The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

[Richard Anderson]

This is simple. You claimed bombing didn't damage aircraft production significantly until 1944 and that's wrong. Blame the mayhem on RAF, AAF, CBO, or Burger King, the damage happened.

No, it isn't simple, it is a highly complex subject. Yes, I did say that, and it isn't wrong. I suggest you look at the inputs - the bombing campaign - and the outputs - the aircraft completed - and then think about the idea that the bombing campaign damaged aircraft production significantly in 1943. If we look at the attacks actually made, we find the following (excluding attacks on centralized repair sites).

Strikes at Aircraft Assembly Plants
Rostock, Heinkel (He 111), 20 April, BC, 149.1 tons
Nantes, Heinkel (He 111), 4 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 145 tons
Kassel, Fiesler (FW 190), 28 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 129 tons (note, most of the bombs appeared to hit the adjacent Sponfasser textile mill)
Oschersleben, AGO (FW 190), 28 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 62.9 tons
Warnemund, Heinkel (FW 190), 29 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 129 tons
Kassel-Bettenhausen, Fiesler (FW 190), 29 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 222 tons
Kassel-Waldau, Fiesler (FW 190), 29 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 87 tons
Wiener-Neustadt, (Bf 109), 13 August, IX Bmb Cmd, 162 tons
Regensburg, Ober Taubling (Bf 109), 17 August, VIII Bmb Cmd, 298.8 tons
Wiener-Neustadt, (Bf 109), 1 October, XII Bmb Cmd, 131.5 tons
Bremen-Weser (Ju 97), 8 October, VIII Bmb Cmd, 81 tons
Anklam, Arado (FW 190), 9 October, VIII Bmb Cmd, 185.5 tons
Marienburg, Focke-Wulf (FW 190), 9 October, VIII Bmb Cmd, 217.9 tons
Wiener-Neustadt, (Bf 109), 24 October, XII Bmb Cmd, 25.5 tons
Wiener-Neustadt, (Bf 109), XV Bmb Cmd, 329 tons

So I missed a few, but then so did the USSBS. Let's look at some of the outcomes, say FW 190? There were five attacks at the end of July, so what was the July/August/September output of each plant?

Kassel - 61/62/58
Oschersleben - 100/80/79
Warnemund - 58/52/77

Significant? What about all those strikes at Weiner-Neustadt? July/August/September/October/November/December output was 270/184/201/218/80/37. Significant? Maybe, except that by January it was back at 119, before dropping to 67, and then skyrocketing to 360 in March and 443 in April.

Strikes at Aircraft Component Manufacture
Bremen, Borgward, 17 April, VIII Bmb Cmd, 263 tons
Le Mans, Engines, 26 June, VIII Bmb Cmd, 181.5 tons
Le Mans, Engines, 4 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 259.5
Amsterdam, Fokker, 17 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 51.5 tons
Villacoublay, Components, 24 August, VIII Bmb Cmd, 257.2 tons
Paris, Caudron-Billancourt (engines), 3 September, VIII Bmb Cmd, 111 tons
Paris, not stated, probably Caudron, 9 September, VIII Bmb Cmd, 58 tons
Paris, Caudron-Billancourt (engines), 15 September, VIII Bmb Cmd, 63
Paris, Hispano-Suiza (engines), 15 September, VIII Bmb Cmd, 229 tons
Frankfurt-am-Main, Heddernheim, VDM (propellers), 4 October, VIII Bmb Cmd, 219.3 tons
Augsburg, XII Bmb Cmd, 100 tons

I don't see many attacks on the Ruhr? Not unusual, since most aircraft component manufacture wasn't in the Ruhr.

On the subsidiary point of who caused the damage, I'm with Tooze that it was primarily Bomber Command. Their resources were much greater in that period. I don't have the tons-dropped at hand but surely the British did the lion's share. If I'm wrong you'll surely correct me.

You have to wonder how that could be, given the lack of aircraft infrastructure in the Ruhr and the lack of BC attacks on the known aircraft complexes.

You're confusing our discussion of what happened in OTL 1943 (Bombing impact bit at least a year earlier than you claimed) with our discussion of what could happen in ATL 1944. The tripling of LW production is feasible only a couple years after SU's fall.

No, I don't think I'm confusing anything, since you keep expressing an opinion that something will happen instead of showing how the Germans could make it happen. So you think that by 1944-1945 they'll be able to triple aircraft output? How? And, more important, why, since their synthetic fuel program is ash by then. And, no, the bombing impact did not bite at least a year earlier.

Well you have a choice of which economic analysts are wrong: 1945's or today's? Here's Tooze on Wagenfuhr's labor classification efforts:

Nevertheless, WagenfuÈhr's Gesamtplan was far from complete. The
problem of attributing inputs to outputs remained unsolved. The rows
in WagenfuÈhr's table purported to show the labour, iron, energy and
transport consumed in the production of each type of weapon. In fact,
they recorded only the resources consumed in the final process of
assembly.

From Statistics and German State, p.278.

Okay, so then in 3Q43, the "final process of assembly" labor in the aviation industry (airframe, engines, and props) in Germany was 935,000 and the US was 910,851 (airframe), 296,949 (engines), and 157,593 (props), for a total of 1,365,393. Now do the productivity calculation.

Now you know how I feel. Okay, so build the plants, build and install the machine tools and jigs, bring in and train the labor force, bring in the raw materials, and have at it. Yes, it takes capitol as in money, but that capitol has to be translated into concrete things. Germany had a problem with that. While there was some plant expansion in the tank industry, it was more limited in the aviation industry, mostly I suspect because so much was already invested in it 1933-1939. The biggest "expansion" was the conversion of the bomber plants to fighter production in 1944.

I've worked with a lot of economists - some renowned - and in a past life took steps on the path to becoming one. So it's not at all foreign to me, finding economists to have tripped up in their analysis. As a group, economists combine great insights with great blindness. Maybe that's the difference in our approaches here.

Funny, I've also worked with economists, I don't know if they're renowned, but they were looking specifically at the economic costs of warfare.

So all this time you've been arguing that economists - Budraß, et all, support your POV, but now you're saying you don't trust the analysis of economists? Um, huh? I don't quite follow the logic there.

That's fine with me and shared. I just don't want our threads locked. Mods - can Richard and I be allowed to play rough with each other?

"Rough" isn't the issue. Logical argument, critical thinking, and honest argument from the historical record rather than imagination that is the issue for me.

Yeah I'm not going to attempt rebutting an impression that analysis implies sympathy. It's beneath me and should be beneath you. This runs off me like I'm sure it runs off you whenever someone claims that TDI's evaluation of German combat effectiveness implies Nazi apologia.

Empathy, not sympathy is the key, in looking at adversary capabilities and intentions, as my old boss liked to say. I'm sorry if your use of suspect internet sources and some of your argumentation raised my hackles, but you must have noticed that it wasn't only me, given that you have been called out on it a number of times? On examination it does look like you bought into that "source" via a combination of eagerness and ignorance, rather than deliberately. And, no, saying it was "ignorance" is not disparaging you, it was just an unfortunate fact...basically you stepped in doo-doo because you thought it was chocolate pudding and might be tasty. As the saying goes, $H*T Happens!

However, as far as the silliness over CEV goes, no, I don't ignore such an implication and never will, because, well, it is silly.

[TheMarcksPlan]

"Rough" isn't the issue. Logical argument, critical thinking, and honest argument from the historical record rather than imagination that is the issue for me.

The “rough” behavior I hope will be allowed is to state frankly what I perceive as your analytical failings, some of them systemic. I’ve been banned twice now for expressing a low opinion of thought processes. I concede that I could have expressed those opinions with more sensitivity and diplomacy; hopefully critique of thought processes will be allowed if done substantively and as politely as possible.

