Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

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Operation Chahar / Peiking –Suiyuan Railway Operation

Post by asiaticus » 23 Nov 2006 20:26

Known by the Japanese as チャハル作戦, Operation Quhar and variously by the Chinese as the 长城抗战 (Battle of the Great Wall), or Peiking – Suiyuan Railway Operation. This campaign occurred in August 1937 following the Battle of Beiping-Tianjin at the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. This was the second attack by Kwangtung Army and the Mongol forces of Prince Teh Wang on Inner Mongolia after the failure of the Suiyuan Campaign (1936). The Chahar Expeditionary Force was under the direct command of General Hideki Tojo, the chief of staff of Kuangtung Army. A second force from the Peiping Railway Garrison Force, later the 1st Army under General Kiyoshi Katsuki was also involved in the attack from the south at Nankou.

The Chinese forces opposing this invasion of Suiyuan were the Suiyuan Pacification Headquarters under the command of General Yen Hsi–shan. Fu Zuoyi governor of Suiyuan was made commander of the 7th Army Group and Liu Ju-ming, governor of Chahar was made its deputy commander, defending Chahar with 143rd Division and two Brigades. General Tang Enbo was sent by Chiang Kai-shek with 13th and 17th Corps from the Central Army and made Frontline Commander in Chief. 1st Cavalry Corps was in Chahar under the command of Chiao Cheng-shou facing the Mongolian forces of Teh Wang.

Battle of Nankou

On August 8th the Japanese 11th Independent Mixed Brigade, commanded by Gen. Shigiyasu Suzuki began their attack on the left flank of the 13th Corps position at Nankou but were thwarted after three days by the difficult terrain and stubborn resistance of the Chinese. A new attack on August 11th supported by tanks and aircraft took Nankou Station after which Gen. Suzuki's brigade advanced on Juyong Pass.
That same day, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the activation of the 14th Army Group (10th, 83rd and 85th Divisions) under Gen. Wei Li-huang. Coming by rail from Yingchia-chuang to Yi Hsien, elements of it were sent on a ten day march through the plains west of Peiking in a turning movement in support of Tang Enbo's forces. 1st Army made attacks on the Japanese forces in Lianghsiang and Chaili to distract them and sent a detachment to Heilung Pass to cover 14th Army Groups advance.

On Aug 12th, Tang Enbo's army counterattacked surrounding the Japanese cutting them off from their supplies and communications. On Aug 14th, Itagaki Seishiro's 5th Division was sent to the relief of the 11th IMB at Juyongguan.

On August 16th, Itagaki arrived at Nankou and began an enveloping attack on the right flank of 13th Corps making a five pronged attack at Huanglaoyuan. 7th Brigade of 4th Division under Shih Chueh was moved to block this move and reinforcements of Li Hsien-chou's 21st Division and Chu Huai-ping's 94th Division were brought up, engaging in days of heavy fighting. On August 17th General Yen His-shan, Director of the Taiyuan Pacification Headquarters, directed 7th Army under Fu Zuoyi to move its 72nd Division and three brigades by rail from Tatung to Huailai to reinforce Gen. Tang Enbo's forces.

Battle the Great Wall

Meanwhile in northern Chahar the Chinese 1st Cavalry Corps captured Shangtu, Nanhaochan, Shangyi and Huateh from the puppet Mongolian Army of Prince Teh Wang. Elements of 143rd Division took Chungli, while its main force reached Changpei. During this Chinese advance the Japanese Chahar Expeditionary Force under Lt. General Hideki Tojo composed of the mechanized 1st Independent Mixed Brigade and the 2nd and 15th Mixed Brigade gathered for a counteroffensive from Changpei to Kalgan.

From August 18th to 19th the Chahar Expeditionary Force counterattacked from Changpei, and took Shenweitaiko on the Great Wall and Hanno Dam. The scattered and poorly equipped Chinese forces were unable to stop them and they now threatened the Peiking – Suiyuan Railway at Kalgan. On the 20th Gen. Fu Zuoyi's 7th Army diverted its 200th and 211th Brigades moving south by rail to join Gen. Tang Enbo's forces back to defend Kalgan, while its remaining 72nd Division arrived to reinforce Chenpien and and 7th Separate Brigade to defend the rail head at Huailai.

