Nazi occupation policies for the USSR

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Post by David Thompson » 16 Oct 2004 20:40


"Document 3663-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VI: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1946. pp. 401-402.
The Reich Minister For the Occupied Eastern Territories

No. I / 2591 /41 It is requested to refer to this number and the subject matter in future correspondence

Berlin W 35 10/31/1919 Rauchstrasse 17/18 Telephone: 21 95 15 and 39
50 46 Cable address: Reichsministerost

[Stamp]: Reich Commissioner East 11/5/1941 Main Division IIa

To the Reich Commissioner for the East (Ostland) in Riga Hermann Goering Street 26

The Reich and Security Main Office has complained that the Reich Commissioner for the East has forbidden executions of Jews in Liepaja (Libau). I request a report in regard to this matter by return mail.

Dr. Leibbrandt
[illegible signature]

[Stamp:] Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories

The Reich Commissioner for the East
IIa 4 M 219/41
15 November 1941

To the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Berlin Rauchstr. 17/18
Re: Executions of Jews District of Erlau 31 October 1941
Reporter: Reg.Rat L Trampedach?

I have forbidden the wild executions of Jews in Liepaja because they were not justifiable in the manner in which they were carried out.

I should like to be informed whether your inquiry of 31 October is to be regarded as a directive to liquidate all Jews in the East? Shall this take place without regard to age and sex and economic interests (of the Wehrmacht, for instance in specialists in the armament industry) ?

[note in different handwriting:] Of course the cleansing of the East of Jews is a necessary task; its solution, however, must be harmonized with the necessities of war production.

So far I have not been able to find such a directive either in the regulations regarding the Jewish question in the "Brown Portfolio" [Braun Mappe] or in other decrees.

2) Resubmit 1.12.41
Submitted 1.12.

Tr. 8.11.

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Post by David Thompson » 17 Oct 2004 20:05


"Document 081-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 126-130.

28 February 1942
1/1 /41 g.Ks
To the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [OKW]
Berlin W 3, Tirpitzufer 72-76

Subject: Prisoners of war.

Since the beginning of its existence, the Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern territories has taken the viewpoint, that the large number of Soviet prisoners of war constitute a highly valuable material for propaganda. The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war must be considered differently than the treatment of prisoners of war of other nations, for various reasons:

1. The war in the East has not been concluded, and the treatment of the prisoners of war must have far-reaching results on the will-to-desert of the Red Army man who is still fighting.

2. Germany intends to keep a large part of the former Soviet Union occupied, even after the end of the war, and to develop it industrially for her purposes. Therefore she depends on a far reaching cooperation of the population.

3. Germany is conducting the fight against the Soviet Union because of ideological viewpoints. Bolshevism must be overthrown and something better must be put in its place. Even the prisoners of war themselves must realize that national socialism is willing and in the position to bring them a better future. They must return later to their homes from Germany with a feeling of admiration and esteem for Germany and German institutions; and thus become propagandists for the cause of Germany and national socialism.

This attempted goal has not been attained so far. The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3.6 millions of prisoners of war, only several hundred thousand are still able to work fully. A large part of them has starved, or died, because of the hazards of the weather. Thousands also died from spotted fever. It is understood, of course, that there are difficulties encountered in the feeding of such a large number of prisoners of war. Anyhow, with a certain amount of understanding for goals aimed at by German politics, dying and deterioration could have been avoided in the extent described. For instance, according to information on hand, the native population within the Soviet Union are absolutely willing to put food at the disposal of the prisoners of war. Several understanding camp commanders have successfully chosen this course. However in the majority of the cases, the camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they have rather let them starve to death. Even on the march to the camps, the civilian population was not allowed to give the prisoners of war food. In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer keep up on the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were shot before the eyes of the horrified civilian population, and the corpses were left. In numerous camps, no shelter for the prisoners of war was provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes or caves. A systematic delousing of the prisoners of war in the camps and of the camps themselves has apparently been missed. Utterances such as these have been heard: "The more of these prisoners die, the better it is for us". The consequence of this treatment is now this, that spotted fever is spreading due to the escape and discharge of prisoners and has claimed its victims among the armed forces as well as among the civilian population, even in the old part of Germany. Finally, the shooting of prisoners of war must be mentioned; these were partly carried out according to viewpoints which ignore all political understanding. For instance, in various camps, all the "Asiatics" were shot, although the inhabitants of the areas, considered belonging to Asia, of Transcaucasia and Turkestan especially, are among those people in the Soviet Union who are most strongly opposed to Russian subjugation and to Bolshevism. The Reich ministry of the occupied Eastern territories has repeatedly emphasized these abuses. However, in November for instance, a detail [Kommando] appeared in a prisoner of war camp in Nikolajew, which wanted to liquidate all Asiatics.

The treatment of prisoners of war appears to be founded for a great part on serious misconceptions about the people of the Soviet Union. One finds the opinion that the people become more inferior the further one goes East. If the Poles already were given harsh treatment, one argues, it should therefore be done to a much greater extent to the Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Russians, and finally the "Asiatics".

It was apparently completely ignored, in the treatment of prisoners of war, that Germany found, in contrast to the West (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway), a people who went through all the terror of Bolshevism, and who now, happy about their liberation, put themselves willingly at the disposal of Germany. A better gift could not come to Germany in this war, which requires every last man. But instead of accepting this gift, the people of the East are being treated more contemptibly and worse than the people of the West, who do not hide their enmity towards Germany.

