabuchi
continued: "If Japan cannot reach a peaceful
settlement through diplomatic negotiations,
Japan must break through the encirclement by
This means engaging America and
Britain in a long, drawn-out conflict. It would
be the height of folly to look on with folded
arms while the forces bent on defeating this
country are at work. The situation will compel
us to stake all to save ourselves as a nation.
... [There was also a report of an American
tanker in transit to Eastern Russia carrying
aviation fuel (barred from Japan) and which
was expected soon to enter the Sea of Japan.
Meanwhile, the Japanese stock market index
moved up when it was rumored that the U.S.
might ship supplies to Russia via Iran.]

[Compiled 1998. ... Stay tuned for late
breaking war bulletins.
... Globalization41.]
Last edited by Globalization41 on 02 Aug 2004 04:13, edited 1 time in total.

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Japanese May Soon Occupy French Southern Indo-China

Post by Globalization41 » 11 Apr 2004 03:58

Saigon, French Indo-China, Associated Press,
The New York Times,
Friday, July 25, 1941:
Japan will swiftly pour thousands of troops
with war equipment into newly won military,
navy, and air bases in Southern French Indo-
starting this weekend, usually reliable
sources reported tonight. Major Gen. Raishiro
chief of the Japanese military mission
to Indo-China, was expected to arrive here
tomorrow from Hanoi to direct the operation.
... Japan has won the right [meaning an
agreement with the French]
to post troops at
several coastal points in Southern Indo-China,
as well as to station warships in Cam Ranh Bay
and at Saigon and to establish several air bases
in the southern part of the colony, it was
reported authoritatively. ... Informed sources
said "several thousand" Japanese troops would
be stationed at Saigon and along the Southeast
Indo-China coast and within Cambodia, which
is on the Gulf of Siam along Indo-China's
border with Thailand. ... All of these positions
into which Japan is moving bring her closer to
Singapore, Britain's great Eastern naval base;
British Malaya; and the Netherlands Indies.
The newspaper Volonte Indo-Chinoise at
Hanoi, the colonial capital, hinted in an
editorial, presumably government inspired, that
Japanese occupation of the new bases would be
a step for further moves south. ... "Indo-
China," the paper said, "is on the way to
Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies.
The Formosa and Hainan bases being too
distant for her South Seas policy,
required these facilities in Southern Indo-
China." ... Members of the French military
staff here [in Saigon] departed for Tonking in
the north. Ship traffic from Haiphong, Indo-
China's chief northern port, was resumed after
cessation for several days. ... ... Vichy,
France, United Press, The New York Times,

Friday, July 25, 1941: The newspaper Cri du
reported from Saigon today that
Japanese warships, "double the number of
British warships [Britain's strategy sometimes
called for campaigning in French colonies after
France's capitulation to Germany]
in Asiatic
waters," had already arrived in Indo-Chinese
waters. ... "Military measures have been taken
and now everything is ready to reply if there is
an attack," the Saigon dispatch to the Cri du
said. [Defeat of the corrupt and poorly
trained French colonial forces
would have been
a training exercise to the Japanese Army,
which was well-led, highly motivated, at peak
efficiency, brutal, and indoctrinated with
(standard in 1941).]
... ... Shanghai,
Associated Press, The New York Times,
July 25, 1941:
Foreign advices from Saigon
said today it was reported there the Japanese
would land between 40,000 and 50,000 troops
in French Indo-China about July 30.

[On July 14, U.S. intelligence intercepted
Japanese radio transmissions revealing plans to
occupy Indo-China, peacefully if possible, by
force if necessary, as a stepping-stone to the oil
of the Netherlands Indies. "Seizing" Singapore
would also be required, but an attack on the
Philippines was not mentioned.
... On July 21,
France reluctantly agreed to allow Japanese
bases in Southern Indo-China. The Japanese
convoy of occupation forces en route to Indo-
China purposely did not sail in secrecy. By
broadcasting their military position during
the movement, the Japanese hoped to deceive
U.S. and British intelligence into believing that
Japanese deployments, which always seemed to
be moving south
(thousands of miles from
Hawaii), could be easily monitored.
Meanwhile, Japanese air bases in Indo-China
would eliminate the need for aircraft carriers in
the eventual assault on the Netherlands Indies,
making a proposal for a simultaneous knockout
blow against the U.S. Navy in Pearl Harbor,

now under consideration, seem more attractive.
The proposal called for an aircraft-carrier task
force to sail for Hawaii in radio silence.]

[Stay tuned for late breaking war bulletins.
... Globalization41.]
Last edited by Globalization41 on 02 Aug 2004 02:54, edited 1 time in total.

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Post by john2 » 12 Apr 2004 16:37

Reply to Globilization41 and Christopher Perrien. Earlier I mentioned the Japanese asking for a new pact from Germany around the time of Pearl Harbor. From what I've read it seems the sequence of events went like this:

On November 25 the Japanese fleet set sail for Hawaii. When they left a deadline for talks with the US was set for November 29.