On August 21st, the Japanese forces broke through at the cities of Hengling and Chenpien. Gen. Tang En-po's forces awaiting reinforcement, but having suffered over 50% casualties, still defended Huailai, Chuyung Pass and Yenching. Liu Ju-ming's 143rd Divison fell back to defend Kalgan from the advancing Japanese.

On August 23rd, as Itagaki Seishiro's 5th Division pushed toward Huailai from Chenpien against Ma Yen-shou's 7th Separate Brigade, advance elements of the 14th Army Group arrived on the Japanese flank at Chingpaikou, driving off the Japanese outpost there and contacted the Japanese forces advancing to Chenpien and the front beyond. However they were delayed in crossing the Yungting River and their attack was delayed until it was too late to stop the Japanese advance, and due to poor communications they failed to link up with Gen. Tang En-po's forces. After 8 days and 8 nights fighting, Itagaki on Aug 24th, linked up with Kwantung army's 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade at Xiahuayuan.

On August 26th, Gen. Tang En-po's forces were ordered to break out toward the Sangchien River while Liu Ju-ming's forces were ordered to withdraw to the far side of the Hsiang-yang River.

On August 29th the Japanese Oui Column moved south from Tushihkou, and on the 30th attacked Yenching via Chihcheng, After repulsing the attack 17th Corps withdrew to join the rest of Tang En-po on the far side of the the Sangchien River.

Kalgan/Zhangjiakou, fell Sept. 3, and after Gen. Fu Zuoyi's 200th and 211th Brigades failed in a counterattack to recapture it and fell back to the west to defend the railway to Suiyuan at Chaikoupao. This brought and end to Operation Chahar.

September 4th, the South Charhar Government was set up at Kalgan. After the fall of Kalgan, Chahar's "complete independence" from China was declared by "100 influential persons," headed by the 36-year-old Prince Teh, a pro-Japanese Mongolian, of the "Inner Mongolia for Inner Mongolians" movement whose Mongolian troops helped the Japanese to take Kalgan.


Sources:
[1] Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, History of The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) 2nd Ed. ,1971. Translated by Wen Ha-hsiung , Chung Wu Publishing; 33, 140th Lane, Tung-hwa Street, Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China.
Pg. 180- 184
Map 3

[2] Jowett, Phillip S. , Rays of The Rising Sun, Armed Forces of Japan’s Asian Allies 1931-45, Volume I: China & Manchuria, 2004. Helion & Co. Ltd., 26 Willow Rd., Solihul, West Midlands, England.

[3] RESISTANCE WARS
http://www.uglychinese.org/war.htm#Ichigo
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Orbats for Operation Chahar / Peiking – Suiyuan Railway Oper

Post by asiaticus » 23 Nov 2006 20:29


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more on Operation Chahar:

Post by asiaticus » 05 Dec 2006 02:30

more on Operation Chahar:
the Oui Column, Manchukuoan forces involved, and a Japanese map of the operation.

Oui Column in Aug. 1937 Operation Chahar?

viewtopic.php?t=111890

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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 29 Jul 2016 15:19

Hello to all :D; a little more on the first stage of this war..................................

The "China Incident" (Lukouchiao), a point of view.

Japan's major interest on the continent was to husband Manchuria. It could not and would not relinquish Manchuria, from which it had expelled Chinese and Russian powers at the cost of two wars. In the 1930s the major threat to Manchuria was posed by the Soviet forces. North China was the rear of Japan's defense against this threat. As the Kuomintang's national unification proceeded, the Kuantung Army became preoccupied with the question of how to neutralize China in the event of a conflict with Russia.

In 1932 Japan risked an initial collision in Shanghai; it was a dress rehearsal for later and more serious attempts, though the Chinese defense of the city area was not without credit. In 1933, it strengthened its position in Manchukuo by adding Jehol. The Soviets were not idle; at the expense of China, they occupied Outer Mongolia; its capital, Ulan Bator, became headquarters of the XXXIII Russian Corps, as a token of sovereignty.

Soviet influence supported Red Chinese armies in South China and Kansu; Chiang Kai-shek waged several campaigns against them, on his own account. Japan regarded the spread of communist influence with a jaundiced eye; along the Amur and on the line Chabarowsk—Vladivostok, both opponents developed fortified positions; an eventual showdown was practicable only via Ulan—Bator against the Siberian railway. As a preliminary strategic condition for this plan, the Peking—Tientsin area was needed for military concentrations, and the five Chinese provinces, Shantung, Hopei, Chahar, Shensi and Suiyuan, had to be brought under Japanese influence.

