Russians simply won by the power of numbers

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Michate
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#256

Post by Michate » 21 Apr 2005, 14:55

H ere are some data points I have for ration strength figures of the German forces in 1943/44:

1. and 2. are strength figures taken from the materials prepared for two presentations on the strategic situation that Chief of the WFSt, Jodl gave. The first presentation was on 7. November 1943 (figures describe state of 15. October 1943); the second presentation was on 5. May 1944 (figures probably describe state of April 1944).

Info was taken the from two publications of the German Military Research Institute (MGFA):

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1. Date: 7.11.1943 (situation of 15.10.1943)
East: 3,900,000
Finland: 180,000
Norway: 315,000
Denmark: 110,000
West: 1,370,000
Italy: 330,000
Balkans: 610,000
Sum: 6,815,000
Source: Materialien zum Vortrag des Chefs des Wehrmachtführungsstabes vom 7.11.1943 "Die strategische Lage am Anfang des fünften Kriegsjahres", (referenced to KTB OKW, IV, S. 1534 ff.)

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2. Date: 5.5.1944 (situation likely of April 1944)
East: 3,878,000
Finland: no figure given
Norway: 311,000
Denmark: no figure given
West: 1,873,000
Italy: 961,000
Balkans: 826,000
Sum: 7,849,000
Source: "Strategische Lage im Frühjahr 1944", Jodl, Vortrag 5.5.1944. (referenced to BA-MA, N69/18.)


Hope this is interesting.

I have published a breakdown for ration strength figures in the West at the appropriate place: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=76052

Best regards,
Michate

RichTO90
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#257

Post by RichTO90 » 21 Apr 2005, 15:17

Victor wrote: Obviously, all the bomber and recon units only fought on the Eastern front.

I suspect the situation was similar in Hungary.
Thanks for the information Victor, it was interesting to read. Do you have any more details on organizations and aircraft strengths, or point me in a direction to look? The German documents are frequently silent on activities of their allied forces.


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#258

Post by RichTO90 » 21 Apr 2005, 15:40

armour wrote:
But armour, by June 1944 the Wehrmacht comprised the bulk of Axis forces, some 10-million men, versus 774,000 Hungarians and Romanians and possibly some 500,000 Finns - who are about to withdraw from their Alliance anyway (internal discussions beginning 29 July and final ratification 2 September IIRC).
You do know that Germans were in FULL RETREAT for a whole year until June 1944 in the East? And according to you they were *so silly* :) as to let half of their soldiers sit in the rear that whole 1 year? Where was that *Rear* in 1943?, Where was that *Rear* in 1944?, where was it going to be in *1945* ANYWAY?
I am unsure how to react to such errant nonesense, but will try.

First, the Germans were not in full retreat (and certainly weren't in a SHOUTING mode either) for the whole year until June 1944. Certainly Zitadelle could not be describe as a retreat of any kind. Nor would Fischfang in Italy. But most certainly during fall of 1943 and winter of 1943/1944 the Germans were forced to withdraw on many sections of the Ostfront.

And in World War II the "rear" was essentially any area in a theater of war or in the homeland that wasn't subject to direct attack, and yes, it's a slippery term. But the experience of the 2,137,973 men (as of 1 September 1944) of the Ersatzheer in the "rear" was considerably different from the war being experienced by the rest of the Wehrmacht.

BTW, if you insist on inserting words into what I have written, I think I will have to cease being civil and address you as you may deserve. I never referred to the Germans or their actions as *so silly* that is your bizarre misinterpretation.
Your description of the West front does sound quite realistic, not surprising for a "FRONT" which hasn't seen any combat for 4 years since 1940...
Really? That would certainly surprise the Luftwaffe. And Heersgruppe Afrika. And Heersgruppe C. And so on. Are you really that truly ignorant of events?
Read Shirer's "Third Reich" ,
Thank you, I have, the first time IIRC in 1970. And it is somewhere on the shelf of my library long with the other few hundreds of books dealing with World War II. Which are alongside the filing cabinets with their tens of thousands of copies of original documents from Freiburg, Kew and College Park. Please don't try to get into a pissing contest over sources, so far you have exibited little knowledge of sources and, worse, even less willingness to accept and interpret data freely given to you.
the Germans attitude towards Western front would become apparent to you,
It is, I require little refreshing from Shirer on the subject.
they haven't given a single serious counter-attack against Allies until the Ardennes because Hitler and other top level officials sincerely hoped that Allies would switch sides and join them against the Soviets - because, and this is a very simple point - they were going to lose the war against Soviets ANYWAY
I don't think your ravings deserve answers any longer. :lol:

[edited by moderator]

RichTO90
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#259

Post by RichTO90 » 21 Apr 2005, 15:41

Michate wrote: Hope this is interesting.

