Post
by Qvist » 10 Jul 2006 11:05
Hi Alex
No problem with the English, I understand you just fine.
Thanks for that. My point wasn't so much that Krivosheev's tank loss figures can't possily be wrong - that is a question that can only be answered by investigating his and other relevant sources, which I am in no position to do. I note with interest that other researchers seem to draw different conclusions, to put it like that.
My point was more that if Krivosheev's figures are inaccurate generally, the reason can't be that he has been including vehicles subsequently repaired by field shops - at least not intentionally.
I don't have the book in front of me right now, but in his overall tables for equipment losses he provides figures for the number of tanks held at the beginning of each year, and deliveries and losses duringthe intervening periods. These figures correspond - ie, stock at the beginning of 1942 minus losses suffered in 42 plus deliveries in 42 is equal to stock on 0101 43.
Unfortunately he does not clarify the precise content of the terms, at least not in the English edition. However - if "deliveries" included field-repaired vehicles but losses only destroyed tanks, or "deliveries" only factory-delivered vehicles but losses both damaged and destroyed tanks, then the totality of deliveries and losses would not equal the development in stock, which they do. Hence, the figures must neccessarily reflect:
either
a) the number of tanks delivered from factory and the number of tanks irrevocably lost
or
b) the number of tanks delivered from factory and field shops and the number of tanks lost or damaged.
Since the delivery figures are almost identical to the production figures cited in f.e. Zaloga/Ness it seems clear that they cannot include vehicles repaired and delivered from field shops. Hence, the losses figure must refer to permanently disabled tanks - otherwise the RKKA inventory of tanks would in reality be much, much higher than Krivosheev cites.
Now, it is of course possible that the tank loss figures Krivosheev cites for operations are generally nonetheless on a different basis, and include damaged vehicles also. If so however, if you add together the losses in all the major operations of a year, you should get a very high figure compared to the stated overall tank losses for that year, since the number of damaged vehicles is normally much higher than the number of write-off losses. In 1945, the losses given for the major operations (Budapest op., Vistula-Oder op., Western Carpathian str off op, East Prussian str off op, East Pomeranian str off op, Vienna str off op, Berlin str off op, Prague str off op) amount to a combined 10,917. The total for the year is 13,700 (of whom 5,000 is SPGs, it must be recalled). As the Budapest losses were substantially incurred in 1944, this would leave 3-4000 machines lost in the fighting beyond the major operations as listed above, which seems plausible. This does not appear to me to allow for the possibility that Kriovsheev's tank loss figures for the operations includes a large number of damaged and subesequently repaired tanks and SPGs. And due to the consistency of different figures, if that is the case, then the delivery figures must be correspondingly too high, or the strength figures correspondingly too low.
That is of course is on the general level, and does not in itself rule out anything regarding a specific figure for a specific operation. But it would be strange if Krivosheev's figure for the Berlin operation was on a different footing from what he uses generally, and at least I do not think it can be assumed without strong proof.
An alternative explanation, if other research can strongly source a lower loss figure for the Berlin operation specifically, might perhaps be delayed reporting (ie, that some of these losses were in fact suffered in earlier fighting)? I have seen comments to his equipment loss figures for operations in late 41 that suggest this, but that would of course be much less likely in 1945 than in that chaotic year.
cheers
