The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Jan 2021 20:30

Richard Anderson wrote:BTW, there is no "admission" by Jentz in the Panzer Tracts that he "got things wrong".
Wrong.

From Panzer Tracts 23:

Image

Jentz clearly states that he made errors before completing the 30 year process of research embodied in Panzer Tracts. Panzertruppen I was published in 1997, well within the 30 year period prior to Panzer Tracts #23's publication in 2011.

I'm beginning to suspect that the reason you so rarely provide cites is you don't want to be corrected like this.

---------------------------

This is, of course, all besides the point. Avalancheon claimed correctly that Umbewaffnung was under way in August 1940, Richard responded that ACTUALLY deliveries didn't happen until Spring '41.

Once again this is completely irrelevant and a time-wasting diversion. The ATL subject is more tanks in Barbarossa; deliveries by Spring '41 predate Barbarossa.

This is why one needs attention to logical rigor as well as factual detail. Failures to think clearly and a tendency to throw up factual chaff, regardless of relevance, detract from productive discussion.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Jan 2021 22:03

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jan 2021 20:30
Wrong.

From Panzer Tracts 23:

Image

Jentz clearly states that he made errors before completing the 30 year process of research embodied in Panzer Tracts. Panzertruppen I was published in 1997, well within the 30 year period prior to Panzer Tracts #23's publication in 2011.
Not wrong. You just decided to move the goalposts.

Perhaps you could point out the passage in Jentz's Panzer Tracts 3-2, where he "clearly states he made errors" in reporting the acceptances of rebuilt Panzer III in Panzertruppen? Or any of the rebuilt figures contained there? Look at page 23-34 in Panzer Tracts and compare it to pages 262 and 264 in Panzertruppen I and tell me where the "errors" Jentz "admitted" are.

Which is what I asked you that you haven't answered. Since I steered you originally to Panzer Tracts and the production data in No. 23, you might actually suppose that I know he stated they made errors in earlier works and describes those errors, but they are not errors in the basic production figures or in the figures I have referred to.
I'm beginning to suspect that the reason you so rarely provide cites is you don't want to be corrected like this.
Maybe I'm tired of responding to smoke and mirrors "gotchas'" that have nothing to do with what I said? Which is why I keep putting you on ignore.
This is, of course, all besides the point. Avalancheon claimed correctly that Umbewaffnung was under way in August 1940, Richard responded that ACTUALLY deliveries didn't happen until Spring '41.
Well, yes, of course it is besides the point, since you avoided the point. Since when do paper plans equate to actual manufacture and/or remanufacture of tanks completed and ready for delivery to units? What was "underway in August 1940" resulted in the actual acceptance of a single actual vehicle (1, one, eins) in January 1941 from the program that had gotten "underway" five months earlier. Overall, the plans developed in August 1940 for rearming 600 Panzer III with 5cm guns resulted by 1943 in 424 actual tanks being so rearmed. Of those, 161 conversions were completed and of those 108 were actually ready for issue by the end of May 1941.
Once again this is completely irrelevant and a time-wasting diversion. The ATL subject is more tanks in Barbarossa; deliveries by Spring '41 predate Barbarossa.
Yes, it is completely irrelevant and a time-wasting diversion, which you just created. If you want to get more manufactured/rebuilt tanks with 5cm guns in time for BARBAROSSA then the manufacturing/rebuilding planning and execution needs to start earlier than July-August 1940.
This is why one needs attention to logical rigor as well as factual detail. Failures to think clearly and a tendency to throw up factual chaff, regardless of relevance, detract from productive discussion.
I am unclear how "logical rigor as well as factual detail" are demonstrated by assuming plans equal reality, an admission of error by an author unrelated to the discussion at hand is relevant, and how moving goalposts makes for "productive discussion"?
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Jan 2021 00:54

KDF33 wrote:It seems to me there is significant evidence that Germany still had economic "slack" in 1941.
Thanks for putting up some data. If you're interested, I'm doing an intermittent series on the historiography of the early-war German economy with a particular focus on where Tooze and modern revisionists go wrong. viewtopic.php?f=66&t=252374

TL;DR: Tooze is ideologically driven to rebut theories of radical German under-mobiilization ("Blitzkrieg Economy"). Shooting down the radical version, however, causes Tooze to miss the smaller extent of German under-mobilization (~10% lower than Britain in 1940) and to make easily
identifiable factual errors.

