Victories and losses of Soviet submarines during WWII

[Art]

One post of BIGpanzer was deleted. I will appreciate very much if the discussion returns to exchange of factual information instead of making personal remarks. I will be forced to delete any remarks of that kind in future. It's an instructive and useful thread and there is no need to convert it into a squabble.

/Art.

[BIGpanzer]

Art wrote:
One post of BIGpanzer was deleted. I will appreciate very much if the discussion returns to exchange of factual information instead of making personal remarks.

Thanks! I also asked Tompuri to do this after he read and learn my complain (I hope he had a chance to do this, if not - I can send the same letter to him by PM). I will also appreciate very much if the discussion returns to respectful exchange of factual info (from my side this is done, unfortunately, not from "another" side - I don't think that overquoting of my own info only and wrong assumptions represents the good way of exchange the info ).
For example I didn't see something like this from Tompuri - "Dear BP, I found that you have a new info on http://brummel.fastbb.ru about the particular case, may I help you to add it here on AHF, in your list"....I can forgot to return back to my list after discussions with Morozov sometimes because of huge amount of another work.
Instead I saw the following from him:

"but you seem not to trust 100% at his info, as you have accepted only a few of his corrections to your "correct and detailed info" at the AHF. "

So I insist on excuse from Tompuri as this is completelly wrong assumption and unrespectful attempt to criticize my large work to post the most correct info possible to find in the net about all victories/losses of Soviet submarines. If quoting [including the link to another forum I provided Tompuri so kindly] - pay attention to the dates at least before making you wrong assumptions. The corresponding list here was created/posted before I found the forum where I can ask Dr. Morozov about several doubtful (as I understood later) cases to post the absolutely correct info for my friends-forummembers here. See the questions to him (you can try to find the info also) about some cases of Black Sea submarines. And I still waiting his answer, no corresponding list here (already made, keep on my hard drive - about M-submarines of Black Sea Navy now).

Art wrote:
It's an instructive and useful thread and there is no need to convert it into a squabble.

Thanks, Art! I completelly agree! At least I am trying to make it useful and the most correct thread here. I hope that this will be clear [at least a little bit] for other guy(s) here.

Tompuri wrote:
Thank you, now you also seem to agree that K-21/Lunin was a bit "unlucky with the torpedoes" as I have tried all the way to make you understand.

Aha....You have tried to make me understand
You "forgot" to quote my letter from 13th January

I wrote:
...Lunin was the third from the end - 47 torpedos during 13 attacks and 1 hit [not a motorboats case].

Tompuri wrote:
Well...actually a lot things at the K-21 "attack" against Tirpitz are far from being clear.

A lot of things are quite unclear indeed [mainly not about the performing of attack itself as corresponding Lunin's report was very detailed (but the report also raises some questions, nevertheless) but about the role of K-21 in preventing the attack of "Tirpitz" and warships of its escort against convoy PQ-17/in cancellation the operation "Rösselsprung"] - so the result of that famous for Soviet submariners attack will be discussed always I guess. We will die but the attack of K-21 against "Tirpitz" will be discussed. But I disagree with your claim to mention this attack as "attack". My opinion you know - unsuccessful attack which could be the most famous and successful for Soviet submarines during the war if Lunin had the possibility to launch torpedos from another position and nose tubes or calculated the speed/course of German battleship more exactly and launched stern torpedos with differ time interval he did.
Short info from Morozov -
http://brummel.fastbb.ru/?1-10-0-000000 ... 1159387755
The detailed discussion with different opinions (on Russian, sorry)
http://sovnavy-ww2.by.ru/articles/k21.htm

Tompuri wrote:
As I have earlier posted, perhaps more correct would be:" according to the Soviet reports, the crew saw...

Only perhaps as the attack at Bogen was made from surface position so several crewmembers from the bridge [several old sources mention also the gun crew on the deck - possible during the night surface attack against port] saw the attack (in fact the weather was bad that time in the area according to Soviet report; a possible reason that German observation posts didn't notice the attack of submarine). As I've written I found the memoires of eye-witness from the bridge (unfortunately, the memoires were old and there are some disagreements with the submarine log-book even which should be much more correct) - anyway, I am trying at the moment to translate these memoires just for the info.

Well, I am returning back to the North Navy and to my list (shortly) after discussions with Dr. Morozov.

Large submarine K-23 and her confirmed victory - Norwegian transport “Soroy” 506 brt 19.01.1942, 70.59’/26.43’ [artillery fire]. Also Norwegian fishing trawler "Start" was lightly damaged by artillery fire 26.11.1941 [my further investigation found that some German sources don't mention the direct damages of the ship but 7 German soldiers on board were killed/wounded by shell fragments indeed], and German mine-sweeper M-22 was heavily damaged by mine(s) from K-23 (explosion took place 05.11.1941, sometimes mentioned as the victory because of, perhaps, the impossibility to repair the damaged ship; but I am not sure about this case as full victory - checking). As for Norwegian transport "Birk" 3664 brt - I agree with Morozov, the ship exploded on German mine 18.02.1942.

Mine-laying submarine L-22 and her confirmed victories - German transport "Muansa" 5472 brt (torpedo attack, 01.01.1943) and German military transport T-4 "Othmarschen" 7077 brt (torpedo attack 01.02.1943). As for German transport "Adolf Binder" 3515 brt (explosion on mine 27.11.1944) - the origin of mine is not very clear (from L-22 or floating mine) because German mine-sweepers sweeped the area of corresponding L-22's mines before "Adolf Binder" hit the mine there.