It was a basic mistake that no difference was made between real prisoners of war and deserters. It is known that German propaganda deposited millions of leaflets beyond the lines, and encouraged the Red soldiers to desert, whereby good treatment and sufficient food was specifically assured to them. These promises were not kept. The deserters were beaten and left to starve the same as so many prisoners of war. A natural consequence of this politically and militarily unwise treatment was not only a paralyzing of the will to desert, but a plain deadly fear to get into German captivity. It would be naive to assume that the occurrences in the prisoner of war camps could be kept hidden from the Soviet government. As can be seen in Molotov's circular the Soviets have in fact an excellent knowledge of the conditions described above, and naturally they have done everything in their power to influence the Soviet population and Red soldiers accordingly It can be said without exaggeration that the mistakes in the treatment of prisoners of war are to a great extent the cause for the stiffening power of resistance of the Red Army, and therefore also cause for the death of thousands of German soldiers.

After the Reich ministry for occupied Eastern territories was finally successful in overcoming the prejudice against Soviet prisoners of war partially and when the prisoners of war were to come to Germany to a great extent for work, it was found that of 3.6 million only several hundred thousand were still able to work. Thus, German economy and armament industry also must suffer for the treatment of prisoners of war.

The above explanations are not intended to be a belated, fruitless criticism, nor are they directed against any official agency, especially since very many objective situations came into play, as has been mentioned, and the responsibility is shared. They should only become the basis for a new policy toward the prisoners of war which corresponds more to our military and civilian interests. The Reich ministry for the occupied Eastern territories is endeavoring with all its powers to assist the fighting troops by effective propaganda for the deterioration of the enemy's military forces. All propaganda will be useless, however, if there is more fear of captivity than of death and wounds on the battlefield.

The primary demand is that the treatment of the prisoners of war ensues according to the laws of humanity and according to the dignity of the German nation. It is understandable that inhuman treatment, proven many times, of German prisoners of war, by members of the Red Army has embittered the German troops so much that they retaliate with the same treatment. However, such retaliatory measures do not improve the situation of German prisoners of war by any means, but must have as their last consequence the fact that neither side will take any more prisoners thus that they conduct the war in a most inhuman manner. At any rate, as much as is known, such retaliatory measures have not been able up to now to cause the enemy to change. They were therefore without purpose.

Furthermore, sufficient food, and at least primitive shelter, are to be provided for the prisoners within the framework of possibility. In the camps for prisoners, scheduled for work projects, as well as in those for the others, skillful propaganda is necessary, which must be carried out by camp newspapers, movies, lectures, simple musical events, games, etc.

Every camp commandant must be made responsible that ever prisoner of war, guarded by him, will return to his home later on as a propagandist for Germany. Of course, on the other side action must be taken with utmost severity against possible agitators. In any case, in the future a difference must be made between real prisoners of war and deserters. The deserters are to be provided with identification certificates, and in any case are to be treated better than the prisoners of war. Especially this measure should have far-reaching success in reference to the deterioration of the Red Army.

I would appreciate an expression of opinion soon, and information of appropriate action.

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Post by David Thompson » 17 Oct 2004 20:27


"Document 072-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. p. 122.

The Deputy of the Fuehrer, Staff Commander

Fuehrer Headquarters 4/19/1941

Fuehrer Bureau (Bo/Fu) Chancellory Rosenberg
No 4609 H
21 April 1941
Shown to the Reichsleiter on the 22.4 [rubber stamp]

To Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg
Berlin W 35, Margaretenstr.
17 Copy to Utikal

Dear party member Rosenberg!

In connection with the received draft of the decree I attended, as ordered, a speech made by SS Brig. Gen. Heydrich. The latter called attention to the fact that the sentence, "In the confiscations undertaken, or to be undertaken in the Reich area, of the property of ideological opponents, the same rules apply", anticipates a regulation which has so far not been introduced and would for the first time set a precedent through this decree-draft. Moreover, the regional governments [Gauleitungen] are never allowed to carry out confiscations.

Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich further pointed out that he could under no circumstances recognize the attempted regulation in the final sentence of your decree-draft, since there existed some objections to it. The scientific treatment of the ideological opposition could only be done in conjunction with the political police work. Only the material should be handed over to you, and the seminar respectively. If a speedier treatment through your office is necessary, duplicates and photocopies should be put at your disposal.

The Fuehrer emphasized that in the Balkans the use of your experts would not be necessary, since there were no art-objects to be confiscated. In Belgrade only the collection of Prince Paul existed, which would be returned to him completely. The remaining material of the lodges, etc. would be seized by the agencies of Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich.

The libraries and art objects of the monasteries, confiscated in the Reich, were to remain for the time being in these monasteries, insofar as the Gauleiters had not determined otherwise. After the war, a careful examination of the stock could be undertaken. Under no circumstances, however, should a centralization of all the libraries be undertaken, the Fuehrer has repeatedly rejected this suggestion.


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Post by David Thompson » 17 Oct 2004 20:31

Additional documentary materials on the activities of the Einsatzgruppen in the USSR may be found at:

Einsatzgruppen Operational Situation Reports USSR
Einsatzgruppe affidavit of Walther Schellenberg
Einsatzgruppe Testimony of Leslie Gordon
Einsatzgruppe 20 Nov 1945 affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf
IMT testimony of Otto Ohlendorf
NMT Einsatzgruppe Testimony of Otto Ohlendorf
NMT Einsatzgruppe testimony of Werner Braune
NMT Einsatzgruppe testimony of Walter Haensch
NMT final statements of the Einsatzgruppe defendants
The German Army and the Einsatzgruppen

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Post by David Thompson » 17 Oct 2004 21:44


"Document 149-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 190-191.

Jews, freemasons and the ideological enemies of National Socialism who are allied with them are the originators of the present war against the Reich. Spiritual struggle according to plan against these powers is a measure necessitated by war.