Of course it was absurd for Germany to be less mobilized than Britain; the opposite should have been true and was later on.

The 10% mobilization delta between Britain and Germany in 1940 (44% vs. 40%) would easily have decided the war in the East if deployed as I suggest: 4% of German GDP is ~4bn RM or the equivalent of ~35,000 Pz3's. That's not to say Germany could have or should have built so many tanks, only to give some scope to the shortfall. Because most German military expenditure was on soldier's pay and provisions, even a relatively small GDP delta to ordnance production could have fundamentally changed the war in '40-'41.

So why didn't Germany do it? The mainstream explanation (e.g. GSWW vol.5/1) is that Hitler et. al. recalled November 1918 and feared pushing the Germans too hard. The obvious problem with that explanation is that those fears disappeared virtually overnight when the Moscow Offensive failed. Did Hitler suddenly believe Germans were less inclined to rebel now that the war wasn't going as well? Of course not, that's absurd.

The real explanation for German under-mobilization is confidence in victory - i.e. Germany wasn't taking the SU seriously, the U.S. wasn't in the war, Britain alone was not a sufficiently powerful enemy.
KDF33 wrote:Finally, a note regarding foreign workers. The period 1939-41 was characterized by three main sources of external labor: Poles, prisoners of war and free workers from neutral and allied countries. The systematic, Europe-wide impounding of foreign civilian workers only got organized in 1942, again after the Moscow setback.
Indeed. Herbert's Hitler's Foreign Workers is the closest to a comprehensive treatment of this topic. Elsewhere I've discussed that book's evidence that Nazi failure to encourage foreign labor was the lowest-hanging fruit and perhaps the greatest missed opportunity of '40-'41. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557&start=45#p2216965

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Critical to understanding German under-mobilization is that (in)efficiency and (under-)mobilization were directly connected. Latter-war output growth was mostly about efficiency. The Germans knew there was waste in the economy in 1940 but refused to take the hard measures that everyone knew would enhance efficiency. For example, from GSWW v.5/1, p.1089:
In February 1942 the Reich labour ministry was forced to concede
that, if measures of rationalization were applied rigorously, at least one million
workers could be released by industry.2
...this same ministry had resisted calls for "combing out" operations until then, largely because industrialists wanted to retain workforce for anticipated peacetime reconversion (see GSWW v.5/1 chapter: "The Crippling of Armaments Production").

A million workers! At a time when the entire tank industry employed on the order of 10,000...

BTW- I suspect that the intimidating length of GSWW v.5, combined with its dreadfully boring focus on intra-state administrative wrangling and execrable writing style, have dissuaded many analysts from internalizing its revealing contents. Tooze mischaracterizes it, for example, and probably only skimmed it.
Richard Anderson wrote:There is also considerable evidence that the British Commonwealth, the U.S.A., and the Soviet Union still had economic "slack" in 1941. Taking up the "slack" took time...the Germans started somewhat earlier in taking up that "slack" than did some of the others
It is precisely this hand-waving of differences that must be avoided. Yes, all economies encountered difficulties mobilizing for war. No, that doesn't mean that particular German circumstances (i.e. over-confidence in victory) were not decisive.