Mine-laying submarine L-22 and her confirmed victories - German transport "Rudesheimer' 2036 brt (torpedo attack 01.09.1943, heavily damaged and wasn't repaired till the end of the war), German hospital ship "Birka" 1000 brt (exploded on mine, 01.06.1943), German mine-sweeping motorboat R 64 135 brt (exploded on mine, 28.12.1943). As for the explosion of decoy-ship Schiff-18 "Alteland" 419 brt - I asked Morozov about this case after I found one doubt that was mine from L-22 (because of large depth in the corresponding point for the mines installed by L-22), perhaps those mines were installed by Soviet patrol motorboats MO. Not very clear case in my present opinion. I am searching the additional info but it seems to be almost impossible to find the exact origin of those Soviet mines.

Medium submarine S-101 and her confirmed victories - German transport "Ajax" 2297 brt (torpedo attack, 29.03.1943), German submarine U-639 (torpedo attack, 28.08.1943). About patrol ship V-6104 (damaged by torpedo 14.06.1943) - this is my mistake [unfortunately, I forgot even the exact source where I found this, would like to see the info ones more], for sure, V-6104 stayed at Kirkenes that time, I confirm.

Regards, BP

[Juha Tompuri]

One post of BIGpanzer was deleted. I will appreciate very much if the discussion returns to exchange of factual information instead of making personal remarks. I will be forced to delete any remarks of that kind in future. It's an instructive and useful thread and there is no need to convert it into a squabble.

/Art.

Thank You very much, Art.

Regards, Juha

[BIGpanzer]

I am still translating the additional (old memoires) info about the attack of K-21 in Bogen and trying to find some additional details if possible to separate it from that obsolete info. For example, I found there that recon group I asked about consisted from Norwegians with only one Soviet member. May be that was the reason that K-21 didn't take that group back after landing - those scouts or agents should stay on enemy territory for a long time.

Found one illustration about the way of K-21 by-passing German observation posts to Bogen port 20.02.1943. Any opinions? In my opinion in such case as it is described here one of the German observation posts (3 posts = 3 cycles in the picture) should notice the explosions, dotted line shows the possible torpedo way.
from http://militera.lib.ru/h/sergeev_km/index.html


Regards, BP

[Juha Tompuri]

Dear BP,

Tompuri, try to help us

About as important as to provide new info, is to check the credibilty of it.
I help here the Forum by checking is the info posted as facts, really based on true events

PS3. Tompuri, may I ask you not to use the final word Regards in the case of you "replies" to me.

Yes you may.

Also you can remove some personal remarks after learning [great doubt, nevertheless]. Not like them but what can I do more to illustrate your shameful behavior

I think I agree with Art, and leave tham as they are.
I agree they are illustrative, but perhaps at different way you thought when posting them.

[you don't like that I disagree with you about Bogen at first and this is partially OK but your wrong unrespectful assumptions about the reliability of my posts and "hiding" the info I got from Morozov will not be excused anyway].

Actually I haven't accused you from hiding info, but as you yourself posted...

So I insist on excuse from Tompuri as this is completelly wrong assumption and unrespectful attempt to criticize my large work to post the most correct info possible to find in the net about all victories/losses of Soviet submarines.

Do you really mean that I should apologize from you because of the errors at your postings, I happened to notice?

If quoting [including the link to another forum I provided Tompuri so kindly] - pay attention to the dates at least before making you wrong assumptions. The corresponding list here was created/posted before I found the forum where I can ask Dr. Morozov about several doubtful (as I understood later) cases to post the absolutely correct info for my friends-forummembers here.

"Pay attention to the dates" - but that's what I've been doing.
Let's see...

Between 5th and 12th January 2008 you posted info from the North Navy submarines.
On 28th January 2008 you received "new" info from Morozov about the claims of, for example K-23, L-20, L-22 and S-101.
On 2nd and 4th February you posted that you have received new info, and would like to update your earlier posts.
At that time you also had the info about the overclaims of the subs I earleir mentioned, but for some reason unclear to me, you seem to have selected them out from your list of the corrections.

About the same time I happened to (re)find the Russian forum where Morozov posting, found the "missing" corrections, and waited for over a week for BIGpanzer to step up to add the leftouts to the list of the corrections.
As that didn't happen, I posted them.

the link to another forum I provided Tompuri so kindly

As I earlier and above have posted, I had been aware of your discussions earlier.

Tompuri wrote:
Thank you, now you also seem to agree that K-21/Lunin was a bit "unlucky with the torpedoes" as I have tried all the way to make you understand.

Aha....You have tried to make me understand
You "forgot" to quote my letter from 13th January

I wrote:
...Lunin was the third from the end - 47 torpedos during 13 attacks and 1 hit [not a motorboats case].

Yes, you are correct.
At that moment, after nearly a year, some light could be seen at the end of the tunnel.

Tompuri wrote:
Well...actually a lot things at the K-21 "attack" against Tirpitz are far from being clear.

A lot of things are quite unclear indeed

Good, now we agree on that too.

But I disagree with your claim to mention this attack as "attack".

At least a quite hostile act.
Also, was the Tirpitz attack an attack or "attack"?