Before expressing some of these opinions as a test case, I’ll repeat my earlier statement that economists are often both clever and blind. So being intellectually competent in economics is not an unalloyed sign of brilliance, nor does lack of such competence imply a lack of brilliance (most of my brilliant professional colleagues are endearingly ignorant on economics, some proudly so - it's a ultra-liberal field and econ is coded right wing).

That said, your incredulity at the concept of economists like Wagenfuhr not being able to complete accurate input-output tables, for example, is an obvious tell that you’re not competent on the intellectual concepts being expressed. Any contemporary non-Marxist/socialist economist who claimed production of an accurate input-output table for an entire war economy would be assumed to be joking or would be asked, “Is everything OK?”

You have to wonder how that could be, given the lack of aircraft infrastructure in the Ruhr and the lack of BC attacks on the known aircraft complexes.

I don’t wonder how that could be and neither does Tooze. We both intuitively understand that a deep supply chain supports the aircraft final and component manufacture – cut that chain at any link and it’s as good as hitting the plants. One of the links is subcomponents. The Ruhr campaign hit this link, causing the ’43 subcomponents crisis that cascaded outwards and included the aviation industry. (cite is Tooze upthread)

So this…

I suggest you look at the inputs - the bombing campaign - and the outputs - the aircraft completed - and then think about the idea that the bombing campaign damaged aircraft production significantly in 1943.
.
.
Strikes at Aircraft Assembly Plants
.
.
.
Strikes at Aircraft Component Manufacture

…is asking the wrong questions – at least asking incomplete questions. You’ve made no factual errors (aside from the topline one regarding when bomb damage became serious), you’re just unaware of or ignoring the broader picture that includes everything below major components.

To me this is simple: Bomber Command damaged Ruhr cities and their embedded subcomponent manufacturers; aircraft can’t be built without subcomponents. That it’s not simple to you may trace to our different background regarding economics.

Okay, so build the plants, build and install the machine tools and jigs, bring in and train the labor force, bring in the raw materials, and have at it.

I consider this progress between us. You at least recognize that my expanded ATL LW production is based on a process of input expansion rather than “stacking Reichsmarks.”

While there was some plant expansion in the tank industry, it was more limited in the aviation industry, mostly I suspect because so much was already invested in it 1933-1939.

Here again it’s important to scrutinize the intellectual structure underlying your assertions for me to make sense of them.

Are you using “plant” interchangeably with capital stock or is there some other meaning?

Are you saying that the LW had excess capital stock and that’s why they supposedly didn’t do much plant expansion?

Your quote contains factual assertions that I’d probably dispute but ancillary to that is clarifying what you’re saying/thinking.

So all this time you've been arguing that economists - Budraß, et all, support your POV, but now you're saying you don't trust the analysis of economists? Um, huh? I don't quite follow the logic there.

Trust in God; all others bring data.

However, as far as the silliness over CEV goes, no, I don't ignore such an implication and never will, because, well, it is silly.

Yeah I’m a little too snobby for that. When I engage silly ideas I end up getting mad at myself for wasting time and then project that anger outwards. For that reason I'm passing on a couple points you made about honesty etc.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Who is that notion popular with? Not me. Again this appears to start as a straw man, which does not bode well for the overall argument.

What I am arguing is that "contract prices" do not actually reflect the cost of producing a particular item in this context. As an example, you can demonstrate that an American Medium Tank "price" was $82,723, $58,197, $47,339, $55,125, or $81,324. Guess which was the "price" for the Medium/Heavy Tank T26E3?

As you've budged - at least rhetorically - on the intellectual structure of my LW ATL, I'll admit that the referenced post did involve some strawmanning - at least rhetorically. But consider it provocative straw-manning designed to elicit at least an admission that there was some relationship between cash-denominated production cost and resource-denominated (a hypothetical denomination of course). I recognized your hedge re "very flexible" relationship between price and true cost, so it wasn't complete strawmanning.

So what's your point re the varying prices of a medium tank? Presumably the price series for one model at different times? If so, it probably reflects production cost declines across a typical curve.

[Richard Anderson]

The “rough” behavior I hope will be allowed is to state frankly what I perceive as your analytical failings, some of them systemic. I’ve been banned twice now for expressing a low opinion of thought processes. I concede that I could have expressed those opinions with more sensitivity and diplomacy; hopefully critique of thought processes will be allowed if done substantively and as politely as possible.

Before expressing some of these opinions as a test case, I’ll repeat my earlier statement that economists are often both clever and blind. So being intellectually competent in economics is not an unalloyed sign of brilliance, nor does lack of such competence imply a lack of brilliance (most of my brilliant professional colleagues are endearingly ignorant on economics, some proudly so - it's a ultra-liberal field and econ is coded right wing).

That said, your incredulity at the concept of economists like Wagenfuhr not being able to complete accurate input-output tables, for example, is an obvious tell that you’re not competent on the intellectual concepts being expressed. Any contemporary non-Marxist/socialist economist who claimed he’d achieved an accurate input-output table for a massive industry would be assumed to be joking or would be asked, “Is everything OK?”

I see. You have a problem understanding simple declarative sentences? What "incredulity" do you see when I, rather gently, pointed out the lack of logic in your referencing economists as "support" for your opinion, then in the same breath say those economists aren't competent, and they are both "clever and blind"? Which is it? Or do only the ones who are clever and not blind support you?

I'm afraid, from my point of view, that simply looks like yet another variation of confirmation bias.

I don’t wonder how that could be and neither does Tooze. We both intuitively understand that a deep supply chain supports the aircraft final and component manufacture – cut that chain at any link and it’s as good as hitting the plants. One of the links is subcomponents. The Ruhr campaign hit this link, causing the ’43 subcomponents crisis that cascaded outwards and included the aviation industry. (cite is Tooze upthread)

Except, aircraft components were manufactured in a very well defined supply chain. As I've mentioned many times before, much of that supply chain was through the conversion of the motor vehicle industry.

Borgward, Bremen - electrical components
BMW, Munich - aircraft motors in 1943
BMW, Eisenach - aircraft motors in 1940
Daimler, Unterturkheim, the third largest auto producer in Germany - aircraft motors in 1940
Adam Opel, Russelheim, the largest auto producer in Germany -aircraft components in 1940

Locations for other component manufacture is also pretty well defined.

VDM was the primary propeller manufacturer, along with landing gear, hydraulics, and radiators, at five plants - two in Hamburg, Hildesheim, Kessler, and Cologne.

Daimler-Benz was one of the three principal engine manufacturers, with plants at Büssing, Henschel, Manfred, Steyr, and Genshagen.
BMW was another at Argus, Spandau, Klockner, and Allach-Munchen.
Junkers was the third at Magdeburg, Kothen, and Taucha.

Then there were the actual major assembly complexes, they were "scattered over most parts of central Germany. There was no concentration of production in a single region. The principal plants lay along an approximately north-south axis from Bremen to Munich. The new plants built between 1934 and 1939, furthermore, were built in the open country, well outside of the towns and cities."

It was a large, robust system. The notion that dispersed night bombing of the "Ruhr" dislocated the system by interupting the production of undefined widgets is at best an unsupported assumption.

…is asking the wrong questions – at least asking incomplete questions. You’ve made no factual errors (aside from the topline one regarding when bomb damage became serious), you’re just unaware of or ignoring the broader picture that includes everything below major components.

What is the "broader picture"? The assumption that something manufactured somewhere in the "Ruhr" had its production interrupted because of random British night bombing, because at some point it needed to put into an airplane? What is it? Where was it made? There is extensive data on where the German final assembly, component, and sub-component manufacture were, and I am simply not seeing where this mysterious British campaign affected it.

However, by all means please do some research and find an example of it.

T

o me this is simple: Bomber Command damaged Ruhr cities and their embedded subcomponent manufacturers; aircraft can’t be built without subcomponents. That it’s not simple to you may trace to our different background regarding economics.

