USSR artillery shell production

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Art » 07 Sep 2021 14:14

Soviet production of toluene (precursor for TNT) in 1941 (tons):

1.41 - 4057
2.41 - 4018
3.41 - 5383
4.41 - 5239
5.41 - 5941
6.41 - 5876
7.41 - 5766
8.41 - 5508
9.41 - 5634
10.41 - 4242
11.41 - 3130
12.41 - 3160
1.42 - 2763
2.42 - 2645
3.42 - 2880
4.42 - 2729
5.42 - 3513
6.42 - 3959
7.42 - 4002
8.42 - 3550
9.42 - 2907
10.42 - 2806
11.42 - 2617
12.42 - 2800

http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/ ... e/4/zoom/6

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Sep 2021 15:22

Thanks Art, this is great.

The time series would correspond with a ~50% decline in toluene production when Germany overran/threatened the Donbas in Fall 1941, then a partial recovery when Ukraine evacuations eased/reversed over the first winter/spring, then a ~30% decline when Ukraine and Rostov Oblast were lost to Blau.

I wonder to what extent it recovered in 43-44 or whether LL covered requirements.

Do you have monthly steel figures, btw?
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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Art » 07 Sep 2021 20:00

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Sep 2021 15:22
The time series would correspond with a ~50% decline in toluene production when Germany overran/threatened the Donbas in Fall 1941, then a partial recovery when Ukraine evacuations eased/reversed over the first winter/spring, then a ~30% decline when Ukraine and Rostov Oblast were lost to Blau.
That was a combined effect of a loss of Donbass coal and a decline in oil production. Toluene was produced either from coal as a byproduct of coke or by pyrolysis of kerosene or gasoil. Before the war the monthly theoretical capacity of coke production was about 3600 tons of toluene, of them about 2/3 in the Donbass basin and 1/3 in the Kuznetsk basin and Ural. Actual production was in average about 3000 tons in a month, so it could be increased by 20% in wartime. Capacity of oil pyrolysis factories was 3450 tons of toluene in a month. Only a small part was actually used before 1941, since the process was too costly. The mass output of toluene was about 3% and other products were of little economical value. So full capacity operation would consume more than 100,000 tons of kerosene monthly, and kerosene was needed elsewhere. On the other hand, unlike "coke", toluene production from kerosene could be strongly increased in wartime. It seems from the monthly figures that USSR switched to this option already in the first half of 1941, that is even before the war start.
In the autumn of 1941 the Donbass basin was lost irretrievably, which meant that monthly "coke" toluene production declined to about 900 tons compared with a peak level of 3300 tons (summer 1941). Kerosene-derived toluene production reached the peak level of 2900 tons in the autumn of 1941, but than dropped below 2000, most probably due to a deficit of kerosene. Partial recovery in the summer of 1942 probably resulted from an improved oil situation.
I wonder to what extent it recovered in 43-44 or whether LL covered requirements.
It didn't fully recover. Annual production:
1940 - 37,900 tons
1941 - 57,900
1942 - 38,100
1943 - 39,800
1944 - 38,300
1945 - 33,500
Oil and coal were principal bottlenecks, which couldn't be bypassed.
In 1942-44 Soviet industry produced 273,200 tons of TNT, which consumed 159,900 tons of toluene, including 64,000 tons from LL
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/nekot ... yny/viewer
That's in addition to 89,000 tons of TNT received from LL.

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Art » 08 Sep 2021 21:45

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Sep 2021 15:22
Do you have monthly steel figures, btw?
Sure, from the same source (thous. tons):
1.41 - 1844
2.41 - 1707
3.41 - 1964
4.41 - 1830
5.41 - 2022
6.41 - 1917
7.41 - 1662
8.41 - 1335
9.41 - 1113
10.41 - 818
11.41 - 670
12.41 - 646
1.42 - 627
2.42 - 549
3.42 - 648
4.42 - 671
5.42 - 743
6.42 - 731
7.42 - 751
8.42 - 736
9.42 - 687
10.42 - 707
11.42 - 636
12.42 - 680
Interestingly, the decline started before any important industrial regions were occupied, probably due to limited freight traffic.

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 10 Sep 2021 07:01

Art wrote:Before the war the monthly theoretical capacity of coke production was about 3600 tons of toluene, of them about 2/3 in the Donbass basin and 1/3 in the Kuznetsk basin and Ural.
Thanks, Art.
Art wrote:On the other hand, unlike "coke", toluene production from kerosene could be strongly increased in wartime. It seems from the monthly figures that USSR switched to this option already in the first half of 1941, that is even before the war start.
Yes a very clear ramping up of toluene in March 1941, around the time when Stalin couldn't ignore potential imminent war with Germany any longer (even if he refused to shade from potential to inevitable).
Art wrote:In the autumn of 1941 the Donbass basin was lost irretrievably, which meant that monthly "coke" toluene production declined to about 900 tons compared with a peak level of 3300 tons (summer 1941)
Not quite all of Donbas though - Voroshilovgrad, Khamensk-Shakhtinsky, Dovzhansk, and other centers of the greater industrial region remained in Soviet hands. Did coke toluene production revive at all in these centers prior to Blau? I ask because Mark Harrison's Soviet Planning in Peace and War has the following:
Of the
23,500 truckloads of equipment designated for removal from Voroshilovgrad district, however, only 8,600 got away by the end of July; the
remainder were trapped, along with trainloads of assets and workers
from the Donbass.184
...which implies that significant levels of industrial activity were still ongoing in the Eastern Donbas in early 1942, despite its proximity to the front. I also recall some GKO directives reversing 1941 evacuations of then-threatened areas though I can't recall or cite whether this specifically applied to the Eastern Donbas.
Art wrote:Oil and coal were principal bottlenecks, which couldn't be bypassed.
Art wrote:Sure, from the same source (thous. tons):
...
Interestingly, the decline started before any important industrial regions were occupied, probably due to limited freight traffic.