I have published a breakdown for ration strength figures in the West at the appropriate place: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=76052

Best regards,
Michate
Very much so, thank you Michate.

Rich

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Victor
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#260

Post by Victor » 21 Apr 2005, 20:54

Let's keep a civil tone and avoid insults.

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One of myths most expensive t

#261

Post by MARABA » 21 Apr 2005, 22:57

[quote="Michate"]H ere are some data points I have for ration strength figures of the German forces in 1943/44:
One of myths most expensive to the left - and in special to the Communists - is that the Ussr defeated nazista Germany in the practically alone Second World War I. "Day D? Thing of Hollywood ", affirms ones. "the allies alone had disembarked in France to hinder that the Ussr took all the Europe", they declare others.

According to this reasoning, the war already was lost for Germany since the battle of Stalingrado, stopped between August of 1942 and February of 1943 e, from, the German army in Russia was taken there of "roldão for destemido" the Red Army, while the allies were postponing until where the launching of the "second front" in the Europe was possible occidental person. By the way, as one another myth very divulged by the communist propaganda, this adjournment had it the "private desire" enters the occidental allies of whom Germany destroyed the regimen Soviet because, after all, "Hitler had been financed for the great occidental capitalists and German".

The article published for the Leaf of S. Paulo " the 60 years of day D of the Second World War I ", * if approaches very to this classic formula of disinformation.

The Soviets had stopped the thick one of the combats against the Germans? Yes, it is a fact. However, also it is a fact that the Russian victory if gave under well different bases of that socialist mythology adores to divulge. They had not been only the heroísmo and the Soviet patriotism - where he weighs the millions of Russian deserters and the warm received one to the invaders German for a saturated population of the horrors of the communism - that they had won the Germans and yes, mainly, the conjugação of a series of tactical, strategical factors and politicians, among which they are distinguished: 1 - Obsession of Hitler in stopping a war of attrition against an enemy of stronger human and industrial potential; 2 - German incapacity - Hitler is read - to define a route in the campaign in the east, what it led first to delayed and failed the offensive one on Moscow, in 1941, later the one equally unfruitful campaign to capture the oil of the Caucasus in 1942, decurrent failure over all of the insistence of the nazista dictator in stopping a battle of extermínio in the ruins of Stalingrado, and finally launching themselves in a suicidal operation against the strong square of Kursk, in 1943; 3 - Nonsense German behavior - violence and disdain - in relation to the Soviet civilians, that led to the fortalecimento of the fight of engages in guerilla warfare commanded for Stalin against the occupants.

To take science of the context of the reality of the combats in the Ussr after Stalingrado is important to know that far to be defeated, the German army, in 1943 middle, still conserved great part of its unbroken power.

Why Stalingrado was not the turn? Of the military point of view, the victory in Stalingrado the Soviets had after not been capable to total capitalize the gotten advantages and even so they retook great part of the territory captured for the enemy in the south of Russia in the German campaign of 1942 summer, one of its main objectives, the ownership of the important industrial city of Kharkov, in the east of the Ukraine, was hindered for the German army, that if quickly recouped of the defeat in Stalingrado, obtaining to paralyze the advance Soviet and to recapture Kharkov, reestablishing its lines of combat for return of March of 1943. With the advent of the spring "period of the mud" occurred the call, provoked for the melting of winter snows, what the impracticable land for military operations for per the little six weeks left, since Russia did not have paved roads. This period was used by the Soviets and Germans to recoup its forces. In the German case, it served especially to revitalize the decimated armored divisions (to panzer) that they were the key of the attack and the defense of its army. The to be adopted tactics then, as praised the main German military man, marshal Erich Von Manstein, would have to be what it called "action rear". This action basically consisted of the commanded withdrawal of the German forces of the areas attacked for the Russians, stopping only action of retardation, until the lines of attack of the Red Army were extended and consumed, moment where the main German units, led for the armored forces, would counterattack objectifying to win and to repel the troops Soviet, a combat concept that had been used with total success in the German victory in Kharkov.

