Battle of Sovkhoz «Red Star» (Sovkhoz 79)

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Post by Yuri » 19 Feb 2007 16:34

continuation by
Technical Report BDM/W-81-077-TR, McLean, VA, December 19, 1980

– 35 –

5. Tactics and Techniques in General

Throughout the four-day conference, discussions ranged over a wide number of tactical questions in some detail. These have been assembled under this heading regardless of the actual sequence in which they occurred.

Very early in the conference General Balck explained a concept for the defense, or perhaps more accurately for the delay, which included, some important technical points.
Gen. Balck: «During my time as a division commander, I thought that our different tactics of concentrating on fixed lines to be held, during the First World War, was wrong. I developed a different defense method successfully:
a. I built up a line according to the old method, but only for deception. The armoured infantry regiments and the engineers were deployed in order to demonstrate some activity.
b. About 50 km away from this line, the armoured regiment, [antitank elements], and [remaining armoured infantry] would attack the advancing Russian troops and destroy[them]. -1/ p.114 L.

– 36 –
c. [We would then] withdraw to the last line, [presumably a rearward line]. Here, usually, the enemy did not have sufficient forces any longer to act energetically». 1/ p.75.

Here, again, the impact of space on tactics is readily apparent. On the largely uninhabited steppes of Russia, 50 kilometers was a trivial distance. However, just two or three such steps backward in Western Europe would signal the end of the war.

During the defense of the Chir River line in Russia, during and just after the failure to relieve Stalingrad, the XLVIlI Panzer Corps employed one weak infantry division and a Luftwaffe field division on the front, with General Balck's 11th Panzer Division in reserve for counterattack. Over a period of many weeks, this one Panzer Division mounted dozens of crucial counterattacks. Each time, the line of the Chir was restored. In the course of these operations the Russian 5th Tank Army was destroyed, and the German Position west and south of Stalingrad was saved from catastrophic defeat.
The discussion turned to the details of this campaign:

Gen. DePuy: «.... what weapons did [the armoured infantry regiment] have to stop the Russian armoured attack»?
Gen. Balck: «I put all available antitank weapons at the disposal of the regiment».
Gen. v. Mellenthin: "Antitank weapons did not belong to the regiment, they were at the disposal of the division». 2/ pp81-82
Gen. DePuy: «What Orders did General Balck issue to the commander of the 15th Panzer regiment in this particular case where the infantry stopped the attack? What were the orders»?
Gen. v. Mellenthin: « 'Forward.' .... One column was attacked and destroyed from the rear, then our tanks turned and attacked the other Russian column while it came over the rise and every tank showed its belly .... With 24 of our own tanks, we destroyed 72 Russian tanks without losing even one single man».
Mr. Dunnigan: «Was that because when you attacked the Russians, they were not facing you, and they were then incapable of resisting the surprise that you gained»?
Gen. Balck: «Naturally». 1/ pp.86-87

– 37 –
A recurring theme had to do with the combined arms team, and more specifically with the tactical employment of armoured infantry. Generally, it appears that the German Army, in World War II and even today, sees the infantry as a more static or deliberate-defending force: holding a line shaping the battlefield - maintaining coherence - providing a framework within which the mobile tank formations, usually held in reserve, carry out the counterattacks as the principal agent for the destruction of the attacking enemy. This leads to a situation in which the coordination of tanks with infantry is effected at the level of the brigade or division.

The American concept is not unlike that of the Germans, with one important exception. The American Army habitually cross-attaches its tank and mechanized battalions so that in almost all cases the mechanized battalions will have at least one tank company and the tank battalions will have one mechanized infantry company. This practice (not unheard of in the German Army as well) stems from the fact that battalions on the NATO line have wide frontages, and often conduct their battles independently in separate terrain compartments.
This means that in the American Army the coordination of tanks with infantry is at the battalion level.

The German Army today prefers to coordinate tanks with infantry at the Brigade level.

In General Balck's 11th Panzer Division the coordination was apparently often at division level:

Gen. DePuy: «…. on the Chir you blocked [the Russian breakthrough] with a Panzer Grenadier Regiment and attacked into the [flank of] the Russian armor with Panzers.
Was the other Panzer Grenadier Regiment then used against the enemy infantry [accompanying the Russian tanks] - did it look anything like that»?
Gen. v. Mellenthin: «General Balck and I consulted, and we concentrated both [Panzer Grenadier Regiments] to stop the tanks, and [our] tanks [alone] attacked into the flank».
Gen. DePuy: «Were there other occasions in which the Panzer Grenadier Regiment attacked in a coordinated way with the tanks»?

– 38 –
Gen. v. Mellenthin: «Usually General Balck preferred it if the units separated, the tanks from the infantry; but you are in a fortunate Position today because you have infantry which is mounted and has everything themselves ...».
Mr. Sprey: «General, is there maybe anything in your memory where Panzers and Panzer Grenadiers attacked combined simply because of the terrain»?
Gen. Balck: «There were occasions, but I tried to avoid it because if you combine two units, the result is so much disorder, and later an you have to separate them again and that will be difficult».
(Unidentified): «You did not run into situations where your Panzers needed infantry to protect them from enemy infantry»?
Gen. Balck: «No». 1/ p.86-87

This entire exchange was somewhat surprising except for General von Mellenthin's recognition that the Situation may be different if the infantry is also armoured and equally mobile in tracked vehicles especially tracked vehicles armed with automatic cannon and ATGMs.

It is generally accepted in all of the modern armies (including the Soviet) that the mechanized infantry will protect the tanks by preceding them into towns and forests in the attack or counterattack, and by clearing strong points or enemy dismounted positions which block or threaten the movement of the armoured force.

We can only take General Balck's strong position at face value. He did not want to mix tanks and infantry below his level. But we must remember that his division consisted of less than one full battalion of tanks. His Panzer Grenadier regiments were merely small battalions. Thus in effect we saw the tactical integration of tanks with infantry at the Brigade level - almost to battalion level - but with a very remarkable commander in charge.

Another aspect of defensive operations to which attention was drawn had to do with antitank weapons in their tactical relationship to infantry and tanks. This Subject is of current importance because of the advent of the antitank guided missile (ATGM).

– 39 –
Gen. DePuy: «In the desert you had the 88-mm and 76-mm antitank guns. What techniques did you use, in coordinating the employment of the antitank weapons with the maneuver of the tanks, that would be similar to what we are trying to do with the ATGM»?
Gen. von Mellenthin: «In Africa we deployed the antitank 88 in the front to block the approach of the enemy, and attacked the enemy with tanks separately from the flank and rear».
Gen. DePuy: «Did the tanks normally wait for the British armoured force to be disorganized by the effect of the antitank weapons before the counterattack»?
Gen. von Mellenthin: «We left them time to kill the attacking tanks in the front line of the 88s. Afterward came the surprise attack of tanks».
Gen. Gorman: «How far off would the 88s engage, assuming that they could see».
Gen. von Mellenthin: «You know, in the desert you have an enormous view, and therefore I would say he Gould successfully destroy tanks at a distance of 2000-3000 meters».
Gen. DePuy: «What, was the range at which you Gould destroy a T-34 tank with a [German] Mark IV»?
Gen von Mellenthin: «1500-2000 meters [but] very often we killed them at only 200-300 meters distances».
Gen. DePuy: «[In the counterattack], I wondered whether you stopped so you Gould fire [accurately] and destroy [the Russian tanks] before you closed [with them]»?
Gen. von Mellenthin: «Yes, quite definitely».1/ pp.B1-53

This last point is important. Many officers visualize a counter attack as a cavalry charge. However, in almost all seasoned armies the counterattacking forte gains a favourable position on the flank from which to destroy the enemy tanks from stationary firing positions. Only After all enemy tanks are destroyed or have taken cover does the force close. In some cases the counterattack never closes.

The desirability of massing antitank weapons was also a central feature of General Balck's defensive operations in Russia:

Gen. Balck: « . . contrary to the order of the Army Group, antitank units were not dispersed in the front lines and would be massively used at the ffocal point [by- 11th Panzer Division]».
Mr. Karber: «What kind of antitank units are we talking about»?

– 40 –
Gen. von Mellenthin: «76-mm guns. We took them from the Russians. They were excellent weapons. It is better to keep the antitank weapons in reserve, until you could see where the Schwerpunkt was».
Mr. Dunnigan: «Why did the Army Group commander want to disperse the force»?
Gen. Balck: «The Army Group commander wanted a long continuous line of antitank units, but this would have been [penetrated] anyway, and then we would not have anything to oppose the major threat».
Gen. von Mellenthin: «He was an excellent soldier, but he was much more infantry-minded than we». 1/ pp.9-10

Here again we see the classic conflict between the desire to hold ground resolutely - to deny it to the enemy and to do so by holding a line - and the alternative tactic of opening up the battle and destroying his forces in the open field. To some extent, as General von Mellenthin points out, this is a difference between the viewpoint of «infantry-minded» officers on the one hand and «armor-minded» officers on the other. This difference should come as no surprise, as infantry is most effective in deliberately prepared defenses where they are protected from artillery and enemy armor by field fortifications and minefields. Tank commanders, on the other hand, are uncomfortable in fixed positions and wish to be able to move about. A judicious mixture of these complementary capabilities seems to shape the battlefield, maintain coherence, and create situations in which the enemy can be destroyed. Either capability acting alone has a value significantly less than 50 percent of their combined effectiveness.

6. Organization of the Fighting Elements

When 11th Panzer Division achieved its incredible series of successful counterattacks an the live of the Chir, it was by no means a full-strength fighting organization. In fact, the 15th Panzer regiment, more often than not, comprised no more than 26 tanks - the equivalent of one and a half U.S. tank companies. A U. S. armoured division today has over 300 tanks. Hown was it that such a small force could destroy, over a period of several months, a Russian Tank Army?