Tooze and his ilk are ideologically aimed at the Blitzkrieg Economy theory; Richard and his ilk are aimed at online Wehraboos. A more intellectually serious and productive discourse remains outside these tawdry and/or outdated disputes.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by KDF33 » 20 Jan 2021 05:34

Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Jan 2021 17:40
Indeed. There is also considerable evidence that the British Commonwealth, the U.S.A., and the Soviet Union still had economic "slack" in 1941. Taking up the "slack" took time...
Although I agree with this in a general sense, in the case of Germany there is substantial evidence that the pattern of mobilization was different from all other belligerents. There were effectively four distinct phases:

1. 1939/Q4 to 1940/Q2: Steady mobilization of resources for the war economy, mostly through reorganizing Germany's internal labor market

2. 1940/Q3 to 1941/Q4: Mobilization stagnant, except for niche areas

3. 1942/Q1 to 1944/Q2: Steady mobilization of resources for the war economy, mostly through conscription of foreign workers

4. 1944/Q3 to 1945/Q1: Collapse

Germany's workforce employed in the munitions industries barely increased in 1941. Between 1941/Q4 and 1943/Q1, it grew by ≈30% - entirely through the conscription of forced labor.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 20 Jan 2021 17:23

KDF33 wrote:
20 Jan 2021 05:34
Although I agree with this in a general sense, in the case of Germany there is substantial evidence that the pattern of mobilization was different from all other belligerents.
Quite possibly, since I wouldn't be surprised if every mobilization was different from other belligerents.
There were effectively four distinct phases:

1. 1939/Q4 to 1940/Q2: Steady mobilization of resources for the war economy, mostly through reorganizing Germany's internal labor market

2. 1940/Q3 to 1941/Q4: Mobilization stagnant, except for niche areas

3. 1942/Q1 to 1944/Q2: Steady mobilization of resources for the war economy, mostly through conscription of foreign workers

4. 1944/Q3 to 1945/Q1: Collapse

Germany's workforce employed in the munitions industries barely increased in 1941. Between 1941/Q4 and 1943/Q1, it grew by ≈30% - entirely through the conscription of forced labor.
Interesting, but it might be even more interesting to speculate/investigate just why that was? What effect did the state of the prewar German have on mobilization? The partial mobilizations for the Munich Crisis? The sudden collapse of France? The start of the second period begins with the great fall industrial furlough...is it related? Then of course the third period also required the decision to employ the large numbers of Zwangsarbeiter in Reich industry.

The other question is what is being counted as mobilization? Manpower? Financial? Industrial output? It will be interesting to explore how this might compare to other nations mobilization.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 20 Jan 2021 17:38

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jan 2021 20:30
Richard Anderson wrote:BTW, there is no "admission" by Jentz in the Panzer Tracts that he "got things wrong".
Wrong.

From Panzer Tracts 23:

Image

Jentz clearly states that he made errors before completing the 30 year process of research embodied in Panzer Tracts. Panzertruppen I was published in 1997, well within the 30 year period prior to Panzer Tracts #23's publication in 2011.

I'm beginning to suspect that the reason you so rarely provide cites is you don't want to be corrected like this.

---------------------------

This is, of course, all besides the point. Avalancheon claimed correctly that Umbewaffnung was under way in August 1940, Richard responded that ACTUALLY deliveries didn't happen until Spring '41.

Once again this is completely irrelevant and a time-wasting diversion. The ATL subject is more tanks in Barbarossa; deliveries by Spring '41 predate Barbarossa.

This is why one needs attention to logical rigor as well as factual detail. Failures to think clearly and a tendency to throw up factual chaff, regardless of relevance, detract from productive discussion.
Ha ha ha. Mostest funny comment by tmp.

Tmp was give quote on author what was admit he was make some errors on 30 year researches.

Then tmp was decide from all 30 years work it can to be tmp what can to choose what datas was error. Anything tmp want for to be error must to be error.

:lol:

Only logical rigor on tmp comment was for to choose errors was be on datas for to mislead peoples about real history and for to make tmp imagination storys plausible.