Huh? This isn't about economics. This is about targeting and weapons effects. You want an undefined, shadowy widget's destruction somewhere in the Ruhr to have an effect on German aircraft production. I want to see some real evidence of aircraft production being affected at all by the rather anemic Allied bombing campaign in 1943.

I consider this progress between us. You at least recognize that my expanded ATL LW production is based on a process of input expansion rather than “stacking Reichsmarks.”

While it wasn't a final assembly plant, but rather a critical engine plant, remember that critical bottleneck?, you might profit by looking at Daimler-Benz's Ostmark plant. It also wasn't unique to Germany...plant boondoggles seem to be a commonplace in wartime.

Here again it’s important to scrutinize the intellectual structure underlying your assertions for me to make sense of them.

Are you using “plant” interchangeably with capital stock or is there some other meaning?

"Plant" as in a place where manufacturing is done. The actual physical, rather than fiscal, expression of manufacture. Final assembly complexes, component, and sub-component manufacturing. The industry was pretty well laid out and funded by the government 1933-1939.

Are you saying that the LW had excess capital stock and that’s why they supposedly didn’t do much plant expansion?

No, I'm not saying that at all. They had limited excess capital stock and made limited additional investment of that capital stock in expanding plant capacity during the war, beyond industrial conversion.

Your quote contains factual assertions that I’d probably dispute but ancillary to that is clarifying what you’re saying/thinking.

Okay.

Trust in God; all others bring data.

Yeah, then why then do you consistently dismiss data as minutia when it doesn't fit with your assumptions? Fraid I don't follow that logic either.

Yeah I’m a little too snobby for that. When I engage silly ideas I end up getting mad at myself for wasting time and then project that anger outwards. For that reason I'm passing on a couple points you made about honesty etc.

I think you mistake what I mean about honesty...I don't mean you're crooked or a thief, a liar or such, but rather I'm speaking of intellectual honesty. So you reference economists, but when they contradict an assumption they aren't reliable; you want all other to bring data, but when you are presented with data you dismiss it. When challenged, you keep falling back on the straw man and ad hominem, rather than asking to clarify a data point or dig into assumptions. I didn't block you originally because of what you were saying, but rather because you seemed so disinterested in listening to any other point of view or analysis.

[Richard Anderson]

So what's your point re the varying prices of a medium tank? Presumably the price series for one model at different times? If so, it probably reflects production cost declines across a typical curve.

That a "price" assigned to such an item in wartime doesn't necessarily have much to do with either the actual "cost" or the difficulty of manufacturing it, especially when starting from scratch. Does the "cost" including the infrastructure construction? GFE? Spares?

The most expensive BTW, was not the last model, it was the first, but no, it isn't really a reflection of production cost declines. Its a reflection of anticipated cost estimates versus what was actually paid.

$82,723 was the September 1942 estimated cost for the Medium Tank M4-series
$58,197 was the April 1944 estimated cost for the Medium Tank M4-series
$47,339 was the average cost computed for close of contract for the Medium Tank M4A3 program (c. August 1945)
$55,145 was the average cost computed for close of contract for the Medium Tank M4A1 program (c. August 1945)
$81,324 was the average cost computed for close of contract for the Medium Tank M26 program (c. October 1945)

Anyway, just under $5.7-billion was spent 1 January 1942-31 December 1945 and bought 82,833 tanks, more or less, so call it $68,813.15 each...except, since in many cases the government paid for the facilities that manufactured the tanks as well, and much of that expenditure was in 1941, all those figures can be taken with a grain of salt too.

[Richard Anderson]

So I may not have much time the next few days for replies, my wife has a major commercial photo assignment I need to help her with and we are also nursing a sick cat.

Anyway, I wish there was an easy way to post graphics, since I don't work with image hosting. If you actually track the German aircraft output by month and type you will quickly realize the "miracle" is driven solely by the Jagdwaffe in general and specifically by the production of the Bf 109 and FW 190. The rest of German aircraft production is essentially a flat line.

The next thing really noticeable is that the single-engine fighter production was also problematic. Until January 1944 it was entirely dependent on the output of seven major aircraft complexes. Those were Messerschmidt Regensburg, Arado Warnemunde, Erla Leipzig, Fiesler Kassel, WNF Vienna, Ago Oschersleben, and Focke-Wulf Marienburg. Until October 1941 only FW Marienburg completed the FW 190, in that month Ago began converting from the Bf 109 (2) to the FW 190 (4) and finished the next month, completing just 3 Bf 109 and 17 FW 190. Obviously the conversion to the new aircraft type affected output from the plant. While Ago completed 41 Bf 109 in February 1941 and peaked at 118 in May, output dropped sharply thereafter, to 50 in June, 41 in July, 31 in August, and 15 in September. Worse, once conversion was complete over the next two years they only managed an average output of 52.7 FW 190 per month and it wasn't until May 1944 before they managed to exceed its May 1941 output - 170 FW 190.

At least that was better than Fieseler, which also shifted to FW 190 production, producing its last Bf 109 in June 1941 (29) and its first FW 190 in May 1942 (1) and it was December 1942 before production returned to "normal". I estimate about 300 aircraft were lost to production in just that changeover.

Otherwise, the production "dips" for 1-E Fighters were January 1942, a second, sustained and longer dip from July-December 1943, and then a distinct hiccup in February 1944. The last is truly interesting, because although it is a very distinct drop, it is also very difficult to attribute it to Allied bombing. In January there was simply few attacks directed at the aircraft industry at all. Oschersleben was hit on 11 January by 288.1 tons and Halberstadt (components) on the same day with 92.1 tons, but that was pretty much it, other than some attacks on widely dispersed component plants in Yugoslavia and Italy. Yes, Oscherslebens output dropped, but so did every plant. A more likely culprit, on the face of it at least, was the massive attacks by the Eighth AF on Tutow, which was where Arado had expanded final assembly to from Warnemunde, Oschersleben, Erla, along with subsidiary attacks on three component plates, but that was on 20 February. It's difficult to see how it had such a massive effect across the gamut of fighter plants, knocking off a quarter of the production at Regensburg and nearly half at Weiner-Neustadt?

[TheMarcksPlan]

"Plant" as in a place where manufacturing is done.

That’s one meaning of plant. Another is basically a synonym for industrial capital stock: “the land, buildings, machinery, apparatus, and fixtures employed in carrying on a trade or an industrial business.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plant

I know this is schoolmarmish but it’s essential to not talking past each other and the distinction will come up below.

They [LW] had limited excess capital stock and made limited additional investment of that capital stock in expanding plant capacity during the war

Second part is definitely not true.

From Budrass, Scherner, and Streib’s “Fixed-price contracts, learning, and outsourcing: explaining the continuous growth of output and labour productivity in the German aircraft industry during the Second World War”:



The paper is a study of only firms involved in the Ju-88 program. As you can see, real fixed assets grew at high rates for each of the firms analyzed, except Heinkel. And as the data runs into 1943 but Ju-88 production didn’t grow much from 1941, it certainly underestimates average industry-wide fixed asset growth.

LW investments were part of the wartime German “investment boom” that Budrass et. al. describe here: https://economics.yale.edu/sites/defaul ... 060329.pdf.

Overall German industrial investment numbers, as computed by Budrass et. al.:



That paper doesn’t decompose total investment and machine tool purchases by service branch but as their other paper shows, LW investment was growing significantly and was surely part of the nationwide investment boom.

As I've mentioned many times before, much of that supply chain was through the conversion of the motor vehicle industry.

You’ve said it many times but haven’t given any cites and I’m not sure what you mean.

I’m a bit worried that you’re looking at plants rather than plant. It would be surprising if a massive aviation industry could be mostly built via partial conversion of a much smaller automotive industry. What are your sources? What % of plant came to aviation from automotive?