On November 29 emperor Hirohito agreed in principle to end the negotiations but wanted a final meeting.

On December 1 Hirohito held a mlitary conference where, for the final time, he approved the attack on Pearl Harbor and the strike south. That same day a message was sent to the Japanese task force saying to "Climb Mount Nitaka". This was the code word that a final go ahead had been given to attack in Hawaii.

On December 3 the Japanese strike force rendezvoued with a group of tankers where they refueled and went on the final leg of their voyage to Pearl Harbor.

On December 6 Roosevelt is given a partly translated 14 part message that was intercepted while it was being sent from the Japanese government to it's embassy in the US. It makes it clear that negotiations are about to be broken off. Roosevelt even says: "This means war." But decides that since war is apparently inevitable to simply wait for the Japanese to attack. He said that "The problem is to maneuver them into firing the first shot without to much danger to ourselves."

Most people know about the above events but almost nothing is mentioned about events taking place across at the time in Europe. In his diary entry for December 3 Ciano makes a stunning entry. He says that on that day the Japanese "made a sensational move". He goes on to say that a Japanese ambassador requested an audience with Mussolini. After his request was granted Ciano went on to relate that the ambassador read aloud to Mussolini a statement saying that negotiations bwtween Japan and the US had reached a dead end. He then concluded by saying the war between them was imminent and that consequently as part of the tripartite pact he wanted Italy to declare war on the US soon as hostilities broke out. Mussolini then made the comment that his prediction that a world war would come was now coming true. Furthermore he said that Roosevelt was letting Japan attack him so that Germany and Italy would declare war. Mussolini then agreed in principle to what the Japanese requested but wanted to consult Berlin first.

Apparently at the same time the Japanese contacted Ribbentrop and having made the same declaration as they did with Italy, asked for assistance from Germany. They also asked for new agreement tahe would bind them more closely together. Ribbentrop agreed the next day and also promised that Germany would declare war on the US immediately after hostlities began. Finally after Pearl Harbor on December 10 a new pact that called for a full fledged military alliance was signed in Berlin. The next day Hitler declared war on the US.

The above though often not mentioned sheds new light on the events surrounding Hitler's declaration of war. From it we can conclude that:

1. That days before Pearl Harbor was attacked bot the US and Germany and Italy all knew that an attack was coming and that it would almost certainly compel the US into war with Japan. Where, when and how this attack would take place however was still not known.
2. The governments of all 3 nations had made up their minds as to they would react. The US intended to simply wait for the attack. Germany and Italy had decided they would declare war on the US if and when Japan attacked.