Sincerely, Juha

[Juha Tompuri]

Thank you for the map and link.

I am still translating the additional (old memoires) info about the attack of K-21 in Bogen

Good.

and trying to find some additional details if possible to separate it from that obsolete info.

Even better.

Found one illustration about the way of K-21 by-passing German observation posts to Bogen port 20.02.1943. Any opinions?

One here - where is the place?
IIRC you earlier mentioned it being in a fjord - do you happen to know the name of it?

In my opinion in such case as it is described here one of the German observation posts (3 posts = 3 cycles in the picture) should notice the explosions, dotted line shows the possible torpedo way.

Maybe should, but for some reason there seems not to be info from the receiving end.
Three torpedoes exploding at a pier/port do leave a mark.


Sincerely, Juha

P.S. do you happen to have info about the Soviet (M-class ?) subs operating/attacking at the Finnish Liinahamari port at Petsamofjord during the Continuation War ?

[Juha Tompuri]

http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/chronik.htm#Z based its info on the research of one of the

most well-known naval historians - Prof. Dr. Jürgen Rohwer (IIRC he was(is) the vice-president of International Association of Military Historians).
Indeed, I am thinking what is the source for the info mentioned here:
http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/chronik.htm#Z
http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/43-02.htm
http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/an ... 02-asa.htm

Von ihnen legt K-21 (Kpt. 2. Rg. Lunin) am 18.2. eine Minensperre im Lyngenfjord, auf der möglicherweise am 22.4. der dt. Dampfer Düna (ex-lett. Kandava, 1926 BRT) verloren geht, setzt Agenten an Land und feuert am 20.2. sechs Torpedos auf einen Küstensicherungs-verband in die Bogenbucht.

20.02.43 0218 sj K-21 4T [ APC, 5 Motorboote +] Bogenbucht

AFAIK four torpedos were spent.
AFAIK at least no any confirmations (from both sides) that APC (depot ship?) and 5 motorboats were sunk in Bogenbucht.

I'm not quite sure as I don't read russian, and rely only to the online translations, but maybe Rohwehr relied here, and based his statement, on official Soviet documents(?)

Приказом № 01 от 20.03.43 г. командира бригады ПЛ были награждены орденом Красной Звезды:

— краснофлотец моторист Петр Белик за отличную службу, храбрость в походах, [144]

— старший краснофлотец электрик Олег Благов за работу по ликвидации последствий пожара и вводу в строй боевых механизмов,

— краснофлотец трюмный Андрей Лазаренко за участие в высадке десанта, решительность и смелость в сложной боевой обстановке,

— краснофлотец торпедист Болеслав Петраго за подготовку торпедного оружия для удара по базе Воген, храбрость в трудных положениях корабля,

— старший краснофлотец моторист Михаил Салтыков за отличную работу по ликвидации последствий пожара, храбрость и стойкость при службе в артрасчете, за мастерскую работу на боевом посту,

— старшина 1 статьи специалист СКС Николай Чубуков за участие в высадке десанта, обеспечение бесперебойной и четкой связи со штабом флота и за участие в сухопутных боях в районе Западной Лицы и проявленные там мужество и храбрость.

Командование засчитало лодке боевой успех — потопление в базе Воген одной плавбазы и четырех катеров ПЛО. На боевой рубке ПЛ появилась цифра «14».

http://militera.lib.ru/h/sergeev_km/09.html

Babelfish translation of the end part gave:

Command included to boat the combat success - sinking in the base Of vogen of one plavbazy and four launches PLO.

I think I will here have to disagree with you and few other persons about the correct name of the place here in question:

Could you tell us the location of the Island/Bay/Port of Vogen/Bogen L-21 claimed to have fired the torpedoes at?

... I found already the exact location of Bogen

Then you should know that it's actually Vågen

Just Bogen is the good solution to be used in future.

I would prefer the correct form, Vågen (also, as Å is a bit rare letter, I think Vogen [Воген] is OK too)
http://webhotel2.gisline.no/gislinewebinnsyn_nordtroms/

Sincerely, Juha

[BIGpanzer]

Hi.

Still not finish the translation of post-war memoires of first officer of K-21 [described in the book of ex-mechanik of K-21 Sergeev, 1999]. By the way, Sergeev strongly disagrees with Prof. Platonov [who investigated many documents from the enemy side for his book] and claims him as "modern falsificator of the history of Great Patriotic war who doubt our victories". With all my respect to Sergeev and other crewmembers of K-21, who participated in many dangerous combat runs during the war, I agree much more with modern archive based sources concerning the descriptions of events. For example, Dr. Morozov confirmed that German observation posts didn't detect Soviet submarine near Vogen whereas old memoires mentions that Lunin ordered to answer on German light signals from observation shore posts something like "Our character is strong" on Russian and that worked three times! It will be interesting to compare the memoires [may be "memoires"] info with the facts mentioned in K-21 log-book and log-books of German observation posts near Vogen [did they send light signals to unknown ship or not that time?]. The scheme I posted above is the original scheme from Lunin's combat report.

JT wrote:
I would prefer the correct form, Vågen (also, as Å is a bit rare letter, I think Vogen [Воген] is OK too)

Ok, if so it will be very easy for me to return back to my old variant - Vogen. Rohwer used Bogenbucht, nevertheless.
http://www.geonames.org/search.html?q=Vagen&country=NO

JT wrote:
I'm not quite sure as I don't read russian, and rely only to the online translations, but maybe Rohwehr relied here, and based his statement, on official Soviet documents(?)