Thanks again for the stats. I'll try to parse my way through the source and its logarithmic translation function but I'm really at the mercy of experts like Mark Harrison and you for any insight into the Soviet economy.

From basic principles I'd guess that the immediate declines in steel output traced also to the SU's immediately conscripting ~5mil men, many of which must have come basic industry including transport and steel. Harrison in Soviet Planning discusses the SU's excessive draw on basic industry during the first year of war; my reading of Google's translation of GKO 675 is that it's consistent with Harrison's view.
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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 14 Sep 2021 16:02

An original copy of the 2 volume "Artillery Supply in the GPW" [Артиллерийское снабжение в Великой Отечественной войне 1941-45 гг.] can be found on this blog https://gercenovec.livejournal.com/ available to download
Tom 1: https://vk.com/doc28797168_543454556
Tom 2: https://vk.com/doc28797168_543978506

These are complete copies unlike the soldat version which is heavily editted.

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Art » 14 Sep 2021 22:32

Great, thanks.

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 14 Sep 2021 23:17

Der Alte Fritz wrote:
14 Sep 2021 16:02
An original copy of the 2 volume "Artillery Supply in the GPW" [Артиллерийское снабжение в Великой Отечественной войне 1941-45 гг.] can be found on this blog https://gercenovec.livejournal.com/ available to download
Tom 1: https://vk.com/doc28797168_543454556
Tom 2: https://vk.com/doc28797168_543978506

These are complete copies unlike the soldat version which is heavily editted.
Amazing. If there's a monthly output table in the book and someone could roughly state what the columns/row headings say, I'll enter the data into a spreadsheet and post it here.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 16 Sep 2021 07:07

Artillery Supply in GPW (original volume 1)
Contents:
Volume 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part 1: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN PRE-WAR PERIOD
Chapter 1 ARTILLERY SUPPLY MANAGEMENT BODIES, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEVICE OF OPERATIONAL AND MILITARY REARS, PERSONNEL TRAINING
Main Artillery Directorate. ... ... ... ... 18
Artillery supply service governing bodies. ... 33
Pre-war views on the organization of the operational and military rear of the active army ....... 43
Artillery supply training. ... ... 4 6

CHAPTER 2 ARTILLERY REAR BODIES, REPAIR ORGANIZATION WEAPONS AND ITS TECHNICAL CONDITION
Artillery bases and warehouses. .... 52
Armament repair organization. ... ... ... ... 70
The technical condition of the weapons. ... ... ... .78

Chapter 3 DEVELOPMENT OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND INSTRUMENTS DURING THE PRE-WAR
1. The state and development of artillery weapons in the first decade after the October Revolution ..... 88
2. The tasks of the technical re-equipment of the Red Army, the first system artillery weapons. ... ... ... ... ... 9 1
3. Artillery modernization. ... ... ... ... ... 94
4. Creation of new types of weapons during the first five-year plan……98
5. Development of ammunition and devices for artillery .113
6. Weapon system for 1934-1938 ... ... ... 117
7. Weapon system 1938. ... ... ... ... .135

CHAPTER 4 WEAPONS MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND AMMUNITION
1. Planning the production and consumption of weapons and ammunition 158
2. Planning mobilization reserves. ... ... .173
3. Mobilization planning in industry. ... 177
4. Development and state of mobilization planning and preparation of industry on the eve of the war. ... ... .184

CHAPTER 5 INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION SECURITY OF MOBILIZATION DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY ON THE EVE OF THE WAR
1 . Artillery supply and war production in the first decade the existence of the Soviet state .... 205
2. Production of weapons and ammunition in the first five-year plan. 209
3. The second military five-year plan. Production of weapons and ammunition in the period 1933-1937. .218
4. Production of weapons and ammunition in the third five-year plan (1938-1941). ... ... ... .225
5. The provision of the Red Army with weapons and ammunition on the eve Great Patriotic War . ... ... ... ... 245

Part 2: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN THE FIRST PERIOD WARS (JUNE 1941 - NOVEMBER 1942)
CHAPTER 6 REBUILDING OF THE SUPPLY APPARATUS IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT METHODS, ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING [289-322]
1. Reorganization of GAU. ... ... ... ... ... 284
2. Front-line (district), army and military command and control bodies artillery supply services .... 293
3. Changes in the structure of the operational and military rear. 300
4 Organization of accounting and reporting. ... ... ... ... 305
5. Training of personnel for artillery supplies. ... ... ... 309

CHAPTER 7: ACTIVITIES OF THE ARTILLERY REAR BODIES [322-349]
1. Mobilization and deployment of artillery bases and warehouses. 315
2. Evacuation and relocation of warehouses and bases. ... .319
3. Operational activities of bases and warehouses .... 325
4. Production activities of bases and ammunition depots. ... 331
5. Activity of bases and warehouses of rockets. ... 335
6. Repair of weapons ..... 340 [349]

CHAPTER 8: INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION [362-402]
1. Mobilization of industry and the transition to a new methodology for planning the supply of weapons and ammunition. ... 355 [362]
2. Evacuation of industrial enterprises, reduction of military capacity production. .... ... 361
3. Restoring the production of some types of weapons. 368
4. Adoption of new models of artillery pieces and ammunition ....... 369
5. Industrial supply of weapons and ammunition. 375