So it seems that Hitler made up his mind BEFORE Pearl Harbor what he would do. It wasn't an instant decision but a calculated one that was taken in advance. Hitler it seems was convinced that the USwas bound to enter the war so he encouraged Japan to make expansionist moves in the Pacific to distract the US. The question is why did he not leave Japan in the lurch so the US would remain distracted. Why did he actually fulfill his promise and declare war? There are only two possible explanations. The first is that he wanted Japan to declare war on Russia. The second was that he believed the US could only be defeated in a two front war. The actual explanation might be a combination of the above. Hitler it seems had two different policies that he was following with the US. At the beginning it is clear that he wanted to avoid a war with the US. In the fall of 1940 Hitler began seeking stronger ties with Japan. The situation had changed dramatically by then. Germany's victories in Europe had given the Germans the belief they were invincible. Japan suddenly felt that very advantageous situation had come. With the European powers weakened and apparently on the verge of defeat their colonies were exposed to attack by Japan. The Japanese wanted to reach an agreement with Germany for fear Germany herself would take them. The US however remained a thorn in both Germany and Japan's side. Japan began to worry the US navy would interfere if Japan tried to take the territory she wanted in the Pacific. Germany did not like increasing US influence in the war in Europe. The US was seen to be supplying Britain, giving her hope and in general encouraging resistance to Hitler's new order throughout Europe, particularly in France. This lead to the tripartite agreement which was primarily a defensive alliance against the US. In April we have the first signs of a possible change in US policy. Hitler talked with the Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka where he urged Japan to attack Signapore and said if this brought the US into war he would immediately support Japan. What caused Hitler to say this? Was he really going to support Japan or was he lying to get them to attack Signapore? We know now it was the former. This comment may have been related to new developments in the situation since the signing of the tripartite pact. First Hitler had decided to attack Russia, which he beleived he could beat by the winter of '41. Second the US had passed a lend/lease bill on March 12. This new law allowed US ships to carry supplies to Britain and Britain need not pay for them immediately. Hitler is seems thought this step would strengthen the possiblity of US intervention. What Hitler thought about the US has been speculative. It seems Hitler understood the United States industrial potential but did not think it would of any value until 1943-44. Furthermore he saw the US divided into roughly 3 major groups. The first group, the inteventionists wanted the US to enter the war to save Britain. Hitler often claimed it was "Jewish" influence behind the frist group. Although this group was relativly small it contained Roosevelt who was prepared to use any dirty trick he could if he felt it would serve his purpose. The second group which I will call the moderate isolationists comprised the majority of Americans. These people wished for Hitler's defeat but did not want to go to war. They were willing to aid Germany's enemies and encourage resistance to Hitler but at the same time hoped that war could somehow be avoided. The third, the extreme isolationistswas a medium sized group. Many influential made up this group. They sought complete neutrality in the war. Some actually supported Hitler while others were simply apathetic to who won the war. The common viewpoint they shared was that under no circumstances except an attack on the US should they enter the war. Hitler secretly supported this group. So how did this affect Hitler's policy towards the US?Hitler it seems wanted the US to remain neutral but at the same time felt that if the prospect of forcing the US into front war opened up then he should take it. The reason being is that he feared if he left Japan in the lurch then Japan's resolve against the US would not be as strong leaving the danger open that Japan and the US could reach an agreement leaving the US free to move against Germany. A declaration of war on the other hand would encourage the Japanese to press on with the fight. In addition the added German pressure would help the Japanese to win as the US would be divided in a two front war. Finally entering such a war at Japan's side would help ensure that no peace agreement unacceptable to Germany would be reached. Early on then it seems Hitler had made up his mind to help Japan against the US. If such a war were to occur thought Hitler it was important that Japan start it. The reason being that while he would not leave Japan in the lurch he could not say the same about Japan. The Japanese he knew were often hesitant and might very well leave Germany to fend for itself if the US managed to join the European conflict on it's own accord. It was for these reasons why Hitler in spite of increasing provocations by the US maintained a cautious stance. He was willing to fight the US only in a two front war with Japan. So while Hitler maintained his cautious attitude officially he secretly encouraged the Japanese to press on with plans to attack Signapore and other British bases in the far east. After Germany's attack on Russia hostlity and fear towards Germany grew. The extreme isolationists whom Hitler had beeen supporting were running more and more into trouble as greater numbers of people were listening to Roosevelt. In August Roosevelt had secret meeting with Churchill. There Roosevelt agreed to continue supporting Britain and give lend/lease to Russia. On September 11 Roosevelt announced that US ships would now shoot German ships on sight. This greatly increased tensions with Germany. Hitler's naval commanders urged him to declare unrestricted submarine warfare. Hitler was unsure what to do. It was clear that Roosevelt was pressing for war and Hitler feared that if he did what his commanders asked Roosevelt would try to make a case for war that just might get accepted by a public that was increasing fearful of Germany. The situation Hitler faced at this point was extremly bad. He could not allow the US to send supllies to Britain and Russia unopposed but if he tried to stop them it could mean war. Hitler once again fell back on what he saw as the best solution, forcing the US into a two front war. So once again he encouraged the Japanese to take some kind of action in the Pacific. The Japanese because of their own problems with the US finally showed signs of agreement. When on December 3 the Japanese made their declaration to Germany about an impending war with the US and asked for help Hitler quickly agreed. Nowwas the chance he had been waiting for. Leaving Japan alone would not only make Germany look she was afraid of the US but it would open the possiblity of the US being able to finish off Japan and then come for Germany. Now was the chance to force the US into a two front war and thus ensure her defeat which seemed likely because of the fact she was unprepared for war. Hitler as we all know followed through on his promises to Japan and declared war on the US on December 11. Hitler it seems regarded the conflict with the US as seperate from the conflict with Russia. The US seen to be mainly a naval power that was not ready for war. A two front war thought Hitler between Japan, whom he regarded as stronger naval power, and Germany would be sure to force the US to come to terms. As far as Russia was concerned Hitler felt they could be finished off for certain by 1942 as they could not possibly withstand another offensive. Hitler wanted the Japanese to help him with Russia so they would releive the pressure the Russians were putting on but this was not the major reason why Hitler declared war on the US as he thought Germany could finish off the Russians on their own and that the US would not be able to fight a war with Germany and Japan for very long. We know of course that Hitler miscalculated. The axis intentions I think are pretty much understood but what about Roosevelt's? Mussolini it seems thought Roosevelt was hoping to enter the war in Europe through Japan. He was not thre only one who thought this. Even Lindbergh, I think, said something to the effect that: "So he (Roosevelt) got us in through the back door". Although the idea of Roosevelt forcing Japan to attack so he could drag the US into the war in Europe sounds compelling there is only scanty evidence for it. First of all as explained before the tripartite pact itself did not bind the axis powers to go to war unless the US was the agressor. The Japanese when they asked their axis partners for help cited the pact and gave their interpretation of what thet considered "aggression". Since agression can be interpretated in different ways Germany and Italy could have, if they wanted, extricated themselves from the pact by simply saying the US had not committed agression. However aside from the pact we know that the Germany promised Japan he would go to war against the US. At the time though these promises could not be counted upon as Hitler could always change his mind. He had before that broken many promises so he could have easily been lying. The Japanese hoped Hitler would support them but were not sure until he finally delivered his declaration of war. What Roosevelt was thinking is not clear. We know he wanted to enter the war in Europe but whether or not he saw war with Japan as a distraction or a "back door" into the European war is still debatable. Although Mussolini and others seemed to think so no clear evidence has been found. Personally to me it seems unlikely Roosevelt would puroposefully fight a two front war. I think he would rather try to take out his enemies one by one. Since he regarded Germany as the major threat it seems plausible he would prefer to keep peace in the Pacific while he turned towards Europe then afterwards against Japan. But that's just my opinion as no real evidence either way has been found. Sorry thiswas such a long post but I have always found the events surrounding the US entry into thewar fascinating because it was the US entry that caused the major turning point in the war.