On one hand, Japan maintained a garrison in north China to guard its embassy and protect the rights of its nationals.This force, known as the China Garrison Army, was composed of one infantry brigade, one field artillery regiment and one tank unit. Its main strength was stationed in Tienching with small units in the vicinity of Peiping and along the Peiping-Linghai Railway.

On the other hand, the Chinese had the 29th Army in north China, commanded by Sung Che-yuan, a war lord from Hopeh and Chahar Provinces, and was composed of four divisions, two independent brigades, two cavalry divisions and one cavalry brigade.

This was the situation when a detachment of the 37th Chinese Division opened fire on a Japanese company engaged in night maneuvers on 7 July in the vicinity of the Marco Polo bridge. Thus the outbreak of the war cannot be explained solely in terms of Japanese actions. Who fired the mysterious shots at Lukouchiao will perhaps never be known.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 06 Aug 2016 18:43

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Concentration and strategic deployment.

The sequence of operations follows an almost orthodox professional pattern, i.e., the step-by-step progress of modern war, from the seizure of suitable concentration areas, under the protection of covering forces (which may have to engage in serious preliminary fighting) to the strategic advance and development, in accord with a prearranged plan of campaign.

Seizure of a concentration area: Armies are not assembled in haphazard fashion; serious administrative and logistic problems will have to be met, adequate road and railroad nets, shelter for the concentration and space for the eventual strategic deployment are required; the Peking—Tientsin area satisfied all requirements, as a line of departure of sufficient width, with rail lines to the zone of the interior (i.e., Manchukuo) and the Tientsin—Taku port, as an oversea's advance base for shipments from Japan. In sharp, localized fighting, Japanese covering forces seized Peking and Tientsin, 26 and 29 July.

On 25 July, the 38th Division of the Chinese 29th Army* launched a surprise attack against a Japanese signal unit engaged in repairing the telephone lines in the vicinity of Langfang station on the Pei-ping-Linghai railway. An infantry company of the China Garrison Army stationed nearby to protect the railway successfully defended the station throughout the night but suffered heavy casualties.

The following day the China Garrison Army lodged a strong protest and demanded that the Chinese forces be withdrawn from the Lukouchiao area within 24 hours. This demand was disregarded and, about sunset that day, an infantry battalion of the China Garrison Army returning to Peiping to protect the Japanese nationals within the walled city, was attacked by Chinese troops as it was passing through the Kuangan Gate. The Japanese troops suffered heavy casualties.

Operations of the covering force. In the last weeks of July, Japanese covering forces drove their opponents south of the Yung-ting River; this secured a line of departure for the advance to the south, but the west flank of their concentration, in direction of Nankow, Suiyuan and the Soviets, remained open.

On 28 July, therefore, the China Garrison Army, supported by one emergency mobilized division, two mixed brigades (one of which was mechanized) and one air group, opened its attack and, by the 30th, had forced the Chinese in the vicinity of Peiping and Tien-ching to retreat to the south of the Yungting Ho.

* The 29th Chinese Army (30, 31, 33, 37, 38 Div.)

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 13 Aug 2016 15:25

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Concentration and strategic deployment.

Being aware of the limited strength of the China Garrison Army and fearing that it might not be possible to localize the incident, on July 19, Central Authorities mobilized the 5th, 6th and 10th Divisions and the Provisional Air Group in Japan and dispatched them as reinforcements to north China to meet the threat of the armies under the direct command of Chiang Kai-shek, which had advanced into southern Hopeh Province.

On 28 July, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Song Zheyuan to retreat to Paoting in southern Hebei province. Over the next two days, intense fighting took place in Tianjin, where the Chinese forces put up a stiff resistance, but subsequently the Chinese retreated south along the lines of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

On 4 August, General Liu Ruzhen's remaining forces withdrew into Chahar. Isolated, Beiping was captured by the Japanese without further resistance on 8 August 1937. General Masakazu Kawabe entered the city on 18 August in a military parade.