On the other hand, the Red Army was increasing its staff quickly allowing that for return of the half of 1943 it surpassed the Wehrmacht (German army), in number of men, will be furnishing with artillery and tank. The Soviet material heavy was very good, as the T-34 tanks, and the increasing mass of Russian soldiers compensated the best training and individual initiative of the soldiers German. Beyond the forces of the Red Army, hundreds of thousand of irregular combatants - guerrila - caused great damage to the German army. The guerrila action was stimulated to a large extent for the nazista behavior in relation the Russian civilians, who went of the disdain and bad-treatments in relation the peoples as the ucranianos - that they had received the Germans in the beginning well from its offensive one against the Ussr, for considering them liberating of the communism - until the pure and simple extermínio for the Jews, who were a very numerous community in the Ussr. Between the Soviet tyranny and the nazista barbarism, many had finished opting to the first option, and had joined it the guerrillas.

Of the strategical point of view, however, the fact is that the Germans still occupied great part of européia Russia, including the Ukraine, White Russia, and vast areas in the north and extremity-north of the Russian territory, what in thesis would allow tactical jibs as the praised ones for Manstein. Moreover, Germany could only concentrate its attentions in Russia. In numerical terms, in ocidente and European south, about 38 German divisions they were parked, while in the Balkans 6 other divisions were kept. In the Norway the Germans kept an inoperative army of 10 divisions since 1940, waiting a British landing that never would come, but that Hitler believed that would happen with the purpose to cut the ore remittances of Swedish iron for Germany. In the reality, the south of the Europe had as main occupant the Italian army, that conserved 5 divisions in ground French, and others 31 divisions in the Balkans - Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece - and islands of the Aegean sea, beyond 30 divisions kept in ground italiano.(1)

Such factors made with that, exactly after the defeat in Stalingrado, the German situation still was not despairing and remained some edge of maneuver for the nazista dictator Adolf Hitler. As much this is truth, that soon after the German victory in Kharkov, Stalin commanded that its representative diplomatist in Sweden established contacts with the German government, aiming at a possible peace separately. In the reality, Stalin even though had the terms for such agreement: the borders of the Eastern Europe would be fixed in the existing ones in 1914, and the Ussr would sign an ample economic agreement with Alemanha.(2)

The decisive point of the war - Soon after the German disaster in Stalingrado, one another one of equal ratios happened for the Axle in Tunisia, when the forces ítalo-Germans in the region had been defeated, locking up definitively the combats that were stopped in Africa of the North since 1940. As result of this defeat, Germans and Italians they had lost something around 250 a thousand men, beyond considerable equipment. It was an smashing defeat, that deprived Germany and Italy of a numerous Army - equivalent, for example, to the nominal cash of 6º German Army, destroyed in Stalingrado - and that also it opened all the south flank of the Europe for operations where the allies could explore its superiority sea and air.

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Qvist
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#262