I have therefore ordered Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg to accomplish this task in cooperation with the chief of the High Command of the armed forces. To accomplish this task, his Einsatzstab for the right occupation territories has the right to explore libraries, archives, lodges, and other ideological and cultural establishments of all kinds for suitable material and to confiscate such material and for the ideological tasks of. the NSDAP and for scientific research work by the university [Hoch Schule]. The same rule applies to cultural goods which are in the possession or are the property of Jews, which are abandoned or whose origin cannot be clearly established. The regulations for the execution of this task with the cooperation will be issued by the Chief of the High Command of the armed forces in agreement with Reichsleiter Rosenberg.

In necessary measures for the eastern territories under German administration will be taken by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in his capacity as Reich Minister for occupied eastern territories.

(Signed) A. HITLER

Fuehrers Headquarters,
March 1942
all Bureaus of the Armed Forces, the Party and the State.

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Post by David Thompson » 17 Oct 2004 21:44

"Document 154-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 193-194.
The Reichsminister and Chief of Chancellery.

Berlin W 8, Voss-strasse 6,
5 July 1942
Present Headquarters of the Fuehrer

To: The Highest Reich Authorities and The Services directly subordinate to the Fuehrer.

The Fuehrer has delegated Reichsleiter Rosenberg in his capacity of commissioner of the Fuehrer to supervise the total spiritual and philosophical indoctrination and education of the NSDAP in the spiritual battle against Jews and Free-Masons as well as against the affiliated philosophical opponents of National Socialism, who are the cause of the present war. For this purpose, the Fuehrer has ordered that Reichsleiter Rosenberg's Staff should be authorized, in the occupied territories under military administration and in the occupied Eastern territories under civil administration (exclusive of the General Gouvernement), to search libraries, archives, lodges and other philosophical and cultural institutions of all types for relevant material for the execution of his task and to request the competent Wehrmacht and police services to seize the material found in order to support the NSDAP in fulfillment of its spiritual task and for the later scientific research work of the "Hohe Schule", whereby police files concerning political activities will remain with the police, and all others be transferred to Reichsleiter Rosenberg's Staff. The staff is authorized to make the same request with regard to cultural goods that are ownerless goods or the ownership of which cannot be readily determined. The Chief of the Army High Command, in agreement with Reichsleiter Rosenberg, will issue regulations governing the cooperation with the Wehrmacht. The necessary measures within the Eastern territories under German administration will be taken by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in his capacity as Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territories.

I inform you of this order of the Fuehrer and request you to support Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the fulfillment of his task.

/s/ Dr. Lammers

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Post by David Thompson » 17 Oct 2004 21:45

"Document 347-PS [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 267-269.
Copy of a Copy
I Ju 3 D 9 Tgb No 783/449

To the Reich Youth Leader Artur Axmann
Berlin-Charlottenburg 9 Kaiserdamm 45/46

18 April 44 [in pencil]

Dear Party Member Axmann:

My chief of the department youth, Obergebietsfuehrer Lueer has proposed to me the plan to let the youth of the Latvian and Estonian peoples participate in complete age groups in the military education camps of the Hitler Youth.

I thank you, party member Axmann, for the generous invitation the Hitler Youth to the Youth organization of the Baltic districts [General Bezirken]. I agree with you in the expectations, which we connect with the enlargements of the camps, begun with such success in East-Prussia.

The experience of Germany is best able to liberate the youth rom thinking about small states and to explain to them the understanding for the European obligation. Furthermore, I expect especially through the conscription of entire age groups, that the military education will make itself felt in the military aspect. Only the education of an entire age group has influence on the reserve situation. The reserve situation of the Estonian and Latvian Legion is marked especially by the lack of noncommissioned officers and instructors. If we can eliminate this lack by the universal military education of the growing age groups, that will mean for the future a considerable inner strengthening of not small parts of our Northern front.

The first General directors as well as state directors in Estonia and Latvia in the meantime have been instructed, to create the legal basis, which are necessary for the execution of required military education. Obergebietsfuehrer Lueer could assure me that the inner readiness exists on the part of the youth. Also the organization and leaders of the youth will never close their ears to this commitment. However, I must draw your attention to the doubts, which are in the way of the military education of the Latvian and Estonian youth on German soil; I have consciously refrained from issuing the necessary orders on my own competence, but have asked Commissioner General to cause the countries own administration to publish the appropriate orders. Because of their own orders, these agencies will also have to issue the specific orders for the individual commitments. This is according to our policy, to relieve the German authorities from all the more technical and administrative problems, which touch little on our leadership and educational mission, and to leave to the countries own administration freedom of action.

However, according to the conferences which have taken place so far, it cannot be expected that General Dankers or Dr. Mae will order their youth organizations on their own, to conduct the military education not in Latvia or Estonia, but in East-Prussia or in Warthegau. This viewpoint is partly caused by the more or less expressed fear, to be suspected by reactionary circles to favor a so called Germanization. General Dankers and Dr. Mae can also point out, that the transfer of the Latvian and Estonian premilitary education of the youth contradicts the above-mentioned principles, which we customarily observe in the realm of the remaining administration. I cannot include a camp education, which primarily is to alleviate the most dire needs of an inadequate recruit training as a matter of our basic German educational mission. In the military education camps, the young Latvians are trained under Latvian leaders in the Latvian language,not because this is our ideal, but because absolute military necessity demands this. If General Dankers or Dr. Mae express the wish, and they have done so, to conduct such camps on Latvian or Estonian soil, I am not able to oppose them with any serious reasons.