On 6 August, the Nanching Government, determined to enter the war, transferred reinforcements to the Peiping-Tienching area from Chahar Province and the Peiping-Hankou railway area.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka
LIFE 23 Ago 1937

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 20 Aug 2016 14:22

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations of the covering force.

The Chinese moved elements of one division via Calgan and quickly occupied Nankow Pass. The Japanese sent a motorized column, 4000 men and 6oo vehicles, initially as a covering force, and then threw mass against the position in a combination of frontal attack envelopment and took Nankow Pass. The Japanese pressed south, in pursuit, while their Mongol ally, Prince Teh, took Calgan in rear of the Chinese defenders.

The war of the railroads.

With the south and west boundaries of the concentration area secured, the assembly of a field army of modern composition of 200,000 to 300,000 men proceeded methodically during August; the Japanese were opposed, on a broad front of approximately 160 miles, by three times their number, but their opponents were inadequately organized, with incomplete artillery and transport.

The subsequent advance of the Japanese, i.e., the skeleton framework of their campaign, was strongly influenced by the existing rail net, in a country generally devoid of modern communications and adequate highways.

Four rail lines of the greatest strategical significance traverse North China:

The line: Peking - Suiyuan, via the Nankow Pass.
The line: Haichow - Suchow - Kaifeng - Sian, the so-called "Lunghai"
The line: Tientsin - Tsinan - Nanking, the so-called "Tsinpu."
The line: Peking - Kaifeng - Hankow, the so-called "Pinghan."

While motor transport has become an important item of modern high-speed communication, it can only supplement but never replace railroads; a standard train of 45 cars will deliver 1500 tons; it would be uneconomical, for long hauls, to attempt this volume with trucks; the enormous consumption of class I, II and III supplies for several hundred thousand men is clearly dependent on "volume delivery," i.e., railroads. The broad lines of the Japanese offensive, in this theater of war, were fixed by the available railroad net.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka
LIFE 23 Ago 1937

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 27 Aug 2016 13:56

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations on the North Front: 1937.

The advance to the south to the Hoang-Ho was conducted in three columns: on the east, General Katsuki followed the "Tsinpu" railroad; in the center, General Nishio advanced along the "Pinghan"; in the west, Itagaki, initially based on Tatung on the Suiyuan railway, moved on Taiyuan into Shansi province. Prince Teh, Japan's Mongol ally, operated along the Suiyuan railway into Outer-Mongolia. The objective of these columns was the seizure of the Lunghai corridor and the control of the northern provinces. The progress of the three main columns was comparatively swift; in less than three months, the Japanese had overrun approximately half of the northern provinces, a lineal advance of about 300 miles, along a 200-mile front. Each column encountered successive defensive positions of considerable strength: the east column at Tsang-tschau, September 24, the center column at Pauting and Schikiachwang, October 10, the west column at the Jengmen Pass; this column, incidentally, narrowly escaped destruction in a clever Chinese trap.

The initial operations of the Japanese columns advancing south of Peking and Tientsin along the "Pinghan" and "Tsinpu" railroads is characteristic of the war of the railroads and the nature of Japanese maneuver.

On August 22, the 26th Chinese Army (6 divisions) held a front from Liuliho to vicinity of Tsinghai; the flanks, i.e., rail lines, were held strongly while the center, along the Hun-ho, was covered by one and one-half divisions only. Count Terauchi, the Japanese commander in chief, decided on a breakthrough in the center, with preliminary enveloping attacks against the flanks.

Sept. 11: The Japanese left wing took Matschang, wading hip-deep in flooded terrain, and advanced slowly on Tsangtschau. Chinese reserves were attracted to this front.

Sept. I5: The right wing began the attack against the strong positions of Fangchan and Liuliho. Chinese reserves were drawn to this area.

Sept. 16: The breakthrough is launched at Kuan, with the infantry supported by tanks, heavy artillery and attack aviation; reserves moved through the gap on Tschotschau, in rear of the weakened Chinese position, and took the town on September 17; another detachment moved on Tinghsing to block the Chinese line of retreat.

The Chinese 26th Army, seriously endangered by encirclement, barely made good its escape to the southwest. The Chinese High Command attempted to reorganize along the line: Yitschau—Tsangtschau; the Japanese continued pressure to the south, and this front was kept in motion until December.

