Hitler's controversial order about Dunkirk

[Imad]

Hello
I am referring to the famous halt order before Dunkirk in 1940. Many historians consider this as Hitler's major blunder in the war while others, like J.F.C Fuller, do not seem to think so. The Fuhrer himself seems to have been apprehensive about the lack of suitability of terrain in that area for armoured operations. I am interested in getting some different opinions from forum members about the merits or demerits of this particular incident. Was the decision correct or not? Please state your reasons.

[tonyh]

The Fuhrer himself seems to have been apprehensive about the lack of suitability of terrain in that area for armoured operations.

Can you point me to a contemporary quote from Hitler, where this is stated?

Tony

[Boby]

The decision was taken by Rundstedt, and Hitler agree.

[Imad]

The Fuhrer himself seems to have been apprehensive about the lack of suitability of terrain in that area for armoured operations.

Can you point me to a contemporary quote from Hitler, where this is stated?

Tony

No contemporary quote, but as early as 9th October 1939 he had stated that "under no circumstances must tanks be permitted to become entangled in the endless rows of houses in Belgian towns".
On the 24th of May 1940 Hitler visited Rundstedt's headquarters and agreed that all armoured forces must be halted on the line Lens-Bethune-Aire-St.Omer-Gravelines. He insisted the Panzers must be conserved for future operations

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In May 1940 a few days after the evacuation of Dunkirk General von Kleist, commanding Panzer Gruppe West ventured to tell Hitler that a great opportunity had been lost. Hitler replied: "That may be so. But I did not want to send the tanks into the Flanders marshes, and the British won't come back in this war."

[tonyh]

Neither quote suggests that Hitler was "apprehensive about the lack of suitability of terrain in that area for armoured operations." regarding Dunkrk.

Tony

[Imad]

When a person says he does not want under any circumstances for his tanks to become entangled in endless rows of houses I think its safe to assume it's terrain he's worried about. Furthermore when he mentions the problems created by Flanders marshes I think it would again be safe to make the same assumption

[tonyh]

Well, you're free to make those assumptions.

Tony

[Simon Gunson]

Yeah quite possibly the endless rows of houses were more likely the terrain you refer to. There was an easily defended town with a concentration of troops and anti tank weapons.

I have heard it said in a documentary that Goering wanted to use the Luftwaffe to reduce the escaping forces.

I have also read speculation before that Hitler was also trying his best to leave open the option of a negotiated peace with Churchill as he did not regard the british as natural enemies.

Adolf Galland speaking after the war Said that Goeirng told himself and Werner Molder that there was never any genuine intent to attack Britain. That all along the Blitzkreig of May 1940 was intended as a distraction for Stalin.

[budenmeyer]

there was never any genuine intent to attack Britain.

This is obvious.

all along the Blitzkreig of May 1940 was intended as a distraction for Stalin.

This doesn't follow from the fact that there was never any genuine intent to attack Britain.

The conquest of Denmark and Norway by Germany was a necessary move to prevent British troops from conquering Scandinavia.

Fall Gelb, i.e. the attack on France via the Benelux countries, was necessary to prevent the French and the British from invading Germany. As you may know, British troops actually crossed the border between France and Germany in the autumn of 1939 when the German army was in France. Hitler decided to ignore the presence of British troops on German soil at that point in time because he believed there was no immediate danger, but the threat from France had to be dealt with sooner or later.

[Bronsky]

Was the decision correct or not? Please state your reasons.

With hindsight, the Germans would probably have been better off pushing on. They might or might not have captured Dunkirk before the bulk of the Allied defenders reached it - the place was not undefended at the time of the haltbefehl, contrary to legend - but they would almost certainly have trapped far more Allied - mostly British - troops.

They would also have lost more tanks, but that's something that they could afford to replace better than Britain could replace trained soldiers.

But we know two very important things that the Germans at the time didn't:

1. Britain had no intention of surrendering,
2. It was possible to evacuate almost 350,000 troops from the pocket.

At the time, the Germans thought that the trapped Allied troops weren't going anywhere (so, for that matter, did the Royal Navy who believed the Allies would be lucky to rescue 40,000 or so), that the Luftwaffe was unstoppable, and that the "real" battle lay ahead for which husbanding German armored strength was necessary.

Hitler also wanted to make a point about who was boss, i.e. when Halder countermanded von Rundstedt's order, Hitler backed up von Rundstedt, not only because he shared his fears (which he did) but to make it plain who was authorized to give orders to top military commanders.

I don't buy the "we'll leave the British an escape route" theory, because if such was the idea then the Luftwaffe and the ground troops pounding Dunkirk would probably have been told.

[tonyh]

Hitler, in his misguided Anglophile mentality, probably felt that the complete destruction of Britain's army would probably get their back up and encourage a "British stuborness". However, if the army were to crawl back to Britain in a defeated state, there may be a chance that Britain would "see sense", fold and withdraw from the war.

In Hitler's eyes, there are a number of hard decisions to make in the situation and any decision made wouldn't have encouraged Britain to sue for peace, at the end of the day.