Very probably, I also found this [but sometimes happened that vice versa Soviet historians used overestimated data about some Soviet victories for Winter war and WWII published by newspaper journalists in Sweden and USA at first]. I am not sure that was the original Soviet documents [just "correct" citation of them in old memoires], it is mentioned there that HQ confirmed that the result of Lunin's attack was successful [as we know he reported about three visible explosion bursts only] and K-21 sank depot ship and four anti-submarine motorboats. Why I doubt that was the info from the real official Soviet documents - because in two official Soviet reference books I have the result of that attack was mentioned as probable not confirmed, and no any depot ship was mentioned [only in "memoires"].

JT wrote:
Maybe should, but for some reason there seems not to be info from the receiving end.
Three torpedoes exploding at a pier/port do leave a mark.

If they exploding directly at a pier - for sure. But did you notice [probably, no, as I don't see quotes ] my posts where I thought about the possibility that torpedos hit the bottom or sludge agglomerations close to the port. For example, at least several cases are known in Arctic where receiving end/enemy side noticed explosions of corresponding torpedos very close to the shore, at least once the unexploded torpedo was found in sludge.

JT wrote:
do you happen to have info about the Soviet (M-class ?) subs operating/attacking at the Finnish Liinahamari port at Petsamofjord during the Continuation War ?

Of course, I have such info from Morozov's book at least. But taking into consideration some doubts and overquotings above...hmmm... Well, can you specify your question and, better, to provide me with the exact name of submarines. Otherwise you should wait until my list about Baltic Sea submarines will be finished [I will pay special attention to all attacks at Liinahamari in that case because I read in details about successful attacks only to describe them in the list, unsuccessful are given as numbers only].
By the way, I came into conclusion that it will be better to mention also how many unsuccessful attempts to sink the corresponding submarines were made by Germans, Finns and Romanians [a lot of Soviet submarines went through many attacks of enemy submarine chasers, aircraft and submarines; hit mines but could return home]. But this is a great job [as nobody gives the exact data about this, I need to calculate all enemy attacks by myself through the descriptions of each combat run] and I need to return back to my lists I already posted in that case. No, too time consuming....

Anyway that was insignificant attack just performed against several motorboats, the only important thing was, perhaps, that as I understood Lunin didn't have the order to attack port in Vogen but tried to penetreate into this enemy area by himself. Also I found the interesting detail about Lunin's attacks - he tried to use British method of torpedo launching from long distances since 1942 [new for Soviet fleet] but because Soviet submarines didn't have modern calculation apparatus for torpedo launching as British had [in principle, the very majority of Soviet submariners used almost WWI-era methods and equipment during the war], his attempts were unsuccessful.

JT wrote:
Well...actually a lot things at the K-21 "attack" against Tirpitz are far from being clear.
I wrote:
A lot of things are quite unclear indeed
JT wrote:
Good, now we agree on that too.

We agree on that always. Another question - what unclear things do you mean. If, for example, exact source of explosions after torpedo launchings heard by acoustic and crewmembers in I and II compartments of K-21 after the attack against "Tirpitz" and its escort - yes, I don't know exactly, and never knew, and nobody knows with 100% sure. See my posts above. I agree with some assumptions based on calculations that torpedos could hit sea bottom because of very long distance to target.

BP

[BIGpanzer]

Hello, friends!

I continue to post the list about victories/losses of Soviet submarines.

Black Sea Navy, small submarines
In 1941 - were used by 8th division [captain-lieutenant D. Larichev], 7th division [captain 3rd rank N. Klynin], training division [captain 3rd rank L. Petrov].
In 1943 - were used by 3rd division [captain 3rd rank L. Hijainen] and 4th division [captain 2nd rank R. Guz].

M-type, VI series:

M-51: 10 combat runs (64 days, also participated in navigational support of landing operation in Feodosiya as floating lighthouse 30.12.1941), no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

M-52: 6 combat runs (45 days), no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

M-type, VI-bis series:

M-54: 9 combat runs (72 days), no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

M-55: 14 combat runs (100 days, also participated in navigational support of landing operation at Sudak 15.01.1942), 2 unsuccessful torpedo attacks, survived the war.

M-type, XII series:

M-31: 12 combat runs (100 days), 3 transport runs (7 days - delivered to Sevastopol 15.9 tons of ammunition, 5.7 tons of food supplies and 5.5 tons of petrol; evacuated from Sevastopol 12 men and 14.456.430 roubles [1.8 tons of cash and orders] from state banks), 3 torpedo attacks (one successful – 06.10.1942, 45.47’/30.19’, convoy 5 ships, 2 torpedos from 3 cables, Romanian tug “Oltul” 293 brt was sunk and 10 crewmembers were lost), lost with 21 crewmembers 17.12.1942 (most probably M-31 was sunk by 50 depth charges from German submarine chaser UJ 116 and mine-sweeping motorboats R 30, FR 2, FR 7, FR 8 in Zhebriyany Bay near Odessa – resurfaced clothing items [but, perhaps, from old wrecks] were found by Germans in water), but also the explosion on mine of Romanian mine-fields S-19 or S-42 around the same date was quite possible.