I consider the arrangement of the most necessary suppositions for the future military service an immediate and simply practical mission of the countries own youth activity. The permission, that the countries own youth organizations, even if only in part and under German leadership, can carry out the military education in the country, gives them a considerable power toward those circles, still opposing, and is also able to increase the enthusiasm, especially of the youth. Our policy must adapt itself in the necessary extent toward this immediate goal, to rouse the Baltic peoples to the highest war effort of all forces. I am sure that the adaptability and educational capacity of the youth demand other measures from us, than those which can be advocated by us in our policies toward the adult parts of the population. However, politics and the education of the youth must perform in common according to the necessities of war, which gives us the problem to mobilize all available forces for victory. Even under these conditions, there are enough possibilities for Germany to exercise influence. The universal execution of the military education based on compulsory service with regard to the location of the camp gives us the possibility to increase the share of the German camps. Two or three camps in Estonia and Latvia therefore act as advertising for the camps within Germany; for in contrast to the Germanic peoples of the West, the military education is no longer to be carried out through voluntary enlistments, but through legal conscription. The camps in Estonia and Latvia as well, will have to be under German leadership, and as military education camps of the Hitler youth, they must be a symbol of our educational mission beyond Germany's borders.

I consider the execution of the military education of the Estonian and Latvian youth not only a military necessity, but also a war mission of the Hitler youth especially. I would be thankful to you, party member Axmann, if the Hitler youth would put itself at our disposal with the same readiness, with which they have so far supported our work in the Baltic Area.

Heil Hitler!
[signed] Lohse.

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Post by David Thompson » 18 Oct 2004 00:07

This document was listed on my table of contents, but I inadvertently omitted it from the chronologcal sequence.


"Document L-221: Memorandum For the Record, 17 August 1941 [translation]", in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VII: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: GPO, 1947. pp. 1086-1093.
Fuehrer's Headquarters
16 July 1941 Bo/Fu

TOP SECRET [Pencil note]

By order of the Fuehrer: he held today at 15 hours in his quarters a conference attended by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reich Minister Lammers, Field Marshal Keitel, the Reich Marshal and myself. The conference began at 15 hours and, including a break for coffee, lasted until about 20 hours.

By way of introduction the Fuehrer pointed out, he desired first of all to make some fundamental statements. Several measures had to be taken without delay; this was confirmed, among other events, by an assertion made in an impudent Vichy newspaper that the war against the Soviet Union was a war waged by Europe, and that, therefore, it had to be conducted for the benefit of Europe as a whole. Obviously the Vichy paper meant to say by these hints that it ought not to be the Germans alone who benefited from this war, but that all European states ought to profit by it.

Now it was essential that we did not publicize our aims before the world; also there was no need for that, but the main thing was that we ourselves knew what we wanted. By no means should we render our task more difficult by making superfluous declarations. Such declarations were superfluous because we could do everything wherever we had the power, and what was beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway.

What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to act here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we did not publish our aims, and it was only sensible to continue in the same way.

Therefore we shall emphasize again that we were forced to occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the interest of the inhabitants that we provided order, food, traffic, etc., hence our measures. Nobody shall be able to recognize that it initiates a final settlement. This need not prevent our taking all necessary measures -- shooting, resettling, etc. -- and we shall take them.

But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to exercise a mandate only. At the same time we must know clearly that we shall never leave those countries.

Our conduct therefore ought to be:

1. To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but to prepare for it only in secret;

2. To emphasize that we are liberators.

In particular:

The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be settled by Germans only.

In the same way the former Austrian part of Galicia will become Reich territory.

Our present relations with Roumania are good, but nobody knows what they will be at any future time. This we have to consider and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One ought not to be dependent on the good will of other people; we have to plan our relations with Roumania in accordance with this principle.

On principle we have now to face the task of cutting up the giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able: first, to dominate it, second, to administer it, and third, to exploit it.

The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us.


Never again must it be possible to create a military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage war for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. Every successor of the Fuehrer should know: security for the Reich exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of the Urals; it is Germany who undertakes the protection of this area against all possible dangers. Our iron principle is and has to remain:

We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry arms!

This is especially important; even when it seems easier at first to enlist the armed support of foreign subjugated nations, it is wrong to do so. In the end this will prove to be to our disadvantage unconditionally and unavoidably. Only the German may carry arms, not the Slav, not the Czech, not the Cossack nor the Ukrainian!

On no account should we apply a wavering policy such as was done in Alsace before 1918. What distinguishes the Englishman is that he pursues constantly one line and one aim. In this respect surely we have to learn from the Englishman. Therefore we ought never to base our actions on single contemporary personalities: here again the conduct of the British in India towards the Indian princes etc. ought to be an example: it is always the soldier who has to consolidate the regime.

We have to create a Garden of Eden in the newly occupied eastern territories; they are vitally important to us; as compared with them colonies play only an entirely subordinate part.

Even if we divide up certain areas at once, we shall always proceed in the role of protectors of the Right and of the people. The terms which are necessary at this time should be selected in accordance with this principle: we shall not speak of new Reich territory only, but of the task which became necessary because of the war.

In particular:

In the Baltic territory the country up to the Duna now will have to be administered in agreement with Field Marshal Keitel. Reichsleiter Rosenberg emphasizes that in his opinion a different treatment of the population is desirable in every district [Kommissariat]. In the
Ukraine we should start with a cultural administration, there we ought to awake the historical consciousness of the Ukrainians, establish a university at Kiev, and the like.

The Reich Marshal makes the counterstatement that we had to think first of securing our food situation, everything else could come later.

(Incidental question: Is there still anything like an educated class in the Ukraine, or are upper class Ukrainians rather to be found only as emigrants outside present day Russia?)

Rosenberg continues, there were certain independent movements in the Ukraine which deserved furtherance.

The Reich Marshal asks the Fuehrer to indicate what areas had been promised to other states.

The Fuehrer replies, Antonescu desired Bessarabia and Odessa with a strip (of land) leading west-northwest from Odessa.