Post by Qvist » 22 Apr 2005, 09:24

Hello there

I won't get into the main argument, but will try to make myself useful by nagging at some of the quantitative aspects implied here.
To take science of the context of the reality of the combats in the Ussr after Stalingrado is important to know that far to be defeated, the German army, in 1943 middle, still conserved great part of its unbroken power.
In fact, it was possibly at its peak since the start of Barbarossa. But it can also be argued that this says little about the overall situation, because it is also true that they faced an adversary whose field forces had now grown two- to threefold since June 1941. So, despite being stronger than they were in the previous summer, the German Army was in much more difficult situation than then. Also, the allied presence was much stronger a year earlier.
On the other hand, the Red Army was increasing its staff quickly allowing that for return of the half of 1943 it surpassed the Wehrmacht (German army), in number of men, will be furnishing with artillery and tank.
This is a key point, but the Red Army had already done that by late 1941. By the summer of 1943, they had built up a very large superiority. As a matter of fact, if one looks at the average quarterly strengths, the 3rd quarter of 1943 is the peak period of the whole war in terms of personnel strengths. The German strength dropped quickly through the quarter as a result of their high losses (the highest since 3q 1941), and averaged roughly 2.8 million (Heer, W-SS, LW ground combat) through the quarter as a whole. The soviet strength (Fronts) averaged 6.8 million through the quarter, and it is worth noting that this is higher than the strength on 1 July, despite incurring 2 864 661 casualties (Krivosheev), the highest loss figure of any quarter during the war. The reason for tihs was, of course, the extent of the Soviet reserves, reinforcements and replacements that could be committed during the quarter.
The Soviet material heavy was very good, as the T-34 tanks,
On the other hand, at least as far as tanks are concerned, this was the period when the pendulum was swinging back the furthest to the other side, with new German types against which the T-34/76 was almost powerless entreing action, while the new Soviet types designed to counter them had not yet entered the field.
In numerical terms, in ocidente and European south, about 38 German divisions they were parked, while in the Balkans 6 other divisions were kept.
As this discussion has made abundantly clear, there is always room for quibbling when it comes to divisional counts, but as this discussion has hopefully also made abundantly clear, all reasonable counts will not vary very much between them. This does not appear to be a reasonable count - as of july 1943 (citing, again, Ron's figures) there were 58 divisions in the OB West and OB Süd, and 15 on the Balkans.
The decisive point of the war - Soon after the German disaster in Stalingrado, one another one of equal ratios happened for the Axle in Tunisia, when the forces ítalo-Germans in the region had been defeated, locking up definitively the combats that were stopped in Africa of the North since 1940. As result of this defeat, Germans and Italians they had lost something around 250 a thousand men, beyond considerable equipment. It was an smashing defeat, that deprived Germany and Italy of a numerous Army - equivalent, for example, to the nominal cash of 6º German Army, destroyed in Stalingrado - and that also it opened all the south flank of the Europe for operations where the allies could explore its superiority sea and air.
Well, if my memory is correct, approximately 20 German divisions were lost in Stalingrad, while 9 were lost in Africa, which one does feel is something that ought to have made the several people who have made this point stop to wonder whether these loss figures are really entirely comparable.


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Qvist
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#263

Post by Qvist » 22 Apr 2005, 09:39

Michael, interesting figures.

I had half suspected that Jodl simply presented a glossy picture at the briefing reproduced in KTB OKW (for the Bulgarian c-in-c wasn't it?), but that he was giving ration strength figures is of course also a clear possibility (not that the distinction between the two is very great :) ). Indeed, from the references provided for both sets of figures, it looks likely that the latter is the case I think. An interesting question by extension is why Jodl chose to use such figures in such a context - after all, the strength definitions themselves make it explicitly clear that ration strength is completely unsuited for use as a measure of strength.


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#264

Post by Igorn » 22 Apr 2005, 10:51

I want to remind to all of them about some historic facts.
RichTO90 wrote: First, the Germans were not in full retreat (and certainly weren't in a SHOUTING mode either) for the whole year until June 1944. Certainly Zitadelle could not be describe as a retreat of any kind.
The German commanders had no choice but to retreat. On 12 July 1943, the Red Army began its own carefully planned strategic offensive, which began with operation Kutuzov against the Orel salient, immediately to the north of the Kursk bulge. Operation Kutuzov was a perfect example of the newly sophisticated Soviet way of war. On 5 August, 3d Guards Tank Army entered Orel, and by 18 August, the Briansk Front had reached the approaches to the city for which it was named, completely eliminating the German salient in the region. The new offensive toward Kharkov, code named Rumiantsev, was to be launched by Voronezh and Steppe Fronts from the southern shoulder of the Kursk salient. Late in the day of 5 August 1943, the third day of Rumiantsev’s offensive, the forward tank elements were free to exploit deep into the German rear area. The same evening, the city of Belgorod fell, and Katukov’s and Rotmistrov’s tank armies reached a depth of over 60 kilometers behind the initial German lines. During the next few days, the combined-arms armies on both sides of the main attack sector began to press forward against the Germans from the north and east in an ever-widening ripple, each army joining in as its neighbor achieved a breakthrough. At this point, the German mobile reserves, hastily moving south from the heavy combat in the Orel region and north from the Donbas, where the earlier Soviet diversionary offensives had drawn them, attempted their usual task of counterattacking to break up the Soviet offensive, but the magic was gone. GD division detrained and entered combat immediately, before its forces were fully assembled. The most the division could achieve on 6-7 August was to delay 40th Army in its secondary attack to the west of the main offensive. Under cover of such local counterattacks, von Manstein assembled four infantry and seven panzer or motorized divisions. Former divisions of II SS Panzer Corps-now under the control of III Panzer Corps, since its parent corps had been summoned westward to deal with the crisis in Sicily-attempted to use the same maneuver schemes that they had employed when capturing Kharkov five months earlier. This time, however, it was the Germans rather than the Soviets who were worn down and overextended. On 11 August, the 1st Tank Army’s leading corps clashed with the SS at the key road junction of Bogodukhov, 30 kilometers northwest of Kharkov. Initially, the German forces halted the Soviets and severely mauled the leading three brigades of the 1st Tank Army. The next day, however, 5th Guards Tank Army sent reinforcements, and the Germans were fought to a draw between 13 and 17 August. German counterattack had failed to destroy a Soviet exploitation force. The two tank armies remained in possession of the ground, thereby ensuring seizure of the city of Kharkov by Konev’s rifle forces on 28 August. The Rumiantsev offensive, including the clash around the Bogodukhov, is usually referred to as the Belgorod-Kharkov operation by the Soviets and the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans. It marked the end of the Battle of Kursk, the last major German offensive in Russia, and the beginning of the Soviet summer-fall campaign.

