Supplying Bataan...

[phylo_roadking]

Can anyone point me to a Net resource or article listing/detailing any attempts to run supplies to the beleagured US and Philippino Forces on Bataan before the Surrender? I'm assuming there weren't any "air bridge" attempts, but I could stand to be proved wrong on that too.

Or post any info you have here?

Or to a good standalone history of the conquest of the Philippines, particularly concentrating on the naval and air campaigns...(in english)...

[mars]

hi, try John W. Whitman's excellent book "Bataan: Our Last Ditch : The Bataan Campaign, 1942"
http://www.amazon.com/Bataan-Last-Ditch ... 230&sr=1-1

[phylo_roadking]

Per review -

It appears to be the only such treatment of forgotten period of American military history

I can agree with that! Thanks for the link

[Michael Emrys]

I don't think there was any attempt to run supplies to Bataan before the forces there surrendered. There were supposed to be dumps on the peninsula sufficient for the troops to hold out for some length of time, but MacArthur neglected to move them into position before hostilities broke out and there wasn't time to do so afterwards, so most of them went up in smoke or were captured by the Japanese.

Michael

[mars]

Michael, there was some attempts via either block runner or submarine, but most did not get through. Col Whitman has some very detail account relates to this in his excellent book

[South]

Good morning all,

Re the blocked quote "forgotten period of American military history";

In a SMITHSONIAN Magazine article of March, 2004, titled "In Their Footsteps", author Donovan Webster writes:

The story of Bataan is one of those episodes in American history many are reluctant to acknowledge,..." (pg 82).

The Bataan prison was at Camp O'Donnell. It was the worst US Army experience since the Confederate Army's Andersonville prison camp during the US Civil War.


Warm regards,

Bob

[James A Pratt III]

The book "Destination Corregidor" deals with all the attempts to run supplies into Bataan ect.

[phylo_roadking]

Ah! Thanks James

[Gaijinaho]

hard earned cash Phylo, try reading this:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... ntents.htm

IIRC, it should have many of the details you are searching for.
Later, gaijinaho

[Michael Emrys]

hard earned cash Phylo, try reading this:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... ntents.htm

IIRC, it should have many of the details you are searching for.
Later, gaijinaho

A quick scan of that source did not turn up anything that would pertain to Phylo's original question. Indeed, the narrative ends just at the point that Bataan is occupied by the defending forces.

Michael

[veevee]

Greetings, maybe these specific links within that same resource would help.

Running the blockade
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 2.htm#p390

Food and Clothing
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 1.htm#p367

Status of Supply
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 5.htm#p254

-victor

[Delta Tank]

Michael and all,

Michael wrote: I don't think there was any attempt to run supplies to Bataan before the forces there surrendered. There were supposed to be dumps on the peninsula sufficient for the troops to hold out for some length of time, but MacArthur neglected to move them into position before hostilities broke out and there wasn't time to do so afterwards, so most of them went up in smoke or were captured by the Japanese.

This from Command Decisions, which can be found here: http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_06.htm

"To support the movement to Bataan a new plan of supply was quickly drawn. Under War Plan ORANGE the movement of supplies to Bataan was to begin immediately on the outbreak of war and continue until the depots and warehouses there had been stocked with sufficient supplies to sustain a garrison of 43,000 men for six months. When MacArthur substituted for ORANGE his order to fight it out on the beaches, this supply plan was canceled. The supplies earmarked for Bataan under ORANGE therefore went to advance depots and railheads behind the beaches. When MacArthur ordered a return to ORANGE, many of the supplies needed on Bataan were scattered, and no measures had yet been taken to move them to Bataan. MacArthur's decision left only seven days, until 1 January, when Manila was evacuated, in which to bring in the supplies, and instead of the 43,000 men provided for in ORANGE, the force withdrawing to Bataan would be closer to 80,000. This change in plans was destined to have a greater effect on the ability of the defenders to hold Bataan than any other phase of the operation.