When tmp was write
. one needs attention to logical rigor
. as well as factual detail.
. Failures to think clearly and a
. tendency to throw up factual chaff, regardless of relevance,

It seems to me for to be mostest accurate comment on what was write tmp.

Topic is now on page 30. I think everybody can to still wait on tmp for to give some evidences and historical datas on what extra resources (how many mens, what factorys, how many metals, how many electricitys etc etc etc etc etc) must for to give on tank manufactures for to make extra tanks what he want for tmp imagination story. Everybody can still to wait on opportuity cost on change allocations on resources. On 30 pages be only tmp wave on hand more resources = more tanks. On 30 pages be only tmp wave on hand Germany economy have slack on system.

How can to have productive discussion on tmp hand wave and factual chaff, regardless of relevance ?

On 30 pages i was not learn nothing on tmp comments on factual detail topic possibility Germany for to manufacture more tanks.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 21 Jan 2021 00:37

As usual in these threads, we need a periodic reminder that the means to increase panzer production is quite simple: double/triple shiftwork (including at component manufacturers). As Daimler-Benz stated when it accepted the Pz3 contract in 1936:
We are interested to learn that you have planned the use of Werke 4 in Marienfelde 20 18-ton Fahrzeuge per month in one shift or 50 in three shifts.
Panzer Tracts No. 3-2, p.4

Add in steel and it really is that simple. No need for machine tools, investment plans, etc.

What's not simple is making decisions either to (1) cut labor and production elsewhere, and/or (2) encourage foreign labor at political cost, and/or (3) release labor from civilian or non-efficient firms via closures - obviously at political cost.

--------------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Anderson wrote:Interesting, but it might be even more interesting to speculate/investigate just why that was?
Better than speculating is to read GSWW vols. 4 & 5 and - to the extent possible - the primary sources cited therein.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Yoozername » 21 Jan 2021 00:44

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
18 Jan 2021 20:20

The fundamental intellectual problem here is to use the word "bottleneck" in a literal sense. Unless all components are produced at identical rates there is always a bottleneck.
Well, since you used the word 'intellectual', your critical thinking might include that they don't have to make components at identical rates. The components need to be made at increased rates to include the spares.

I think you are straining towards an idea like JIT. But there is no point in producing tanks without spares.Didn't we go over this already?

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 21 Jan 2021 00:56

yoozername wrote:your critical thinking might include that they don't have to make components at identical rates.
This is so obviously not an intellectually serious response that I'm only replying to point out its absurdity.

Literally identical rates would mean producing one gun, one roadwheel, one ball bearing per tank.

Any reasonable reader will infer that "identical" means in proportion to need, which includes spares.

For others - I realize I may come off sometimes as harsh. But this is what I deal with constantly here.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Yoozername » 21 Jan 2021 01:21

Since you never seem to grasp that these panzers were being made under contracts, largely through private firms, I find you equally absurd.

Specifically, you're statement "There are always bottlenecks" shows no real world appreciation how products are contracted/manufactured.

Since you now seem to think that all the tanks will have stocks of JIT components, and plenty of spares; Why not toss in some Sonderkraftfahrzeug 8? And expanded schools for drivers and gunner's and mechanics, and ammunition, etc, etc.?

believe me...you have no idea how you come off...LOL...we had an expression in the Army...SHL.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by KDF33 » 21 Jan 2021 08:58

Yoozername wrote:
21 Jan 2021 01:21
Since you never seem to grasp that these panzers were being made under contracts, largely through private firms, I find you equally absurd.
I, for one, do not understand your point about private firms and contracts. What is it meant to suggest?
Yoozername wrote:
21 Jan 2021 01:21
Specifically, you're statement "There are always bottlenecks" shows no real world appreciation how products are contracted/manufactured.
Again, how is TMP's statement showing a lack of real world appreciation for contract and manufacture? And what conclusions can be derived from this asserted misunderstanding with regards to the topic at hand?
Yoozername wrote:
21 Jan 2021 01:21
Since you now seem to think that all the tanks will have stocks of JIT components, and plenty of spares; Why not toss in some Sonderkraftfahrzeug 8? And expanded schools for drivers and gunner's and mechanics, and ammunition, etc, etc.?
My understanding of TMP's argument is that Germany increases the number of Panzer divisions from 20 to 25 in time for June 1941. It implies not just an increase in tank production, but also in the other components of a Panzer division, whether material or human. So all of the above is already implied.
Yoozername wrote:
21 Jan 2021 01:21
believe me...you have no idea how you come off...LOL...we had an expression in the Army...SHL.
What is SHL?