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Pearl Harbor, Hitler, and Roosevelt

Post by Globalization41 » 13 Apr 2004 05:13

Great post John2. I totally enjoyed reading it.
If someone were to write a 1000-page book
just on the first week of December 1941 I'd
read it several times. The interplay between
Roosevelt, Hitler, the Japanese, Italy,
Churchill, the isolationists, and even Stalin
(good ol' Uncle Joe had some excellent spies;
he certainly knew enough to strip his Far
Eastern front of Siberian divisions) constitutes
the most significant moment in world history,
in my view. ... In America, Pearl Harbor totally
discredited isolationists so much that even to
this day American citizens advocating non-
interventionism will be buried in an avalanche
of hate to divert the argument. "America First"
is forbidden; "Israel first" is required to
compete in America's mass media mafia. But
many forget that if it hadn't been for the antiwar
isolationists, Roosevelt would have committed
himself too early and would not have had the
political support required to prosecute the war
as necessary.
(Bush and his neocon ex-
Bolshevik advisers are beginning to realize
the negative strategic effect of going to war
without political support, though they'd never
admit it and they were too stupid to plan for it.)
... Without the counterbalance of isolationists,
Congress almost unanimously voted to
escalate the Vietnam War. When an isolationist
makes a good point the Zionists and their
fellow travelers begin conspiring. (A neutral
America would result in Israel being overrun
just as South Vietnam was.)
... ... Since
Roosevelt was reading deciphers of
Japanese diplomatic communications, which
relayed promises by Hitler to Tokyo, it's easy
to see why many believe
F.D.R. decided to
enter the European war through the Asian
back door. Suppose Hitler had told the
Japanese he had changed his mind and
would not declare war on the U.S. if Japan
attacked America. Would Roosevelt (after
reading the intercepts) have been so eager to
confront Japan's aggression? ... Suppose
Japan had attacked the U.S. in April after
Hitler's promise to Matsuko. Would Hitler
have declared war then, just before invading
Russia? ... What effect did Roosevelt's leak
of America's top secret contingency war
plans, which called for the military defeat of
Germany, have? The leak caused
sensational headlines a couple or three days
prior to Pearl Harbor. Even if the leak had no
effect on Hitler's decision, it's timing is still
... I'm also suspicious of the timing
of Churchill's declaration of war on Finland, just
before Pearl Harbor. ... Hitler's speech
declaring war on America offers some vitally
important clues
for World War II buffs.

[Hitler's Reichstag Speech of December 11,


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Suquence of events leading to Pearl Harbor.

Post by Simon Gunson » 13 Apr 2004 11:25

Yeah great post John. Hard to read at a single sitting though.

Try using an attention grabbing headline next time...

Something like "Al qaeda plans attacks on mainland USA"
Short and simple...for simple folks

By the way did Condeleeza's granny work for Roosevelt ?

Seriously though your quote of Roosevelt's comments on 6th December. I'm not doubting you, but could you place the remarks or give a source please?
Putting the whole deal in context is really valuable. So many people study events from only one perspective as if with tweezers and a microscope that they forget the ambience of events.

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Post by ChristopherPerrien » 13 Apr 2004 13:00

Why did he actually fulfill his promise and declare war? There are only two possible explanations. The first is that he wanted Japan to declare war on Russia. The second was that he believed the US could only be defeated in a two front war.
A third reason, past the mere politics , Is that Hitler had a sense of "honor", especially when dealing with friendly or non-hostile nations or to paraphase Mao/Machevelli/etc. -" the enemy of my enemy is my friend".

Perhaps it can be said he made a bad bet, but Roosevelt was hell-bent on going to war with Germany no matter what Hitler did or did not do.