The supply plan went into effect on the morning of 24 December, when General Marshall called the G-4 and the quartermaster into his office and told them of the decision to withdraw all troops on Luzon to Bataan and to evacuate Manila. Brig. Gen. Charles C. Drake, the quartermaster, was instructed to move his base of operations to Bataan immediately and to check on the reserves at Corregidor to be sure that there was enough to supply 10,000 men for six months. Small barges and boats required to move the supplies from Manila to Corregidor and Bataan were quickly gathered, and within twenty-four hours Corregidor was completely stocked with the supplies for a six-month campaign. At the same time, all supplies were immediately started on their way to Bataan by every available means-water, truck, and rail. Ammunition had already been stored in the peninsula, together with certain defense reserves including 300,000 gallons of gasoline, lubricating oil, and greases, and about 3,000 tons of canned meats and fish. [29] "

So as I read this the food got there but the number of men in the perimeter had doubled, but the amount of food had not. And remember Bataan and Corregidor held out for just about 5 months, (versus the planned 6 months) but the US did not fight their way back for another two and half years! so I doubt if enough supplies could of been placed on Battan to last that amount of time.

This comes from the book entitled "Fall of the Philippines"
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 5.htm#p254

"Full-scale movement of supplies to Bataan did not begin until the decision was made on 23 December to withdraw to Bataan. By that time the number of troops to be supplied during the siege of Bataan had increased from the planned 43,000 to almost 80,000, in addition to about 26,000 civilians who had fled to Bataan to escape the invading army. Moving to Bataan enough food and supplies to keep so large a force in action for a period of 180 days would have been extremely difficult under the most favorable circumstances. To accomplish it in about one week, during the confusion of war and retreat, proved to be an impossible task. (page 254)"

Discussions on the attempts to run the blockade can be found here:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_22.htm
Starting on page 390

"Only a very small portion of the supplies gathered so painfully and hoarded so carefully in the south ever reached Manila Bay. The total could not have been more than a few thousand tons. The Legaspi, with a capacity of 1,000 tons, was the first of the interisland steamers to make the journey safely. On 22 January she brought a cargo of rice and other food from Panay to Corregidor, and in February completed another trip. On 1 March, while she was on her third trip, she was sunk by a Japanese gunboat off the north coast of Mindoro and her crew captured.

Late in February the Princessa made the run from Cebu to Corregidor with a cargo of 700 tons of food. At Mindanao the 2,500 tons of rations and 2,000 rounds of 81-mm. ammunition from the Coast Farmer were transferred to the Elcano and Lepus. The first got through to Manila Bay, but the Lepus was captured off Palawan on 28 February. The cargoes of the Dona Nati and Anhui were loaded for transshipment at Cebu, but the ships failed to break through the tightening Japanese blockade. Ten of the interisland steamers were sunk by the enemy or scuttled by their crews to avoid capture, resulting in the loss of 7,000 tons of food, petroleum, and other miscellaneous supplies.25

In terms of supplies delivered to the battlefield, the blockade-running program from Australia and the Netherland Indies was a dismal failure. Of the 10,000 tons of rations which reached Mindanao and Cebu only about 1,000 tons-a four-day supply for the 100,000 soldiers and civilians on Bataan-reached Manila Bay. Even more distressing was the condition of the food when it finally reached the men. The containers in which the food was packed had broken open and the holds of the ships contained a miscellaneous pile of canned goods. All of it had to be sorted and repacked before it could be issued to the troops. Practically all the paper labels on the cans were destroyed so that they could not be identified without opening them. Flour and sugar sacks had broken open and the contents were spread loosely among the cans. Shovels had to be used to get these precious commodities back into new sacks. Onions and potatoes, piled on the decks during the voyage through tropical waters, were rotted and had to be destroyed almost before the eyes of the starving men. These "heart-breaking" conditions resulted in delays in unloading and, what was much worse, considerable loss of food to the weakened and hungry garrison.26"

Mike

[Michael Emrys]

Thanks, Mike. That's very close to the same information given in the links that veevee provided. I was mistaken to say that no attempts had been made to resupply Bataan. It appears though that such attempts as were made had negligible success.

Michael

[Delta Tank]

Michael,

Well they had a little success but obviously not enough, however there never was going to be enough. The defenders of the Philippines basically accomplished their mission and even if they would of held out for four more weeks, which would of made it 6 months, it really, in the end would not of matter. The Philippines were written off before the war and if (Big IF) the Japanese would of held off their attack until April of 1942, things would of been more difficult, but in the end they still would of won. Just too far away and we were just too unprepared.


Mike

[Michael Emrys]

Just too far away and we were just too unprepared.

Right. By sending B-17s to the Philippines, Roosevelt was trying to use the big stick technique to deter Japanese aggression. Instead, it turned out that the Japanese had a bigger stick—at least in local terms—and they called his bluff. They lost in the end, but it took a major effort and a lot of Allied blood to pull that off.

Michael