CHAPTER 9:PROVIDING THE OPERATING ARMY WITH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION [402-453]
1. Losses of weapons and ammunition ..... 392 [402]
2. The growth of the needs of the Red Army in weapons and ammunition and their satisfaction ....... 406
3. The use of imported and captured weapons. ... 435
4 Technical condition and operation of weapons. ... 436

CHAPTER 10: WESTERN FRONT ARTILLERY IN BATTLE UNDER MOSCOW [454- ]
1. General situation and arrangement of the operational rear. ... 444
2. Providing the Western Front with weapons. ... 447
3. Provision of ammunition ...... 459
4. Features and difficulties of supplying the Western Front with weapons and ammunition ....... 477

CHAPTER 11: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN DEFENCE BATTLE UNDER STALINGRAD
1. General environment ....... 483
2. Providing troops with weapons ..... 484
3. Provision of ammunition ...... 489
4. Features and difficulties of providing troops with weapons and ammunition 499
5. Collecting weapons on the battlefield and evacuating them. ... ... 503
6. Armament repair organization. ... ... ... ... 505

APPENDIX I. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 513
1. Organisation of GAU August 1917
2. Organisation of GAU June 1940 shtat 1/61
3. Unknown Characteristics of artillery weapons?
4. The main tactical and technical characteristics of small arms, which were in service with the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War
5. The most important tactical and technical characteristics of the main samples of guns and mortars, which were in service with the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War
6. Comparative characteristics of small arms of the Red Army and foreign models by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War ……528
7. Comparison of the main tactical and technical characteristics of the latest models of guns and mortars that were in the armament of the Red Army and the armies of the advanced capitalist countries by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War ………………..533
8. The provision of the Red Army with weapons as of January 1941 ……………542
9. The provision of artillery and mortar weapons in the border districts as of May 1, 1941 ...545
10. Organisation of GAU 5 January 1942
11. The number of weapons and instruments repaired by mobile repair units in 1941-1912
12. Map Battle of Moscow
13. Map Battle of Stalingrad
14. Contents ……………….545

Artillery Supply in GPW (original volume 2)
Volume 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART THREE: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN THE SECOND PERIOD WAR
Chapter 12: SITUATION ON THE FRONTS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1943
1. The November offensive of the Red Army and the encirclement of the Stalingrad group feasting of the Germans ......... 3
2. Provision of the fronts with artillery weapons and ammunition 4
3. Rear device ........ 8
4. Consumption of ammunition ....... 8
5. Weapon repair ... ... ... ... .11

Chapter 13: DEVELOPMENT OF ARTILLERY TECHNOLOGY IN 1943
1. Provision of weapons and ammunition at the fronts and the development of artillery equipment in 1943. ... ... ... ... .20

CHAPTER 14: PROVIDING THE ARMY WITH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION IN 1943
1. Armament resources - providing for the formations of n fronts. ... Thirty

Chapter 15: ARTILLERY SUPPLIES IN THE BATTLE FOR THE CAUCASUS
I. General environment ....... 36 39
2. The provision of weapons ...
3. Provision of ammunition and their separation 41
4. Delivery of ammunition and weapons 46
5. Ammunition consumption ... 49
6. Combat use of ammunition and artillery 49
7. Collection and evacuation to the rear of spent cartridges and capping 52
8. Repair of weapons

CHAPTER 16: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN OPERATION ON BREAKING THE BLOCKADE OF LENINGRAD (January 1943)
1. General environment ..... 61
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition. 62
3. Organization of the rear and separation of ammunition 4. Consumption of ammunition 63
5. Repair of weapons ....... 65
6. Industry of the besieged Leningrad .... 67

Chapter 17: ARTILLERY SUPPLIES IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK
1. General situation ........ 71
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition 72
3. Artillery rear services organization and separation of ammunition 74
4. Ammunition consumption ....... 77

Chapter 18: COMBAT SUPPLIES IN THE KIEV-ZHYTOMIR OPERATION
1. Artillery supply in the Kiev-Zhitomir operation and the operation for the liberation of Donbass ... 82

Chapter 19: WORK OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN 1943
1. Industry indicators ...... 89
2. Creation of new types of weapons and ammunition 91

Chapter 20: WORK OF THE ARTILLERY REARS IN 1943
1. Work and performance of bases and arsenals ..... 93

PART FOUR: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN 1944 AND IN THE FINAL PERIOD OF THE WAR
Chapter 21: PROVIDING THE ARMY WITH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION IN 1944 AND 1945
1. The situation with the resources of artillery supply to the beginning of the final victory in 1945 ........ 102

Chapter 22: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN OPERATIONS TO DESTROY THE GERMANS AT LENINGRAD
a. General situation ........ 108
b. Support of the operation with weapons ..... 110
c. Provision of ammunition and their separation Artillery rear services organization ..... 117
d. Ammunition consumption ........ 121
e. Losses, collection of weapons , evacuation and repair .... 124

CHAPTER 23: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN PROVIDING THE KORSUN-SHEVCHENKOVSKAYA OPERATION
1. General situation ........130
2. Provision of armies of the 2nd and 1st Ukrainian fronts with weapons 131
3. Provision of ammunition for the 2nd and 1st Ukrainian fronts 133
4. Artillery rear arrangement and control ... 137
5. Ammunition consumption ........ 140
6. Losses, collection of weapons, evacuation and repairs ....141