This swift advance, based on railroads, slowed down in December, primarily because events on the South Front became of paramount interest.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 03 Sep 2016 13:15

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations on the South Front: Shanghai—Nanking, 1937.

On 9 August, Lieut. Ojama, a marine officer, was killed by Chinese police within the international settlement. Two days later, a Japanese naval squadron appeared before Shanghai and landed 4000 marines; thereafter, reinforcements had to be fed into this sector, until it became a major theater of operations. The storm broke on 13 August; fighting continued with increasing intensity for three and one-half months.

Bridgehead operations. The Japanese were faced by markedly superior numbers from the outset. The character of their initial operations was clearly that of joint army-navy actions, landing operations, the establishment and expansion of bridgeheads for a coordinated, general advance into the interior.

Under the protective fire from Japanese warships, the initial Japanese bridgeheads at Hongkiu Park and Yukong wharf were precariously held against immense pressure. The narrow bridgehead was enlarged by a landing nine miles north of Shanghai, at Wusung. Five days later, the flanking maneuver of 1932 was repeated and a landing effected at Liuho, in spite of notoriously unfavorable shore conditions.

From now on, the newly appointed Japanese commander, General Iwane Matsui, engaged in step-by-step fighting of increasing ferocity, gaining and losing ground on the front, Liuho—Shanghai. Both opponents steadily increased their forces until an estimated 120,000 Japanese were battering against 300,000 defenders in the Shanghai corridor.

September rains delayed a serious offensive in a veritable morass of canals; mechanized vehicles and heavy artillery were immobilized; supplies had to be handled by coolie carriers and 5000 pack animals—a nice example of Japanese foresight. Reinforced to 225,000, Matsui attacked late in October and forced the Chinese to rearward lines. On 6 November, the outflanking maneuver of Liuho was repeated: two divisions landed 30 miles behind the Chinese lines, and their south flank was opened. Shifting to the north on 13 November, that flank was then attacked, and the Chinese withdrew to the "winter-line," a previously prepared strong position.

This position rested on the south on a series of lakes, regarded as a serious tactical obstacle; the resourceful Japanese enveloped this flank, employing flatboats and motor launches of Japanese make; simultaneously, a successful penetration of the center was staged in seizing Suchou through a bold coup-de-main; this brought on the collapse of the "winter-line"; thereafter, the Chinese engaged in delaying action in successive positions; once again, the envelopment of a flank, the transport of troops across Tai Lake, turned the new position and by forced marches the
Japanese reached Nanking on 12 December. A southern column took Wuhu, on the upper Yangtse, to cut off the retreat of the remnants of the Chinese forces, while the main body attacked the city of Nanking from three sides; the city fell within a few hours.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 10 Sep 2016 15:02

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations against the Lunghai corridor, 1938.

(1) Tactical and strategical considerations. In the wake of the collapse of the Shanghai Army, its remnants withdrew in various directions; the Japanese High Command saw no reason to pursue them in a major effort. An immediate advance on Hankow presented a difficult line of communications except via the Yangtze River, which was still blocked by a number of booms.

An advance northward, in direction of Suchow, was of greater promise, especially if coordinated with an advance toward the south by the left wing of Terauchi's Northern Army. The Lunghai railroad, it will be recalled, is a great arterial line, a "rocade", linking the "Tsinpu" and "Pinghan" railroads, and represents in its western branch (Kaifeng—Sian) the gate to Russia and the point of entry of a continuous stream of war materiel.

A simultaneous, coordinated advance from the north and south would cut this artery in vicinity of Suchow (Hsuchou), an important rail center, encircle the Chinese forces in that area, or push them westward; consequently, the Lunghai corridor became the next Japanese objective.

It is obvious that the capture of Suchow in itself could not have an immediate decisive effect; it was expected that Chinese reinforcements would pour into this area—and they did; Chiang Kai-shek made the defense of the Lunghai the great military issue of this war. The entire length of the "Lunghai" was bound to be affected; Suchow became one of several objectives; indeed, the Kaifeng area farther west was even more important as the junction of the "Lunghai" with the "Pinghan" railroad over which all Chinese troops in the corridor were supplied from Hankow.

