John T wrote:I can agree that the tug and its barges would be closer but each such combo would need some leeway to the next or you'd risk a terrible mid-channel spagetti-carbonara!
Well, that gets interesting. The actual German description for the tows in the Schleppezüge was in groups of three "nebeneinander" or literally "next to each other". I also thought by that they meant towing in line ahead, but in German I think that would be something like "ein nach dem anderen" or something?
No if they are literally "side by side" then of course that makes them more stable and simplifies the problem of beaching them, but it also makes for a larger target. And it also makes it much harder to tow them given the additional bow resistance. But if they were towed line ahead then how were they to get them to the beach side by side? And they would of neccessity not be able to do close tows as in a river or canal, since the swells alone would cause that to be problematic, but the problem of control increases as the distance between the tows increases, the tug would have literally no control over the last barge in the troika.
See the problems that the Heer conveniently chose not to worry about?
Andreas wrote:Would you elaborate on this?
I got the impression, that the assult should be spread out over a number of beaches. Much more dispersed than during D-Day.
So concentration in time was more important than concentration i space.
It is while forming up that you'd really need the space to manouver.
The first wave schematically was (note the number of MS, RB, and VP is approximate):
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt
16.Armee — Generaloberst Ernst Busch
XIII.Armee-Korps (Folkestone-Dungeness/New Romney) General Heinrich-Gottfried von Vietinghoff genannt Scheel
Schleppverband 1 (Dunkirk)
Minensuchflottille 3 (8 minesweepers, M15-19, 22, 29, and 30)
Räumbootsflottille 11 (8)
Vorpostenflottille 3 (8 V301-308)
Schleppzüge: 75 (each towing three barges)
Geleitzug 1 (Ostende)
Minensuchflottille 16 (9 minesweepers, M1601-1609)
Dampfer: 8 (planned 15)
Prähme: 16 (planned 30)
Motorboote: 16 (planned 30)
Schleppverband 2 (Ostende)
Räumbootsflottille 3 (8 R33-R40)
Vorpostenflottille 2 (8 V201-208)
Schleppzüge: 24 (each towing three barges)
Geleitzug 2 (Rotterdam)
Minensuchflottille 4 (still organizing and only three operational, M1, 2, and 36)
4./Bau-Lehr-Regiment z.b.V. 800 Brandenburg (direct assault on Dover)
Kp./Bau-Lehr-Regiment z.b.V. 800 Brandenburg
1./Bau-Lehr-Regiment z.b.V. 800 Brandenburg (131 men with m/c)
Tauchpanzer-Abteilung ‘D’ (minus one company)
VII.Armee-Korps (Rye-Hastings) Generaloberst Eugen Ritter von Schobert
Schleppverband 3 (Calais)
Minensuchflottille 1 (5 minesweepers, M3, 4, 6-8)
Minensuchflottille 32 (28 converted fishing boats, M3200-3227)
Räumbootsflottille 4 (12 R41-R52)
Vorpostenflottille 7 (8 V701-708)
Schleppzüge: 99 (each towing three barges)
Geleitzug 3 (Antwerpen)
Minensuchflottille 15 (8 converted trawlers, M1501-1508)
Dampfer: 57 (planned 50)
Prähme: 114 (planned 100)
Motorboote: 14 (as planned)
I./Bau-Lehr-Regiment z.b.V. 800 Brandenburg (-) (presumed)
9.Armee — Generaloberst Adolf Strauss
XXVIII.Armee-Korps (Bexhill-Eastbourne/Beachy Head) General Erich von Manstein
Schleppverband 4 (Boulogne)
Minensuchflottille 2 (4 minesweepers, M9, 10, 12, and 13)
Minensuchflottille 18 (8 converted trawlers, M1801-1808)
Räumbootsflottille 2 (9 R25-R32)
Vorpostenflottille 15 (8 V1501-1508)
Vorpostengruppe 16 (3 Schiff 9, 18, and 37)
Vorpostengruppe 18 (3 Schiff 7, 27, and 27)
Schleppzüge: 164 (each towing four barges)
11./Bau-Lehr-Regiment z.b.V. 800 Brandenburg (two teams with 110 men on m/c, assigned to destroy the battery and radio station at Beachy Head)
11./Bau-Lehr-Regiment z.b.V. 800 Brandenburg (one team of 48 men on m/c)
VIII.Armee-Korps (Beachy Head/Selsey Bill-Brighton) General Walter Heitz
Schleppverbandverband 5 (Le Havre)
Räumbootsflottille 1 (8 R17-R24)
Vorpostenflottille 4 (8 V401-408)
Vorpostenflottille 13 (13 V1301-1308)
Vorpostenflottille 20 (8 V2001-2008)
Schlepper: 25 (each towing three barges)
Geleitzug 4 (Le Havre)
Minensuchflottille 12 (5 converted trawlers, M601-605)
Dampfer: 25 (as planned)
Prähme: 50 (as planned)
Geleitzug 5 (Le Havre)
Minensuchflottille 14 (8 converted trawlers, M1401-1408)
Dampfer: 25 (as planned)
Prhme: 50 (as planned)
X. Armee-Korps – General der Artillerie Christian Hansen
You easily accept the fact that these barges where hard to navigate cross the channel, since it supports you view that seelöve where impractical but you seems unwilling to accept the consequence to those who should try to navigate these barges and to those who should bomb them.
Er, unpowered barges don't "navigate" they get towed. And of course it was problematical, the barges were designed for towing on canals, rivers, and coastal waters, not the open sea and not with a cargo of people and animals.
If you would please try to look at the physical reality rather than trying to score point with rethorics you might see it.
A bomb exploding in water damage a ship in a radius of a few meters.
A convoy is dispersed as a target from bombing attack if the ships are a few hundred of meters from each other.
But they cannot be, since about three-quarters of the vessels are in tow, with minimal maneuverability. The towing vessel itself could be a hundred yards away from the closest barge, but they cannot be hundereds of yards from each other too, it simply becomes impossible to navigate at then.
And who is watching out for the hundreds of yards of towline in all this? And how easily can a towline be severed by a bomb fragment?
Gotta go, beer beckons. Or maybe ine. Later.