Chapter 24: ARTILLERY SUPPLIES IN OPERATIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF ODESSA AND CRIMEA
1. General situation ........ 145
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition .... 150
3. Artillery rear arrangement
4. Supply of Crimean partisans ......
5. Consumption of ammunition ........
6. Losses, collection of weapons, evacuation and repairs .... 157

Chapter 25: ARTS SUPPLY IN OPERATIONS TO DESTROY FINNISH TROOPS IN KARELIA
1. General situation ........166
2. Provision of the operation with weapons and ammunition
3. Ammunition consumption ........ 169

Chapter 26: ARTS SUPPLY IN THE BELARUSIAN OPERATION
1. General situation ........ 171
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition ....
3. Artillery rear arrangement ........
4. Ammunition consumption ........
5. Weapon repair. ....... 188

Chapter 27: ARTS SUPPLY IN OPERATIONS BREAKING THE GERMANS IN WESTERN UKRAINE
1. General environment ........
2. Providing the fronts with weapons and ammunition
3. Ammunition consumption. ... ... ... ... ...

Chapter 28: ARTS SUPPLY IN THE IASSY-CHISINAU OPERATION
1. General environment ........
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition ...
3. Artillery rear arrangement .....
4. Ammunition consumption. ... ... ...
5. Exit of weapons for repair during the operation. 21 1 21

Chapter 29: ARTS SUPPLY IN OPERATIONS TO DESTROY THE GERMANS IN THE BALTIC
1. General situation 217
2. Providing the fronts with weapons and ammunition
3. Artillery rear arrangement .....
4. Ammunition consumption .......
5. Losses, collection of weapons, evacuation and repair 229

Chapter 30: ARTS SUPPLY IN FINAL OPERATIONS 1944 AND RESULTS OF ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN 1944
1. General situation in the south ..... 234
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition ....
3. Artillery rear support ....
4. Ammunition consumption in the 4th quarter of 1944 in the South
5. Artillery supply in Petsamo- Kirkeves operation 245

Chapter 31: PROVIDING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION OF OPERATIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1945
1. General situation 260
2. East Prussian operation
3. Provision of weapons and ammunition for the Vistula-Oder operation 267
4. Support for the Budapest operation. ... ... ... 277
5. Support for the Vienna operation ...... 288

Chapter 32: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN BERLIN OPERATION
1. General environment 297
2. Providing artillery weapons 299
3. Provision of ammunition 302
4. Organization of the artillery rear 306
5. Consumption of ammunition and tractors 313

CHAPTER 33: PROVIDING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FOR THE FAR EAST TROOPS
1 Preparation of the operation, supply of weapons and ammunition 325

Chapter 34: THE SOVIET UNION FULFILLED ITS INTERNATIONAL DUTY
1. Armament of the armies of the socialist states in the West and East 337

Chapter 35: THE WORK OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CHIEF ARTILLERY DEPARTMENT AND THE ARSENALS, BASES AND FOUNDATIONS DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
1. Results of work during the Great Patriotic War 344

Chapter 36: TASKS OF THE SUPPLY SERVICE AFTER THE VICTORY END OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
I. Creation of a new weapons system 365

Appendix 1 Chiefs of artillery supply to fronts 385
Appendix 2 Chiefs of artillery supply to armies 387

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by rcocean » 20 Sep 2021 16:57

Thanks to Art and everyone for all the Great information. This is amazing.

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Supply of weapons and ammunition during the Great Patriotic War