Personally I feel that this backing of Japan was not Hitler's worst error due to "honor" , rather it was his backing of the Italians/Mussolini in their failed efforts in the Mediterranean and Africa. That support delayed "Barbarossa" , and may have well been the difference between beating Russia in 1941, before massive US "lend lease/support" , and losing.
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At Dawn we Slept

Post by Globalization41 » 13 Apr 2004 13:01

At Dawn we Slept, The Untold Story of
Pearl Harbor

This is the best book on Pearl Harbor, in my
opinion. ... The 9/11 bombing of New York
and Washington was even better than Pearl
Harbor. The Muslims lost about 20 troops
and a few boxcutters,
taking down the twin
towers and denting the Pentagon. We should
have congratulated them on their operational
proficiency, napalmed a few cities and
bunches of Mosques, and called it even with
no hard feelings while the 9/11 commission
focused on the question of the subversion of
U.S. neutrality over the decades.


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Post by john2 » 13 Apr 2004 14:24

Seriously though your quote of Roosevelt's comments on 6th December. I'm not doubting you, but could you place the remarks or give a source please?
I'm sorry but I don't have a specific source for Roosevelt's comments. I have read them quoted many times in various books and in context they seem like something Roosevelt might say. After reading the partly deciphered 14 part message to the Japanese embassy Roosevelt was to have remarked to Harry Hopkins: "This means war." Hopkins then said it was too bad war would come at Japan's leisure and if they could not find a way to attack first. Roosevelt was then to have said: "No, we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people but we do have a good record."

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Post by john2 » 13 Apr 2004 14:35

For those of you who are interested here is the complete diary entry of Count Ciano, the foreign minister of Italy for December 3, 1941.
Wednesday "Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and proposes the signature of an agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication and said: "We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as September 1939." What does this new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy -- much too easy - to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive. "Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of provoking America's intervention pleases the Germans less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it.

My source for this document from from the proceedings of the Nuremburg trials. Although I certainly don't accept everything that went on in those trials as right, I see no reason to question the above document's authenticity.

Btw here is another entry from December 5, same year.
"A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness. After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackenson to my house to submit-a plan for a triple agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter was very glad I hadn't."
The triple agreement Ciano mentions is the pact for a full military alliance that I talked about. It was signed in Berlin the day Hitler declared war on the US. In his war declaration Hitler also made reference to it.
Last edited by john2 on 13 Apr 2004 17:29, edited 1 time in total.

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Post by DrG » 13 Apr 2004 17:02

The agreement mentioned by Ciano didn't force Italy and Germany to declare war on the USA, and was signed on 11 Dec. 1941 (3 days after Pearl Harbour).
Hitler, in his long but interesting speech of 11 Dec. (, told:
Germany and Italy have been finally compelled, in view of this, and in loyalty to the Tri-Partite act, to carry on the struggle against the U.S.A. and England jointly and side by side with Japan for the defense and thus for the maintenance of the liberty and independence of their nations and empires.

The Three Powers have therefore concluded the following Agreement, which was signed in Berlin today:

"In their unshakable determination not to lay down arms until the joint war against the U.S.A. and England reaches a successful conclusion, the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments have agreed on the following points:

Article I. Germany, Italy and Japan will wage the common war forced upon them by the U.S.A. and England with all the means of power at their disposal, to a victorious conclusion.

Article II. Germany, Italy and Japan undertake not to conclude an armistice or peace with the U.S.A. or with England without complete mutual understanding.

Article III. Germany, Italy and Japan will continue the closest cooperation even after the victorious conclusion of the war in order to bring about a just new order in the sense of the Tri-Partite Pact concluded by them on the 27th September 1940.

Article IV. This Agreement comes into force immediately after signature and remains in force as long as the Tri-Partite Pact of 27th September 1940. The Signatory Powers will confer in time before this period ends about the future form of the co-operation provided for in Article III of this Agreement."
The loyalty to the Tripartie pact is only moral, not strictly legal; in fact it was only a defensive pact (see article III):
Three-Power Pact Between Germany, Italy, and Japan

Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940

The governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.

Furthermore, it is the desire of the three governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized.

Accordingly, the governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishment of a new order in Europe.

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in greater East Asia.

Germany, Italy and Japan agree to co-operate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

With the view to implementing the present pact, joint technical commissions, members which are to be appointed by the respective governments of Germany, Italy and Japan will meet without delay.

Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting powers and Soviet Russia.

The present pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force 10 years from the date of its coming into force. At the proper time before expiration of said term, the high contracting parties shall at the request of any of them enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned duly authorized by their respective governments have signed this pact and have affixed hereto their signatures.

Done in triplicate at Berlin, the 27th day of September, 1940, in the 19th year of the fascist era, corresponding to the 27th day of the ninth month of the 15th year of Showa (the reign of Emperor Hirohito).

