How did war in the Far East affect the Middle East?

[JonS]

p127

[JonS]

p128

[Andreas]

Thanks a lot for posting these Jon.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Hmm, yes, I forgot to include the Australian clause which I named in my other post. As I understand it, Australian units in the Middle East were under a number of political restrictions regarding their use already prior to Dec 7th. The 9th Division, for example, had been withdrawn from Tobruk by the time of Crusader, and AFAIK there were no major Australian units present for Operation Crusader. Which is probably why the Commonwealth OOB site lists their locations as Syria and Palestine

I think this is an artificial distinction, which would not have mattered much to Middle East Command, which after all was responsible for the whole area, and needed to find resources to secure all of it. If they did not have the Aussies to look after Syria/Iraq, they would need somebody else to do it, so overall the departure was a net loss at a critical moment. (aside - 2/13 Battalion participated in the breakout at Ed Duda, they could not be withdrawn due to a change of allocation of the Polish officer legion).

Also, political restrictions change - there is for me no way of knowing if, had the request been made to use I Australian Corps in ACROBAT, this would have been turned down. Maybe an Australian member can comment? But even if it had been, the simple availability of the Australian forces would have freed up non-Australian forces for ACROBAT.

One distraction which no longer applied by late 1941 was the recently-ended East African campaign, which allowed for the transfer of the 1st South African division and the 4th Indian division to Egypt. Also, with the Red Sea no longer a war zone naval assets in Aden were freed up for use elsewhere.

But this was a long time before, and the divisions and assets had been used (and in the case of 1st SA heavily damaged) in CRUSADER. 4th Indian was in the line with two brigades at Benghazi and Derna, and another guarding Tobruk. The naval assets freed up from this also had been used for a while. East Africa no longer mattered one way or the other by the turn of the year.

Whichever way you turn this, the outbreak of a shooting war in the Far East had a very considerable negative impact on the fortunes of the North African campaign. Had this not happened, it is quite likely that the course of the campaign would have been considerably different, and it may well have finished with the internment of Axis forces in Tunisia in March 1942.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

BTW - a topic split maybe useful in developing this discussion further.

All the best

Andreas

[Jon G.]

BTW - a topic split maybe useful in developing this discussion further.

Done. I wanted a longer title, but the forum software wouldn't let me.

I do not wish to be forced into a debating position where you make it appear as if I'm claiming that the Far East had no impact whatsoever on British/Commonwealth strategy in the Middle East. In response to my original point that Axis bombing campaigns against Malta coincided with improved Axis fortunes in North Africa you put forward that Britain was distracted in the Far East at the same time. That I do not reject.

I do however maintain that Axis war fortunes in North Africa do not directly correlate with events in the Far East, any more than bombing Malta did. Also, the Far East was a drain on British resources prior to December 7th.

Distractions apply all round. Yes, the British were distracted in the Far East and elsewhere, but then the Italians were also distracted in Greece, and the Germans were distracted in the Soviet Union. In fact, the German decision to attack the USSR affected the size of the German commitment to the Mediterranean right from the beginning.

[Andreas]

BTW - a topic split maybe useful in developing this discussion further.

Done. I wanted a longer title, but the forum software wouldn't let me.

I do not wish to be forced into a debating position where you make it appear as if I'm claiming that the Far East had no impact whatsoever on British/Commonwealth strategy in the Middle East.

I am not intending to force you into anything, let alone a stance that is not sensible. I just think it is an interesting topic that we can all learn from, which is why I am pursuing the debate.

I do however maintain that Axis war fortunes in North Africa do not directly correlate with events in the Far East, any more than bombing Malta did. Also, the Far East was a drain on British resources prior to December 7th.

Here I disagree - at the turn of the year 42/43, the distraction in the Far East had a far more significant impact than bombing Malta, especially considering the other two events (Force K and Alexandria X MAS) not relating to the bombing of Malta, which altered the naval balance completely.

Distractions apply all round. Yes, the British were distracted in the Far East and elsewhere, but then the Italians were also distracted in Greece, and the Germans were distracted in the Soviet Union. In fact, the German decision to attack the USSR affected the size of the German commitment to the Mediterranean right from the beginning.

Of course. But that's not what I am interested in since it is all bygones at this point in time. By the end of 42, the active Greek campaign was history, and the invasion of the SU had been going on for half a year. The Germans and Italians had settled into this, and were about to be beaten very badly in Cyrenaica. The entirely new factor was the shooting war in the Far East starting on 7 December, and this materially altered things in Africa, leading to a rise of Axis fortunes in the first half of 42, starting with a rout in western Cyrenaica in January and culminating in the rout on the Gazala line in June.