The Napoleonic concept of the Japanese High Command was never more clearly demonstrated than when it shifted from the initial attack on Suchow, as it slowed down, to extend to the west and threaten the entire "Lunghai" front, with the main effort in direction of Kaifeng; when it was found later on that the mass of Chinese forces was committed within the corridor, the Japanese quickly shifted again, resumed operations in Shantung and forced a decision in the battle of Suchow. The subsequent advance west, in an envelopment, while the line of the Lunghai was contained frontally cleared the corridor in hard fighting and opened the avenue for an advance on Hankow, the last stronghold of organized Chinese resistance.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 17 Sep 2016 22:13

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations against the Lunghai corridor, 1938.

(2) Operations in Shantung. The Japanese Second Army, in the north, faced Tsinan; the crossing of the Hoangho was effected on 23 December. Tsinan fell on the twenty-seventh; the Chinese Shantung divisions, under a lukewarm commander, offered feeble resistance. Tsingtau was taken and fresh troops started west from this port. The Japanese right wing, however, ran into stiff resistance along the Grand Canal; by mid February, the line stabilized on the front: Tsining—Yihsien.

The advance of the First Army from the south, in three columns, made fair progress initially; the Wai River line was reached by the end of January, but strong Chinese counterattack held their opponents thereafter on the front: Pengpu—Huntze Lake.

(3) Advance on Kaifeng—Chengchow. The advance of the Japanese First and Second Army was not only stopped but seriously hampered by continuous Chinese counteroffensives; the Japanese estimated that this effort must have drawn forces from western "Lunghai"; consequently early in February, they reinforced their Third Army on the Changte Front and began an advance in several columns. They succeeded in reaching the north bank of the Hoangho and holding it generally in spite of serious Chinese counterattacks; this army thereafter remained in position as a threat to the vital Kaifeng—Chengchow area.

(4) Operations in Shansi. The Eighth Chinese Army (Communistic) and numerous guerrilla had been able to threaten all Japanese communications in this province, thereby constituting a constant threat against the right of the Japanese northern armies. Operating from Tayuan, the Japanese Fourth Army advanced generally along the Tayuan—Tungkwan Railroad and parallel mountain roads; elevations of 7000 feet give an indication of the terrain difficulties encountered; the Japanese detached a force from Changte, to take the Chinese in rear; this detachment covered 140 miles in six days. By the end of February, the Japanese reached the Hoangho and established an effective western barrier and flank security for the ensemble of their armies in the east.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 24 Sep 2016 16:30

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations against the Lunghai corridor, 1938.

(5) The Chinese Counteroffensive: Tayerchwang. The center of gravity shifted from the western end of the Lunghai to its eastern mouth and the railroad junction Hsuchou.

In this sector the Japanese slowly continued south in the direction of Hsuchou and reached the line: Tsining—Tayerchwang. Chiang Kai-shek, in the meanwhile, had amassed enormous reinforcements in this area, evidently for a major counteroffensive; the numerical superiority over the Japanese forces was estimated at 6 to 1. In reckless attacks, the Chinese seriously endangered their opponents; the precarious Japanese communications to the north were cut repeatedly; Tayerchwang changed hands several times.

For the first time in recent history a Japanese unit was to be defeated, although through overwhelming numbers. Japanese reinforcements, in particular the 10th (Isogai) and 11th (Itagaki) Divisions, attempted to regain lost terrain; in bitter fighting, from 27 March to April, they took Tayerchwang only to find themselves completely cut off; escape to the east was blocked by inundations, since the Chinese had blown up the levees of the Grand Canal; 30 tanks, 77 field pieces and hundreds of trucks were mired; the Japanese lost heavily; only General Itagaki, with a few thousands, cut his way through to the north where he took up and held a defensive position at Ishien. The remnants of Isogai's Division were massacred.

Stung to the quick, the Japanese rushed reinforcements to this front; both North and South Armies were increased by four divisions each; nevertheless, the Japanese were still confronted by superior numbers, an unsatisfactory ratio that prevailed throughout this war, and a tell-tale index of the efficacy of troops with adequate modern equipment over improvised organizations.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 02 Oct 2016 21:09

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations against the Lunghai corridor, 1938.