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Post by john2 » 13 Apr 2004 17:28

Thanks. I thought the agreement was signed on the 10th, I guess I was a day off. Btw I did not say the agreement bound Germany to declare war as it happened after Pearl Harbor.

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Re: Suquence of events leading to Pearl Harbor.

Post by chrisccoyle » 16 Apr 2004 03:51

I can't give you a link, but I can tell you this.

On Friday the 5th December 1941, in Gaza, Guy Royal and Buddy Stewart, both men in charge of getting the Families of U.S> diplomats out of Germany, told my Father "Col watch your newspapers on Tuesday America will be in the war"

john2 wrote:Hi! Does anyone know a link I can go to that shows a chronolgy of the eventsa leading to Pearl Harbor? I would really appreciate it.

Posts: 1298
Joined: 13 Mar 2002 02:52
Location: California

F.D.R. Tightens Anti-Axis Policy by Decreasing Oil Exports

Post by Globalization41 » 28 Apr 2004 17:33

[There's no way Roosevelt could have known
for sure what Hitler would do. But F.D.R. laid
the groundwork through provocations and
insults blended with whoppers. ... Stalin
wouldn't have hesitated to double-cross the
if he had been Hitler. Roosevelt
himself played the double game with his
advisers and everyone else. It was the most
important throw of the dice in the history of
mankind. Hitler's declaration of war must
have been a tremendous relief to Roosevelt.
Unfortunately, F.D.R.'s visionary new world
of social utopia never materialized as
Stalin and Mao filled the power vacuums left
by Hitler and Tojo.]

Washington, Special to The New York
Friday, August 1, 1941: President
Roosevelt tonight tightened the anti-Axis
of economic encirclement by
redefining the United States petroleum export
in such a way that Japan will be
deprived of all further gasoline that could be
used for aviation,
and placing other petroleum
exports to Japan on a pre-war quota basis. ...
The White House announcement of the new
policy, implementing the drastic action of last
week, when, the President ended American
appeasement of Japan
by freezing all
Japanese assets in the United States, was
immediately interpreted in many quarters as
indicative of official dissatisfaction over reports
of Japanese military and naval activities
Southern Indo-China. ... The announcement,
which came shortly after the weekly Cabinet
meeting, made no mention of Japan, but was
so worded that Japan could be the only
important country affected. ... After stating
that the President had directed the Export
Control Administrator to "initiate further
regulation in respect to the export of
petroleum products in the interest of national
defense," and the action was defined as
follows: "The action will have two immediate
effects. It will prohibit the exportation of motor
fuels and oils suitable for use in aircraft
of certain raw stocks from which such
products are derived to destinations other than
the Western Hemisphere, the British Empire,
and the unoccupied territories of other
countries engaged in resisting aggression. It
will also limit the exportation of other
petroleum products, except to the destination
referred to above, to usual or pre-war
quantities and provide for the pro-rata
[according to previously calculated
proportion or share]
issuance of licenses on
that basis." ... The State Department quickly
put the President's new policy into action by
announcing it had revoked all outstanding
petroleum export licenses to the areas
defined by the President and informed holders
of the licenses that they might be resubmitted
for consideration on a new basis.
licenses were returned to applicants. There
was little indication of experts here to relate
the new counter-Japanese move to the
accidental bombing of the United States river
gunboat Tutuila at Chungking, China, which
Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State,
described yesterday as a closed incident.
The action was believed based almost entirely
upon continued Japanese military action in
Southern Indo-China, from which area an
attack could be made upon Singapore or the
Netherlands Indies. ... The advices from which
the action was based were available only to
high officials here, but observers read into the
President's action his desire to impress the
Japanese with this government's resolve to
continue economic pressure
until Japanese
threats to areas in the South Pacific regarded
as of strategic importance by the United
States are definitely halted. ... The language
of the White House announcement indicated
that any type of petroleum export the
Japanese could use for aviation purposes,
whether directly or after reprocessing would
be stopped. ... The United States stopped
exports of the highest octane aviation gasoline
about a year ago, but since then the Japanese
have been buying even larger than usual
quantities of lower octane-rated gasolines
they might use directly, or after processing, in
their planes. ... Japan last year completed two
plants for the production of high-octane
aviation gasoline
so the ban on exports of this
type of fuel was no longer a decisive military
factor. One of the plants, owned by Mitsubishi
Oil Company,
went into operation May 21,
1940, and the other, completed in August,
1940, was placed in operation by the Japan
Petroleum Company.
... The second part of
the White House announcement, relating to
quota control of other petroleum exports, had
experts here guessing in the absence of any
precise definition of what base period would
be used for controlling these shipments. ...
Early this year the Japanese were taking
about 3,000,000 barrels of petroleum from the
United States each month, but this was
regarded in excess of normal requirements.
By way of contrast, Japanese requirements for
1939 were estimated at around 2,000,000
barrels per month. [In case of an embargo,
Japan had been stockpiling a strategic oil
reserve to fuel military operations supporting
the seizing of a new supply in Indonesia.]
... The New York Times, Friday, August 1,
President Roosevelt's ban on exports
of motor fuel will seriously affect Japan. ...
Exports of motor fuel to Japan last year
amounted to 3,256,908 barrels, more than
double that of 1939,
while aviation gasoline
shipments were 595,404 barrels. Under the
President's order this movement will cease,
but how it will interfere with the crude oil
shipment is not indicated. ... Apparently crude
oil, gas oil, and distillates, heavy fuel oil, and
lubricating oils are to be exempted from the
Japan may be permitted to obtain
approximately the same quantity as in 1940,
which amounted to 11,465,000 barrels of
crude oil. This was lower than any year since
1936. ... Other oil movements to Japan last
year included 43,463 barrels of kerosene,
5,116,180 barrels of gas oil and distillates,
2,132,146 of heavy fuel oil, and 819,419 of
lubricating oils. ... [Additional countries
affected were]
Spain, which received [in 1940]
1,520,000 barrels of motor fuel, and Portugal,
98,000 barrels. ... [Still eligible and barrels of
motor fuel exported in 1940: Russia,
1,065,000. ... China, 1,231,000. ... Britain,
... Barrels to Britain were down by
one half from 1939, due in part to U-boats.]