Without the war in the Far East, Luftflotte 2 bombing Malta would have struggled to rescue anything in North Africa, let alone allow such a complete transformation of the campaign. It is therefore my view that the war in the Far East is a critical element in this, of higher importance than bombing Malta.

All the best

Andreas

[Jon G.]

I am not intending to force you into anything, let alone a stance that is not sensible. I just think it is an interesting topic that we can all learn from, which is why I am pursuing the debate.

Fair enough. It is indeed an interesting question. The problem is that it's difficult to come up with definite answers without moving into pure speculation about what might have happened.

I do however maintain that Axis war fortunes in North Africa do not directly correlate with events in the Far East, any more than bombing Malta did. Also, the Far East was a drain on British resources prior to December 7th.

Here I disagree - at the turn of the year 42/43, the distraction in the Far East had a far more significant impact than bombing Malta, especially considering the other two events (Force K and Alexandria X MAS) not relating to the bombing of Malta, which altered the naval balance completely.

Well, the actions of Force K and its subsequent de-commissioning by minefield rather underline the importance of Malta (not the importance of bombing Malta cf. the original thread) with regards to the war in North Africa. As can be seen from my namesake's scans, the recent outbreak of war in the Far East meant that Cunningham couldn't expect replacements for his lost battleships.

Ideally, that should swing the naval balance over to the Italians - however, the Regia Marina was not able to capitalize on the advantage gained, in part because they did not know for sure how much damage the Decima Mas raid had caused, in part because they didn't have ample air cover for their ships, and in part because they did not have enough fuel oil for offensive action while maintaining convoys for North Africa at the same time. The net result was that the Italians found it necessary to provide very heavy escorts for their late 1941/early 1942 convoys for North Africa.

Distractions apply all round...

Of course. But that's not what I am interested in since it is all bygones at this point in time. By the end of 42, the active Greek campaign was history, and the invasion of the SU had been going on for half a year. The Germans and Italians had settled into this, and were about to be beaten very badly in Cyrenaica. The entirely new factor was the shooting war in the Far East starting on 7 December, and this materially altered things in Africa, leading to a rise of Axis fortunes in the first half of 42, starting with a rout in western Cyrenaica in January and culminating in the rout on the Gazala line in June...

Well, I would contend that Wavell was at least as distracted in early/mid 1941 as Auchinleck was in late 1941. Wavell had his hands full with Greece, Crete, North Africa, East Africa and an Iraqi rebellion and the subsequent Operation Exporter just to keep him busy. Unlike the Far East, these were all trouble zones which fell inside Wavell's purview, directly affecting the forces already under his command, rather than scheduled reinforcements.

But in the end it didn't matter much, for the Germans had already relegated the Mediterranean to secondary status through their decision to attack the Soviet Union. If you view the Mediterranean theatre through the lens of other theatre distractions you can arrive at any outcome you want.

[Andreas]

Well, the actions of Force K and its subsequent de-commissioning by minefield rather underline the importance of Malta (not the importance of bombing Malta cf. the original thread) with regards to the war in North Africa. As can be seen from my namesake's scans, the recent outbreak of war in the Far East meant that Cunningham couldn't expect replacements for his lost battleships.

Minor point - the battleships were of course based in Alexandria.

Ideally, that should swing the naval balance over to the Italians - however, the Regia Marina was not able to capitalize on the advantage gained, in part because they did not know for sure how much damage the Decima Mas raid had caused, in part because they didn't have ample air cover for their ships, and in part because they did not have enough fuel oil for offensive action while maintaining convoys for North Africa at the same time. The net result was that the Italians found it necessary to provide very heavy escorts for their late 1941/early 1942 convoys for North Africa.

I'd say the net result was that the Italians got through with their convoys in December/January. Force K was looking for M.42 (which was quite brazen, really) when they ran on the mine barrier, and I think it is clear that the M.43 convoy would have been attacked had Cunningham had any heavy units available, with potential consequences for the 100% delivery rate of the month. Holding on to 80 or so Blenheims and to the Cyrenaica airfields would also have given the RAF a good chance to give convoys a bit of a pounding.

Well, I would contend that Wavell was at least as distracted in early/mid 1941 as Auchinleck was in late 1941. Wavell had his hands full with Greece, Crete, North Africa, East Africa and an Iraqi rebellion and the subsequent Operation Exporter just to keep him busy. Unlike the Far East, these were all trouble zones which fell inside Wavell's purview, directly affecting the forces already under his command, rather than scheduled reinforcements.

Absolutely.

But in the end it didn't matter much, for the Germans had already relegated the Mediterranean to secondary status through their decision to attack the Soviet Union.

Not correct in my view - in the end it mattered a lot. Without these distractions, Rommel's first dash across Cyrenaica is very unlikely to have succeeded.

If you view the Mediterranean theatre through the lens of other theatre distractions you can arrive at any outcome you want.