The industry was pretty well laid out and funded by the government 1933-1939.

So again it’s plant vs. plants. Both of the following can be true without contradiction:

• 1. Wartime LW production proceeded at the same locations established pre-war (until late-war dispersals/evacuations).
• 2. Pre-war plant investment constituted only a small portion of the LW’s productive capital.

That (2) is almost certainly true is evident from another chart from Budrass et. al.:



As you can see, Wehrmacht purchases of machine tools were 3.5-4x 1938’s level in each of ’40-’43. If LW’s investment pattern followed the Wehrmacht’s then prewar machine plant would have been ~10% of wartime investment. As wartime plant investment had a higher ratio of non-machine : machine than prewar, the prewar portion of total plant would be even lower.

By analogy to your field of specialty, focusing on plants rather than total capital stock would be akin to saying the German army grew massively after 1941 based solely on its division count. Just as we need to look past divisions to real forces in divisions, so we need to look past plants to real capital in plants, i.e. plant.

The notion that dispersed night bombing of the "Ruhr" dislocated the system by interupting the production of undefined widgets is at best an unsupported assumption.

Tooze says the impact was on "castings and forgings," which cascaded out towards subcomponents. For many industries the metalworks did castings and forgings, shipping them onward to parts suppliers and assemblers (tanks is an example you're probably familiar with). So while I appreciate you listing the component manufacturers (source? I'd like to read), I'm not convinced you've caught the entire aviation production chain in your one reply.

Tooze's footnote on the issue:

For the direct connection between the Battle of the Ruhr, shortfalls in steel supply and
the Zulieferungskrise, see BAL R3/1737, 10 June 1943, meeting at Ruhrstahl, 83; IWM
FD 3353/45, vol. 180, 29 July 1943, 44th meeting Zentrale Planung; BAL R3/1738,
15 September 1943, 145.

Anybody have access to those documents?

It's undisputed that LW production stopped increasing simultaneously with the Ruhr campaign and increased afterwards. Besides the castings/forgings issue, steel shortfalls - especially in comparison to steel budgets made on planned expansion - likely impacted the machine tools industry, from which plant for further LW expansion was expected. It certainly caused a diversion of labor to repair. Because you're resistant to counterfactual reasoning, you may be resistant to seeing the interruption of growth as real damage - needing to see actual declines instead.

If it turns out you've caught Tooze making another error I'll happily agree with you - he certainly made errors in WoD, as I've documented elsewhere. But given the basic sense of the castings/forgings issue he highlights and the concentration of primary metalworking in the Ruhr, I'm inclined to believe Tooze is right on this one.

When challenged, you keep falling back on the straw man and ad hominem,

Look I’m fine with us trading barbs and critiquing each other’s thinking styles. Say I’m riddled with confirmation bias, that I dismiss data, or have problems with intellectual honesty. Really, fine. Have at it.

But if we’re doing it that way neither of us should whine about “ad homs.” Let’s just go about our arguments knowing that you or I have certain views of each other and may express them.

when you are presented with data you dismiss it.

why then do you consistently dismiss data as minutia when it doesn't fit with your assumptions?

I appreciate the data you share here, especially when you cite sources that expand my reading list.

Often, however, you present things that you think support your point or contradict mine without understanding the argument or, therefore, the relevance of your replies.

The time required to explain (1) the point I’m actually making and (2) how your data and/or argument actually relates to my point is substantial. That’s the main reason I put you on ignore in the past. This debating dynamic has been described as the Gish Gallop. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gish_gallop

So sometimes you perceive unwarranted dismissal of facts when I am disagreeing with you analytically instead of factually, and sometimes I just don’t have time for a Gish Gallop.

On economic matters this is especially true. Your apparently limited background in economics sometimes causes you to make assertions whose rebuttal requires, basically, a lesson on economics.

But as I've said economics is just one field; I’ve learned a lot from you and surely could learn more. Just understand that I’ll always independently evaluate your statements and that I have subjectively genuine reasons for being suspicious whether you always know what you’re talking about.

One last little thing:

I'm afraid, from my point of view, that simply looks like yet another variation of confirmation bias.

Query whether you're more or less likely to find confirmation bias when expecting to find it and hoping to expose it.

[TheMarcksPlan]

So I may not have much time the next few days

Possibly me neither, it's at the whim of the Trump admin and what they try to do to my clients on the way out.

Anyway, I wish there was an easy way to post graphics, since I don't work with image hosting.

Imgur is free; not even a login required. https://imgur.com/upload

Otherwise, the production "dips" for 1-E Fighters were January 1942

The general crisis caused primarily by 70% of trains sent East being stuck there until Spring.

a second, sustained and longer dip from July-December 1943

Zulieferungskrise

It's difficult to see how it had such a massive effect across the gamut of fighter plants, knocking off a quarter of the production at Regensburg and nearly half at Weiner-Neustadt?

Source? Sounds like something I'd like to read if I can.

That a "price" assigned to such an item in wartime doesn't necessarily have much to do with either the actual "cost" or the difficulty of manufacturing it, especially when starting from scratch. Does the "cost" including the infrastructure construction? GFE? Spares?

Why not just say that more expensive weapons usually embodied more resources, but caveats are necessary regarding certain details?

Just as with your objection to my caveat about comparisons between US and German aircraft industries... The big-picture trend is true: America was more productive than Germany. But a caveat is necessary.

At the biggest picture - a service branch's total procurement statistics, for example - the small variations between contracts will be sanded out and the equivalence of resource and expenditure pictures is clearer. Of course that doesn't mean we don't still need carful attention to data - O'Brien's discussion of air/sea spending is at service branch level, for example, but his data don't include non-weapons spending and thereby diminishes land warfare's salience. And if one conflates "ASF" and "AGF" as I once did (and you corrected me), then of course one's data is off.

Nonetheless, if we're careful about our data problems the price-denominated costs of LW/KM/Heer, or on AAF/AGF/USN, reflect real resource-denominated costs.

[Richard Anderson]

That’s one meaning of plant. Another is basically a synonym for industrial capital stock: “the land, buildings, machinery, apparatus, and fixtures employed in carrying on a trade or an industrial business.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plant

I know this is schoolmarmish but it’s essential to not talking past each other and the distinction will come up below.

I'll try not to be schoolmarmish as well, but you do realize those "land, buildings, machinery, apparatus, and fixtures employed in carrying on a trade or an industrial business" usually take place at certain areas generally known as "plants"? And are you aware that in the German aviation industry in World War II, those plants were generally in such very distinct areas that they were characterized as "complexes"?

"2. The Aircraft Complexes
a. A distinctive feature of the organization of the German aircraft industry was the system of complexes, which was an extension of the rationalization principal adopted so generally by the Hitler regime. The original was the Junkers complex. Its purpose was to control manufacturing operations carried on in "shadow-plants" and in the plants of subcontractors. Junkers maintained rigid control over engineering design, provided at least the basic tools, administered inspection, and took care of materials and facilities requirements. In addition Junkers controlled the manufacturing methods, operations sequences and machining methods employed by subcontractors and licensees. Messerschmitt and Focke-Wulf eventually built up similar complexes." USSBS Report No. 4, Aviation Industry, p. 16.

Second part is definitely not true.

Okay, so I should have said that investment was not in new aviation complexes, but rather in expansion of the plant at existing complexes, which quite evidently did not result in the increased output desired in the industry in general and did not result in major expansion of the output of the 1-E fighter industry at the levels desired until 1944, which was much too late.

From Budrass, Scherner, and Streib’s “Fixed-price contracts, learning, and outsourcing: explaining the continuous growth of output and labour productivity in the German aircraft industry during the Second World War”:

The paper is a study of only firms involved in the Ju-88 program. As you can see, real fixed assets grew at high rates for each of the firms analyzed, except Heinkel. And as the data runs into 1943 but Ju-88 production didn’t grow much from 1941, it certainly underestimates average industry-wide fixed asset growth.