Yankee Stadium, The New York Times, By
Louis Effrat, Friday, August 1, 1941: When
Vernon (Lefty) Gomez blanked the St. Louis
outfit, 9-0, the fact that he issued 11 base on
balls was dismissed as insignificant by a
ladies' day gathering of 8,730 fans. ... Long
before the game was over, doubt concerning
the outcome had vanished. Senor Gomez
curve-balled the Brownies into submission,
yielding only five hits. The visitors spent too
much time walking to first [but] whenever the
Browns threatened, Gomez proved equal to
the task, and he romped to his tenth triumph
of the season [178th career win], his eighth in
succession, and his second shutout [28th
career shutout].
[The only Yankee fielding
assists were made on two double plays.]
With the Indians idle, this victory boosted the
Yankees' lead to a half a game over the dozen
mark. ... The McCarthymen teed off
immediately against the veteran Eldon Auker
and continued to pound young Maurice Newlin
with Tommy Henrich leading the mass
production with two homers [21st and 22nd of
and two singles. ... After St. Louis had
[stranded three in the 1st] the Yankees went
to town [as] Red Rolfe walked and Henrich
planted a round-tripper in the lower right-field
seats. Joe DiMaggio singled and was forced
by Charlie Keller, and Bill Dickey tripled King
Kong home to make it 3-0. ... It became 6-0
in the 3rd on Henrich's second homer,
DiMaggio's double, Keller's single, and the
three-bagger by Gordon, which followed a
double play. After that little mattered, except
Gomez's shutout and complete game.
kept the southpaw in hot water. [In the 9th
after three two-out walks]
Chet Laabs ended
the struggle with a towering fly to DiMaggio.
[Gomez fanned four, walked 11, and stranded
... Yankee outfielders caught 11 fly balls.
... The Yanks hammered Auker for eight hits
and six runs in three innings. Auker walked
two and struck out two. Newlin mopped up for
the Brownies, working five innings, permitting
six hits and three walks, and striking out
none. ... St. Louis finished the day at 38-58,
a game in the cellar. ... The Yanks improved
to 68-30. ... The attendance was 5,858 paid,
2,872 ladies.
... The umpires were Bill
behind the plate, John A. Quinn at
first, and Bill Grieve at third. ... Time of
game was 2:20.]

Starting Lineups

St. Louis Browns

Don Heffner 2b
Harlond Clift 3b
George McQuinn 1b
Walt Judnich cf
Roy Cullenbine lf
Chet Laabs rf
Johnny Berardino ss
Bob Swift c
Eldon Auker p

New York Yankees
Johnny Sturm 1b
Red Rolfe 3b
Tommy Henrich rf
Joe DiMaggio cf
Charlie Keller lf
Bill Dickey c
Joe Gordon 2b
Phil Rizzuto ss
Lefty Gomez p

[Stay tuned for late breaking war bulletins.
... Globalization41.]