Gen. Balck: «In the three years that I was a company commander in World War I, we always had concentrated attacks with few people but much artillery. {In other words, you}

– 41 –
In other words, you should have a lot of technology but as few people as possible, that is the way to conduct a war».
Gen. von Mellenthin: «I can only stress what General Balck told us about smaller units: that you should avoid big units. It does not matter if it is a company or an Army Corps or a division it is easier to have small formations». 1/ p.61
Gen. DePuy: «How many officers did the General have in his company most of the time»?
Gen. Balck: «No more than one. He was a platoon leader. Normally you did not need more than two [officers in the company]. Sometimes there was no other officer besides me in the company. On the other hand, I led many special forces, commando forces, raids like Teheran, and in such instances we had up to 4 to 6 officers. …Company strength should be no more than 70 to 80 people».
«…300 men (in a battalion) are broken into 4 companies - 3 rifle companies and a machine gun company». 2/ ibid.
Gen. Balck: «The ideal [armoured] division would consist of three [Panzergrenadier] regiments with 2 battalions in watch, and one tank regiment».
....If I had a good tank, 10 tanks per company would be enough ..., there should be 3 platoons with 3 tanks bach, and one tank for the company commander. Too many tanks will lead to too many losses».
p «…3 [companies per battalion]». 1 p.62
Mr. Karber: «One of the arguments of the critics [of small units] was that after a battle, the losses you had taken made the unit too weak to still be a viable combatant unit».
Gen. Balck: «The argument against that is that smaller units have smaller losses. It is a tendency amongst the troops that they stick together [bunch up], that when you have one there are others around - you have 12 tanks [in one place], they are hit by fire, and half of them are gone."
“ ..... a small unit is easier to lead and is more flexible». 2/ pp.62-63

Mr. Dunnigan: «What was the resistance you got in the German Army to go to smaller units»?.
Gen. Balck: «The resistance was that everybody wanted as much as possible because they believe with more they can do more». 3/ p.64

Gen. DePuy: «When the 11th Panzer Division achieved its most impressive results, it was understrength. Therefore, what in fact happened was that perhaps the best division commander in the German Army was commanding a brigade [sized force], and the regimental commanders were commanding battalions, und the battalion commanders companies, and the company commanders were commanding two or three tanks at the most. Now, is that further proof that success depends on quality of leadership and the size of the units being led? Is that a fair proposition»?

– 42 –

Gen. von Mellenthin: «Right»!
Gen. Balck: «Yes, absolutely»! 4/ pp.68-69

Closely related to the size of units is the question of their composition. There are a number of strong supporters of the idea that battalions should be mixed (tanks and mechanized infantry) from the start, because that is the way they fight. Others favour «pure» companies and battalions to facilitate and simplify training, maintenance and leadership.

Mr. Dunnigan: «General, in 1940 you developed the Kampfgruppe, a unit that had tanks, infantry, pioneers that were needed for that particular mission. You still feel that that is the way to do it»?
Gen. von Mellenthin: «Sometimes yes, sometimes no - depends on the circumstances».
Mr. Dunnigan: «Do you mean, in some cases the paper organization of the division is the one you go into combat with, with separate battalions of infantry and tanks»?
Gen. Balck: «The organization must be maintained, because it is the basis for the training and the feeding and the command and control of the unit».
Mr. Dunnigan: «In 1945 the German Army did one final reorganization doing in the direction of composite battalions - of tanks and APCs and even antitank units. Do you feel that this was solution, or do you feel that units should be 'pure' at the battalion level»?
Gen. Balck: «I think the latter would be the thing to do. You have to keep one thing in mind, which is repair and maintenance of modern weapons systems, and that can only be done in 'pure units'. The maintenance of the materiel is of paramount importance, and it is not possible to maintain the materiel in one unit where you have a conglomeration of different types of materiel. That is the art of leadership, that you can control the various forces but you still maintain the pureness of the unit».
Mr. Dunnigan: «The German Army in World War II had an armoured reconnaissance battalion which was a mixed unit .... did that present a lot of maintenance problems, because of that mix»?
Gen. Balck: «Resupply problems». 1/ pp.30-31

The issue remains unresolved in the minds of many, some of whom continue to believe we should be organized the way we fight - that is, cross-attached.
– 43 –
The fact remains that all the principal armies of the world continue to maintain «pure» tank and infantry battalions, cross-attaching as necessary for tactical training and for combat.

7. Other Subjects on which the Generals had important and interesting comments

The Location of Command Posts in Retrograde Movement

Gen. Balck: «....during the withdrawal, many commanders hesitated to shift their staff to the rear and then they got into .... bad disasters. In my system, the staff would work quietly [in the rear] and the commander would be at the focal point (Schwerpunkt) and exert his moral power». 2/ p.7

General Balck explained further that the rearward command post should not be situated at some nodal point along the obvious line of advance of the attacking Russians - for example a town on the main road to the rear - but rather should be off to the side in an inconspicuous location. The Russian attack could then sweep by, if necessary, and command and control would not be lost.

The Impact of Tactical Air Forces

Col. Samuel: «How do you view the role of the Air Force - the Luftwaffe - in highly mobile operations»?
Gen, v. Mellenthin: «In my opinion it is a decisive question. The Air Force must assist us to destroy the enemy. For instance on Tuesday, when we made our counterattack [in the simulation]: we can not make the counterattack without assistance from the Air Force.
There must be a very close Liaison between the Air Force and division or brigade, [battalion, etc.]». 1/ p.117
Col. Samuel: «[In the circumstances of today], would it be more valuable for the Air Force to support you in close combat, that is, close air support operations, [or by] interdiction in the rear of the enemy against reserves and support units»?

Colonel Samuels was seeking the General's view on an issue of current interest. There are those who feel that air forces today are most effective in the role of battlefield air interdiction that is, the highest pay-off with the lowest attrition rate.

– 44 –
Gen. v. Mellenthin: «Now, we are fortunately allied with you, and you have a very big Air Farce, and we are hopeful that this Air Force will have the strength to assist our tactical attack, in addition to the other [interdiction] mission.
"In the East we were never really dangerously attacked by the [Russian Air Force], but at the Normandy campaign even in Army Group G [in Lorraine], movement stopped completely [in the day time] because of your Air Force. No movement, impossible».
Col. Samuel: «How effective was [the Russian Air Force] against ....your supply units»?
Gen. v. Mellenthin: «Not drastically. We had sometimes heavy losses [when] our troops used roads we had forbidden them to use. The Russian Air Force attacked them and destroyed them, but it was a mistake of our troops». 2/ pp.117-118

Russian Guerrilla Operations

General Balck rated highly the value of Russian guerrillas to the Soviet war effort. He preferred that headquarters and service units be located in positions where the security requirements would be reduced that is, in small villages and woods, or even in the open. positions in large towns or cities, and in or near large forests, were especially vulnerable.

Gen. Balck: «I have always forbidden taking up such positions, and pressed my view against strong protests by the units in question. There are no disadvantages from the Service point of view. On the contrary, the guerrillas lost their freedom of movement . ... A Corps which concentrated in a city lost 720 trucks when it suddenly had to be moved.
They were completely immobilized [by guerrillas], and one Corps was a total loss.
This teaches us also something else, that comprehensive good infantry training for all soldiers and Services is a necessity». 1/ p.5

Another example was given, wherein 50 guerrillas massacred over 400 service troops who were not trained or disposed to fight.

– 45 –
The Von Hutier Issue

Perhaps only military historians will be interested, but the discussions led to a somewhat surprising exchange on the nature of evolution of German tactics. British and American historians have long put forth the theory that General von Hutier's infiltration tactics using Stosstruppen (assault troops), first employed with great success against the Russians at Riga in World War I, were the lineal forbearers of the Blitz tactics of World War II. General Balck professed ignorant of this connection.

Mr. Dunnigan: «At the end of World War I, the German Army developed what we call infiltration tactics, Stosstruppen, many energetic officers were attracted to that type of service. Did you find there was any carry-over in that mentality among those officers and troops to your tactics in World War II»?
Mr. Sprey:(Translating in German) «In the U. S. we talk a lot about the infiltration technique of the First World War. By that they mean the breaking in with shock troops to open the enemy position, and then to follow with the other forces. The question is, does the mentality of the shock troop leader have any influence an the tank troops [Leader] or otherwise»?
Gen. Balck: «The last part of the First World War, I was in attack units (Stosstruppen)».

Mr. Sprey: «Was not the so-called Alpen Corps predominantly attackoriented»?
Gen. Balck: «[It was] one of the best attack units, and I never noticed anything of this method of infiltration, we did not use it. We suppressed the enemy fire by strong artillery and then we deployed».

Mr. Sprey: «What here in the States is called 'Von Hutier tactics' is not known in Germany»?
Gen. Balck: «I can only say that I went through practically everything, but that is something that I did not experience». 1/ p.59-60

In a separate conversation later, Col. von Uslar-Gleichen, the German Army Attaché in Washington, told this reporter that the «Von Hutier» theory seemed to be confined to the British and Americans. He knew of no such ideas in German military doctrine or publications.
Given the wide adherence to the theory outside Germany, this may be a fertile field for further research.

- 46 -


In addition to the great value derived from all the details of the wide-ranging discussions over the period of four days with our distinguished guests, there was an added dimension of enormous importance.

We were reminded in the most vivid and convincing manner that small forces skilfully led can win battles against large forces if the small force is synchronized and the large force is disorganized. Generals Balck and von Mellenthin made it clear that this is the essence of successful operations. Their experience told them that it was not difficult to create such opportunities - that the Russians were peculiarly susceptible to disorganization when confronted with new and unexpected situations. Conversely, they expressed confidence that soldiers of the "West" were inherently superior in fast-breaking situations - more apt to take individual initiative - more apt to adjust quickly to opportunities and cope with surprises.
They Said many times, in many ways, that it was the goal of the German "system" to nurture these qualities in their Leaders and even in every soldier. They believed that the basic nature of the German citizen and the tradition of the German Army strongly supported this effort.