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Terry Duncan » 21 Jan 2021 10:22

Yoozername wrote:
21 Jan 2021 01:21
Since you never seem to grasp that these panzers were being made under contracts, largely through private firms, I find you equally absurd.

Specifically, you're statement "There are always bottlenecks" shows no real world appreciation how products are contracted/manufactured.

Since you now seem to think that all the tanks will have stocks of JIT components, and plenty of spares; Why not toss in some Sonderkraftfahrzeug 8? And expanded schools for drivers and gunner's and mechanics, and ammunition, etc, etc.?

believe me...you have no idea how you come off...LOL...we had an expression in the Army...SHL.

Yoozername,

Please refrain from making personal comments about other members, it is against the rules and usually ends in nothing good.


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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 21 Jan 2021 18:01

KDF33 wrote:I, for one, do not understand your point about private firms and contracts. What is it meant to suggest?
I will be shocked if there is an articulable rationale behind the utterance. Yoozername only wishes to remind us that he served as a U.S. Army engineer and his opinions should be judged based on that personal trait, regardless of facts and logic.
viewtopic.php?p=2308129#p2308129

He feels he's owed deference, is angry at being denied it, and is lashing out.

His charge that I ignore that private firms built panzers is particularly absurd in light of my suggestion upthread that these firms' investment decisions were adversely affected by 1939 funding volatility, and that their ensuing private investment planning may underlie 1940-41 production shortfalls. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=109591&start=270#p2305719 (towards bottom of that long post)

I didn't respond to his accusation earlier because I don't anticipate reasoned dialogue ensuing from arguments with Yoozername. But FYI...
KDF33 wrote:My understanding of TMP's argument is that Germany increases the number of Panzer divisions from 20 to 25 in time for June 1941. It implies not just an increase in tank production, but also in the other components of a Panzer division, whether material or human. So all of the above is already implied.
Of course.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Yoozername » 21 Jan 2021 18:01

Terry Duncan wrote:
21 Jan 2021 10:22
Yoozername wrote:
21 Jan 2021 01:21
Since you never seem to grasp that these panzers were being made under contracts, largely through private firms, I find you equally absurd.

Specifically, you're statement "There are always bottlenecks" shows no real world appreciation how products are contracted/manufactured.

Since you now seem to think that all the tanks will have stocks of JIT components, and plenty of spares; Why not toss in some Sonderkraftfahrzeug 8? And expanded schools for drivers and gunner's and mechanics, and ammunition, etc, etc.?

believe me...you have no idea how you come off...LOL...we had an expression in the Army...SHL.

Yoozername,

Please refrain from making personal comments about other members, it is against the rules and usually ends in nothing good.


Terry [/b]
It was clearly a response to this.... "This is so obviously not an intellectually serious response that I'm only replying to point out its absurdity."...

Since he brought up how he "comes off"....I think my opinion on he 'comes off' is relevant.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Yoozername » 21 Jan 2021 18:06

I, for one, do not understand your point about private firms and contracts. What is it meant to suggest?
Not suggesting anything. Stating a fact. Most producers of AFV for Germany were private companies in the time frame we are discussing. They were awarded contracts to build AFV per contracted specification.

It was not a case of "build things till we run into some limitation and then it is a bottleneck". That is an absurd argument.

I do like to stay on topic.

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