Upon objections made by the Reich Marshal and Rosenberg, the Fuehrer replies that the new frontiers desired by Antonescu contained little outside the old Roumanian frontiers.

The Fuehrer states furthermore that nothing definite had been promised to the Hungarians, Turks and Slovaks.

Then the Fuehrer submits for consideration whether the former Austrian part of Galicia ought to be added at once to the government; upon objections having been voiced the Fuehrer decides that this part shall not be added to the government but should only be subordinated likewise to Reichminister Frank (Lwow).

The Reich Marshal thinks it was right to incorporate into East Prussia several parts of the Baltic country, e.g. the Forest of Bialystok.

The Fuehrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic country will have to be incorporated into Germany.

At the same time the Crimea, including a considerable hinterland (situated north of the Crimea) should become Reich territory; the hinterland should be as large as possible.

Rosenberg objects to this because of the Ukrainians living there.

(Incidental question: It occurred to me several time that Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he desires to aggrandize the former Ukraine to a considerable extent. )

The Fuehrer emphasizes furthermore that the Volga Colony too will have to become Reich territory, also the district around Baku; the latter will have to become a German concession (Military colony).

The Finns wanted East Carelia, but the Kola Peninsula will be taken by Germany because of the large nickel mines there.

The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be prepared with caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by the Finns; the Fuehrer will raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand it over to the Finns.

There ensues a rather long discussion as to the qualifications of Gau Leader [Gauleiter] Lohse, who has been proposed by Rosenberg as Governor of the Baltic country. Rosenberg reiterates that having approached Lohse already he would be in a difficult situation in case Lohse were not appointed; for the western part of the Baltic country Kube was to be appointed, but subordinated to Lohse; for the Ukraine Rosenberg proposes Sauckel.

The Reich Marshal, however, emphasized the most important points of view on which we ought to base these appointments:

Securing of food supplies, and as far as necessary, of trade; securing of communications, etc.

The Reich Marshal emphasizes, either Koch should be appointed for the Baltic country because he knew this country very well, or Koch should receive the Ukraine because Koch was the person with the greatest initiative and with the best education.

The Fuehrer asked whether Kube could not be appointed as commissioner for the district of Moscow; Rosenberg and the Reich Marshal both think that Kube was too old for this position.

Upon further representations Rosenberg replied he was afraid that Koch might soon refuse to obey his (Rosenberg's) instructions; by the way, Koch had predicted such conduct on his part.

The Reich Marshal replied it was indeed not desirable that Rosenberg guide every step of the appointees, rather these people had the duty of working quite independently.

For the Caucasus area Rosenberg proposed his Chief of Staff Schickedanz; he reiterated that Schickedanz certainly would fulfil his task very well, a statement which is doubted by the Reich Marshal.

Rosenberg then stated Lutze had proposed to him to appoint several SA Leaders, namely Scheppmann for Kiev,Manthey Dr. BenneckeLitzmann for Estonia and Burgomaster Dr. Drexler for Latvia. The Fuehrer has no objections to the use of SA Leaders.

Rosenberg then states he had received a letter from Ribbentrop who desired the participation of the Foreign Office; but he (Rosenberg) asked the Fuehrer to determine that the internal formation of the newly acquired areas was no concern of the Foreign Office. The Fuehrer agrees with this conception. Until further notice it will be sufficient for the Foreign Office to appoint a liaison officer to Reichsleiter Rosenberg.

The Fuehrer emphasizes that the Ukraine would undoubtedly be the most important district for the next three years. Therefore it would be best to appoint Koch there; if Sauckel were to be used, then it would be better to appoint him for the Baltic country.

Rosenberg continues, he intended to appoint Schmeer, Selzner and Manderbach as Commissioners for the Moscow area. The Fuehrer desires that Holz be used too, and that the former Gauleiter Frauenfeld should be placed in charge of administering the Crimea.

Rosenberg states he intended to use also Captain von Petersdorff, owing to his special merits; general consternation, general rejection. The Fuehrer and the Reich Marshal both emphasize there was no doubt that von Petersdorff was insane.

Rosenberg states furthermore that the appointment of the Burgomaster of Stuttgart, Stroelin has been proposed to him. There were no objections.

Since Kube is considered too old for the Moscow district by both the Reich Marshal and Rosenberg, Kasche is to take over this district.

(Memo for Party Comrade Klopfer: Please ask Dr. Meyer at once for the files concerning the plans for the future organization and the intended appointments.)

The Reich Marshal emphasizes he intended to appoint Gauleiter Terboven for the exploitation of the Kola Peninsula; the Fuehrer agrees.

The Fuehrer emphasizes that Lohse, provided he thinks himself equal to this task, should take over the Baltic country Kasche Moskow, Koch the Ukraine, Frauenfeld the Crimea, Terboven Kola, and Schickedanz the Caucasus.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then broached the question of securing the administration of the Eastern areas.

The Fuehrer tells the Reich Marshal and the Field Marshal he had always urged that Police Regiments should be provided with armored cars; this has proved to be quite necessary for police operations within the newly occupied eastern territories, because a Police Regiment equipped with the appropriate number of armored cars of course could perform many services. Otherwise though, the Fuehrer pointed out the protection was very slight. However, the Reich Marshal was going to transfer all his training fields to the new territories, and if necessary even Junkers
52 could throw bombs in case of riots. Naturally this giant area would have to be pacified as quickly as possible; the best solution was to shoot anybody who looked sideways.