LW investments were part of the wartime German “investment boom” that Budrass et. al. describe here

Ah, you noticed. Yes, Ju-88 - and all 2-engine bomber production - did not increase from about July 1941. The four-year 1941-1944 average was 427.27 per month and had hit 430 in July 1941 and the peak of 623 was achieved in February 1943.

The "production miracle" was confined to the 1-E fighter industry, which is also I suspect where the builk of the "investment boom" went.

You’ve said it many times but haven’t given any cites and I’m not sure what you mean.

Yes, I've said it many times and I've given the source a number of times.

I’m a bit worried that you’re looking at plants rather than plant. It would be surprising if a massive aviation industry could be mostly built via partial conversion of a much smaller automotive industry. What are your sources? What % of plant came to aviation from automotive?

I'm not looking at anything other than the original sources that address the conversion of the motor vehicle industry to supporting the aviation and AFV industry.

So again it’s plant vs. plants. Both of the following can be true without contradiction:

• 1. Wartime LW production proceeded at the same locations established pre-war (until late-war dispersals/evacuations).
• 2. Pre-war plant investment constituted only a small portion of the LW’s productive capital.

That (2) is almost certainly true is evident from another chart from Budrass et. al.:

Indeed, but yet again, haven't you noticed that the only element of that industry that saw a significant expansion of productive output was the 1-engine fighter plant?

As you can see, Wehrmacht purchases of machine tools were 3.5-4x 1938’s level in each of ’40-’43. If LW’s investment pattern followed the Wehrmacht’s then prewar machine plant would have been ~10% of wartime investment. As wartime plant investment had a higher ratio of non-machine : machine than prewar, the prewar portion of total plant would be even lower.

By analogy to your field of specialty, focusing on plants rather than total capital stock would be akin to saying the German army grew massively after 1941 based solely on its division count. Just as we need to look past divisions to real forces in divisions, so we need to look past plants to real capital in plants, i.e. plant.

My interest in this case is the outputs resulting from those inputs.

Tooze says the impact was on "castings and forgings," which cascaded out towards subcomponents. For many industries the metalworks did castings and forgings, shipping them onward to parts suppliers and assemblers (tanks is an example you're probably familiar with). So while I appreciate you listing the component manufacturers (source? I'd like to read), I'm not convinced you've caught the entire aviation production chain in your one reply.

That is possible, if I could figure out what part "castings and forgings" play in aircraft manufacture? Engine castings, cams, and shafts, sure, except I don't recall a decrease in engine production during the period. I'll see if some of the plant reports demonstrate such, but it may not be so obvious.

Anybody have access to those documents?

Not off hand, but I would be more interested in how the bombing campaign affected the output of aluminum was affected. Anecdotally, CHASTISE affected that in June-July 1943, but I am unaware of the details.

It's undisputed that LW production stopped increasing simultaneously with the Ruhr campaign and increased afterwards.

No, I'll actually dispute that blanket statement. The production of 1-E fighters dipped noticeably and increased afterwards, especially as the other "LW production" was shifted to supporting the 1-E fighter production.

I appreciate the data you share here, especially when you cite sources that expand my reading list.

Okay, then start reading them, rather than falling back on referring me to studies I read long ago.

Often, however, you present things that you think support your point or contradict mine without understanding the argument or, therefore, the relevance of your replies.

Okay. Let me restate your thesis then and tell me how close I am. If the Germans 'win" in the east at some time in 1942 for some undefined reason, then German aircraft output triples from its historic high sometime in 1944-1945?

The time required to explain (1) the point I’m actually making and (2) how your data and/or argument actually relates to my point is substantial. That’s the main reason I put you on ignore in the past. This debating dynamic has been described as the Gish Gallop.

Why, indeed I noticed, and your unwillingness to discuss the data countering your assumptions is why I put you on ignore. It can't be described as any form of debate dynamic if there isn't any debate and counterarguments are simply dismissed out of hand without attempting to understanding the contrary data.

So sometimes you perceive unwarranted dismissal of facts when I am disagreeing with you analytically instead of factually, and sometimes I just don’t have time for a Gish Gallop.

Um, when you dismiss facts without any argument as to why, you are being neither analytical or factual. You are just being contrary. Never mind that it also constitutes a rather blatant example of conformation bias.

On economic matters this is especially true. Your apparently limited background in economics sometimes causes you to make assertions whose rebuttal requires, basically, a lesson on economics.

But as I've said economics is just one field; I’ve learned a lot from you and surely could learn more. Just understand that I’ll always independently evaluate your statements and that I have subjectively genuine reasons for being suspicious whether you always know what you’re talking about.

Yeah, I've already gotten that you're a polymath trending through the muck with lesser mortals. Me? I'm just a historian that has done some analysis.

One last little thing:

I'm afraid, from my point of view, that simply looks like yet another variation of confirmation bias.

Query whether you're more or less likely to find confirmation bias when expecting to find it and hoping to expose it.

Well of course, but then if you don't want me to find it where I expect to find it you should stop doing it.

[Richard Anderson]

So I may not have much time the next few days

Possibly me neither, it's at the whim of the Trump admin and what they try to do to my clients on the way out.

Hopefully that will be resolved this Tuesday.

Imgur is free; not even a login required. https://imgur.com/upload

I know its free, but I try to limit my time-wasting activities to this and keeping track of my kids and the state of the yammering throng on Facebook.

The general crisis caused primarily by 70% of trains sent East being stuck there until Spring.

Of course.

Zulieferungskrise?

Perhaps.

Source? Sounds like something I'd like to read if I can.

You've been told, many times. USSBS. The reports are as important today for analysis as they were then.

Why not just say that more expensive weapons usually embodied more resources, but caveats are necessary regarding certain details?

Well, sure, and aircraft the most expensive.

Just as with your objection to my caveat about comparisons between US and German aircraft industries... The big-picture trend is true: America was more productive than Germany. But a caveat is necessary.

Yes, but why was it so much more productive?

At the biggest picture - a service branch's total procurement statistics, for example - the small variations between contracts will be sanded out and the equivalence of resource and expenditure pictures is clearer. Of course that doesn't mean we don't still need carful attention to data - O'Brien's discussion of air/sea spending is at service branch level, for example, but his data don't include non-weapons spending and thereby diminishes land warfare's salience. And if one conflates "ASF" and "AGF" as I once did (and you corrected me), then of course one's data is off.

Nonetheless, if we're careful about our data problems the price-denominated costs of LW/KM/Heer, or on AAF/AGF/USN, reflect real resource-denominated costs.

Perhaps.

[TheMarcksPlan]

investment was not in new aviation complexes, but rather in expansion of the plant at existing complexes, which quite evidently did not result in the increased output desired in the industry in general and did not result in major expansion of the output of the 1-E fighter industry at the levels desired until 1944, which was much too late.

Pretty much agree. Only I'd emphasize the real increases in 1E fighters before '44, even if not to the levels desired - which '44 didn't achieve either. Certainly never enough to defend German airspace.

I prefer the shifted emphasis because it tells the rational economic story of increasing LW production caused by learning effects (up to '43 or so) and by increasing investment and labor deployment.

The "production miracle" was confined to the 1-E fighter industry, which is also I suspect where the builk of the "investment boom" went.

Agreed.

As Tooze most famously puts it, there was no room for miracles. LW production increased due to learning effects and increased inputs. No mysteries here, just a few decades in which even most of the USSBS economists were fooled by Speer's self-serving propaganda, which his loyal servant Wagenfuhr perpetuated. [Not all USSBS economists btw, but Galbraith certainly took the bait]

That is possible, if I could figure out what part "castings and forgings" play in aircraft manufacture? Engine castings, cams, and shafts, sure, except I don't recall a decrease in engine production during the period. I'll see if some of the plant reports demonstrate such, but it may not be so obvious.