David Glantz & Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed, PP. 167-170

“…Model’s retreat to the Hagen position brought to an end the chain of events directly associated with Zitadelle. Hitler had intended once more to make the world sit up and take notice. Instead, he had touched off a gigantic convulsion of the Eastern Front that weakened the armies in the East and left the Soviet Union in full possession of the initiative. By the time the divisions of Army Group Center moved into the Hagen position, the Soviet armies in the south were on the march again. The summer campaign was far from over…Employing the peculiar rippling effect that marked their offensives, the Russians, thwarted in one place, had shifted to others, adding weight to the offensive laterally. For the first time in the war they had the full strategic initiative, and they grasped it jealously without regard for economy of effort, tactical sophistication, or the danger of overreaching themselves. The Stavka, apparently worried that the Germans would try for a stalemate, aimed at keeping the enemy off balance and not letting him to establish a stable front anywhere in the Army Group Center and Army Group South sectors… In two and one-half months Army Groups Center and South had been forced back an average distance of 150 miles on a front 650 miles long. Economically, the Germans lost the most valuable territory they had taken in the Soviet Union. In an effort at least to deny the Soviet Union the fruits of these rich areas Hitler had initiated a scorched-earth policy. On reaching the Dnepr River the Soviet Army attained the original objectives of its summer offensive…”

Earl Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin. The German Defeat in the East, PP.-141-173
RichTO90 wrote: But most certainly during fall of 1943 and winter of 1943/1944 the Germans were forced to withdraw on many sections of the Ostfront.]
“…In four months the Soviet offensive machine had freed Leningrad, the Ukraine, and the Crimea and made inroads into Belorussia. Two of Hitler’s most effective operational leaders, Manstein and Kleist, lost their commands. In the process, 16 German divisions, comprising at least 50,000 troops, were wiped off the map through encirclement and attrition; another 60 divisions were reduced to skeletal strength. Whereas the late winter and spring of 1942-43 had been periods of rest and refitting for the Germans, the corresponding period of 1944 was one of unremitting struggle for survival. The German panzer and Waffen SS divisions rushed from place to place, shoring up the tottering defences….”

David Glantz & Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed, PP. 193-194