Field Marshal Keitel emphasizes the inhabitants themselves ought to be made responsible for their things because it was of course impossible to put a sentry in front of every shed or railway station. The inhabitants had to understand that anybody who did not perform their duties properly would be shot, and that they would be held responsible for each offense. Upon a question of Reichsleiter Rosenberg the Fuehrer replied newspapers also - e.g. for the Ukraine would have to be reestablished, in order to obtain means of influencing the inhabitants. After the interval the Fuehrer emphasized we had to understand that the Europe of today was nothing but a geographical term; in reality Asia extended up to our previous frontiers.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then described the organizational arrangement he intended to establish; he did not intend to appoint a Permanent Deputy of the Reich Commissioner ahead of time, but always the most efficient of the General Commissioners would be called upon to deputize for the Reich Commissioner.

Rosenberg will set up four departments in the office of the Reich Commissioner: first for the general administration, second for politics, third for economics, fourth for engineering and architecture.

(Incidental remark: The Fuehrer emphasizes that activities on the part of the churches are out of the question. Papen had sent him through the Foreign Office a long memorandum in which it was asserted now was the right moment to reintroduce the churches; but this was completely out of the question.)

The Reich Marshal will detail to the Rosenberg Office Assistant Secretaries [Ministerialdirektoren] Schlotterer and Riecke.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg applies for appropriate premises to house his administration; he applies for the premises of the Commercial Mission of the Soviet Union in Lietzenberger Street; the Foreign Office, though, were of the opinion that these premises were extraterritorial. The Fuehrer replies that this was nonsense; Reich Minister Lammers was charged to inform the Foreign Office they were to hand over these premises to Rosenberg at once and without any negotiations. Rosenberg then proposes to detail a liaison officer to the Fuehrer; his adjutant Koeppen was to be appointed; the Fuehrer agrees and adds that Koeppen would become the opposite number to Hewel.

A longer discussion takes place concerning the jurisdiction of Reich SS Fuehrer; obviously at the same time the participants have in mind the jurisdiction of the Reich Marshal.

The Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal and others reiterate that Himmler was to have no greater jurisdiction than he had in Germany proper; but this (much) was absolutely necessary.

The Fuehrer repeats emphatically this quarrel would soon subside in practice; he recalls the excellent collaboration between Army and Air Force at the front.

In conclusion it is decided to call the Baltic country "Ostland".

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Post by David Thompson » 18 Oct 2004 21:34


"Covering Letter From 18th Army, 28 September 1941, Transmitting Keitel Order, 12 September 1941, Concerning Jews in the Occupied Territories", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 10: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'The High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1951. pp. 1210-1211.
Partial Translation of Document NOKW-3292, Prosecution Exhibit 1556

Enclosure 5
XXVI Army Corps Ic No. 862/41 Secret, Qu.
No. 717/41 Secret,
[Stamp] Secret.
18th Army Command, Ic/Counter Intelligence Officer
No. 1229/41

Army Headquarters
28 September 1941

The enclosed instructions from the OKW are hereby forwarded for your information and observation.

For the Army Command,
The Chief of Staff,
By Order:
[Signed] Richter.

Down to the regiments, independent battalions, and Supply Troops, 2 enclosures.
[Handwritten] Announced at roll call, [Illegible initial].
[Handwritten] Only Enclosure 1, Enclosure 2 to be shown to the two chaplains [kriegspfarrer] and to be acknowledged in writing [Illegible initial].

Fuehrer Headquarters
12 September 1941
Armed Forces High Command
Armed Forces Operations Staff/Dept. National Defense (IV/QIl)
No. 02041/41

Subject: Jews in the Occupied Eastern Territories.

Individual occurrences give cause to refer to the directives issued for the behavior of the troops in Russia (OKW Armed Forces Operations Staff/Dept. National Defense (IV/Qu.) No. 44560/41, Top Secret, Matter for Chiefs, 19 May 1941).

The struggle against bolshevism demands ruthless and energetic measures above all also against the Jews, who are the main bearers of bolshevism.

Therefore, there will be no collaboration between the armed forces and the Jewish population, whose attitude is openly or secretly anti-German, and no employment of individual Jews to render preferential auxiliary services for the armed forces. papers which confirm to the Jews that they are employed for armed forces purposes, will not be issued by military headquarters under any circumstances.

Excepted from this is solely the employment of Jews in specially set up labor columns which are only to be assigned under German supervision.

It is requested to disseminate this order to the troops.

The Chief of the OKW,
Signed: Keitel.

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Post by David Thompson » 18 Oct 2004 21:45


"Letter of Transmittal and 'Reichenau Order', of 10 October 1941, Distributed by XXVII Army Corps of the 18th Army, Commanded by Defendant von Kuechler", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 10: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'The High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1951. pp. 1211-1214.

Translation of Document NOKW-3411, Prosecution Rebuttal Exhibit 14 [Photographic reproduction of this document appear in Section VIII, Case 12, vol. XI.]

[This order, originally composed and issued by Field Marshal von Reichenau, Commander in Chief of the 6th Army, was disseminated widely within the German military forces in the East. The prosecution introduced this copy into evidence as a rebuttal document in connection with the testimony of the Defendant von Kuechler that the 'Reichenau Order" was not distributed within the 18th Army. (See von Kuechler's testimony below in this section.)]
[Handwritten] Activity Report IV
Appendix 17 Ic
[Stamp] Secret
Corps Hq. XXVIII Army Corps
Section Ic
No. 706/41

Corps Command Post, Lissino
6 November 1941
Corps Hq. XXVIII Army Corps, Section Ia
No. 1552/41

As enclosure an order by an army command is forwarded; this order has been approved by the Fuehrer and deals with the conduct of the troops in the Eastern Territories. In the corps are too, the conditions in general are such that the soldiers must be educated to show more harshness.