USSBS has at least one example:

Material shortages were expedited by the application of emergency priorities. Couriers were used to rush shipments of materials and equipment. In the case of steel forgings, for example, including tapered steel spar caps for the wings, Saur had the Ruhr mills so terrified because of their earlier experiences with him that the bottleneck was completely broken.

The engine mounts had to be cast as well. Probably main and supporting struts for landing gear. For each control surface, the actuation machinery would have dozens of gears and struts, probably each of which were cast/forged. Fuselage longerons? Brackets for internal wiring? Weapons hardpoints? Mountings for guns? Guns themselves of course involved cast/forged parts.

I would be more interested in how the bombing campaign affected the output of aluminum was affected. Anecdotally, CHASTISE affected that in June-July 1943, but I am unaware of the details.

USSBS Aircraft Industry report doesn't discuss damage to aluminum much. It finds that aluminum wasn't a constraint on production except early and late in the war. You're probably right though, to think that aluminum castings/forgings would have been appended to the primary metal industry and therefore probably impacted by damage to it.

No, I'll actually dispute that blanket statement. The production of 1-E fighters dipped noticeably and increased afterwards, especially as the other "LW production" was shifted to supporting the 1-E fighter production.

Well it depends on the scale of resolution I guess. Between early '43 and early '44 there's a trough.

On aero-engines there's a smaller trough. I imported USSBS's monthly factory stats into a spreadsheet to generate totals:



Production declined after March '43 and didn't exceed March by more than a few % until November.

Okay. Let me restate your thesis then and tell me how close I am. If the Germans 'win" in the east at some time in 1942 for some undefined reason, then German aircraft output triples from its historic high sometime in 1944-1945?

That's about it. [Of course the reason Germany beats SU is specified in my Eastern Front ATL's...]

Now that we've explored some of the reasons that LW production increased OTL, it should be easier to see the outline of my LW ATL. As we know OTL LW output depended on the usual inputs, and as we know the usual inputs would dramatically increase in a post-SU ATL, the conclusion of higher LW production is inescapable.

This is just a sketch:

To briefly recap, LW production depended on the magnitude of real inputs like labor, capital, and raw materials. Except for an early-war learning curve period, there was no miraculous rise in German production - just the application of resources.

In a post-SU ATL, the Ostheer and "zombie Ostheer" (those killed/disabled/captured by RKKA OTL but not ATL) return to the German economy and include many experienced/skilled aviation workers. In addition, greater foreign labor inputs arise from conquering the SU (aviation firms liked Russian women particularly) and from better recruitment within OTL Grossraum due to better German war fortunes.

Between these two factors, total German domestic industrial labor supply should approximately double, adding ~10-15mil workers. viewtopic.php?f=76&t=251476. If we say the aviation industry was ~2mil, tripling its labor input requires ~4mil workers or not even half the augmented labor supply.

To achieve 3x OTL production would require more capital but not 3x as much due to higher intensity of utilization. OTL German aviation plants weren't always two-shift because there weren't sufficient German skilled/experienced workers to supervise a second shift. ATL there are such workers. My rough guess based on the prevalence of 2nd-shift plants is 2x OTL capital stock, implying 50% higher plant utilization than OTL.

German plant investment (machine tools and floor space) would, if and as necessary, shift towards LW from Heer beginning early in '42. As the machine tool industry's production is largely fungible between the two service branches there's no reasonable obstacle to this occurring.

It's possible that no real total shift would be necessary, however. Rather, it's possible that additional LW investment would come from additional overall investment. OTL we see that German investment surged early in the war, peaking in '40-'42 and then declining. Within the peak period, '42 investment may already have been smaller than '41, which wasn't dramatically higher than '40. In an ATL in which Germany foresees the opportunity to employ millions more workers, investment would have continued rising significantly in '42 and '43.

Given 3x the labor and effective capital inputs, 3x the LW output is straightforward.

We'd need more aluminum but Germany had access to immense deposits in France, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. The problem is getting miners, the problem with Germany getting miners in WW2 was feeding them adequately (miners need >4,000 calories to remain productive and/or not strike/desert). With Germany's food position better-secured by (1) substituting fertilizer production for explosives from '42 and (2) taking/keeping more of Black-Earth SU, feeding miners is no longer a problem.
---------------------------------------------------------

Of course that's before figuring diminution of bombing damage. Depending on the slope and timing of higher LW production, by early 1944 fighter production will already be meaningfully higher than OTL even if not quite 3x the inputs are yet effectively mobilized. Even if it's "only" 2x the input/output, however, bomb damage will be significantly lower - probably effectively zero from AAF's campaign. In addition, the absence of a Soviet Air Force in '43 (and a weakened one in '42) saves ~4,000 planes including ~1,500 1-E fighters and pilots. More Ju-88's can be built as Nachtjager absent the Eastern Front's losses, some Bf-110's as well (they were actually useful as Nachtjager). And Germany's fuel situation - therefore its training programs - are on much better ground as the Caucasus starts producing in '43 and by '44 is fully back in swing.

So combining 3x the inputs with substantially lower bomb damage - including the absence of emergency dispersal - could result in >4x the OTL LW output.

Such output would be redistributed from OTL type proportions - proportionately fewer 109's, more 190's and He-219's and probably more bombers to keep things historically feasible (Hitler wouldn't be able to resist). As we move into '45, Me-262/Ta-152/Do-335/Ar-234 programs do not suffer OTL crippling due to manpower and plant shortages under emergency conditions and therefore attain high production rates. Jumo jet engines benefit from Russian cobalt, solving many reliability/durability problems.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I know its free, but I try to limit my time-wasting activities to this and keeping track of my kids and the state of the yammering throng on Facebook.

It takes 10 seconds to post a screenshot image. Just hit "print screen," paste into MS Paint (default windows image program) or something similar, save, and then upload at https://imgur.com/upload. Copy the image link into [img].../img] - (bracket omitted).

Yes, but why was (America) so much more productive?

I would say the usual reasons, primarily our longer tradition of universal education and the historical/demographic/economic momentum of having a massive, rich continent. These days the Germans have caught up and are about as productive as us, they just work less. Good for them.

[Richard Anderson]

Pretty much agree. Only I'd emphasize the real increases in 1E fighters before '44, even if not to the levels desired - which '44 didn't achieve either. Certainly never enough to defend German airspace.

I'm not sure what you are emphasizing? Or what you think I was de-emphasizing? Of course there were "real increases in 1E fighters before '44". Did I ever say anything different?

I prefer the shifted emphasis because it tells the rational economic story of increasing LW production caused by learning effects (up to '43 or so) and by increasing investment and labor deployment.

What non-rational economic story was I promoting?

I'm afraid that sounds like preaching to the choir?

Agreed.

Good.

As Tooze most famously puts it, there was no room for miracles. LW production increased due to learning effects and increased inputs. No mysteries here, just a few decades in which even most of the USSBS economists were fooled by Speer's self-serving propaganda, which his loyal servant Wagenfuhr perpetuated. [Not all USSBS economists btw, but Galbraith certainly took the bait]

I'm sorry, but the notion that the USSBS economists were fooled by Speer is a trope promoted now to balance the hagiographic Speer accounts of the 1980s and is pushed most notably here by ljadw. However, it lacks substance, particularly if you read the actual USSBS reports, especially The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy.

USSBS has at least one example:

Material shortages were expedited by the application of emergency priorities. Couriers were used to rush shipments of materials and equipment. In the case of steel forgings, for example, including tapered steel spar caps for the wings, Saur had the Ruhr mills so terrified because of their earlier experiences with him that the bottleneck was completely broken.