"... On 7 April 1944 Schoerner inspected the Crimea defences, pronounced them in excellent shape, and in reporting that the peninsula could be held ‘for a long time’ made one of the least accurate predictions of the war. The next morning Fourth Ukrainian Front attacked. The isthmus line held , but the Rumanian 10th division holding half of the Sivash bridgehead line was badly shaken the first day and collapsed the next. .. Hitler authorized a withdrawal to the Gneisenau line and, if necessary, to Sevastopol, but directed that Sevastopol was to be held indefinitely. Schoerner reported that the Gneisenau line and Sevastopol could not be held more than three or four weeks. On the 12th, Soviet tanks broke into the Gneisenau line in several places; the next day Simferopol was lost. On 16th April, the Russians close behind them, the Seventeenth Army rear guard went into the main Sevastopol line. Casualties in the first ten days numbered 13,131 Germans and 17,652 Rumanians. The ration strength of 17th Army stood at 75,546 Germans and 45,887 Rumanians… On the 28th April Hitler called Jaenecke to Berchtesgaden and promised him generous reinforcements. On 5 May the Russians hit the front north of Sevastopol. By the end of the day the Russians had smashed through to the Sapun Heigts, which gave them a clear field of observation over the whole beachhead to the tip of Cape Khersones. The next day the 17th Army regained its original north front but failed to retake the heights in the south. By then the losses were so great that it had become impossible to hold anywhere. That night Hitler agreed to let the army be evacuated. During the next four nights convoys with enough ships to take aboard all the troops stood off the cape, but some turned back to Constanta empty and others took aboard only a fraction og the men they could have carried. The Navy claimed that the whole cape was shrouded in smoke and the ships could not go inshore. The Chief of Staff, 17th Army, insisted visibility was always adequate for ships to have found their way into the inlets, but several whole convoys failed even to try. The result was a tragic fiasco. Of 64,700 men still at Sevastopol in the first week of May, 26,700 were left on the beach to fall into Soviet hands. In the aftermath the Commanding Admiral, Black Sea, and the Naval Commander, Crimea, were awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross; and Hitler ordered that neither Jaenecke nor Almendinger was to be given another command until a court-martial had resolved ‘the suspicion that all was not done that might have been done to hold the Crimea’…”

Earl Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin. The German Defeat in the East, PP.-291-295
RichTO90 wrote:
Your description of the West front does sound quite realistic, not surprising for a "FRONT" which hasn't seen any combat for 4 years since 1940...
Really? That would certainly surprise the Luftwaffe. And Heersgruppe Afrika. And Heersgruppe C. And so on. Are you really that truly ignorant of events?..
From June 1941 through December 1941 over three million German troops fought in the East, while less than a million struggled elsewhere, attended to occupied Europe, or rested in the homeland. From December 1941 through November 1942, while over nine million troops on both sides struggled in the East, the only significant ground action in the Western Theater took place in North Africa, where relatively small British forces engaged Rommel’s Africa Corps and its Italian allies. In November 1942, the British celebrated victory over the Germans at El-Alamein, defeating four German divisions and somewhat larger Italian force, and inflicting 60,000 Axis losses. The same month, at Stalingrad, the Soviets defeated and encircled the German Sixth Army, and smashed Rumanian Third and Fourth Armies, eradicating over 50 divisions and over 300,000 men from the Axis order of battle. By May 1943, the Allies had pursued Rommel’s Africa Corps across northern Africa into Tunisia, where, after heavy fighting, the German and Italian force of 250,000 surrendered. Meanwhile, in the East, another German Army (Second) was severely mauled, and Italian Eighth and Hungarian Second Armies were utterly destroyed, exceeding Axis losses in Tunisia. While over two million German and Soviet troops struggled at Kursk and five million later fought on a 600 –kilometer front from Smolensk to the Black Sea coast, in July 1943, Allied forces invaded Sicily, and drove 60,000 Germans from the island. In August, the Allies landed on the Italian peninsula. By October, when 2,5 million men of the Wehrmacht faced 6.6 million Soviets, the frontlines had stabilized in Italy south of Rome, as the Germans deployed a much smaller, although significant , number of troops to halt the Allies advance. By 1 October 1943, 2,565,000 men – representing 63% of the Wehrmacht’s total strength-struggled in the East, together with the bulk of the 300,000 Waffen SS troops. On 1 June 1944, 239 (two hundred thirty nine) or 62% of the German Army’s division equivalents fought in the East. With operations in Italy at a stalemate, until June 1944, the Wehrmacht still considered the West as a semi-reserve. In August 1944, after the opening of the second front, while 2.1 million Germans fought in the East, 1 million opposed Allied operations in France…. Casualty figures underscore this reality. From September 1939 to September 1942, the bulk of the German Army’s 922,000 dead, missing, and disabled could be credited to combat in the East. Between 1 September 1942 and 20 November 1943, this grim count rose to 2,077,000, again primarily in the East. From June through November 1944, after the opening of the second front, the German Army suffered another 1,457,000 irrevocable losses. Of this number, 903,000 (62%) were lost in the East. Finally, after losing 120,000 men in the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans suffered another 2 million losses, two thirds at Soviet hands from 1 January 1945 to 30 April 1945. Total Wehrmacht losses to 30 April 1945 amounted to 11,135,500 including 6,035,000 wounded. Of these, almost 9,000,000 fell in the East. German armed forces’ losses to war’s end numbered 13,488,000 men (75% of the mobilized forces and 46% of the 1939 male population of Germany). Of these, 10,758,000 fell or were taken prisoner in the East. Today, the stark inscription “died in the East” that is carved on countless thousands of headstones in scores of German cemeteries bears mute witness to the carnage in the East, where the will and strength of the Wehrmacht perished….”