Not surprisingly, the wider audience on the last day was deeply impressed. Inevitably the question arose as to whether American generals and American soldiers measured up to the standards implicit in the Balck/ von Mellenthin prescription for success in combat wich Russians. General Blanchard, former Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Army Europe and Commander, NATO Central Army Group, was positive in his opinion on this score. He thought the concept of the Auftragstaktik deserved emphasis in U. S. training. He attributed flexibility and initiative to our officers and non-commissioned officers.

No army has found the key to the mass production of either a Balck or a von Mellenthin. This kind of talent is found - not made - although, of course, it is sharpened and directed through doctrine and training. In this respect we must give the German system high marks. In this same respect, the insights into that system and its philosophy that we were given by the German generals is worthy of our most careful thought and attention.

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Post by Yuri » 19 Feb 2007 21:24

From the von Mellenthin's book «Panzer battles», from records of a the general's Balck diary, from the general's Knobelsdorff report and as from BDM-report by General William DePu we can see as former commanders German 48th Panzer Korp the generals Balck and von Mellenthin during many tens years after an end of the war assured readers of the books and students of the audiences that during the period about the end of November on the end of December, 1942 in numerous battles on the river Chir headed by them - these commanders - German divisions from structure 48th Panzer Korp gained above numerous Russian troops one by one more than convincing victories;

Generals Balck and von Mellenthin continuously declared all and everywhere, that 48th Panzer Korp has destroyed, ostensibly, during the period from December, 7 till December, 23, 1942 during battles in region Nizhne-Kalinovka - sovkhoz ¹ 79 (state farm ¹ 79) more than 700 Russian tanks, and huge hordes of Russian barbarians in a panic ran from not numerous German tankmen.

As is known, generals in all armies of all countries are identical that after resignation sit down a desk to write memoirs.
It is known as, generals of all countries have the same weakness, that which it is usually observed at fishermen and hunters.
Differently, in the memoirs commanders, to put it mildly, like to embellish the victories.

In this respect a Wermacht's generals are allocated on a background of generals of other armies unless propensity to romaticize event by which participants by him was possible to be the greater.
Therefore to all general's memoirs follows concerns with a small share of irony. As if to memoirs of the German generals at reading their books it is necessary to take a mouthful of a portion of irony more usual in such cases. Well, and when in memoirs of the German general the story about battles of his brave troops against Russian enemies then to the reader does not prevent to taste a cup with irony once again another begins. It, precisely, will not damage.

So Russian read memoirs of all commanders - and our own and another's.

However, from BDM-report by General William DePu we can see, that high-ranking military grades of the NATO have apprehended literary turns of speech of generals the Balck and the von Mellenthin literally.

We see, that the American composers of the BDM-report sincerely trust that the German generals the Balck and the von Mellenthin could win Russian even when Russian hordes surpassed number of a German troops ten times and more.
We see under the contents of questions which have been set the Balck and the von Mellenthin, that their affable American owners are well informed on remarkable victories of German 48th Panzer Korp gained above numerous Russian hordes on the river Chir.

In this connection it would be curious to look, and as far as such boundless trust to the German generals is justified on the part of their American colleague.

For this purpose, naturally, it is necessary to recreate under archival documents a real course of operations on the river Chir, in particular, in region of Sovkhoz No 79 (state farm 79 or sovkhoz "Red Star" or settlement Sysojkin and now it is settlement refers a little differently - Sysoevskij) in December, 1942.
We have a fine opportunity to perform such works. In our disposal there is enough of documents that we could see this reality of war on the river Chir.
We also shall be occupied with it further.

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Post by Kim Sung » 20 Feb 2007 15:43

Yuri, did you translate captions in those Japanese maps on your own? Your translation is very accurate. ... 883#944883

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Post by Yuri » 21 Feb 2007 21:11

Kim Sung wrote:Yuri, did you translate captions in those Japanese maps on your own? Your translation is very accurate. ... 883#944883
About, no, it to me not on forces.
I have compared the Japanese map to Russian card of 1941 and did inscriptions on corresponding places in the Japanese map.

In post-war books and statements former commanders 48th Pazer Korp generals Balck and von Mellenthin tried to inspire in every way to the readers and hearers an idea that entrusted by him - to these commanders - a German troops conducted on the river Chir in November and December, 1942, ostensibly, only defensive battles. About carrying out and about results of any offensive operations of a troops 48th Pazer Korp on the river Chir generals the Balck and the von Mellenthin have not made any word or a sound.

As also the general the von Knobelsdorff in the made for Americans the report as has not informed that him corps conducted offensive operations on the river Chir.

However about that in December, 1942 on the river Chir in region Nizhne-Chirskaja-Sovkhoz No 79 (Sysojkin) - Surovokino troops 48-th Panzer Korp developed and conducted offensive operations it is possible to find out from classical work Hans Dyorr's «The Campaign to Stalingrad. The operative review».

The corresponding place of the citation from their this book is allocated by color.
Here that part of the book «The Campaign to Stalingrad. The operative review» is quoted where it is told about how at the end of November and the beginning of December, 1942 the German-Romanian troops created defense on the river Chir and the river Krivaja (Curve).

The short note for a fast orienting point under maps:
The river Krivaja (by the way, this river has second name - Kriusha) flows in a direction from the north on the south, at her source is settlement Jagodnyj, runs Krivaja into Chir in his headwaters.

On the map 17 in own book Hans Dyorr illustrates the description of process of creation of defense on the rivers Chirs and Krivaja .
This map from Hans Dyorr's book in many respects is identical to the Japanese map – «Battle of Stalingrad. Phase 6».
Or it is possible as to take advantage of this map. ... map_10.htm

It is possible to assume, that composers of these two maps and Hans Dyorr used the same sources.
Thus it is visible, that all these maps without use of Russian sources were made. As result, on all these maps it is possible to see errors.
However, at the given stage these errors will not be critical and consequently maps are quite suitable for use at reading the citation from the book «The Campaign to Stalingrad. The operative review».

The book «The Campaign to Stalingrad» has been translated to Russian in 1957. It is natural, that my return translation contains many errors, for what I bring apologies.
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Post by Yuri » 21 Feb 2007 21:18

HANS Dyorr
«The «The Campaign to Stalingrad. The operative review»
Creation of a united front
(the Circuit 17)

The Hitler's order of the 6-th Army on occupation of all-round defense and on waiting the unblocking impact had under itself the unsteady basis. On November, 24 it was still not known, whether it will be possible to keep district for a counteroffensive; besides for the unblocking impact not available of sufficient forces.

On the foreground the imperative need was put forward to create a united front and to stop Russian armies. The further they would manage to press our troops, the than a condition for supply of 6-th Army by air would be worse, the more forces it was required for a counteroffensive and that the greater would be danger, that their offensive impulse would not suffice to make the way to the surrounded troops.
It understood also the Russian Supreme Command. Instead of drawing decisive impact on even efficient twenty two divisions of 6th Army it has elected slower, but also more reliable variant: it has consolidated a ring of an encirclement and tried as it is possible to push aside further the near by units of allies from 6-th army.

The first days of approach of Russian armies have created preconditions for fulfilment of this problem. To the south of Stalingrad as a result of fast promotion of Russian 51-st Army to heights on a southwest from Abganerovo Romanian 4-n the Army has not had time to organize defense on a boundary of the river Myshkova which would be a suitable initial position for a counteroffensive.
In the big meander of Don promotion of a western grouping of the opponent through Perelazovskij has unexpectedly resulted in rout of the Romanian 3-rd Army and has deprived German command of an opportunity to stop the opponent between the rivers Chir and Don. From the very beginning Russian on flanks have put forward in a western direction the strong advance parties which have advanced far for the river Chir in his headwaters.

When the 6-n Army in the evening on November, 22 has been surrounded, the troops which has rushed back of the Romanian ally have departed already deeply in rear. To the east of Don the distance from forward German parts up to the nearest units of 6-th Army was 70 km (on direct line); in the bottom current the river Chir the Romanian 3-n Army has departed approximately on 60 kms a front of encirclement to the west Marinovka. Withdrawal in rear still proceeded.
Therefore that due to vigorous actions of commanders to the east of the bridge through Don in region Verkh.-Chirskij the bridgehead has been formed near of the firth river Myshkova at Nemkovskij, stations of the Lozhki on that side of Don to the west up to station Rychkov was of great importance. It should serve for a cover and gathering of numerous groups to which managed to shun an encirclement to the east of Don, and represented the hand stretched to surrounded armies.

The organization of defense on the river Chir
prior to the beginning of approach with the purpose of deblocking the surrounded troops
(from November, 24 till December, 11, 1942)
(Map 17)

For us was happiness, that Russian after a conduct of an operation against 6-th Army have made a respite for strengthening a front of encirclement. It has enabled German command (army groups «B») to stop withdrawal and to arrange on a boundary of the river Chir the Romanian 3-n Army, which part already is significant was forwarded through the river Chir in his headwaters to the west.
Skeleton of this defensive position was made by German battle groups which were formed in part under the initiative of commanders of connections, in part under the order of an army group «B» already since November, 19.

They were created hasty, including all up to last soldier: from summary companies, army staff , commandant's offices, subdivisions of service of rear, commands of holidayers, building units, ground structure Air Force, railwaymen, etc. From any subdivisions which are having numbers of field mails and taking place in rear region of 6-th army. In the majority there there were people, on combat training, to equipment and arms not prepared for actions as infantrymen in developed then to extremely heavy conditions.
These brave people which it was not mentioned neither in one report and nor in one history of a regiment promoted then to stabilization of conditions on a southern site of East front. It is necessary to emphasize, that it would be not possible, if an average and younger part of the commanders repeatedly showing the readiness for self-sacrifice, has not shown in it an example.