Very good, however, did you notice that was part of a general review of the strategic decision making in 1943/1944, which led to the creation of the Jägerstab and Sauer's role, rather than a discussion of a "Zulieferung" crisis caused by BC night bombing of the Ruhr?

So go down to the next page where you will find:

"The basic reason for Saur's success was the fact that on 15 August and 1 October, months before he came into power, the aircraft industry was given official programs as shown in Exhibit II which provided for important increases in production. Materials had been ordered on the basis of these accelerated schedules and shop releases had been made or were scheduled to be made which would keep the pipeline full. The bombing raids in later fall of 1943 had hit final assembly operations principally. The effect was to cause an excess amount of parts and work in process to accumulate in the pipeline. The Fighter Staff, by its expediting efforts, which included the use of threats to send plant managers to Dachau, released this accumulated potential."

USSBS Aircraft Industry report doesn't discuss damage to aluminum much. It finds that aluminum wasn't a constraint on production except early and late in the war. You're probably right though, to think that aluminum castings/forgings would have been appended to the primary metal industry and therefore probably impacted by damage to it.

Report No. 20 might address it. I'll see if I can get a chance to re-read it sometime. It's still a bit hectic here.

Well it depends on the scale of resolution I guess. Between early '43 and early '44 there's a trough.

If you've got the engine plants in Excel, I suspect you have the aircraft plant reports in Excel too. The 1943 "dip" monthly starting with July is:

1045
905
853
940
771
557
1273
1009
And then upwards from March's 1327.

Production declined after March '43 and didn't exceed March by more than a few % until November.

Run some charts and explore trend-lines.

That's about it. [Of course the reason Germany beats SU is specified in my Eastern Front ATL's...]

Oh, right, how could I forget.

To briefly recap, LW production depended on the magnitude of real inputs like labor, capital, and raw materials. Except for an early-war learning curve period, there was no miraculous rise in German production - just the application of resources.

Yep.

In a post-SU ATL, the Ostheer and "zombie Ostheer" (those killed/disabled/captured by RKKA OTL but not ATL) return to the German economy and include many experienced/skilled aviation workers. In addition, greater foreign labor inputs arise from conquering the SU (aviation firms liked Russian women particularly) and from better recruitment within OTL Grossraum due to better German war fortunes.

One problem and one question.

I suspect "experienced/skilled aviation workers" were invariably UK-Gestellte, so were unlikely to return from the Ostfront.

Where is it specified that "aviation firms liked Russian women particularly"? Budraß et all merely state "Even a document of the Reich’s aviation department found in the Military archives in Freiburg stated that the productivity of female Russians and Czech skilled worker came up to 90 to 100 percent of the productivity of their German counterparts." And, "Between summer 1941 and summer 1942 it was the employment of foreign civilian workers in which female Russians played a prominent role which enabled Heinkel not only to replace its lost German workers but also to expand its work force again by 40 percent." Nor does the Aircraft Industry Division Report give such an accolade? The best I can find is "The Dutch were the least cooperative, the Belgians and French were somewhat better, and Russians, especially Ukrainian women, reasonably well regarded."

Between these two factors, total German domestic industrial labor supply should approximately double, adding ~10-15mil workers. viewtopic.php?f=76&t=251476. If we say the aviation industry was ~2mil, tripling its labor input requires ~4mil workers or not even half the augmented labor supply.

Um, the Ostheer was roughly 3-million Wehrmacht personnel. In reality it took over a year for the Reich to amass some 6+ million slave laborers. That looks like c. 9 million to me as a maximum, not 10-15 million. On the bright side, I'm not sure how you think the workforce of the German aviation industry exceeded that of the US, but sure, whatever.

To achieve 3x OTL production would require more capital but not 3x as much due to higher intensity of utilization. OTL German aviation plants weren't always two-shift because there weren't sufficient German skilled/experienced workers to supervise a second shift. ATL there are such workers. My rough guess based on the prevalence of 2nd-shift plants is 2x OTL capital stock, implying 50% higher plant utilization than OTL.

The 1944 "miracle" was a result of extending the German labor force work week hours from 57 to 72 and instituting a second shift in the selected plants...as well as by adding non-German forced labor into the system such that by October 1944 48 percent were such. That would only amount to half a million+ industry-wide in theory.

German plant investment (machine tools and floor space) would, if and as necessary, shift towards LW from Heer beginning early in '42. As the machine tool industry's production is largely fungible between the two service branches there's no reasonable obstacle to this occurring.

Yeah, but I thought you were just telling me how difficult it was to convert the motor vehicle industry into aviation industry component manufacturing?

It's possible that no real total shift would be necessary, however. Rather, it's possible that additional LW investment would come from additional overall investment. OTL we see that German investment surged early in the war, peaking in '40-'42 and then declining. Within the peak period, '42 investment may already have been smaller than '41, which wasn't dramatically higher than '40. In an ATL in which Germany foresees the opportunity to employ millions more workers, investment would have continued rising significantly in '42 and '43.

Germany needs to foresee a lot. More seriously, you might want to dig a little deeper into the nature of German wartime finances and the financial shell-game that was played. IIRC and its been a while since I last dug into the subject, German government finance was near collapse in 1939 and again in 1942 and was only sustained in the first instance by raping western Europe and in the second by draining the German pension scheme. I'll see if I can track down my notes, but it was twenty-odd years and a number of moves ago. Or perhaps my econometrician friend Dr. Chris Rholfs might have something on it, although his study was primarily concerned with US wartime economics. Dueling experts anyone?

Given 3x the labor and effective capital inputs, 3x the LW output is straightforward.

Sure, GIGO.

We'd need more aluminum but Germany had access to immense deposits in France, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. The problem is getting miners, the problem with Germany getting miners in WW2 was feeding them adequately (miners need >4,000 calories to remain productive and/or not strike/desert). With Germany's food position better-secured by (1) substituting fertilizer production for explosives from '42 and (2) taking/keeping more of Black-Earth SU, feeding miners is no longer a problem.

Well, miners and electricity...
No, miners, electricity, and farmers...
No, miners, electricity, farmers, and fuel...
Starting to look like a Monty Python sketch.

Of course that's before figuring diminution of bombing damage. Depending on the slope and timing of higher LW production, by early 1944 fighter production will already be meaningfully higher than OTL even if not quite 3x the inputs are yet effectively mobilized. Even if it's "only" 2x the input/output, however, bomb damage will be significantly lower - probably effectively zero from AAF's campaign. In addition, the absence of a Soviet Air Force in '43 (and a weakened one in '42) saves ~4,000 planes including ~1,500 1-E fighters and pilots. More Ju-88's can be built as Nachtjager absent the Eastern Front's losses, some Bf-110's as well (they were actually useful as Nachtjager). And Germany's fuel situation - therefore its training programs - are on much better ground as the Caucasus starts producing in '43 and by '44 is fully back in swing.

But I thought you had already cut the Ju 88 out because it was useless and you needed those resources to build the additional mechanized forces that win the war in the east in order for you to build more aircraft in 1943 including Ju 88 that you are no longer building in order to defeat the CBO?

Did I mention fuel?

So combining 3x the inputs with substantially lower bomb damage - including the absence of emergency dispersal - could result in >4x the OTL LW output.

I see, so the overall Luftwaffe output isn't now three time that ever achieved just for the Jagdwaffe, its four times?

Did I mention fuel?

Such output would be redistributed from OTL type proportions - proportionately fewer 109's, more 190's and He-219's and probably more bombers to keep things historically feasible (Hitler wouldn't be able to resist). As we move into '45, Me-262/Ta-152/Do-335/Ar-234 programs do not suffer OTL crippling due to manpower and plant shortages under emergency conditions and therefore attain high production rates. Jumo jet engines benefit from Russian cobalt, solving many reliability/durability problems.

Fine tuning plans with the benefit of hindsight is easy, isn't it?