M-32: 11 combat runs (73 days), 2 transport runs (5 days – delivered to Sevastopol 14 tons of ammunition, 1.5 tons of food supplies and 5.8 tons of petrol; evacuated from Sevastopol 8 men), 1 unsuccessful torpedo attack, survived the war.

M-33: 14 combat runs (37 days), 3 transport runs (4 days – delivered to Sevastopol 12.9 tons of ammunition, 6.9 tons of food supplies and 6 tons of petrol), 1 unsuccessful torpedo attack, lost with 20 crewmembers [4 men could leave the sunken submarine but couldn’t reach the seashore] 22-25.08.1942 (exploded on two mines UMB of Romanian mine–field S-33 in the point 46.20’/30.54’ near Odessa), M-33 was found by Soviet naval divers at a depth 27 m and the wrecks were raised in July 1951.

M-34: 7 combat runs (44 days), 1 unsuccessful torpedo attack, lost with 20 crewmembers 03.11.1941 near Constanta (most probably, exploded on floating mine).

M-35: 32 combat runs (291 days), 16 torpedo attacks (two + two successful: 27.10.1941, near Sulina, convoy 2 ships, 2 torpedos from 5 cables – German transport/auxiliary anti-submarine vessel Schiff-29 “Lola” 1193 brt was damaged by unexploded torpedo; 21.10.1942, to the east from Sulina 45.07’/29.45’, convoy 4 ships, 2 torpedos from 4 cables – German tanker “Le Progres” 511 brt with 348 tons of oil and 149 tons of petrol was sunk, 5 of its crewmembers were lost; 02.11.1943, 45.33’/32.42’, single anchored ship, 1 torpedo from 14 cables – German lighter L-1293 1270 brt was heavily damaged and wasn’t repaired; 23.11.1943, 45.32’/32.32’, 6 warships, 2 torpedos from 2.5 cables, German submarine chaser UJ 101 was damaged by unexploded torpedo), 1 successful artillery attack (26.10.1941, north to Constanta, convoy of 9 small ships, German motor ferry SF 25 140 brt was sunk by 4 direct hits and German motor ferry SF 36 140 brt was heavily damaged and sank soon but later it was raised and repaired, 110 45mm shells were spent from 3 cables to sink both motor ferries), 2 destructions of detected floating mines by artillery fire (23.12.1941, 13.05.1944), survived the war.

M-36: 12 combat runs (89 days), 2 torpedo attacks (one successful: 23.08.1942, 45.48’/30.08’, convoy 6 ships, 2 torpedos from 3 cables, German tug “Ankara” 112 brt was sunk), lost with 22 crewmembers 04.01.1944 near Kobuletti during post-repair sea trials (most probably, emergency because of installation defect took place on board during crash dive; Soviet aircraft found in the point 41.59’/41.40’ with a depth 415 m several oil spots, buoy and floating box during the searches of submarine 06.-08.01.1944). The version of possible explosion of M-36 on mine laid by German submarine U-20 (described in some German and Russian sources) is incorrect because U-20 laid 9 mines UMB in another area (42.13’/41.37’), also Soviet coastal observation post No. 4 didn’t detect any mine explosions there.

M-58: 6 combat runs (41 days), no torpedo attacks, lost with 19 crewmembers 18.-21.10.1941 near Constanta (most probably exploded on mine of Romanian mine-field S-12 or on floating mine). The version (described in some German, Bulgarian and Russian sources) of attack of Bulgarian seaplane Smolnik S.328 Vrana performed at 10:55 15.10.1941 near Shabla Cape as the reason of loss of M-58 is incorrect because M-58 started her last combat run 16.10.1941 only.

M-59: 3 combat runs (18 days), no torpedo attacks, lost with 20 crewmembers 28.10.-01.11.1941 near Sulina (most probably exploded on mine of Romanian mine-field or on floating mine).

M-60: 8 combat runs (69 days), no torpedo attacks, lost with 21 crewmembers [8 men could leave the sunken submarine but couldn’t reach the seashore] 23.09.-26.09.1942 (exploded on mine UMB of Romanian mine-field S-33 near Odessa in the point 46.20’/30.54’), M-60 was found by Soviet naval divers at a depth 27 m and the wrecks were raised in July 1951.

M-62: 26 combat runs (226 days), 6 unsuccessful torpedo attacks, survived the war.

M-111: 27 combat runs (223 days), 4 transport runs (11 days, delivered 5.5 tons of food supplies to Sevastopol but couldn’t reach Sevastopol with 6.9 tons of ammunition and 0.5 tons of food supplies during the last runs because of strong enemy anti-submarine defense), 21 torpedo attacks (two(three?) + one(two?) successful: 28.06.1943, 10 miles to the S from Cape Chauda, convoy 7 ships, 2 torpedos from 3 cables, German large landing barge “F 325” was damaged by unexploded torpedo? [unclear as the barge was damaged indeed but there is some difference in time between German and Soviet reports for that day]; 17.07.1943, 44.58’/35.44’, convoy 5 ships, 1 torpedo from 8 cables, German tanker “Adelheid” 444 brt was damaged by unexploded torpedo; 28.08.1943, 44.47’/33.26’, convoy 15 ships, 2 torpedos from 2 cables, German tug “Hainburg” 400 brt was heavily damaged (lost nose part, 4 from its crewmembers were lost), towed to Brailu and repaired after the war only and 12.11.1943, 45.54’/30.23’, convoy 6 ships, 2 torpedos from 3 cables, German transport “Theoderich” 4200 brt was sunk and 6 from its crewmembers were lost), 1 destruction of detected floating mine by artillery fire (29.10.1942), survived the war.
a). According to the new info from Dr. Morozov – torpedo attack of M-111 which took place 18.07.1943 and described by all modern sources as successful (44.59’/35.32’, convoy 5 ships, 1 torpedo from 8 cables, Romanian lighter/self-propelled barge “Dunarea-1” 505 brt was sunk) was unsuccessful and performed against another target in reality (tug “Junak” with barge L-1349), Romanian lighter “Dunarea-1” sank in Danube estuary on air laid mine.
b). M-111 performed the attack against German lighter/barge the result of which was described by Soviet captain as evident event [visual confirmation through periscope] whereas there is no any info from German side still – 27.11.1942, 45.55’/30.20, convoy 4 ships, 1 torpedo from 2 cables, hit of barge by unexploded torpedo and following collision of submarine with that barge.