The following factors are reemphasized:

1. Every piece of bread given to the civilian population, be missed at home.

2. Every civilian, even woman or child, trying to cross our encirclement around Leningrad, is to be fired on. The less mouths to feed at Leningrad, the longer will be its resistance there, and each refugee is inclined toward espionage and the partisans; all these things cost the lives of German soldiers.

3. German trucks and vehicles are not here to serve as transportation for the Russian population.

As Deputy
[Signed] Kratzebt
Major General.

Distribution: Down to battalions.


Copy of copy
Army Command [AOK]
Army Hq.
10 October 1941
Subject: Conduct of the troops in the Eastern Territories.

In many places there still exist vague ideas regarding the conduct of the troops towards the Bolshevist system.

The most important objective of the war against the Jewish-Bolshevist system is the complete destruction of its means of power and the elimination of the Asiatic influence within the sphere of European civilization.

In this connection, tasks arise for the troops, which exceed the traditional one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the Eastern Territories is not only a fighter according to the rules of the art of war, but also the bearer of a ruthless national ideology and the avenger of all the bestialities which have been inflicted on the German and racially related nations.

This is the reason why the soldier must have full understanding of the necessity of a severe but just retribution upon the JewiSh subhuman elements. Its second purpose is to nip in the bud revolts in the rear of the armed forces, which, as experience shows, are always fomented by Jews. The struggle against the enemy behind the front is still not being taken seriously enough. Malicious cruel partisans and degenerate females are still being made prisoners of war; and snipers and vagrants dressed partly in uniforms or in civilian clothes, are being treated like decent soldiers and turned over to PW camps. Indeed, the captured Russian officers report sneeringly that the Soviet agents roam the streets unmolested and frequently eat meals at German field kitchens. Such conduct on the part of the troops can be explained only as complete thoughtlessness. In this case, however, the time has come for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the present struggle.

The feeding at army kitchens of the native population and prisoners of war who are not in the service of the armed forces, is an equally misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving away of cigarettes and bread. The items given up at home under the greatest sacrifices, and transported to the front by the command authorities under the greatest of difficulties, must not be given away by the soldier to the enemy, even if they come from booty stores. They are an essential part of our supplies.

The Soviets frequently set fire to buildings while retreating. The troops should be interested in fire fighting only as far as necessary troop billets must be preserved. In all other cases, the disappearance of the symbols of the former Bolshevist regime, even if represented by buildings, belongs into the framework of the war of annihilation. In this respect, neither historical nor artistic considerations play a part in the eastern region. The command authorities will give the necessary orders for the preservation of the raw materials and production plants essential for war economy. The total disarming of the population in the rear the fighting troops is especially urgent in view of the long and vulnerable supply lines. Captured arms and ammunition are to be salvaged and guarded wherever possible. If the combat situation does not permit this, arms and ammunition are to be rendered useless. If individual partisans are found to be using firearms in the rear of the army, this has to be suppressed by drastic measures. These measures must also be extended to those persons of male population who were in a position to prevent or report sabotage operations. The indifference of numerous allegedly anti-soviet elements, which derives from a "wait and see" attitude, must give way to a clear decision to cooperate actively against bolshevism. Otherwise no one can complain about being considered and treated as an adherent of the Soviet system. The fear of the German countermeasures must be stronger than the threat from the wandering Bolshevist remnants.

Apart from all political considerations of the future, the soldier must fulfill two demands.

1. The total annihilation of the false bolshevist doctrine of the Soviet state and its armed forces.

2. The pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty, and by the same token, the protection of the lives of the members of the German Armed Forces in Russia.

Only in this manner shall we fulfill our historical mission to free the German people from the Asiatic-Jewish danger once and for all.

Signed signature
Certified true copy:
[Signed] von Katzell
1st Lt.

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Post by David Thompson » 19 Oct 2004 00:35

Letter of Transmittal From army High Command (OKH) To Major Subordinate Units in the East, 28 October 1941, Requesting Implementation of 'Reichenau Order'", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 10: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'The High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1951. pp. 1214-1215.
Partial Translation of Document NOKW-663, Prosecution Exhibit 618.

High Command of the Army
General Staff of the Army/Generalquartiermeister
Dept. War Administration (Qu.4/B)
II 7498/41
Headquarters, High Command of the Army
28 October 1941
[Stamp] Secret.

Subject: Conduct of troops in Eastern Territories.

By order of the Commander in Chief of the Army [von Brauchitsch], the copy of an order concerning the conduct of the troops in the Eastern Territories by the Commander in Chief of the Sixth Army, designated as excellent by the Fuehrer, is herewith transmitted with the request to issue--if not already done orders to the same effect. [The order transmitted was signed "Commander in Chief, von Reichenau, Field Marshal". A translation of the text of this order is contained in Document NOKW-3411, Prosecution rebuttal exhibit 14, immediately preceding. (Moderator's note -- the "Reichenau Order" of 10 October 1941 on "Conduct of the troops in the Eastern Territories" is contained in the document immediately above this one.)]

By Order:

To all [in the East]:
Army Groups
Panzer Groups
Commanders of Army Group Rear Area.

Certified True Copy:
[Illegible signature]

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Post by David Thompson » 21 Oct 2004 10:38

Additional information pertaining to this subject may be found on "The German Army and anti-partisan warfare in the USSR" thread, at:

and "The Barbarossa jurisdiction order," at:

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Post by David Thompson » 22 Oct 2004 01:58


"Extract From Report on Partisan Activities by the Commanding General of Security Troops and Commander of Rear Area Army Group North, 1-15 June 1942, Concerning the Shooting of Gypsies", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 10: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'The High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1951. p. 1192.
Partial Translation of Document NOKW-2111, Prosecution Exhibit 296.

In the zone north of Novorzhev, 7 June 1942.