I think that is a matter of mental self-discipline when approaching these things. There are some clear cause/effect relationships at work here albeit in a multi-factor environment. Trying to develop these will help us understand why things happened. Trying to do that is not the same as saying 'If Raeder had had his way, and the Germans had postponed Barbarossa, they could have been in Afghanistan by end-1942'.

All the best

Andreas

[Michael Emrys]

I think one thing should be clear. If all the reinforcements slated for the ME had reached there, and none of the withdrawals had taken place, the Gazala battles might have been a much tougher go for Rommel. It might also have been possible that Auchinleck would have preempted him, though how those battles would have worked out is unknowable.

Michael

[Andreas]

I think one thing should be clear. If all the reinforcements slated for the ME had reached there, and none of the withdrawals had taken place, the Gazala battles might have been a much tougher go for Rommel. It might also have been possible that Auchinleck would have preempted him, though how those battles would have worked out is unknowable.

Michael

I don't think there would ever have been Gazala battles. The decision by PAA to attack out of the el Agheila line was based on the analysis of the temporary weakness of the 8th Army. Had that weakness not been the case, I think it is highly unlikely the attack would have taken place, or if it had, would have been successful.

All the best

Andreas

[Jon G.]

Regarding the battleships lost at Alexandria, note that they were only lost in the wake of the first battle of Sirte - that is, after the first Italian battleship convoy.

...

Well, I would contend that Wavell was at least as distracted in early/mid 1941 as Auchinleck was in late 1941. Wavell had his hands full with Greece, Crete, North Africa, East Africa and an Iraqi rebellion and the subsequent Operation Exporter just to keep him busy. Unlike the Far East, these were all trouble zones which fell inside Wavell's purview, directly affecting the forces already under his command, rather than scheduled reinforcements.

Absolutely.

But in the end it didn't matter much, for the Germans had already relegated the Mediterranean to secondary status through their decision to attack the Soviet Union.

Not correct in my view - in the end it mattered a lot. Without these distractions, Rommel's first dash across Cyrenaica is very unlikely to have succeeded.

The problem with that line of reasoning is that we can't allow ourselves to presume all other factors to be equal if we pick one, or even several, 'distractions' out of the equation. At the very least, we should try and keep speculative outcomes seperate from actual outcomes.

The Iraqi coup, for example, in part happened because of Rommel's apparent success in Cyrenaica. Rommel, in turn, can be credited with a certain opportunism - that is, he decided to defy his orders and push far beyond Benghazi exactly because the British were busy elsewhere at the same time.

If you view the Mediterranean theatre through the lens of other theatre distractions you can arrive at any outcome you want.

I think that is a matter of mental self-discipline when approaching these things. There are some clear cause/effect relationships at work here albeit in a multi-factor environment. Trying to develop these will help us understand why things happened. Trying to do that is not the same as saying 'If Raeder had had his way, and the Germans had postponed Barbarossa, they could have been in Afghanistan by end-1942'.

I agree that with some self-restraint exploring what-ifs can be very satisfying. We can also safely explore to which extent war in the Far East affected British decision-making in the Middle East, and we can attempt to quantify which forces were diverted away from the Middle to the Far East, as you and JonS have done.

We can't, however, predict what might have happened if there had not been a war in the Far East. In fact, even determining what is cause and what is effect is difficult. You could, for example, reasonably claim that part of the Japanese decision to reach for British colonial possessions in the Far East was the fact that Britain already had her hands full in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

[Michael Emrys]

The decision by PAA to attack out of the el Agheila line was based on the analysis of the temporary weakness of the 8th Army. Had that weakness not been the case, I think it is highly unlikely the attack would have taken place, or if it had, would have been successful.

But was the weakness at that exact point in time due to withdrawals from the Middle East? I thought it was due to the forces that had fought CRUSADER mostly being depleted and exhausted, with many of the more experienced units being pulled out of the line and rotated back to the Delta for refitting. Also ISTR there was a measure of incompetence in the deployment of the forces in nearest proximity to the Axis.

Michael

[JonS]

A bit of both I think Michael. The forces that took over at EA were fairly fresh to the desert (read: inexperienced and undertrained), and at the end of a nasty supply line which greatly restricted their size and strength. Also, IIRC, the armd vehs the fresh warm bodies took over around EA were fairly shagged by the time they got them. All in all, an almost exact mirror of 12 months earlier.

Although the ground forces in the diverted convoys wouldn't have been in action by the time PAA struck again in late Jan, the airforces and naval forces would have been available. Also, the withdrawal of 7th Armd Bde had a fairly substantial effect (although, of course, they were already out of the line and back in the Delta). Too, the NZ and Australian forces off in Syria may have been available closer to the Western Desert had other forces not already been moved or moving out of the theatre.