M-112: 21 combat runs (221 days), 3 transport runs (8 days, delivered 10.2 tons of ammunition and 2 tons of food supplies to Sevastopol, evacuated 20 men [including 10 men rescued in the sea]), 3 torpedo attacks (one successful – 25.10.1943, 45.31’/32.36’, convoy 24 ships, 2 torpedos from 2 cables, German self-propelled barge “Tyra-5” 1278 brt was heavily damaged [lost nose part after torpedo explosion], ran aground and destroyed, 1 from its crewmembers was lost), survived the war.

M-113: 18 combat runs (183 days), 6 unsuccessful torpedo attacks, shelling enemy airfield in Novo-Fedorovka [28.02.1942, 25 cables, 40 45mm shells were spent], survived the war.

M-117: 14 combat runs (159 days), 10 unsuccessful torpedo attacks (unclear case – 21.06.1943, 44.48’/33.11’, single ship, 1 torpedo from 9 cables, German large landing barge F139A was damaged?), survived the war.

M-118: 5 combat runs (46 days), 3 transport runs (6 days, delivered 18.5 tons of ammunition, 4 tons of food supplies and 6 tons of fuel to Sevastopol, evacuated 0.8 tons of cargos and 18 men), 2 torpedo attacks (one successful – 01.10.1942, 45.53’/30.19’, convoy 5 ships, 2 torpedos from 3-5 cables, German transport “Salzburg” 1742 brt with 840 tons of manganese ore and 2300 Soviet POWs was sunk and 5 enemy soldiers + 2080 Soviet POWs were lost), 1 unsuccessful artillery attack, 1 destruction of detected floating mine by artillery fire [28.06.1942], lost with 21 crewmembers 01-02.10.1942 (most probably the submarine was sunk 01.10. after her detection by German seaplane Ar-196 [dropped 2 depth charges] and further attack by Romanian gun-boats “Locotenant-Commandor Stihi Eugen” and “Sublocotenant Ghigulescu” [dropped 7 depth charges], perhaps oil spot and surfaced uniform were detected in the point 45.53’/30.19’; but explosion on mine of Romanian mine-field S-32 or attack of German flying-boat BV.138 performed 02.10. were also quite possible).

M-120: 11 combat runs (81 days), 1 transport run (2 days, delivered 6.5 tons of ammunition to Sevastopol and evacuated 6 men), 1 unsuccessful torpedo attack, 1 destruction of detected floating mine by artillery fire [09.09.1944], survived the war.

M-type, XV series:

M-202 “Rybnik Donbassa” (“Fish-farmer of Donbass”) – didn’t participate in combat runs [in service since 30.05.1944], survived the war.

M-203 “Irkutsky rybak” (“Fisherman of Irkutsk”) – didn’t participate in the war [in service since 05.10.1945], survived the war.

Regards, BP

[BIGpanzer]

Hi,

JT wrote:
When USSR still existed Finns had an expression: Suuri maa, suuret toleranssit Something like: "big country, big tolerances" in English.

Interesting expression. In my text-book of Russian language there are a lot of wise Russian proverbs. One of them - "Try to see the grain in the alien eye and don't see the big log in your own eye". This represents the case here very well. You tried to find the small incorrectness [as I wrote "probably, several motorboats were sunk in Vogen"] among my descriptions of more than two hunderd submarines based on many newest and checked sources whereas you described at least half(!) of actions of Finnish submarines which doged Soviet submarines on their positions of battery charges after crossing of mine-fields of Gulf of Finland in a wrong way [the most shameful example is that you insisted on success of attack of "Iko-Tursu" against Shch-320 27.10.1942 after my detailed explanations that "Iko-Tursu" unsuccessfully attacked Shch-307 (you must now that Finnish submarine performed only one attack on 26-27.10.1942) and Shch-320 exploded on mine in the beginning of October]. Dr. Morozov sent me Finnish combat report of "Iku-Turso" as well as Soviet report of Shch-307 - in 1940s were already 100% clear after comparisons of those reports that the result of torpedo attack of "Iku-Turso" was unsuccessful because Shch-307 detected and avoided Finnish torpedos [which hit, perhaps, rocks] by skilful manoeuvring, and Shch-320 most probably exploded on mine more than two weeks before Finns "attack" her [also Shch-320 were ordered to use completelly another position than in the area "Iku-Turso" "attacked" her].
See here [may be Art will help to translate completelly the Finnish translations of their own reports into Russian performed in 1944-45 [identical texts on Finnish Dr. Morozov sent me by e-mail] , also Soviet report of Shch-307 dated 1942].
http://brummel.fastbb.ru/?1-9-0-0000003 ... -0#083.001

As for the collision/ramming of "Vetehinen" with Shch-305.
Some old posts from me and Tompuri from this thread:

Tompuri answered:
250m was too close, the torpedoes went under the target

I wrote: Very probably, that Finnish artillerymen could be blinded by their shots. That happened very often during night artillery fire from deck guns.