(6) Japanese major offensive: Hsuchou, May 1938. In the first week of May, both Japanese armies began a coordinated advance on Hsuchou, from the north and south; the five columns (corps) of the northern army, from right to left, advanced on the following objectives:

First column: West of Tsining (TSI) on Kweiteh (KW)
Second column: Vicinity Tsining on Tangshan (T)
Third column: Tsining on Hsuchou
Fourth column: Tsuhsien (TS) on Tayerchwang (TA)
Fifth column: Itchou (IT)—Tancheng (TAN) on Sinanchen (S).

The southern army started its advance: on the right, Sato's column reached Funing (F); his neighbor was stopped at Sunsien (S). The main column, following the Peking Railroad, ran into stiff resistance at Kuchen (K) and Menchen (M), but by a series of outflanking movements with motorized units pushed northward to Yungchen (Y) and finally Hsiashin (H); this column, with 40 tanks and heavy artillery, ran into a fresh Chinese division, poorly armed, and broke right through it; that night, 6,000 Chinese attacked the Japanese, in bivouac, in corral formation, but were repulsed. The Chinese fought gallantly in every sector of this widely dispersed battle area.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.
Resistance and Revolution in China. The Communists and the Second United Front. Tetsuya Kataoka

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 08 Oct 2016 16:37

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations against the Lunghai corridor, 1938.

(6) Japanese major offensive: Hsuchou, May 1938. In the north, the columns attempting to cut the Lunghai at Kweiteh (KW) and Tangshan (T) were repulsed. On the line Hsuchou-Tayerchwang (TA), the Japanese ran into a prepared position, and they were promptly slowed down. It was apparent that this front could not be broken easily and that gains would have to be made by the flanking columns; battering against organized positions, from 14 to 17 May, the third column slowly made headway: on the right, the fifth column fought against superior numbers, in a ratio of 1 to 5, but cut the "Lunghai" on 15 May, at Sinanchen. On the twentieth, contact was made with the leading elements of the southern army.

Elements of the left column of the southern army turned north on Suhsien and collided on 16 May with strong Chinese forces fighting desperately; these were divisions withdrawing from Hsuchou; the Japanese stood fast, but wide intervals between adjacent units enabled the bulk of the Chinese to make a get away to rallying positions in the west.

After 16 May, the northern army made definite progress, and the right and center reached the outskirts of Hsuchou (Hsutschau) on the nineteenth. The city fell after a heavy bombardment in which 200 aircraft participated; a surprisingly small number of defenders fell into Japanese hands; the bulk of the garrison escaped in an incredible detour, slipping through Japanese columns. However, the great mass of Chinese divisions, containing the best available units, had been severely handled in pitched engagements, and their morale and power of organized resistance were definitely lowered.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Early Japanese Campaign(s) in the 2ndSino-Japanese War

Post by tigre » 15 Oct 2016 16:46

Hello to all :D; a little more..................................

Operations against the Lunghai corridor, 1938.

(7) The envelopment of the corridor. Within a few days of the fall of Hsuchou, the Japanese organized the pursuit along the axis of the "Lunghai," with Kaifeng as the next objective.

In accord with accepted procedure, in pursuit, detachments were sent on Tchukaikou to intercept the Chinese retreat on Hankow, while in the corridor itself the 14th Japanese Division" attempted to block the flood of retreating columns, far in rear, at Kaifeng; this place was taken on the twenty.fourth, but this small division found itself immediately confronted by overwhelming numbers and was surrounded. It held Kaifeng until the twenty-eighth, then broke through the cordon to the north; with incredible tenacity, this outfit battled for its life until pressure was relieved by the subsequent Japanese advance within the corridor itself.

This progress was contested step by step; heavy fighting took place at Kweiteh and Ningling. The Japanese finally took Kaifeng on 6 June. It was calculable at the moment that the Chinese in the Tchengchau-Kaifeng area were trapped and their retreat on Hankow seriously threatened.

The Chinese High Command then made a grave decision: on 12 June, the levees of the Hoangho were ordered cut and the surrounding country was flooded for hundreds of square miles; the Hoangho, in this area, is at a level approximately 25 feet above the adjacent plains. This artificial disaster stopped any further Japanese operations in this sector but brought death and ruin to hundreds of Chinese villages and hamlets.

Equally determined and far more resourceful, the Japanese High Command promptly abandoned the line of the Lunghai and shifted its operative advance against Hankow, across high ground and along the Yangtze valley.

Sources: FMFRP-Maneuvers in War. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.
China Area Operations Record. 1937-1941.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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