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 30 Sep 2021 10:53

Clipped from: http://www.oboznik.ru/?p=11507

In the first weeks of the war, the fronts suffered significant losses of weapons and ammunition accumulated in the troops of the border military districts in the pre-war years. Most of the artillery and ammunition factories were evacuated from the threatened areas to the east.
The supply of weapons and ammunition by military factories in the south of the country has ceased. All this significantly complicated the production of weapons and ammunition and the provision of them to the active army and new military formations. The shortcomings in the work of the Main Artillery Directorate also had a negative effect on the supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops. GAU did not always know exactly the state of security of the front troops, since strict reporting on this service had not been established before the war. The table of urgent reports on ammunition was introduced at the end of 1941 , and on weapons - in April 1942.
Soon, changes were made to the organization of the Main Artillery Directorate. In July 1941, the Directorate for the supply of ground artillery weapons was formed, and on September 20 of the same year the post of chief of artillery of the Soviet Army was restored with the GAU subordinate to him. The chief of GAU became the first deputy chief of artillery of the Soviet Army. The adopted structure of the GAU did not change throughout the war and fully justified itself. With the introduction of the post of Chief of the Rear Services of the Soviet Army, close cooperation was established between the GAU, the headquarters of the Chief of the Rear Services of the Soviet Army and the Central Directorate of Military Communications.
The heroic labor of the working class, scientists, engineers and technicians at the military enterprises of the central and eastern regions of the country, the firm and skillful leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, local party organizations by the restructuring of the entire national economy on a war footing allowed the Soviet military industry to be released in the second half of 1941 30.2 thousand guns, including 9.9 thousand 76-mm and larger calibers, 42.3 thousand mortars (of which 19.1 thousand 82 mm and larger), 106.2 thousand machine guns , 89.7 thousand machine guns, 1.6 million rifles and carbines and 62.9 million shells, bombs and mines215. But since these deliveries of weapons and ammunition only partially covered the losses of 1941, the situation with the provision of the troops of the active army with weapons and ammunition continued to remain tense. It took a tremendous strain from the military industry, the work of the central rear services, the artillery supply service of the GAU in order to meet the needs of the fronts for weapons, and especially for ammunition.
During the period of the defensive battle near Moscow, due to the current production, which was growing continuously in the eastern regions of the country, they were primarily provided with weapons of the reserve pool of the Supreme Command Headquarters - the 1st shock, 20th and 10th armies, formed in the interior of the country and transferred to the beginning of the counter-offensive near Moscow to the Western Front. Due to the current production of weapons, the needs of the troops and other fronts that participated in the defensive battle and counteroffensive near Moscow were also satisfied.
Moscow factories carried out a great deal of work on the manufacture of various types of weapons in this difficult period for our country. As a result, the amount of weapons in the Western Front by December 1941 for some of its types increased from 50-80 to 370-640 percent. A significant increase in armament was also in the troops of other fronts.
During the counter-offensive near Moscow, a massive repair of out-of-order weapons and military equipment was organized in military repair shops, at enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region. And yet, the situation with the provision of troops during this period was so difficult that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief JV Stalin personally distributed anti-tank guns, machine guns, 76-mm anti-tank regimental and divisional guns between the fronts.
As military factories came into operation, especially in the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, and Kazakhstan, in the second quarter of 1942, the supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops began to noticeably improve. In 1942, the military industry supplied the front with tens of thousands of 76 mm and larger guns, over 100,000 mortars (82-120 mm), many millions of shells and mines.
In 1942, the main and most difficult task was to provide for the troops of the fronts operating in the Stalingrad area, in the great bend of the Don and in the Caucasus.
The consumption of ammunition in the defensive battle of Stalingrad was very high. So, for example, from July 12 to November 18, 1942, the troops of the Don, Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts spent: 7 610 thousand shells and mines, including about 5 million shells and mines by the troops of the Stalingrad Front216.
In view of the enormous workload of the railways with operational traffic, the transports with ammunition moved slowly and were unloaded at the stations of the front railway section (Elton, Dzhanybek, Kaisatskaya, Krasny Kut). In order to quickly deliver ammunition to the troops, two automobile battalions were assigned to the artillery supply department of the Stalingrad Front, which, in an extremely limited time, managed to transport over 500 wagons of ammunition.
The provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the Stalingrad Front was complicated by the continuous bombing by the enemy of the crossings across the Volga. As a result of enemy air raids and shelling, the artillery depots of the front and armies were often forced to change their deployment. The echelons were unloaded only at night. In order to disperse the supply railroad trains, ammunition was sent to army depots and their departments located near the railway, in volunteers, 5-10 cars each, and then to the troops in small car columns (10-12 vehicles), which usually followed different routes. This method of delivery ensured the safety of ammunition, but at the same time lengthened the delivery time for them to the troops.
The delivery of weapons and ammunition to the troops of other fronts operating in the Volga and Don areas during this period was less complicated and laborious. During the period of the defensive battle at Stalingrad, 5388 wagons of ammunition, 123 thousand rifles and machine guns, 53 thousand machine guns and 8 thousand guns were supplied to all three fronts.217.
Along with the current supply of troops, the rear services of the center, fronts and armies during the defensive battle at Stalingrad carried out the accumulation of weapons and ammunition. As a result of the work done, by the beginning of the counteroffensive, the troops were mainly provided with ammunition (Table 19).
Table 19
The provision of the troops of the three fronts with ammunition (in ammunition) as of November 19, 1942218
AmmunitionFrontStalingradDonskoySouthwestern