Counterbalanced Commander 3-rd Romanian army having the big self-control possible to take again management of army in the hands. Under his command (in the head of his army headquarters the colonel of General Staff Wenk has been put from the German side) on a boundary station Chir, bridgehead in this region, station Dmitrievka, Surovikino, Oblivskaja, Varlamov have been organized defense. In the beginning it planned to equip it to the north of road Morozovskaja-Stalingrad on which supply of army came true; but this plan managed to be carried out only in part.

The staffs of battle groups submitted to an staff of 3-rd Romanian army:
«Group Stumpfeld» (the chief of artillery of 108-th division); the group held the right flank up to Oblivskaja (inclusive);
«Group Spang» (the chief of rear region of front); the group held the left flank up to Varlamov.

Further to the north our troops managed to stabilize position and again to hold a boundary on the river Chir. Arrived in the Bottom Astakhov region 17-th Army Corps on November, 24 has rejected the opponent to the west of the river Chir in its headwaters to the east, has held bridgehead in region Bokovskaja, has promoted on a valley river Krivaja (river Curve) to the north Dubovskij also has grasped. Within the next days he has held defense on the rivers Chir and Krivaja. From Dubovskij the front line departed back on northwest where in region Tokin in 40 kms to northwest from Bokovskaja passed poorly supplied joint with the Italian 8-th
Army on Don. On November, 26 the rests of 48th Panzer Korp which has broken through from an encirclement in region Chernyshevskaja, have joined in defense on river Chir, having held a strip on both sides of settlement between the Romanian 3-rd Army and 17th Army Corps.

After on November, 30 from rear «group Stahel» (8-th Air Corps), held a strip between group Stumpfeld and group Spang in region of station Sekretev, Karaichev has been tightened still, it was possible to count, that conditions in the big meander of Don has been stabilized, between western flank of group Gotha at firth Aksaj to the north Potemkinskaja and bridgehead to Verkh.-Chirskij on western coast of Don held defense «group Adam» had small forces (later «group Abraham») to which it has been assigned as well defense of bridgehead.

On November, 26 the opponent has renewed the actions on flanks of 6-th army. Attacks his first and not stopping any more had the purpose capture beyond Don of bridgehead which at the end of a month has been narrowed as a result of enemy actions. Simultaneously he conducted a fighting patrol at the front Romanian 3-rd Army and on several sites has gone over to the offensive. On November, 29 he has broken through defense to the east Surovikino, has left on southern coast river Chir also has seized Ostrovskij.

To liquidate the opponent's bridgehead which has arisen as a result of it which he has expanded the next days, to the north from settlement Sysojkin has been concentrated the increased 336-n Infantry Division which on December, 7 should counterstrike.

Approach of this division on December, 7 has encountered counter approach considerably superior forces of the opponent from his bridgehead on the south; apparently, he put before himself a task to liquidate German bridgehead in region Verh.-Chirskij, operating with heights in region Nizhne-Solonovskij. In heavy battles, eventually, it was possible, engaged to action 11th Panzer Division tightened in this region to break the put opponent, and, both sides have had the big losses. Our troops have again seized prevailing heights to the south of the river Chir.

Russian have transferred a main axis of advance to region to the west Surovikino and as a result occupations Chuvilevskij have again created heavy conditions which managed to be unloaded only after the settlement Surovikino has been handed over; defense of it absorbed many forces. On December, 12 heights in the south ð. Chir were strongly kept by Germans.

As a whole the front on the river Chir, despite of shortage in people and technical equipment, has stood before onslaught of the enemy forces many times over{many times} surpassing our forces. It had huge value for the unblocking approach which have begun on December, 12 of army group Gotha to the east of Don. However now it was impossible and to think, that the forces which are taking place on bridgehead at Verkh.-Chirskij, can accept any participation in operation.

The increased actions extemporaneous battle groups in this region should be noted especially because the most part of their staff made soldiers of not front service.

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Post by Yuri » 22 Feb 2007 21:16

German, I emphasize once again, the German author of the operative review of a campaign to Stalingrad Hans Doerr unambiguously declares that in the start of December, 1942 an staff 48-th tank corps has developed the plan of offensive operation in region Sysojkin, (or in region of sovkhoz 79). Hans Doerr informs, that the increased 336-n infantry division should take part in this approach. A date started of this of approach on December, 7, 1942.

From own words of all German commanders and chiefs of 48-th tank corps follows, that developers of the plan of offensive operation of 48-th tank corps could be only they, and not anybody another. That is, the attack plan for December, 7, 1942 have developed:
a) The corps commander the general - lieutenant the von Knobelsdorff;
b) The chief of a corps staff the lieutenant colonel von Mellenthin;
c) The commander of 336-th infantry division general - lieutenant Lucht;
d) The commander of 11-th tank division the general - major Balck.
e) Participation of the commander of 7-th airfield division Luftwaffe in development of the plan of offensive operation is not revealed. Whether it is difficult even to tell the commander of this division was at that time in region Nizhne-Chirskaja, sovkhoz 79. All German data on it divisions the extremely inconsistent (in brackets it is necessary to note, that is not better than data on 8-th and 9-th airfield divisions).

All German commanders listed here arrived in region of operations (that is to region Nizhne-Chirskaja, sovkhoz 79, Surovikino) before December, 7, 1942
The corps commander the general - lieutenant von Knobelsdorff:
- Has arrived to Tormosin on December, 1 (the certificate of colonel Adam), and has entered a post of the corps commander in 5.00 December, 5 (under own application of the general).
The chief of a corps staff the lieutenant colonel von Mellenthin:
- Under his own application has arrived with the staff in region Nizhne-Chirskaja not later on December, 4;
The commander of 336-th infantry division the general lieutenant Lucht:
- Has arrived in region of sovkhoz 79 before December, 4 as he already was here by the moment of arrival here an staff of 48-th tank corps of region to the west from Petrovka.
The commander of 11-th tank division the general Balck:
- Under the certificate the von Mellenthin has arrived on December, 6. Date of arrival of the Balck contradicts, apparently, to the application of general Knobelsdorff which is informed that by the Balck, ostensibly, has arrived on December, 7. However, from on a context of the official report of the general the von Knobelsdorff it is visible, that the commander of 11-th tank division the general the Balck has arrived for a day prior to the beginning of battle for sovkhoz 79 (Sysojkin). Thus, from a context of the report of the general von Knobelsdorff follows, that the general of the Balck has arrived on December, 6, 1942.

Time for participation in development of the plan of offensive operation of 48th tank corps at the general of the Balck was quite enough - the whole day.
Let's recollect, that on May, 19, 1980 on development of a plan of action for US 3-rd Armored Division on reflection of attack USSR of 1-st Guards tank army to generals Balck and von Mellenthin was required to no more than 5 minutes.

Unfortunately, in the book «The Campaign to Stalingrad. The operative review» it is not told about details of the plan of offensive operation of 48-th tank corps for December, 7, 1942.
It is in more details informed the plan íàñòóïåëíèÿ 48-th tank corps in books of one more German author - about it writes Paul Carell in books « Unternehmen Barbarossa ».
In book Paul Carell is a little data and on the plan of field marshal of the Manstein on clearing 6-th army from an encirclement - the plan «inter thunder-storm».

Paul Carell «Unternehmen Barbarossa»
Verlag Ullstein Gmbh 1963
Smolensk, 2003
Page 486
In the morning on November, 27 von Manstein, having arrived on the command point, has accepted command.
Despite of all complexity, von Manstein's plan seem courageous and encouraging: he assumed a frontal attack from the west from Chir of front of forces of an army group «Hollidt» to move on the Kalach, and an Goth's army group was necessary to punch a Soviet ring of impact from region, to adjoin to Kotel'nikovo.
To understand all specificity of conditions, it is necessary to return mentally back. How affairs under Chir and under Kotel'nikovo - at these major starting points of the German approach which are having for an object deblocking were?
Contrary to all fears position between Chir and Don nevertheless was stabilized. First of all, it was a merit of whom we already had to meet on pages of this book - colonel Venk, on November, 19 still former on a post of the chief of an army headquarters of 57-th Tank Corps involved in heavy battles on the Caucasian front under Tuapse. On November, 21 he has received from OKH the order by special plane immediately to be directed in Morozovskaja where he should undertake a management of an army headquarters of Romanian 3-rd army.
When on November, 27 field marshal a von Manstein has undertaken command just the created army group "Don", the Wenk was to him to Novocherkassk. The Manstein remembered this colonel. Therefore his order has sounded rather laconically: «Wenk, you to me a head are responsible for that Russian have not broken to Rostov on your site. Don-Chir front is obliged to stand. Otherwise will be lost not only 6-n army in Stalingrad, but also all army group "A" on Caucasus». And the army group "A" is, by the way, one million warriors. And who would be surprised, what commander of front quite often resorted to so unambiguous and terrible formulations, desperately to search for rescue in any sorts provisional remedys?