Posts: 1298
Joined: 13 Mar 2002 02:52
Location: California

Tojo to Replace Konoye in Japan; U.S. Officials Remain Calm

Post by Globalization41 » 21 Sep 2004 06:20

Tokyo, Wireless to The New York Times, By
Otto D. Tolischus, Friday, October 17, 1941:
[Thursday, U.S. time] The third Cabinet of
Prince Fumimaro Konoye has resigned because
of a division of opinion among its Ministers
regarding policies to be pursued in meeting
what is termed here the greatest crisis Japan
has faced in her long history. ... The
resignation, announced last night, came after
several days of feverish conferences lasting
late into the night, during which Emperor
repeatedly received in audience
Premier Konoye and War Minister, Lieut. Gen.
Eiki Tojo
. The Cabinet had been in office
three months. ... The government's statement
[announcing the submission of the resignation]
made it plain that the same two irreconcilable
schools of thought that had deadlocked the
second Konoye Cabinet and forced its
resignation were carried over into the third
Cabinet. Recent utterances from official and
unofficial quarters, as well as press
commentaries, have made amply evident that
the two schools divide the issue whether Japan
should reach an agreement with the United
States at the cost of substantial concessions or
should pursue her "immutable" national policy
by lining up with Germany under the terms of
the Axis alliance. This alliance calls for
Japanese military assistance in the event the
United States enters the war. ... Prince
Konoye himself appears to have staked
everything on the success of his "peace
message" to President Roosevelt, but the slow
progress of Washington conversations, coupled
with a continuation of what is termed here
Anglo-American encirclement of Japan and
new German victories in Russia, has caused
such vehement demands for immediate action
that the Cabinet split wide apart. Meanwhile,
Japanese national mobilization is proceeding
apace and the most powerful newspapers insist
that unless the United States is ready to
acknowledge a changed situation in the Far
East and recognize Japan's "immutable"
, agreement between the two countries
is well-nigh impossible. ... "A Chinese
political group is fighting Japan
on the
mainland by using American weapons, bullets,
and technical assistance
together with American
military and monetary advice," The Times
declared. ... "Far more than such
provocation warrants, Japan has been trying to
maintain and improve relations with the United
States with all the good-will which such a
situation can engender. It is a one-way
conciliation. Japan in no way has interfered
with America's sphere of influence or living
area, whereas the United States has leaped an
ocean to intrude into the affairs of the Far
East. The Japanese people will continue to
insist that American policy must be radically
changed -- first in respect to China, by ceasing
to act as Chungking's war partner. When the
American people look objectively at the two
sides of the case they cannot fail to admit that
Japan has just cause for bitter compliant and is
acting within its rights in taking protective

Washington, Special to The New York Times,
By Frank L. Kluckhohn, Thursday, October
16, 1941:
The United States Government was
calm but determined today in the face of a
possibility that ultra-nationalists, eager for
further conquests, might take over direction of
affairs in Japan, where the government of
Prince Konoye resigned after having been
under fire of extremists. ... There was an
apparent determination in official quarters here
to regard economic and political measures to
check Japanese expansion as exhausted if, as a
result of the Tokyo crisis, Japan should move
into Siberia or south into the Netherlands
Indies or Thailand. ... President Roosevelt
canceled a scheduled Cabinet meeting and held
a lengthy conference at the White House this
afternoon with his inner defense council
consisting of Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary
of the Navy Frank Knox, Harry L. Hopkins,
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R.
, and Army Chief of Staff General George
C. Marshall
. ... At the express request of the
President, none of those present would discuss
the meeting. It was reported in usually reliable
official quarters, however, that methods of
meeting naval and military contingencies were
canvassed. In some quarters it was indicated
that dispositions to meet any far-flung Japanese
move of aggression already were underway.
However, it is not yet certain here from
official reports that the Tokyo Cabinet crisis
does mean action by Japan. ... Diplomats
found it difficult to believe that Japan would
move on Siberia, unless her leaders have lost
all judgement. ... In Congress, Senator Burton
K. Wheeler
, Democrat, Montana, leader
among the opponents of the Administration's
foreign policy
, thought that the U.S. and Japan
could settle their differences peaceably "unless
the hotheads in Japan go crazy." ... The
Japanese Embassy is proceeding with
negotiations for two of three Japanese ships
due at Honolulu and West Coast ports in the
next few weeks with Americans from Japan to
evacuate Japanese from the United States.

The New York Times, Late Thursday, October
16, 1941:
A Reuters dispatch from Tokyo
reported that General Tojo, who has often been
called a typical militarist, had been designated
to form a new government.

Washington, Special Cable to The New York
By Turner Catledge, Friday, October
17, 1941:
Another attack on an American war
vessel engaged in patrolling the North Atlantic
was revealed today. The short announcement
came in time to dominate the final day's debate
in the House on the Administration's resolution
authorizing arming of merchant ships, and to
add to the tension already running high in
Washington as a result of the turn of events in
Russia and the Far East. It read [in part] "The
Navy Dept. announced the U.S.S. Kearny,
destroyer, was torpedoed this morning while on
patrol duty. No casualties were indicated in
dispatches. Despite damage, the ship is able to
proceed under her own power. No other
details are available at this time."

[Stay tuned for late breaking war bulletins.
... Globalization41.]

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