128 gypsies shot after investigation because of assistance to the partisans.
Last edited by David Thompson on 22 Oct 2004 02:03, edited 1 time in total.

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Post by David Thompson » 22 Oct 2004 01:58


Report and Order From 281st Security Division, 23 June 1942, Concerning Shooting and Treatment of Gypsies", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 10: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'The High Command Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1951. pp. 1192-1194.
Partial Translation of Document NOKW-2072, Prosecution Exhibit 682.

23 June 1942.

281st Security Division,
Sect. Ia/Ic/VII-297/42

To the Commander Rear Area Army Group North, Section VII, in Voru.

Report concerning the shooting of gypsies in Novorzhev.

The following report is submitted concerning the shooting of 128 gypsies in Novorzhev.

In the second half of May 1942 a considerably increased number of partisans made their appearance in the area of Novorzhev which had already had to suffer continually from the activity of partisans. The activity of partisans especially increased in the neighborhood of Vibor (map 1: 100000 2 kilometers east of Derevizy which is 24 kilometers north of Novorzhev. The presence of partisans was established in four different places in this area between the 25-26 May 1942. On 26 May 1942, a motor-vehicle belonging to the armed forces was attacked on the emergency highway from Novorzhev-Pushkinskiye Gory and the executive officer of the Ortkommandatur I (V) 265 in Novorzhev, Lieutenant Hall, wounded.

At the same time gypsies were loitering in the areas mentioned. They had not registered, had no regular work, and managed to live by begging their way from place to place; they had no fixed place of residence and constituted a burden in every way.

The general experience, not limited solely to Russia, that gypsies are especially suitable as agents on account of their nomadic form of life, and that they are also almost always willing to render such services, has also been confirmed again in Russia. Since, therefore, the possibility existed from the start that the gypsies were connected with the increased activity of the partisans, their arrest and screening was ordered.

The inquiries carried out by the Secret Field Police showed that among the persons arrested there were many men of draft age who had not been drafted. Furthermore, it was established that a number of the gypsies who were shot, who were of draft age, had at the approach of the German troops in July 1941, left the areas in which they had hitherto been and had stayed in the neighborhood of Cholm whence they had returned only a short time before.

As it [the order of Feldkommandatur 822 concerning the treatment of gypsies] does not correspond to the directives given, especially to the order of the Commanding General and Commander in the Army Group Area North dated 21 November 1941

1045/41, the Feldkommandatur 822 was instructed to rescind this order and to proceed against gypsies in future in accordance with the stipulations of the above-mentioned order, insofar as gypsies who had been arrested are not convicted beyond a doubt of partisan activity or of aiding the partisans.

Summing up, the division reports that considering all the circumstances in spite of the existence of formal misgivings in this exceptional case, the shooting of the gypsies must be regarded as really justified materially especially since no more attacks have taken place in this area since the shooting was carried out.

Brigadier General and Deputy Division Commander.

For information:
Secret Field Police

Certified true copy:
[Illegible signature]
War Administrative Inspector.

23 June 1942
281st Security Division.

To the Feldkommandatur (V) 822 in Ostrov.

Subject: Treatment of gypsies.

Reference: Feldkommandatur 822
Ia secret
12 May 1942.

The order referred to, which says that gypsies are always to be treated as partisans does not comply with the regulations issued. If gypsies are convicted of partisan activity they are to be treated in accordance with the order of the Security Division Section Ia, 6 January 1942; if they are not convicted of partisan activity, they are to be treated according to the stipulations of the commander's decree, 21 November 1941, VII 1045/41 communicated with order of the Division Section VII, 28 November 1941.

The order of the Feldkommandatur, 12 May 1942, is therefore to be rescinded. The abrogation is to be reported to the division when it has taken place. Further, a report is to be furnished giving the reasons why the order, at variance with the regulations issued, was published.

Brigadier General and Deputy Division Commander;
Certified true copy:
[Illegible signature]
War Administrative Inspector.
Last edited by David Thompson on 22 Oct 2004 02:04, edited 1 time in total.

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Post by David Thompson » 22 Oct 2004 02:01


"Directive from 281st Security Division to Feldkommandatur 822, 24 March 1943, Concerning the Handing Over of Gypsies and Jews to the SD", in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 10: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'The High Command Case'). District of Columbia: GPO, 1951. pp.
Partial Translation of Document NOKW-2022, Prosecution Exhibit 977.

24 March 1943,
281st Security Division
Section VII/Ia, File No. 457/43.
Secret, [Stamp]

Subject: Gypsies and Jews; Reference: Ortskommandatur 534, File No. 193/43, secret 22 March 1943.

To Feldkommandatur 822.

According to the order of the commanding general, 2 November 1941--VII 1046/43--nonmigratory gypsies who have already resided at their place of residence for two years, and who are politically and criminally nonsuspect, are to be left where they are; whereas. migratory gypsies are to be handed over to the nearest Einsatzkommando of the Security Service.

Jewish affairs are also to be handled by the Security Service. However concerning the Jewish doctors it would be necessary to request comment from Section IVb, as to whether or not they are indispensable as key personnel.

The competency of the military offices is limited to the, "handing over" [zuzufuehren], of gypsies and Jews to the Security Service, which will take the further necessary steps according to its own instructions. A cooperation of military authorities in the possible liquidations of gypsies and Jews by the SD as a political measure is not provided for anywhere and is rejected.

Paragraph V of the Commander's decree, 13 March 1943, does not constitute an alteration in respect to the present regulations, since it only states that the Security Service is not entitled to shoot the local population on account of criminal acts.

[Illegible initial] For information: Section VII.
Last edited by David Thompson on 22 Oct 2004 20:59, edited 1 time in total.

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