First of all, for curbing tank parts of the enemy becoming masters of the situation catastrophically there were no mobile tank offensive forces of a reserve. Russian tanks constantly appeared that in one place, in the friend, inducing horror on rear regions of an army group. The army headquarters of the Wenk has hurriedly knock together from damaged, but capable to move tanks, homeless assault guns and armoured personnel carriers the subdivision subsequently most advantageously operating in hot points of defensive battle between Don and Chir.
Naturally, and it demanded inflow of fresh forces. And officers of the Wenk have despaired on «enforced measures» - the tanks moved on transported platforms through a site of army and intending for an army group "A" or 4-th Tank Army, «were withdrawn and delivered in a reliable place» that then, conducted by skilled crews, they have forever remained in structure of their tank companies. Own tank batallion has been little by little created. When then the first staff officer lieutenant colonel Hyorst once has informed about the successful prevention of break by forces of "our tank batallion » both field marshal, and all army headquarters (army groups "Don") came in bewilderment, and at the Wenk have demanded the report.
«With what it is forces of «our tank batallion» army has warned break and has corrected position? By our data, it does not arrange any «battalions»? » - the Manstein has inquired. Other exit did not remain as soon as to lay the cards on the table. The Wenk has laid out to field-marshal all frankly, having added: «At us did not remain other exit if we wanted to cope with these crises at once several sites. In case of need I am ready to that my destiny will solve a court-martial».

In the answer field marshal the Manstein has only absent-mindedly shaken a head. Then on his face has appeared similarity of a smile. Commanding has forgiven unauthorized use of technical equipment, having understood motives notorious « enforced measures », however on the future has very strictly prohibited «theft of tanks». «We shall transfer some from machines to 6-th and 23-rd Tank Divisions and henceforth we shall break our tank forces on companies that in case of that to not be lit without extreme need in the supreme spheres».
So the thorough gap punched by Russian approach in rear of 6-th army has been patched. From the point of view of the command organization - unprecedented achievement. During weeks the front in the extent two hundred kilometers was kept with forces which lion's share was made by railwaymen of rear services of a Reich, members of «German labour front », builders or volunteers from among cossacks.
And still it is necessary to note, that the numerous routed Romanian parts went under German command. And, appearing under German command, in part having received in hands the German weapon, they on separate sites battled rather and most advantageously, and many of them and have decided to battle in structure of German parts.
Only at the end of November to Chir front have thrown the present regular army connection - 17-th Army Corps of the general Hollidt working on an operative site of Romanian 3-rd Army. Now it was possible to take breath, at last.

The army group under the offer of the Wenk has subordinated to the Hollidt all site from Don up to Chir, and as all parts battling for that moment there. So « the army operative group of the Hollidt », put an end ill-matched «armies of the Wenk» has been formed. She has demonstrated such battle opportunities with which hardly will be analogies in a military history.
On such opportunities the second act of operation at Chir also was based - to beat off at Russian unapproachable heights for counter-attacks on southwest coast of the river. These the problem with shine has been solved in the beginning of December by the parts of 336-th infantry division thrown here and 11-th tank division which has followed behind her. As a result of severe and bloody battles of height have been taken and have resisted against all counter-attacks of Soviet.
And now we shall return to the beginning of the unit of this chapter for positions at Chir had crucial importance for the operation conceived by the Manstein on deblocking Stalingrad for which fulfilment field marshal has involved a Goth's group to the east of Don, having started up her to approach on the part of Kotel'nikovo. The Chir front carried out a flank and rear cover of this action{share} on rescue of 6-th army. Moreover - as soon as conditions, 48-th tank corps, now taking place under command of the general of a tank troops the von Knobelsdorff will allow, should provide support of Goth's operation with forces of 11-th Tank Division, 336-th Infantry Division and a one Luftwaffe Field Division approach in a northeast direction. A springboard for this auxiliary operation should become last Don bridgehead of 6-th army to Verkh.-Chirskij, just at a place of merge of Chir and Don. Colonel Adam, aide-de-camp of general Pauljus, kept this central point forces of parts of 6-th army urgently typed from everywhere, rendering in conditions of all-round defense really heroic rebuff to the enemy.
Thus, all arrows were everything are transferred, made, that in human forces, having called to the aid courage of front-line soldiers, both skill of commanders, and quickness of commanders, for the sake of elimination of a great strategic oversight of the Hitler and clearing of an enemy ring of 6-th army.

On December, 12 began the Goth's approach. The most experienced, artful and courageous commander - tankman faced difficult, but not to a hopeless problem.
The right Goth's flank, as well as at Chir, defended weak means. Here colonel Dyorr - as on northern site colonel Wenk - as the chief of an army headquarters of communication at routed Romanian 4-th Army forces of on duty subdivisions and the rests of German mobile parts collected from everywhere has managed to create a thin line of flank defense. Battle groups of major Sovana with parts of 14-th Tank Division, colonel Pannvits with the cossacks, air defence units and on duty subdivisions have brought slightly in calmnesses, having moderated a panic in the disorder receding Romanian parts and German rear services gradually infected by these panic.
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Post by Kim Sung » 23 Feb 2007 02:21

The tank battle south of the Chir River

* Image Source : スターリングラード攻防戦 (The Battle of Stalingrad)


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Post by Kim Sung » 23 Feb 2007 02:42

Operation 'Wintergewitter'

* Image Source : スターリングラード攻防戦 (The Battle of Stalingrad)


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Post by Yuri » 23 Feb 2007 03:55

The analysis of distortions in the description of battle for state farm (sovkhoz) «Red Star» under the version of generals Balck and von Mellenthin.
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Post by Yuri » 23 Feb 2007 22:26

Fighting structure and number of staff of units 333 RD
Battles structure and number of staff of units 333 RD on December,1,1942

(Units | All = Off + (NCO + private) )

333 staff | 127 = 70 + 57

1116 RR | 1989 = 204 + 1785

1118 RR | 1536 = 170 + 1366

1120 RR | 951 = 119 + 832

897 AR | 905 = 105 + 800

SERBat | 320 = 33 + 287

SMGBat | 204 = 29 + 175

1 SFATD | 220 = 30 + 190

442 SAAD | 53 = 4 + 49

296 SRC | 93 = 6 + 87

614 SSBat | 151 = 20 + 131

172 SCC | 151 = 17 + 134

312 SCCP | 42 = 7 + 35

162 ACD | 92 = 12 + 80

188 FB | 63 = 3 + 60

419 SMSBat | 100 = 29 + 71

757 DVC | 11 = 3 + 8

333 CAD | 19 = 1 + 18

All | 7027 = 862 + 6165

Outside of norm of Red Army

361 FP | 10 = 3 + 7

789 FCD SB | 3 = 3 + 0

SD NKVD | 19 = 19 + 0


f333sd. op. 1 d. 78. L.12

The document is published for the first time
It is my personal find

OoB 333 Rifle Division

333 staff - Staff Division
1116 RR - Rifle Regiment
1118 RR - Rifle Regiment
1120 RR - Rifle Regiment
897 AR - Artillery Regiment
SERBat - Separate Educational-Rifle Battalion
SMGBat - Separate Machine-Gun Battalion
1 SFATD - Separate Fighter Anti-Tank Divisional
442 SAAB - Separate Anti-Arircraft the battery
296 SRC - Separate Recon Company
614 SSBat - Separate Sapper a Battalion
172 SCC - Separate Company of Communication
312 SCCP - Separate a Company of Chemical Protection
162 ACD - Automobile a Company Deliver
188 FB - Filed Bakery
419 SMSBat - Separate Medic-sanitary Battalion
757 DVC - Divisional Veterinary Clinic
333 CAD - Chief of Artillery of a Division

Outside of norms of Red Army

361 FP - Field Post
789 FCD SB - Field Cash Department of the State Bank
SD NKVD - Special Department of NKVD

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Post by Yuri » 23 Feb 2007 23:55

Central Archive Ministersva of Defense of the Russian Federation
Fund 331, Inventory 5041, file, 24 Sheet 90.
The operative report ¹ 0204 to 7.00 6/12/42. An army headquarters 1TC

1. The opponent continues to defend on a boundary a mark 155.0, on southern slopes of height 161 to the south from a mark of 161 600 meters, a mark 156.0, LISINSKIJ.

2. Within night of a part of the First TC resulted an equipment in a combat readiness and filled up ammunition reserves, PP (PETROLEUM PRODUCTS) and the foodstuffs.
89 TBr - in region ZhIRKOV
In ready to fight tanks T-34=13, T-70=7, T-60=10/from them faulty T-34=3, T-60=4/, guns AT=3.
Active bayonets - 87.
Security: an ammunition-1,5 battle complete sets, PP -1 fill, the foodstuffs - for 4 day

117 TBr - in region OSTROVSKIJ.
Two platoons exposed in ambushes, supported actions 1116 RR in reflection of attacks of the opponent.
In ready to fight T-34=19, T-70=9
In operating repair: T-34=7, T-70-2
Security: an ammunition - 1,5 ammunition loads, PP - 1,7 fills, the foodstuffs - for 10 day.
Losses in personnel - it is killed-2,-2 persons are wounded
In an equipment - has burned down - 1 tank, and one tank it is not known where / specify /

159 TBr a reserve commanding Armies, in region NOVOMAKSIMOVSKIJ
In ready to fight: T-34=11, T-70=10, guns AT=2
Active bayonets - 29
Security: an ammunition - 76 mm of shells 1200,
45 mm - " - 710,
Rifle patrons 100 000
Patrons to PPSh 24 000
Patrons to ATR 180 pieces
Mines - 400 pieces
Pomegranates - 700 piece.
PP - diesel fuel - 3 fills
KB-70 - 1,5 fills
Autogasoline - 1,5 fills
Autooil MK - is not present
The foodstuffs - for 5 day
At joint actions with parts 258 RD during attack one tank T-34 has burned down, is killed-4 person.

216 TBr - after fulfilment of a march has concentrated in ð-not OSTROVSKIJ.
Ready to fight: tanks KV=7, T-34=2, T-70=4
Security: an ammunition - 1 ammunition load, PP of 0,8 fills

44 MRBr - it continues to be consolidated on a boundary to the south mark 161 600 meters.
In ready to fight: Active bayonets - 305, including submachine gunners - 138.
Presence of arms: mortars of 82 mm - 19 pieces,
Mortars - 120 mm - 6 pieces,
Guns of 76 mm - 12 pieces,
Guns of 45 mm - 6 pieces,
Ammunition - 2 ammunition loads, /for 120 mm 0,10 ammunition load/,
PP - 3 fills. The foodstuffs - 5 day.
Trophies - in GOLOVSKIJ it is taken - 8 guns.