Sorry, gotta run...may be next week before I can answer again.

[Peter89]

We'd need more aluminum but Germany had access to immense deposits in France, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. The problem is getting miners, the problem with Germany getting miners in WW2 was feeding them adequately (miners need >4,000 calories to remain productive and/or not strike/desert). With Germany's food position better-secured by (1) substituting fertilizer production for explosives from '42 and (2) taking/keeping more of Black-Earth SU, feeding miners is no longer a problem.

My family was deeply involved in the industrial development of Hungary (especially at the communist era, but before that too, as miners as factory workers).

What you say is half-true; Germany could have utilized the raw materials, skilled workforce and production capacities in Hungary much, much more. There wasn't a famine in Hungary in WW2, only in the last days, so no extra food was needed for increased output.

In fact, Hungary had the largest Manganese deposit near Úrkút, already explored, mined (1922) with a refinery (1926) and rail connection, and a small-scale production has been started involving German capital, too. Somewhere between 50-100,000t ore was mined; depending on the quality, it was refined into 10-30,000t enriched manganese-oxide, 1/4-ing the transport needs.

What you think about Hungarian "Aluminium", is not really the case. It was rather Hungarian bauxite (containing an unusually high amount of titanium, the reason why Soviets imported it later on), but the point is that the German capital started to build an alumina refinery in Almásfüzitő in 1941, with a projtected capacity of 60,000t. (About 4-5t bauxite gets refined into approximately 2t of alumina, which in turn gets smelted into 1t of aluminium.). There were also alumina refineries in Ajka (1942) and Mosonmagyaróvár (a small, prewar refinery bought from Germany).

The ironic thing here is that until the German occupation of Hungary (1944.03.15), the Germans... well... didn't care. After that, however, heavy capital investments went into both these industries and the POL industry, including the synfuel plant in Pétfürdő. But they couldn't finish it; instead, the rising communist system did, quickly increasing the production based on German plans (and sometimes with even more worse technology) to 4-5 times in a few years.

Such was the scale of the unexploited materials.

You could argue well that the Germans could have exploited these sources substantially better. However, the Germans had no such thing in mind before they captured Hungary. So it brings me to the conclusion that the Germans needed another approach to gain access to these sources and capacities.

[TheMarcksPlan]

What non-rational economic story was I promoting?

I'm afraid that sounds like preaching to the choir?

Indeed I am preaching to the choir - non-AHF readers of this site and others who recite a chorus line. One of those chorus lines is the irredeemable pathology of German production systems. Not just AHF - I actually had a renowned historian tell me directly that additional German industrial manpower wouldn't have caused increased production due to German inefficiency. There's a strain of academic anti-Wehraboosim that - like all thoughts motivated only by opposition to another stupid thought - is a mirror image of the motivating stupidity.

I'm sorry, but the notion that the USSBS economists were fooled by Speer is a trope promoted now to balance the hagiographic Speer accounts of the 1980s and is pushed most notably here by ljadw.

Evaluation of USSBS is a big topic and I fear that, given your response to my statements about economists, full explanation would invoke degrees of subtlety undreamt of in your philosophy. A short version is that USSBS isn't a unified product and is internally contradictory - just see Tooze's exposition of the productivity stats produced internally by USSBS versus the Wagenfuhr stats used in the summary report.

The Aircraft Division's report alone contains many statements that modern scholarship has disproven or heavily modified. For example the report endorses the notions that (1) Hitler forced V-2 production (actually Hitler was initially resistant and Speer enthusiastic), (2) that the relative paucity of 2-shift work owed to laxness rather than to German supervisory labor shortage and other factors, (3) that cost-plus contracts dominated wartime aircraft procurement when RLM largely phased them out by 1939.

You seem unable to believe that one can find scholarship serious/important despite seeing serious systemic errors in it, so I won't pursue the argument further in this post.

[from USSBS]The effect was to cause an excess amount of parts and work in process to accumulate in the pipeline.

Again I'm inclined to trust Tooze's more recent scholarship and credit his relation of Zentralplanung's description of things. In any event, there's no contradiction between a surplus of some parts and a shortage of others.

The piece about steel spar caps shows that steel foundry/casting work was important to the aviation industry, it's not offered to tie up a narrative about Saur's bickering with Ruhr industrialists. For those wondering why steel spar caps: heavier weights at the end of wings provide bending relief, thereby enabling a smaller/lighter inner wing. This remains true today, as Airbus found when considering CFRP for the outer wings of the A380. When engineers did the math, it turned out that using CFRP only on the outer wings removed bending relief sufficiently that the heavier inner (aluminum) wing's weight canceled out any weight savings and only added cost and complexity.

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Aside re USSBS: Before joining AHF early last year, my main WW2/MH reading was in adolescence and college. During college I checked out well-worn copies of USSBS reports from the Uni library and kept them in my room at the fraternity. Predictably, beer/whatever was spilled on them (the passive voice is necessary due to the haziness of that period). Afraid that I had damaged rare original documents, I didn't return them. When I accepted my "diploma" on stage in front of family and friends, the diploma folder was empty but for a several-hundred dollar bill from the library. They shortly got back their USSBS reports and didn't notice or raise a stink about the beer stink.

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I suspect "experienced/skilled aviation workers" were invariably UK-Gestellte, so were unlikely to return from the Ostfront.

Not true. BMW, for instance, lost 18% of its workforce to Wehrmacht call ups in early 1943, including from aero-engine plants. Arming the Luftwaffe contains multiple such examples, as well anecdotes about skilled soldiers being "loaned" back to factories.

The reserved occupation system is a gross description of a policy aim; as with much in wartime Germany (and elsewhere) policy aims are not self-executing and rely on bureaucratic efficiency to turn goal into reality.

Where is it specified that "aviation firms liked Russian women particularly"? Budraß et all merely state "Even a document of the Reich’s aviation department found in the Military archives in Freiburg stated that the productivity of female Russians and Czech skilled worker came up to 90 to 100 percent of the productivity of their German counterparts." And

You quote the evidence yourself.

Um, the Ostheer was roughly 3-million Wehrmacht personnel

You're ignoring the Zombie Ostheer and the smaller Ersatzheer resulting from no Ostheer. Figures discussed in the post linked originally.

In reality it took over a year for the Reich to amass some 6+ million slave laborers. That looks like c. 9 million to me as a maximum

Anything to justify your "looks like?" As I've discussed elsewhere, citing works like Herbert's Hitler's Foreign Workers, Germany's ability to recruit/retain foreign labor diminished with her war fortunes. ATL she's winning and collaboration becomes a much more rational strategy.

You're also ignoring that Germany occupies >100mil more Soviets in this ATL than in OTL 1944.

More seriously, you might want to dig a little deeper into the nature of German wartime finances and the financial shell-game that was played.

Seriously you need to articulate a claim regarding the relationship between debt financing and war production. You're gesturing towards some financial limit additional to real resource limits but haven't spelled anything out. If you believe that Germany's debt position would have prevented the mobilization of resources for production, you should say so and justify the view. Instead you do these drive-by citings where identification of the arguments/logic is impossible.

No, miners, electricity, farmers, and fuel...

So now you're just listing things that I didn't include in a sketch?

As any serious reader here will know, I've addressed these issues elsewhere.

But I thought you had already cut the Ju 88 out

See this is where we revisit the territory of my having to ignore you. You know that a cut to Ju-88 production in '39-40 isn't a "cut out" - so you're consciously misrepresenting arguments. If you want to have a serious discussion we can do so; if you want to play games I have better uses of my time.

Fine tuning plans with the benefit of hindsight is easy, isn't it?

A cheap slogan that anybody capable of signing up for an account can make.

Does anyone else doubt that LW production would have shifted towards more expensive and capable planes if the Germans had greater resources? It's almost too dumb a question to ask...