I wrote:
Annoyed A. Leino ordered to open fire from 76mm gun [not 100mm] and, probably, shots blinded captain and other Finnish crewmembers on the submarine bridge.

Tompuri answered:
At least the Soviet crew inside their bridge

Tompuri answered:
Well...3 out of the 6 Bofors shots fired hit the target. Hardly possible blinded.
The ones at the receiving end were very probably blinded.

I wrote:
In 30 sec both submarines collided unexpectedly for both crews

Tompuri answered:
Unexpectedly to the Soviet crew.

Tompuri answered:
Most probably not. The sub captain ordered full speed towards the enemy sub at very close distance.

Tompuri wrote:
Every info about the case is based on Finnish eye-wittnesses.
I, as the Swedish sites, prefer ramming over the some Soviet preferred collied

I prefer to believe facts not popular literature sources so I very much prefer collision over ramming.
About Finnish eye-wittnesses - yes, the big problem is [and I completelly agree with Dr. Morozov in this] that there are significant doubts that many Finnish historians prefer to use their own archive sources even. Instead they continue to base their info on literature sources which contains a lot of wrong info. As, for example, here - http://users.tkk.fi/~jaromaa/Navygallery/
AFAIK many Russian historians don't use the obsolete Soviet literature sources in their research already but for some unknown reason many Finnish historians continue to use their own obsolete literature sources describing the myths as facts till now. Quite strange and shameful in my opinion.

Here is the quote from original report of captain of "Vetehinen" . No any word about intentional ramming there but descriptions of big problems in distance and speed determination of Soviet submarine, and collision with Soviet submarine after artillery fire blinded Finnish crewmembers. Interesting to see the honest original text written by Finnish captain and its following interpretation by some Finns. No need to say that I tried to translate all details from Finnish and Russian [compare both original variants - Finnish report and its original Finnish translation into Russian] as correct as I could, that took one hour. Sorry for my personal ( ! ) in brackets and emphasis. They represents the attention to important info as well as my observation that Finnish submariners had bad training to perform hunting against Soviet submarines even under advantageous conditions for Finns.
Submarines which had the goal to detect and attack enemy submarines in the known area of their battery charges had significant advantage over submarines which performed hard combat runs avoiding enemy mines and anti-submarine forces, needed to move on diesels during battery charge in the dangerous area and which had the goal to reach their final positions to attack enemy transports.

The quote from the report of the captain of "Vetehinen"

I gave the full speed by both electric engines and turned to the left strongly to reach the position for torpedo launching. As the visibility in different directions were differ, I determined the distance to submarine as too large number (!). I couldn't determine the speed (!!!) but according to my previous experience (!!!) I considered the speed as 13 knots and angle of sight was 17.5 degrees. The submarine was determined as submarine of S-class. But now the distance became too close so I gave half-full speed forward at 22:55. At that moment our course was 180 degrees. At 22:55 I launched torpedo aiming to the nose of submarine. The man who passes my order in the deck-house launched also the second torpedo which was not planned to launch (!), but he accepted as the order to launch the message from observer that deck-house became close to the line of sight, so the second torpedo was launched in the direction of dech-house.We noticed immediately after launching that the distance was very close, later (!) it was found the distance was 250 m only. Torpedos went by nose, probably, because the speed of enemy was significantly less than we assumed. At critical path of torpedo T/33 as 250 m, probably, they went under target . Fall of safety device from firing mechanisms takes place at the distance approximately 200 m.

Now the approach tooks place very fast so I ordered to open artillery fire at 22:56. After opening artillery fire it became almost impossible to perform further observations because of blinding, which was caused by shot fire. At 22.56.5 (!) we run on enemy submarine between her deck-house and nose. Our speed was 6 knots during this. In the moment of collision (Finnish captain didn't mention any rammings! - BP) our nose climbed to enemy submarine, speed decreased and we turned to the left slightly. Our net-cutter cut the ropings - net-cutters of enemy submarine. In the moment of collision we fired two short bursts from Madsen gun....

Further parts later if needed, no time.
I 100% believe to Finnish translators, and they used the word collision in their translation into Russian [yhteentörmäys = столкновение, collision] which is also quite obvious taking into consideration the details mentioned in Finnish captain's report [problems in distance determination, blinding by artillery fire, no any words that he increased speed at the end but only decreased it because the distance was too short]. I completelly agree with Dr. Morozov that was unexpected collision for both crews (Finnish and Soviet). About the "attack" of "Iku-Turso" - in the next letter, but this is more easy and 100% clear without any even very small doubts [Finnish captain of "Iku-Turso" wrote detailed report about that attack and previous events, and Soviet report from Shch-307 corresponds with the Finnish data very well concerning the details except Finnish claim that all(!) their 50 shots from Madsen gun hit Soviet submarine, in reality no any hits were noticed by Soviet crew because Shch-307 diving that time already].
Seems to be that Mr. Tompuri doesn't know some Finnish combat reports and bases his info on memoires and other Finnish literature sources, claiming and insisting such an info as "facts", instead to use original archive data.