307 Separate Guards Mortar Divisional - MARKINSKIJ.
In I build installations-M-8=5, on the average repair of battle machines-3.
Security: an ammunition - 1008 pieces of /5 volleys / .
Fuel - 0,8 fills, the foodstuffs - 5 day.

10 SepRecBat - MARKINSKIJ.
In ready to fight: armoured personnel carriers - 14, BA-64=6

3. The aircraft of the opponent within night of active actions did not conduct. Above an arrangement 1 TC flew by transport planes of the opponent.

4. Weather cloudy. Are dear are passable

5. Communication with an army headquarters 5 TA - radio, the officer of communication; with parts - radio, phone, officers of communication.
With neighbours of radio, officers of communication.

The chief of an army headquarters 1 TC
The colonel /Kharchevnikov/

The chief of an operations section 1 TC
Guards major /Guturov/
The document is published for the first time
It is my personal find

Russian text
ÖÀÌÎ ÐÔ Ôîíä 331 Îïèñü 5041 Äåëî 24 Ëèñò 90

Îïåðñâîäêà ¹ 0204 ê 7.00 6.12.42 ã. Øòàêîð 1ÒÊ

1. Ïðîòèâíèê ïðîäîëæàåò îáîðîíÿòüñÿ íà ðóáåæå îòì.155.0, ïî þæíûì ñêàòàì âûñ.161 þæíåå îòì.161 600 ì., îòì.156.0, ËÈÑÈÍÑÊÈÉ.

2.  òå÷åíèå íî÷è ÷àñòè Ïåðâîãî ÒÊ ïðèâîäèëè ìàò. ÷àñòü â áîåâóþ ãîòîâíîñòü è ïîïîëíÿëè çàïàñû áîåïðèïàñîâ, ÃÑÌ è ïðîäîâîëüñòâèÿ.
89 ÒÁð - â ðàéîíå ÆÈÐÊÎÂ
 ñòðîþ òàíêîâ Ò-34=13, Ò-70=7, Ò-60=10 /èç íèõ íåèñïðàâíûõ Ò-34=3, Ò-60=4/, îðóäèé ÏÒÎ=3.
Àêòèâíûõ øòûêîâ - 87.
Îáåñïå÷åííîñòü: áîåïðèïàñîâ -1,5 ÁÊ, ÃÑÌ -1 çàïðàâêà, ïðîäîâ. - 4 ñ/ä

117 ÒÁð - â ðàéîíå ÎÑÒÐÎÂÑÊÈÉ.
Äâóìÿ âçâîäàìè, âûñòàâëåííûìè â çàñàäàõ, ïîääåðæèâàëà äåéñòâèÿ 1116 ÑÏ â îòðàæåíèå àòàê ïðîòèâíèêà.
 ñòðîþ Ò-34=19, Ò-70=9
 òåêóùåì ðåìîíòå: Ò-34=7, Ò-70-2
Îáåñïå÷åííîñòü: áîåïðèïàñîâ - 1,5 ÁÊ, ÃÑÌ - 1,7 çàïðàâêè, ïðîäîâîëüñòâèÿ - 10 ñ/ä.
Ïîòåðè â ëè÷íîì ñîñòàâå - óáèòî -2, ðàíåíî -2 ÷åë.
 ìàò.÷àñòè - ñãîðåëî - 1 òàíê, îäèí òàíê íåèçâåñòíî ãäå /óòî÷íÿåòñÿ/

159 ÒÁð ðåçåðâ êîìàíäóþùåãî Àðìèè, â ðàéîíå ÍÎÂÎÌÀÊÑÈÌÎÂÑÊÈÉ
 ñòðîþ: Ò-34=11, Ò-70=10, îðóäèé ÏÒÎ=2
Àêòèâíûõ øòûêîâ - 29
Îáåñïå÷åííîñòü: áîåïðèïàñîâ - 76 ìì ñíàðÿäîâ 1200,
45 ìì -"- 710,
âèíòïàòðîíîâ 100000
Ïàòðîíîâ ê ÏÏØ 24000
Ïàòðîíîâ ê ÏÒÐ 180 øò
ìèí - 400 øò
ãðàíàò - 700 øò.
ÃÑÌ - äèçòîïëèâî - 3 çàïðàâêè
ÊÁ-70 - 1,5 çàïðàâêè
Àâòîáåíçèí - 1,5 çàïðàâêè
Àâòîìàñëî ÌÊ - íåò
Ïðîäîâîëüñòâèå - 5 ñ\ä
Ïðè ñîâìåñòíûõ äåéñòâèÿõ ñ ÷àñòÿìè 258 ÑÄ âî âðåìÿ àòàêè ñãîðåë îäèí òàíê Ò-34, óáèòî -4 ÷åë

216 ÒÁð - ïîñëå ñîâåðøåíèÿ ìàðøà ñîñðåäîòî÷èëàñü â ð-íå ÎÑÒÐÎÂÑÊÈÉ.
 ñòðîþ: òàíêîâ ÊÂ-7, Ò-34-2, Ò-70-4
Îáåñïå÷åííîñòü: áîåïðèïàñîâ - 1 ÁÊ, ÃÑÌ 0,8 çàïðàâêè

44 ÌÑÁð - ïðîäîëæàåò çàêðåïëÿòüñÿ íà ðóáåæå þæíåå îòì.161 600 ì.
 ñòðîþ: Àêòèâíûõ øòûêîâ - 305, â òîì ÷èñëå àâòîìàò÷èêîâ - 138.
Íàëè÷èå âîîðóæåíèÿ: ìèíîìåòîâ 82 ìì - 19 øò., ìèíîìåòîâ - 120 ìì - 6 øò., îðóäèé 76 ìì - 12 øò., îðóäèé 45 ìì - 6 øò, áîåïðèïàñîâ - 2 ÁÊ, /120 ìì 0,10 ÁÊ/,
ÃÑÌ - 3 çàïðàâêè. Ïðîäîâîëüñòâèÿ - 5 ñ/ä.
Òðîôåè - â ÃÎËÎÂÑÊÈÉ âçÿòî - 8 îðóäèé.

 ñòðîþ óñòàíîâîê - Ì-8 -5, â ñðåäíåì ðåìîíòå áîåâûõ ìàøèí -3.
Îáåñïå÷åííîñòü: áîåïðèïàñîâ - 1008 øò /5 çàëïîâ/.
Ãîðþ÷åãî - 0,8 çàïðàâêè, ïðîäîâîëüñòâèÿ - 5 ñ/ä.

 ñòðîþ: áðîíåòðàíñïîðòåðîâ - 14, ÁÀ-64-6

3. Àâèàöèÿ ïðîòèâíèêà â òå÷åíèå íî÷è àêòèâíûõ äåéñòâèé íå âåëà. Íàä ðàñïîëîæåíèåì 1 ÒÊ ïðîëåòàëè òðàíñïîðòíûå ñàìîëåòû ïð-êà.

4. Ïîãîäà ïàñìóðíàÿ. Äîðîãè ïðîõîäèìû

5. Ñâÿçü ñî øòàáîì 5 ÒÀ - ðàäèî, îôèöåð ñâÿçè; ñ ÷àñòÿìè - ðàäèî, òåëåôîí, îôèöåðû ñâÿçè.
Ñ ñîñåäÿìè ðàäèî, îôèöåðû ñâÿçè.

Íà÷àëüíèê øòàáà 1 ÒÊ
ïîëêîâíèê /Õàð÷åâíèêîâ/

Íà÷àëüíèê îïåðàòèâíîãî îòäåëà 1 ÒÊ
ãâàðäèè ìàéîð /Ãóòîðîâ/

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Post by Yuri » 26 Feb 2007 14:43

In battles of state farm «Red Star» (the state farm 79) has taken part 8-th separate motorcycle regiment - the regiment commander lieutenant colonel Belik Petr Alekseevich (was born on October, 6, 1909, village Zhukovtsy, region Obuhovsky, Kiev area - has died on June, 12 1980ã.)

In many respects due to desperate guys from a regiment of lieutenant colonel Belik we today can reconstruct in details a course of battle for state farm «Red Star» (sovkhoz 79).
In particular, motorcyclists 8th SMcR have grasped the order ¹ 039 from 6.12.1942 on 336-th infantry division general - lieutenant Lucht. This general - lieutenant Lucht's order, in aggregate with others grasped in army headquarters of the opponent documents, allows to see a plan of the offensive operation developed by an army headquarters of 48-th tank corps which chief, as is known, was the von Mellenthin. Yes so, that von Mellenthin who later almost four ten years after battle for state farm «Red Star», in May, 1980, taught the American generals from the NATO to sciences to win Russian hordes ten times exceeding forces of defenders of the European democracies.

In archive I have found out reports which lieutenant colonel Belik and his motorcyclists sent in an army HQ of 5th Tank Army directly from a place of battle.
Some from them here will be reproduced, and it will be possible to see as far as it is the first class sources of information for reconstruction of battle for state farm «Red Star».

Unfortunately, about one today I yet did not manage to find the document containing data on actual forces 8-th SMcR at the moment of beginning of battle for state farm «Red Star».
However, with a sufficient degree of accuracy these forces can be calculated. At detection of the corresponding document these approximate data can be corrected.