Rifle cartridges 3.0 1.8 3.2
Cartridges for pistols 2.4 2.5 1.3
Anti-tank rifle cartridges 1,2 1.5 1.6
Hand and anti-tank grenades 1.0 1.5 2.9
50mm mines 1.3 1.4 2.4
82 mm mines 1.5 0.7 2.4
120mm mines 1,2 1.3 2.7
Shots:
45 mm cannon 2.9 2.9 4.9
76-mm cannon regimental artillery 2.1 1.4 3.3
76-mm cannon divisional artillery 1.8 2.8 4.0
122 mm howitzer 1.7 0.9 3.3
122 mm cannon 0,4 2.2 -
152 mm howitzer 1,2 7.2 5.7
152-mm howitzer-cannon 1.1 3.5 3.6
203 mm howitzer - - -
37-mm anti-aircraft 2.4 3.2 5.1
76 mm anti-aircraft - 5.1 4.5
85 mm anti-aircraft - 3.0 4.2
A great deal of work on providing troops with ammunition during this period was done by the chiefs of the artillery supply services of the fronts: Stalingrad - Colonel A.I. Markov, Donskoy - Colonel N.M. Bocharov, South-West - Colonel S.G. Algasov, as well as a special group of officers GAU, headed by the deputy chief of GAU, Lieutenant-General of Artillery KR Myshkov, who died on August 10, 1942 during an enemy air raid on Stalingrad.
Simultaneously with the battles that unfolded on the banks of the Volga and in the Don steppes, the battle for the Caucasus began in the vast area from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. The supply of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (Northern and Black Sea groups) with weapons and ammunition was an even more difficult problem than at Stalingrad. The supply of weapons and ammunition was carried out in a roundabout way, that is, from the Urals and from Siberia through Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, Baku. Some transports went through Astrakhan, Baku or Makhachkala. The long route of ammunition transports (5170-5370 km) and the need for repeated transshipment of goods from rail to water and vice versa, or from rail to road and mountain-pack, greatly increased the time of their delivery to front and army warehouses. For example, transport No. 83/0418, sent on September 1, 1942 from the Urals to the address of the Transcaucasian Front, arrived at the destination only on December 1. Transport No. 83/0334 made the route from Eastern Siberia to Transcaucasia, equal to 7027 km. But, despite such huge distances, transports with ammunition regularly went to the Caucasus. For six months of hostilities, the Transcaucasian (North Caucasian) Front received about 2 thousand wagons of ammunition219.
The delivery of ammunition from the front-line and army depots to the troops defending the mountain passes and passes of the Caucasian ridge was very difficult. The main means of transportation here were army and troop pack companies. In the 20th Guards Rifle Division, which defended the Belorechensk sector, shells from Sukhumi to Sochi were fed by sea, then to the divisional warehouse by road, and to the regimental supply points by pack transport. For the 394th Infantry Division, ammunition was transported by U-2 aircraft from the Sukhumi airfield. In a similar way, ammunition was delivered for almost all divisions of the 46th Army.
The working people of Transcaucasia rendered great assistance to the front. Up to 30 mechanical factories and workshops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were involved in the manufacture of cases for hand grenades, mines and medium-caliber shells. From October 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, they manufactured 1.3 million cases of hand grenades, 1 million mines and 226 thousand shells. The local industry of Transcaucasia produced in 1942 4294 50-mm mortars, 688 82-mm mortars, 46 492 machine guns220.
The working class of besieged Leningrad labored heroically. The delivery of weapons and ammunition to the besieged city was extremely difficult, so their production on site was often critical. From September until the end of 1941 alone, the city's industry supplied the front with 12,085 submachine guns and signal pistols, 7682 mortars, 2,298 artillery pieces and 41 rocket launchers. In addition, the Leningraders produced 3.2 million shells and mines, over 5 million hand grenades.
Leningrad supplied weapons to other fronts as well. In the difficult days of November 1941, when the enemy was rushing to Moscow, by decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, 926 mortars and 431 76-mm regimental guns were sent to Moscow. Disassembled guns were loaded onto planes and sent to the Cherepovets station, where an artillery shop was equipped for their assembly. Then the assembled weapons were loaded onto platforms and transported by rail to Moscow. In the same period, Leningrad sent 39,700 76-mm armor-piercing shells to Moscow by air.
Despite the difficulties of the first period of the war, our industry steadily increased its output from month to month. In 1942, GAU received from military factories 125.6 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), 33.1 thousand 76 mm and larger guns without tank, 127.4 million shells without aviation and mines221, 2,069 thousand rockets222. This made it possible to fully replenish the combat losses of weapons and ammunition consumption.
Providing the troops of the active army with weapons and ammunition remained difficult in the second period of the war, which was marked by the beginning of a powerful counteroffensive by Soviet troops near Stalingrad. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts had 30.4 thousand guns and mortars, including 16,755 units of 76 mm caliber and above223, about 6 million shells and mines, 380 million rounds of small arms ammunition and 1.2 million hand grenades. The supply of ammunition from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU for the entire time of the counteroffensive and the elimination of the encircled enemy grouping was carried out continuously. From November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1943, the Stalingrad Front received 1,095 wagons of ammunition, Donskoy (from November 16, 1942 to February 2, 1943) - 1,460 wagons, South-West (from November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1942) - 1090 cars and the Voronezh Front (from December 15, 1942 to January 1, 1943) - 278 cars. In total, 3923 wagons of ammunition were supplied to four fronts for the period November 1942 - January 1943.
The total consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Stalingrad, starting on July 12, 1942, reached 9,539 wagons224 and had no equal in the history of previous wars. It amounted to a third of the ammunition consumption of the entire Russian army during the four years of the First World War and twice the ammunition consumption of both belligerents at Verdun.
A huge amount of weapons and ammunition had to be supplied during the second period of the war to the Transcaucasian and North Caucasian Fronts, which liberated the North Caucasus from the Nazi troops.
Thanks to the effective measures of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, the State Defense Committee, local party and Soviet bodies, the heroic labor of the working class in 1942, the production of weapons and ammunition increased significantly. This made it possible to increase their supplies to the troops. The increase in the number of weapons in the front troops at the beginning of 1943 in comparison with 1942 is shown in Table. twenty225.
Table 20
Armament Availability as of January 1, 1942, thous. Availability as of January 1, 1943, thous.