David Glantz & Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed, PP. 282-284

Best Regards from Russia,

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#265

Post by Michate » 22 Apr 2005, 12:51

OK, although by doing this I am violating some personal SOP, just a few comments to a few weak points in the otherwise well written book "When Titans clashed":
On 1 June 1944, 239 (two hundred thirty nine) or 62% of the German Army’s division equivalents fought in the East.
This passage clearly shows how figures, once they are out in the air, start a life of their own, and also the danger of imprecise language or terminology coupled with the will to proof certain points even in respectable works. IMHO this also shows the need for such discussions as above, tedious as they are.
Finally, after losing 120,000 men in the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans suffered another 2 million losses, two thirds at Soviet hands from 1 January 1945 to 30 April 1945. Total Wehrmacht losses to 30 April 1945 amounted to 11,135,500 including 6,035,000 wounded. Of these, almost 9,000,000 fell in the East. German armed forces’ losses to war’s end numbered 13,488,000 men (75% of the mobilized forces and 46% of the 1939 male population of Germany). Of these, 10,758,000 fell or were taken prisoner in the East. Today, the stark inscription “died in the East” that is carved on countless thousands of headstones in scores of German cemeteries bears mute witness to the carnage in the East, where the will and strength of the Wehrmacht perished….”
Well, this passage is based on the uncritical acceptance of Krivosheev's "calculation" of German losses and their distribution by Glantz and House (just look into the appendix of WTC to see the origin of the quoted figures). I wonder if Krivosheev ever stumbled about the fact that the Western allies took over 7 million German prisoners, the vast majority of them in the last weeks or end of the war. And I can only hope his calculations of Soviet losses are more credible.

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#266

Post by Victor » 22 Apr 2005, 15:46

Igorn, not everybody that has different opinion than yours is a Nazi simpathyzer. Insulting other members doesn't contribute to proving your point in a discussion.

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#267

Post by Andreas » 24 Apr 2005, 11:13

RichTO90 wrote:But most certainly during fall of 1943 and winter of 1943/1944 the Germans were forced to withdraw on many sections of the Ostfront.
Rich, I think that you are a bit generous here. Between fall 1943 and the end of the winter campaign, the Germans retreated across the whole of the front (ignoring the 20th Mountain Army), i.e. not 'many', but all of its sections.

Beginning in the south:

- evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead, inability to deny Soviet landings on the Crimea
- Retreat from the Mius and Kharkov to the Dnestr and the pre-war border with Romania, inability to hold on to the Dnepr leading to Cherkassy encirclement.
- AG South split in two with the loss of Tarnopol, encirclement of 1st Panzer Army.
- Retreat of the northern wing of AG South to the Carpathians and Brody/L'vov approaches
- Creation of the Wehrmachtsloch across the Pripjet - up to 100km between AG South and Centre with almost no Germans in it
- AG Centre retreats during the autumn, losing Orel, then Smolensk, finally manages to hold on to Vitebsk and Orsha. But this creates the Wehrmachts balcony just north of the Wehrmachtsloch.
- AG North retreats (routs) from the Leningrad approaches to the Baltics

I can not think of a single point in the frontline held in autumn 1943 that was still held in June 1944. The closest was around Vitebsk, but even there the Germans had to retreat, at least according to Ziemke's maps.