So, by the moment of the beginning of operation Uranus, battle structure of 8-th SMcR was such:

People - 843 persons.
Combat material and arms:
Manual machine guns - 36 pieces;
Heavy machine guns - 5 pieces;
Mortars - 17 pieces;
AT rifle - 10 pieces;
AT guns - 9 pieces;
Armoured cars - 10 pieces, including:
- Easy BA-64 - 6 pieces;
- Average - BA-10 - 4 pieces;
Jeep Willys - it is necessary 12, there was 12, all on the move.
Motorcycles M-72 - 187 pieces are necessary, in presence on 17.11.42 there were 175 pieces, from them:
a) On the move 168 pieces;
b) In operating repair - 3 pieces;
c) On repair outside a regiment - 4 pieces.

Archive of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
Fund 331, Inv. 5041:
File 10, S. 42; File 13, S. 251; File 13, S. 274.
Documents were not published earlier are my archival find.

By the way, motorcycle M-72 was it well recommending itself in a Wermacht motorcycle BMW R-71. The license and the equipment necessary for manufacture of this motorcycle Germany has transferred the USSR in 1940 in execution Soviet - Germany of the non-aggression pact from August, 23, 1939.

From the beginning of operation Uranus before arrival on December, 6 in region state farm « Red Star » (the state farm ¹ 79), 8th SMcR participated in battles with Romanian 1st Arm.Div, German 22nd Pz. Div., has made raid on Oblivskaja, and then has risen to the north for reflection approach of army group «Hollidt» in region of river Krivaja.

In available documents it is visible, that 8th SMcR has lost about 150-200 person and about half of motorcycles of technical equipment, a significant part which nevertheless managed to be restored.
Thus, in region of state farm «Red Star» the regiment had about 600 person and 120-130 motorcycles.

The way 8th SMcR to state farm «Red Star» was such.

For successful actions to Stalingrad operations «Uranus» and «Saturn» 8-th separate motorcycle regiment has been awarded with the honourable name «Guards» and began to be called - 3-rd Guards Separate Motorcycle Regiment.

To the commander of this motorcycle unit to lieutenant colonel P. A. Belik the Decree of Presidium of a Supreme Soviet of the USSR from 14.02.1943 had been gave a honorary title - the Hero of Soviet Union with delivery of a medal «Gold Star» for ¹ 789.
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Post by Yuri » 26 Feb 2007 15:58

Actions 8 SMcR in operation Uranus:
- Participation in battles with Romanian 1 AD in region Zhirki (Zhirkovskij)-Perelazovskij
- raid in rear of the opponent on Oblivskaja - Sekretev
- Participation in battles with 22 Pz. Div in Mal. Dontschinka
- Reflection of attacks of group "Hollidt" of region Bokovskaja on Pronin-Perelazovskij
- Arrival in region state farm "Red Star"
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Post by Yuri » 26 Feb 2007 20:09

Addition: 8th SMcR had also English (and it is possible Canadian) an armored troop-carrier "Universal" in quantity of 10 pieces.
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Post by Yuri » 28 Feb 2007 20:30

Tank's Attack 11-th tank division conducted on December, 8 on state farm « Red Star » (it state farm 79) - the von Mellenthin draws as the original standard, as the original card of the general Balck. If to speak it is literally, on December, 8, 1942 defended settlement Sysojkin (differently in the central manor of state farm « Red Star ») 216-n a tank brigade which was not unit of 1-st tank corps.
216-n the tank brigade (the commander lieutenant colonel Kozhanov) was unit of 26-th tank corps which at this time was in region to the east from the Kalach and operated against surrounded in region of Stalingrad of a grouping of the opponent.
OoB a tank brigade of lieutenant colonel Kozhanov's: two tank batallions (580-th and 581-st TB) and one motorized-rifle machine-gun batallion (MRMGB).
Numerical structure 216 TBr:

Archive MO of the Russian Federation
Fund 331 Inventory 5041 Business 14 Sheets 226, 226 revolution
(list of staff/ actual strength)

Officer: 223/212
NCO: 368/368
Private: 450/450
All: 1041/1030

Before day of the beginning of operation "Uranus", that is 18/11/1942, the army headquarters 26th TC has given the following data on presence and a condition of combat material in units (the data on 216 TBr are allocated by a fat font):

Fund 331 Inventory 5041 File 29 Sheet 141
Operative report No 135
Army headquarters 26 TC 18/11/42 on 14÷àñîâ 30 minutes

14 MRBr
Motor-vehicle transport - 196 machines, 7 from them under repair.
Armoured personnel carrier "Universal" - 10 on the move.
Armoured cars 7 - on the move.

157 TBr
T-34 = 32 from them 1 under repair,
T-70 = 21 - on the move.
Motor transport - 105, from them 12 under repair (cargo and special).

19 TBr
T-34 = 32 - on the move,
T-70 = 21 - on the move.
Motor-vehicle transport - 105, from them under repair 8.

216 TBr
KV =24 - on the move,
T-70 = 27 from them 1 under repair,
T-34 = 4 on the move.
Motor transport - cargo and special machines 95, from them under repair 7.

26 STC (a separate transport company) a motor-vehicle transport of 48 machines, all are serviceable.

146 and 174 MRB - restoration of equipment of the case

2263 AAAR (the air-defence artillery regiment) covers assembly area

The chief of an army headquarters 26 TC
The colonel / Zinov'ev/
The chief of an operations section
The lieutenant colonel / Belousov/
Specified here in structure of 216-th TBr tanks T-34 it is commander's tanks - tanks of the brigade commander and commanders of batallions.
About actions of 216-th tank brigade in operation "Uranus" it has been told here a little: ... &start=135

Apparently, the brigade had heavy tanks KV. Therefore in itself in the beginning operations "Uranus" tanks of a brigade were involved as tanks of a break-through of the defenses of the opponent (TBD). The brigade of lieutenant colonel Kozhanov broke through defense of Romanian 3-rd army on a site to the east from settlement Bol'shoj.

After the Romanian defense has been broken through, 216-n TBr has taken part in struggle against divisions of 48-th tank corps which was an operative reserve of an army group "B" on a site of Romanian 3-rd army.
In particular, in region of settlement Zhirki (on the Romanian and German maps this settlement is designated Zhirkovskij) 216 TBr conducted battles with 1-st Romanian armoured division.

Then, the brigade participated in liquidation of the boiler in region of settlements Big Dontschinka and Small Dontschinka (to a southwest from Perelazovskij).
Here, in particular, the shot from a gun of the tank of the commander had been killed the Romanian general - the commander of 15-th infantry division.
By this time all other units 26-th tank corps was already on east coast of Don in the Kalach.

The brigade of lieutenant colonel Kozhanova has received the order to move to position area of the Corps.
However, the order has soon arrived to move in completely other direction - on northwest in region of the river the Krivaja (Curve) where have gone over to the offensive again arrived German divisions of army group Hollidt.
216-th tank brigade, as well as 8-th separate motorcycle regiment have taken part in battles with this grouping of the opponent.

The order with a problem for December, 4 to defend region Kamenka and to seize a village Krasnokutskaja (on the river the Krivaja - Curve).

Fund 331, Inventory 5041, File 10. Sheet 167

Battle order No 015 An army headquarters of a brigade 216 TBr 23 hour of 00 mines 3/12/42 Pronin

1. The opponent force up to two batallions 515 IR Germans holds defense in Krasnokutskaja.

2. The brigade has a problem in interaction with 510 RR 47 GRD to seize height with four barrows and further to seize Krasnokutskaja.

3. I have decided 581 TB with two tanks KV 580 TB under command of major Titarenko to attack Krasnokutskaja from the south and a southeast together with 510 RR.
Initial positions in region Starikovâ to hold to 7.30 4/12/42.
Attack - a signal by radio «Forward».

4. To captain Tamilin with one KV, one T-34, three T-70 to cover attack of a brigade from direction Fomin by ambushes in region âûñîòà110.3, gully Sennoj Log.
To prepare an ambush 6.004/12/42.

5. MSMGB to hold defense in region the height 110.3, gully Sennoj Log, at any cost reflecting counter-attacks of the opponent, from direction Fomin.

6. Five tanks under command of lieutenant Turchak to leave in Kamenka. To carry out a task put by the commander 159 RD.

7. My command point with 5.00 4/12/42 in Starikov.

8. Tank Evacuation Point up to the order to leave on a place.

The commander 216 TBr
The lieutenant colonel /Kozhanov/
The chief of an army headquarters 216 TBr
The captain /Malyshev/
On December, 5 lieutenant colonel Kozhanov has received the order from commanding 5-th tank army of general - lieutenant Romanenko to follow in the region, arranged in 120 km to a southeast from a boundary of the river Krivaja (Curve), namely, on bridgehead which was held with units of 333-rd RD in region of farm Ostrovsky (to the south from Surovikino).
By this time in motorized-rifle - a machine-gun batallion from 315 person of initial structure remained 200 person.

After a concentration on bridgehead, 216 TBr has come in operative submission of an army headquarters 1 TK which has reported on the following data on amount of available tanks in an army headquarters of 5-th tank army:

Fund 331, In. 5041, file 24, S. 91
The operative report ¹ 0205 to 16.00 6/12/42 the Corps headquarters 1TC

1. The opponent continues to defend on a former boundary. At 11.00 has undertaken counter-attack against a summary batallion 44 MRBr which have been beaten off.

2. Within day of a units of the First TC conducted preparation for fulfilment of the order ¹ 043.

89 TBr - in region ZHIRKOV
Ready to fight: T-34 =11, T-70 =7, T-60 =7, guns AT =3.
Active bayonets - 84.
Security (well-being): without changes

117 TBr - in region OSTROVSKIJ.
In I build T-34=19, T-70=9, including again arrived T-34=15, T-70=7
Security: without changes

159 TBr a reserve commander Army.

216 TBr - in region OSTROVSKIJ.
In I build: tanks KV=9, T-34 =2, T-70 =2
Security: without changes

44 MRBr - the mark of 161 600 m continued to be consolidated on a boundary to the south.
At 11.00 has successfully beaten off counter-attack on right flank.