Rifles 2113.6 3151.4
Automatic machines 54.3 556.2
Machine guns (hand and easel) 54.3 123.0
Mortars (no 50mm) 10.5 57.0
Guns of all calibers 13.2 42,7
The hostilities that unfolded in 1943 posed new, even more difficult tasks for the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army in the timely accumulation and current supply of the front troops with weapons and ammunition.
The volume of deliveries of weapons and ammunition especially increased during the preparation for the battle of Kursk. Between March and July 1943, more than half a million rifles and machine guns, 31.6 thousand light and heavy machine guns, 520 large-caliber machine guns, 21.8 thousand anti-tank rifles, 12 326 guns and mortars were sent to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU , or a total of 3100 wagons of weapons226.
In preparation for the Battle of Kursk, the artillery supply agencies of the center, fronts and armies already had a certain amount of experience in planning the provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the active army. It was carried out as follows. Every month, the General Staff issued a directive, which indicated which front, in which queue, how much ammunition (in ammunition) and when to send. On the basis of these instructions, time sheets of urgent reports from the fronts and their applications, the GAU planned to send ammunition to the troops of the active army, based on their availability at the bases and warehouses of the NCO, production capabilities within a month, the security and needs of the fronts. When GAU did not have the necessary resources, it, in agreement with the General Staff, made adjustments to the established volume of ammunition distribution.
On the basis of this plan, the organizational and planning department of the GAU (headed by General P.P. Volkotrubenko) reported data on the release and dispatch of ammunition to the fronts and gave orders to the Ammunition Supply Directorate. The latter, together with TsUPVOSO, planned the dispatch of transports in terms of five days and informed the fronts of the numbers of transports, places and dates of their dispatch. As a rule, the dispatch of transports with ammunition to the address of the fronts began on the 5th and ended on the 25th of each month. This method of planning and sending ammunition to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of NPOs remained until the end of the war.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk (on July 1, 1943), the Central and Voronezh fronts had 21,686 guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 518 rocket launchers, 3,489 tanks and self-propelled guns227.
The large number of weapons in the troops of the fronts operating on the Kursk Bulge and the intensity of hostilities in the planned offensive operations demanded an increase in the supply of ammunition to them. During April - June 1943, the Central, Voronezh and Bryansk fronts received over 4.2 million shells and mines, about 300 million small arms ammunition and almost 2 million hand grenades (over 4 thousand cars). By the beginning of the defensive battle, the fronts were provided with: 76-mm rounds - 2.7-4.3 ammunition; 122 mm howitzer rounds - 2.4–3.4; 120 mm mines - 2.4-4; large caliber ammunition - 3-5 ammunition228. In addition, during the Battle of Kursk, 4,781 wagons (over 119 full-weight trains) of various types of ammunition were delivered to the aforementioned fronts from central bases and warehouses. The average daily supply of them to the Central Front was 51 cars, Voronezh - 72 cars and Bryansk - 31 cars229.
The ammunition consumption in the Battle of Kursk was especially high. In the period 5-12 July 1943 alone, the troops of the Central Front, repelling the fierce tank attacks of the enemy, used up 1,083 wagons of ammunition (135 wagons per day). The bulk falls on the 13th Army, which in eight days used up 817 wagons of ammunition, or 100 wagons per day. In just 50 days of the Battle of Kursk, three fronts spent about 10,640 wagons of ammunition (not counting rockets), including 733 wagons of ammunition for small arms, 70 wagons of ammunition for anti-tank rifles, 234 wagons of hand grenades, 3369 wagons of mines, 276 wagons shots of anti-aircraft artillery and 5950 carriages of shots of ground artillery230.
Artillery supply in the battle of Kursk was led by the chiefs of the artillery supply service of the fronts: Central - Colonel V.I.Shebanin, Voronezh - Colonel T.M. Moskalenko, Bryansk - Colonel M.V. Kuznetsov.
In the third period of the war, the provision of front troops with weapons and ammunition improved significantly. Already by the beginning of this period, the Soviet military industry could uninterruptedly supply them to the troops of the active army and new military formations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At the bases and warehouses of the GAU, significant stocks of guns, mortars, and especially small arms were created. In this regard, in 1944 the production of small arms and ground artillery pieces decreased somewhat. If in 1943 the military industry supplied the Soviet Army with 130.3 thousand guns, then in 1944 - 122.5 thousand. The supply of rocket launchers also decreased (from 3330 in 1943 to 2564 in 1944). Due to this, the production of tanks and self-propelled guns continued to grow (29 thousand in 1944 against 24 thousand in 1943).
At the same time, the supply of ammunition to the troops of the active army continued to be tense, especially with shells of 122 mm caliber and above, due to their high consumption. The total stocks of these ammunition decreased: for 122-mm rounds - by 670 thousand, for 152-mm shells - by 1.2 million, and for 203-mm shells - by 172 thousand.231
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the State Defense Committee, having considered the situation with the production of acutely deficient shells on the eve of decisive offensive operations, set the military industry the task of a radical revision of production programs for 1944 towards a sharp increase in the production of all types of ammunition, and especially scarce ones.
By the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, the production of ammunition in 1944 was significantly increased compared to 1943: especially 122-mm and 152-mm shells, 76-mm - by 3,064 thousand (9 percent), M-13 - by 385.5 thousand (19 percent) and M-31 shells - by 15.2 thousand (4 percent)232. This made it possible to provide the troops of the fronts with all types of ammunition in the offensive operations of the third period of the war.
On the eve of the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts had about 50 thousand guns and mortars, 2 million rifles and machine guns, 10 thousand machine guns233, 12.2 million shells and mines, 700 million ammunition for small arms and 5 million hand grenades, which amounted to 1-2 front-line ammunition. During the operation, these fronts were supplied with more than 1,300 wagons of all types of ammunition.234. There were no interruptions in their supply. However, due to the beginning of the early spring thaw on military highways and military supply routes, the movement of road transport became impossible, and the fronts began to experience great difficulties in transporting ammunition to the troops and to the firing positions of artillery. It was necessary to use tractors, and in some cases to attract soldiers and the local population on impassable road sections to carry shells, cartridges, grenades. Transport aircraft were also used to deliver ammunition to the cutting edge.