BP

[Juha Tompuri]

BIGpanzer, drop the personal issues, and concentrate your energy to the topic.

In my text-book of Russian language there are a lot of wise Russian proverbs. One of them - "Try to see the grain in the alien eye and don't see the big log in your own eye".

Russian?

Brother let me pull out the mote that is in thine eye: when thou perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye?

Luke 6:42


These posts puzzle me:

identical texts on Finnish Dr. Morozov sent me by e-mail

Here is the quote from original report of captain of "Vetehinen"

I 100% believe to Finnish translators, and they used the word collision in their translation into Russian [yhteentörmäys = столкновение, collision]

Where do you need your (100%) beliefs if you have the originals?
Why not posting them?

I prefer to believe facts not popular literature sources so I very much prefer collision over ramming.
About Finnish eye-wittnesses - yes, the big problem is [and I completelly agree with Dr. Morozov in this] that there are significant doubts that many Finnish historians prefer to use their own archive sources even. Instead they continue to base their info on literature sources which contains a lot of wrong info. As, for example, here - http://users.tkk.fi/~jaromaa/Navygallery/

You can post more detailed complainments of the pages at (for instance) Winter War & Continuation War section.

Seems to be that Mr. Tompuri doesn't know some Finnish combat reports

True, I don't know all the reports.

and bases his info on memoires and other Finnish literature sources, claiming and insisting such an info as "facts", instead to use original archive data.

/Juha

Rammten = rammed
(P-O Ekman Krigsvardag)

fact2.jpg (37.77 KiB) Viewed 3256 times

[Janne]

To BP: first a sincere and curious question: does Dr Morozov give any background into the background of the translated combat report ("Taistelukertomus", I presume? There were numerous paragraphs in the September 1944 peace agreement and many of them applied to the Finnish Navy, but i cannot easily think of any that would've obliged the Finns to provide the Soviets with copies of their sub captains' combat reports. There are plenty of accounts of how the Allied (read: Soviet) Control Commission acted and interpreted how those paragraphs were to be implemented in practise, but I cannot recall (or indeed find) anything about this. Does Morozov really say the report he quotes was handed over in 1944-45 or that it was translated by (Finnish) Finns?

Second, a friendly opinion from a native Finnish speaker: "yhteentörmäys" is a word that can be equally well used to describe the result of a ramming as that of an unintentional, unavoidable or indeed unforeseen collision. In fact there is no better word for the former and we must simply accept that in this particular case no amount of close reading or linguistic analysis can bring us one percent closer to full 100% proof truth.

Third, I'm not quite sure whether it is only you or also Dr Morozov who seem to make a big deal about how "Finns believe to their own "canonical" myths till now and don't pay attention to correct them" and how "Finns don't want to recognize some of their historical info as myths. They are always right." Anyway, the truth is darker than that: there is and has been no study or research into the subs' activity, including their true or alleged victories, after P-O. Ekman (who was a Navy veteran, not a professional or academic historian) for the simple fact that there hasn't been a single historian who would've had the interest and the time (read: the money) to do any orginal work. There hasn't been a single enthusiastic ameteur or hobbyist, either, who would've done any independent research in the archives. It puzzles me why you (and Dr Morozov) aren't aware of this and purport to see things that IMHO really aren't there.

[Hakkapeliitta1630]

This combat record is made in handwriting by my grandfather, the 1st officer of Vetehinen, who was in command when Vetehinen rammed the Russian submarine. Yes, rammed purposefully because there were no other options at that moment. The whole incident has been hushed down because the captain was under deck in somewhat indisposed condition. So the records are quite unclear and general because fellow officers wanted to shield their colleague. Now when they are all dead, I can assure that my source (grandfather) is quite reliable. My other grandfather was the captain of Sisu, the submarine tender and he confirmed the facts.

[Juha Tompuri]

Hakkapeliitta,
Thank you for the interesting information, and welcome to the Forum.
Here is the your grandfather written combat report in Russian:
http://radikal.ru/F/i008.radikal.ru/080 ... 6.jpg.html
Source the same as the one mentioned later at my post.

There were numerous paragraphs in the September 1944 peace agreement and many of them applied to the Finnish Navy, but i cannot easily think of any that would've obliged the Finns to provide the Soviets with copies of their sub captains' combat reports. There are plenty of accounts of how the Allied (read: Soviet) Control Commission acted and interpreted how those paragraphs were to be implemented in practise, but I cannot recall (or indeed find) anything about this. Does Morozov really say the report he quotes was handed over in 1944-45 or that it was translated by (Finnish) Finns?

Check the post 16.02.08 15:20 at this site:
http://www.brummel.borda.ru/?1-14-0-00000005-000-120-0

Regards, Juha

[Mangrove]

From Archipelago Sea Coastal Brigade's war diary.
http://digi.narc.fi/digi/fullpic.ka?kuid=3617364

10.57 p.m. Vetehinen sunk enemy C-class submarine at grid 134 c 84, [...] and finally by ramming [it].

2257. Upotti suv. Vetehinen vih. C-luokan suv:n 134 c 84:ssä, [...] ja lopuksi ajamalla päälle.