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#268

Post by MARABA » 24 Apr 2005, 11:40

Andreas wrote:
RichTO90 wrote:But most certainly during fall of 1943 and winter of 1943/1944 the Germans were forced to withdraw on many sections of the Ostfront.
Russia won the II World War. It engaged 80% of German military and inflicted 80% of casualties on the overall German force. It significantly expanded its territory. It surrounded itself with the Eastern Block. Most importantly, it came a long way from an isolated international pariah and emerged a major military force. For decades ahead it secured a high moral ground in the histories of the war.
Its success is especially impressive since it came unexpected to all. By the beginning of the war with Germany, Russia had an inexperienced, recently purged army, where ideology played much greater role than professionalism. Its extensive military did not achieve in quality what it did in quantity. Its economy was considered backward and incapable to adjust quickly. A significant part of its population hated Moscow and later collaborated with the Axis.

Yet above the victory, for the Russian people the war was a tragedy. The author stays with the conservative estimate of 25 million Russians dead. For generations of Russian people, the War was a sacred topic, the symbol of righteous sacrifice. For them, accepting the recently publicized conclusions that some aspects of the war were much less than heroic and many Russian deaths might have been unjustified, is a tall order. The central character of the book's drama, Stalin, for all his ability to master detail, was a terrible military strategist. His main desire for a military campaign was to be on the offensive. Against military advice, he ordered numerous attacks in the first year of the war, which led to numerous "bayonet charges" against German machine guns. In the spring of '42, he ordered an attack on Kharkov, which led to the encirclement of 3 armies. All this perhaps cost Russians hundreds of thousands of lives. Stalin misjudged Hitler's resolve to strike. In 1941 he mistakenly thought Hitler would direct his main forces towards the Russian South, when in fact the main strike was towards Moscow. In the spring of 1942, Stalin guessed that Hitler would try to reach Moscow, whereas now the German generals were after the oil- and grain- rich Russian South. Stalin appears most insightful when, starting with the battle of Stalingrad, he abstained from imposing his will and let the professional military commanders be in charge. Given all this, the conclusion of the important positive role Stalin played in the war is surprising.

The undisputed mass heroism of Soviet people during the war is tainted by the government's methods of pushing its people into the battle. A Russian commander knew that unless he clearly stayed in front of his troops on the battlefield, according to the Order 270 of August 1941, issued just 2 months after the start of the conflict, he could be demoted to a private or shot on the spot. This led to a mass loss of commanding officers, who were easily spotted and taken out by the enemy. According to the same order, prisoners of war were equated to "malevolent deserters", to be killed on the spot, their families subject to arrest (for commanders) or to be taken off the state assistance programs (for lower ranks). The NKVD troops, terrorizing the military, were joined briefly in the second half of 1942 by zagradotryady (created to shoot anyone who failed to go forward). One can only guess at how many instances of desperate heroism were provoked by these measures.


Written by Gene Zafrin (Dobbs Ferry, NY)
Source: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/de ... 0?v=glance
[edited by moderator]

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#269

Post by Andreas » 24 Apr 2005, 11:59

What's your point?

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#270

Post by Qvist » 24 Apr 2005, 13:21

Hi Michate
1. Date: 7.11.1943 (situation of 15.10.1943)
East: 3,900,000
Finland: 180,000
Norway: 315,000
Denmark: 110,000
West: 1,370,000
Italy: 330,000
Balkans: 610,000
Sum: 6,815,000
Source: Materialien zum Vortrag des Chefs des Wehrmachtführungsstabes vom 7.11.1943 "Die strategische Lage am Anfang des fünften Kriegsjahres", (referenced to KTB OKW, IV, S. 1534 ff.)
I am having some trouble squaring this completely with the referenced document in the KTB OKW (which, incidentally, was for the Gauleiters in Munich on 7 november 1943). The document contains the following figures, scattered about here and there in this long brief :

- "Eigene Kräfte in Norwegen betragen 380,000 mann" (p.1548)
- Finland, roughly as stated (Geb.=AOK 20: 176,800 Mann, p.1547)
- Dänemark: "Insgesamt eingesätzte Verbände aller Wehrmachtteile: 106,500 Mann". (p.1548)
- Strength in the West, as stated (p.1549)
- Italy: "Gesamtverpflegungsstärke aller Wehrmachtteile mit Gefolge etwas über 400,000" (p.1550)
- Southeast, as stated (or rather, 612,000 men) (p.1551)
- "Eigene Stärke im Osten: 4,183,000 mann" (p.1552). This however includes 10 Rumanian and 6 Hungarian divisions.

cheers

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