Also, if the destruction of the army on the beach was what Hitler wanted. Then the Luftwaffe would have been usd in far greater strength. AFAIR, it was just used in penny packet formations and not en masse.

Hitler didn't seem too bothered that the British Army had escaped back to Britain. In fact, when the evacuation was over, he simply went on a tour of the Flanders battlefields a couple of days later, convinced that Britain would be out of the war soon.

The fear of bogging down the panzers seems to be a post-event summary, rather than something Hitler truly had in mind. The only quote I have found was one given after the British had escaped accross the channel and then refused to give up. Hitler seems to to be justifing his silly halt order, by saying he was worried about "terrain", rather than saying that he actually admired the British. Something which many members of staff felt was extremely misplaced and in the end very dangerous for Germany.

Tony

[Bronsky]

Hitler, in his misguided Anglophile mentality, probably felt that the complete destruction of Britain's army would probably get their back up and encourage a "British stuborness".

And your source is...? Hitler's anglophilia was demonstrated by the Blitz, Baedecker raids, V-1s?

Note that if Guderian had captured Dunkirk before the Allies got there in numbers, this would have resulted in the capture of the BEF, not its physical destruction. The British would have surrendered in a hopeless situation, as they did later at Saint-Valery en Caux.

Also, if the destruction of the army on the beach was what Hitler wanted. Then the Luftwaffe would have been usd in far greater strength. AFAIR, it was just used in penny packet formations and not en masse.

My understanding is that the Luftwaffe gave it its best effort, though it was hampered by distance and supply problems, bad weather also helped the Allies by making effective air attacks impossible for a few days. Finally, the Luftwaffe units, at the end of their operational range, were now facing new opposition from Britain-based RAF fighters, including Spitfires (first committed to the fight on the Continent on that occasion).

This understanding is based on Bekker's "Luftwaffe diary", Hooton's "Phoenix Triumphant", Murray's "Luftwaffe" as well as various individual memoirs and unit histories. If you have better sources than "AFAIR" for your contention that the Luftwaffe pulled its punches, I'd be interested in seeing them.

Additionally, the German ground forces attacking the pocket definitely did not pull back. If the idea was to give the British a respite, the order certainly did not reach von Bock's army group.

Hitler didn't seem too bothered that the British Army had escaped back to Britain.

When did Hitler ever admit to having been wrong before Stalingrad?

The fear of bogging down the panzers seems to be a post-event summary, rather than something Hitler truly had in mind.

It is a fact that the armored spearhead were depleted and extremely tired, and that Kleist had requested a break for that reason. Hitler was made aware of that situation. Whether he specifically worried about tanks bogging down is not something I remember anything about, nor do I feel it's particularly important. He had reasons to want to preserve his armored forces other than the fear of their bogging down.

[Imad]

Well Bronsky, Hitler's Anglophilia can actually be traced to a few passages in Mein Kampf. The Blitz, V weapons, etc. were expedients he resorted to after he realized what a stubborn opponent he was up against. His anglophilia actually lasted only up till the Battle of Britain.
Anyway my question was regarding the wisdom behind the halt order. He seems to have been caught in the horns of a dilemma. Wipe out the BEF and have his Panzerwaffe suffer heavy casualties and hence leave himself vulnerable to a French counterthrust or let the Brits go, hoping they would see sense eventually and come to the negotiating table, and deal with the rest of France. Not an easy decision to make at all.

[Lkefct]

The Fuhrer himself seems to have been apprehensive about the lack of suitability of terrain in that area for armoured operations.

Can you point me to a contemporary quote from Hitler, where this is stated?

Tony

No contemporary quote, but as early as 9th October 1939 he had stated that "under no circumstances must tanks be permitted to become entangled in the endless rows of houses in Belgian towns".
On the 24th of May 1940 Hitler visited Rundstedt's headquarters and agreed that all armoured forces must be halted on the line Lens-Bethune-Aire-St.Omer-Gravelines. He insisted the Panzers must be conserved for future operations

I was always under the impression that the quote from Oct 1939 was due to the losses taken by 4th Pz around Warsaw where they lost 57 of 120 tanks to Poles in street fighitng. While you can consider the streets around Warsaw as terrain, I am not sure that Hitler is thinking in the same line with this order. Bogging a tank down in muddy or soft ground is a distnactly different way to lose a tank as the tight, closed in areas around a city. The end result may be that a tank is lost, but the root of the problem is very different.

Some of the comments taht I have read was that Hitler was very concerned with the tank losses that he had taken up to that point. Kleists Pz Group was done to half of their tanks running, Hoth had lost 1/3. The vast majority of these would be back into action shortly, but at least Nehring was under the impression that talking to Hitler that he didn't seemt o understand that (at that point or latter on).

The last point is that I am not sure that the Germans had any idea of how many British and Allied troops where in DUnkirk. They certtainly realized tha there where a lot of men being evacuated, but at least kesselring commented afterwards that when told that around 300,000 men had been taken out, "Even 100,000 would have struck us as greatly exagerated.". Had they know it might have lead to a more vigerous push by the German infantry, and the luftwaffe concentrating on supporting the attackers ratehr then trying to disrupt the evacuation.