Ready to fight - M-8 =5, on the average repair of battle machines =3.
Security: an ammunition - 1008 pieces of /5 volleys / .
Fuel - 2 fills, the foodstuffs - 3 day.

3. The aircraft of the opponent within day above an arrangement of units 1 TC did not undertake active actions.

4. Weather - cloudy. Road are passable

5. Communication - former.

The chief of an army headquarters 1 TC
The colonel / Kharchevnikov/
The chief of an operations section 1 TC
Guards the captain / Gutorov/
Apparently from the evening operative report of an army headquarters 1 TC for December, 6, for light time of day to bridgehead two arrived more KV and now the general number of this type of tanks began 9 pieces.

Units............ KV................T34.............. T70...............T60.............. Active bayonets
89 TBr.......... -...................11..................7.................7,.................84
117 TBr........ -...................19................ 9.................. -...................110
159 TBr........ -...................11.................10................-...................29
44 MRBr...... -...................-...................-...................-...................305
216 TBr........ 9...................2..................2..................-.................. 200
SubTotal...... 9.................. 43................ 38................ 7.................. 728
Total 87
KV&T34 52

The note: Number of active bayonets 117 TBr it is given as of 25.11.42 (last report with the indication of number of active bayonets in this brigade)

Russian text

Àðõèâ ÌÎ ÐÔ Ôîíä 331 Îïèñü 5041 Äåëî 29 Ëèñò 141
Îïåðàòèâíàÿ ñâîäêà ¹ 135 Øòàá 26 ÒÊ 18.11.42 ã. íà 14.30

14 ÌÑÁð Àâòîòðàíñïîðò – 196 ìàøèí, 7 èç íèõ â ðåìîíòå. ÁÒÐ Óíèâåðñàë – 10 íà õîäó. Áðîíåàâòîìîáèëåé 7 – íà õîäó.

157 ÒÁð Ò-34 – 32 èç íèõ 1 â ðåìîíòå, Ò-70 – 21 – íà õîäó. Àâòîòðàíñïîðò – 105 èç íèõ 12 â ðåìîíòå (ãðóçîâûå è ñïåöèàëüíûå)

19 ÒÁð Ò-34 – 32 – íà õîäó, Ò-70 – 21 – íà õîäó. Àâòîòðàíñïîðò – 105, èç íèõ â ðåìîíòå 8.

216 ÒÁð ÊÂ – 24 – íà õîäó, Ò-70 – 27 èç íèõ 1 â ðåìîíòå, Ò-34 – 4 íà õîäó. Àâòîòðàíñïîðò ãðóçè ñïåö. ìàøèíû 95 èç íèõ â ðåìîíòå 7.

26 ÎÒÐ àâòîòðàíñïîðò 48 ìàøèí èñïðàâíû

146 è 174 ÏÐÁ – âîññòàíîâëåíèå ìàò÷àñòåé êîðïóñà

2263 ÇÀÏ ïðèêðûâàåò ðàéîí ñîñðåäîòî÷åíèÿ

Íà÷àëüíèê øòàáà 26 ÒÊ
ïîëêîâíèê /Çèíîâüåâ/
Íà÷àëüíèê îïåðîòäåëà
ïîäïîëêîâíèê /Áåëîóñîâ/
ÖÀÌÎ ÐÔ Ôîíä 331 Îïèñü 5041 Äåëî 10 Ëèñò 167
Áîåâîé ïðèêàç ¹ 015 Øòàáðèã 216 òàíêîâûé 23.00 3.12.42 ã. Ïðîíèí

1. Ïðîòèâíèê ñèëîé äî äâóõ áàòàëüîíîâ 515 ÏÏ íåìöåâ çàíèìàåò îáîðîíó â Êðàñíîêóòñêàÿ.
2. Áðèãàäà èìååò çàäà÷ó âî âçàèìîäåéñòâèè ñ 510 ñï 47 ãâ. ñä îâëàäåòü âûñ. ñ ÷åòûðüìÿ êóðãàíàìè è â äàëüíåéøåì îâëàäåòü Êðàñíîêóòñêàÿ.
3. ß ðåøèë 581 ÒÁ ñ äâóìÿ òàíêàìè ÊÂ 580 ÒÁ ïîä êîìàíäîâàíèåì ìàéîðà Òèòàðåíêî àòàêîâàòü Êðàñíîêóòñêàÿ ñ þãà è þãî-âîñòîêà ñîâìåñòíî ñ 510 ñï.
Èñõîäíûå ïîçèöèè â ð-íå Ñòàðèêîâ çàíÿòü ê 7.30 4.12.42 ã. Àòàêà - ñèãíàë ïî ðàäèî "Âïåðåä".
4. Êàïèòàíó Òàìèëèíó ñ îäíèì ÊÂ, îäíèì Ò-34, òðåìÿ Ò-70 ïðèêðûòü àòàêó áðèãàäû ñ íàïðàâëåíèÿ Ôîìèí ïóòåì çàñàä â ðàéîíå âûñ.110.3, áàëêà Ñåííîé Ëîã.
Ïîäãîòîâèòü çàñàäó 6.00 4.12.42 ã.
5. ÌÑÏÁ çàíÿòü îáîðîíó â ðàéîíå âûñ.110.3, áàëêà Ñåííîé Ëîã, ëþáîé öåíîé îòðàæàÿ êîíòðàòàêè ïð-êà, ñ íàïðàâëåíèÿ Ôîìèí.
6. Ïÿòü òàíêîâ ïîä êîìàíäîâàíèåì ë-òà Òóð÷àê îñòàâèòü â Êàìåíêà. Âûïîëíÿòü çàäà÷ó, ïîñòàâëåííóþ êîìàíäèðîì 159 ñä.
7. Ìîé ÊÏ ñ 5.00 4.12.42 Ñòàðèêîâ.
8. ÒÝÏ äî ðàñïîðÿæåíèÿ îñòàâèòü íà ìåñòå.

Êîìàíäèð 216 ÒÁð
ïîäïîëêîâíèê /Êîæàíîâ/
Íà÷àëüíèê øòàáà 216 ÒÁð
êàïèòàí /Ìàëûøåâ/
ÖÀÌÎ ÐÔ Ôîíä 331 Îïèñü 5041 Äåëî 24 Ëèñò 91
Îïåðñâîäêà ¹0205 ê 16.00 6.12.42 ã. Øòàêîð 1ÒÊ

1. Ïðîòèâíèê ïðîäîëæàåò îáîðîíÿòüñÿ íà ïðåæíåì ðóáåæå. Â 11.00 ïðåäïðèíÿë êîíòðàòàêó ïðîòèâ ñâîäíîãî áàòàëüîíà 44 ÌÑÁð, êîòîðàÿ áûëà îòáèòà.
2.  òå÷åíèå äíÿ ÷àñòè Ïåðâîãî ÒÊ ïðîâîäèëè ïîäãîòîâêó ê âûïîëíåíèþ ïðèêàçà ¹ 043.
89 ÒÁð - â ðàéîíå ÆÈÐÊÎÂ
 ñòðîþ òàíêîâ Ò-34=11, Ò-70=7, Ò-60=7, îðóäèé ÏÒÎ=3.
Àêòèâíûõ øòûêîâ - 84.
Îáåñïå÷åííîñòü: áåç èçìåíåíèé
117 ÒÁð - â ðàéîíå ÎÑÒÐÎÂÑÊÈÉ.
 ñòðîþ Ò-34=19, Ò-70=9, â òîì ÷èñëå âíîâü ïðèáûâøèå Ò-34=15, Ò-70=7
Îáåñïå÷åííîñòü: áåç èçìåíåíèé
159 ÒÁð ðåçåðâ êîìàíäóþùåãî.
216 ÒÁð - â ðàéîíå ÎÑÒÐÎÂÑÊÈÉ.
 ñòðîþ: òàíêîâ ÊÂ-9, Ò-34-2, Ò-70- 2 [ýòî ìåñòî ïëîõî ÷èòàåòñÿ – âîçìîæíî, ÷òî çäåñü ñòîèò öèôðà 12, îäíàêî ïî ñìûñëó âñ¸ æå äîëæíà áûòü 2 èëè 4 – ïðèìå÷àíèå ìî¸]
Îáåñïå÷åííîñòü: áåç èçìåíåíèé
44 ÌÑÁð - ïðîäîëæàëà çàêðåïëÿòüñÿ íà ðóáåæå þæíåå îòì.161 600 ì.
 11.00 óñïåøíî îòáèëà êîíòðàòàêó íà ïðàâîì ôëàíãå.
 ñòðîþ óñòàíîâîê - Ì-8 -5, â ñðåäíåì ðåìîíòå áîåâûõ ìàøèí -3.
Îáåñïå÷åííîñòü: áîåïðèïàñîâ - 1008 øò /5 çàëïîâ/.
Ãîðþ÷åãî - 2 çàïðàâêè, ïðîäîâîëüñòâèÿ - 3 ñ/ä.
3. Àâèàöèÿ ïðîòèâíèêà â òå÷åíèå äíÿ íàä ðàñïîëîæåíèåì ÷àñòåé 1 ÒÊ àêòèâíûõ äåéñòâèé íå ïðåäïðèíèìàëà.
4. Ïîãîäà - ïàñìóðíàÿ. Äîðîãè ïðîõîäèìû
5. Ñâÿçü - ïðåæíÿÿ.

Íà÷àëüíèê øòàáà 1 ÒÊ
ïîëêîâíèê /Õàð÷åâíèêîâ/
Íà÷àëüíèê îïåðàòèâíîãî îòäåëà 1 ÒÊ
ãâàðäèè êàïèòàí /Ãóòîðîâ/
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