To provide ammunition for the tank formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front, advancing in the operational depth of the enemy's defense, Po-2 aircraft were used. On February 7 and 8, 1944, from the Fursy airfield, they delivered 4.5 million cartridges, 5.5 thousand hand grenades, 15 thousand 82- and 120-mm mines and 10 thousand 76- and 122 mm shells. Every day, 80–85 aircraft delivered ammunition to tank units, making three to four flights a day. In total, over 400 tons of ammunition were delivered to the advancing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.235.
Despite the great difficulties with the supply, the subunits, units and formations that participated in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation were fully provided with ammunition. Moreover, their consumption in this operation was relatively small. In total, the troops of the two fronts spent only about 5.6 million rounds, including 400 thousand anti-aircraft artillery shells, 2.6 million ground artillery shells and 2.56 million mines.
The provision of troops with ammunition and weapons was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: 1st Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery N.Ye. Manzhurin, 2nd Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery P.A.Rozhkov.
A huge amount of weapons and ammunition was required during the preparation and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation, one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. To fully equip the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts, which took part in it, in May - July 1944 were supplied: 6370 guns and mortars, over 10 thousand machine guns and 260 thousand rifles and machines236. By the beginning of the operation, the fronts had 2–2.5 ammunition for small arms, 2.5–5 ammunition for mines, 2.5–4 ammunition for anti-aircraft rounds, 3-4 ammunition for 76-mm shells, 2.5–5.3 ammunition for 122-mm howitzer shells, 3.0-8.3 ammunition for 152-mm shells.
Such a high supply of ammunition to the front forces has never been seen in any of the previously conducted strategic offensive operations. For the shipment of weapons and ammunition to the fronts of the base, warehouses and arsenals of NGOs worked at maximum load. The personnel of all levels of the rear, the workers of the railway transport did everything in their power to deliver weapons and ammunition to the troops in a timely manner.
However, in the course of the Byelorussian operation, due to the rapid detachment of troops from the bases, as well as due to the insufficiently high rates of restoration of the railway communications badly destroyed by the enemy, the supply of ammunition to the fronts was often complicated. Automobile transport worked with great stress, but could not alone cope with the huge volume of supply in the operational and military rear.
Even the relatively frequent advance of the head sections of front-line and army artillery depots did not solve the problem of timely delivery of ammunition to troops advancing in wooded and swampy terrain, in off-road conditions. The scattering of ammunition stocks along the front line and in depth also had a negative effect. For example, two warehouses of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front on August 1, 1944 were located at six points at a distance of 60 to 650 km from the front line. A similar situation was in a number of armies of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts. The advancing units and formations could not raise all the stocks of ammunition accumulated in them during the preparation of the operation. The military councils of the fronts and armies were forced to allocate a large number of motor vehicles for the collection and delivery of the ammunition remaining in the rear to the troops. For example, the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front allocated 150 vehicles for this purpose, and the head of the rear of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front - 60 vehicles and a working company of 120 people. On the 2nd Belorussian Front, in the Krichev and Mogilev regions, by the end of July 1944, ammunition stocks were at 85 points, and at the starting positions of the 1st Belorussian Front troops - at 100. The command had to transfer them by planes237. The abandonment of ammunition at the initial lines, firing positions of artillery and along the path of advance of units and formations led to the fact that the troops began to experience a shortage of them, although there was a sufficient amount of ammunition on the record in the fronts and armies.
The total consumption of ammunition of all calibers during the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was significant. But if we proceed from the large availability of weapons, then it was generally relatively small. During the operation, 270 million (460 cars) of ammunition for small arms, 2 832 thousand (1700 cars) mines, 478 thousand (115 cars) anti-aircraft artillery rounds, about 3434.6 thousand (3656 cars) ground rounds artillery238.
The supply of troops with ammunition during the Belarusian offensive operation was led by the chiefs of artillery supply of the fronts: 1st Baltic - Major General of Artillery A.P. Baikov, 3rd Belorussian - Major General of Engineering Service A.S. Volkov, 2nd Belorussky - Engineer-Colonel E. N. Ivanov and 1st Belorussky - Major General of Engineering Service V. I. Shebanin.
The consumption of ammunition in the Lvov-Sandomierz and Brest-Lublin offensive operations was also significant. In July and August, the 1st Ukrainian Front used 4,706 wagons, and the 1st Belorussian Front - 2372 wagons of ammunition. As in the Byelorussian operation, the supply of ammunition was fraught with serious difficulties due to the high pace of the offensive of the troops and their large separation from the artillery depots of the fronts and armies, poor road conditions and the large volume of supplies, which fell on the shoulders of road transport.
A similar situation developed in the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, which took part in the Jassy-Kishinev operation. Before the start of the offensive, two to three ammunition sets were concentrated directly in the troops. But in the course of breaking through the enemy's defenses, they were not completely used up. The troops moved quickly forward and took with them only the ammunition that their road transport could lift. A significant amount of ammunition remained in divisional depots on the right and left banks of the Dniester. Due to the great length of the military routes, their supply stopped two days later, and five or six days after the start of the offensive, the troops began to feel a great need for ammunition, despite their low consumption. After the decisive intervention of the military councils and bodies of the rear of the fronts, all vehicles were mobilized, and soon the situation was corrected. This made it possible to successfully complete the Jassy-Kishinev operation.
During the offensive operations of 1945, there were no particular difficulties in providing the troops with weapons and ammunition. The total stocks of ammunition as of January 1, 1945, against 1944, increased: for mines - by 54 percent, for anti-aircraft artillery shots - by 35, for ground artillery shots - by 11 percent239. Thus, in the final period of the war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, the needs of the troops of the active army were not only fully met, but it was also possible to create additional stocks of ammunition at the front and army depots of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts.
The beginning of 1945 was marked by two major offensive operations - East Prussian and Vistula-Oder. During their training, the troops were fully provided with weapons and ammunition. It did not present serious difficulties and their transportation during operations due to the presence of a well-developed network of railways and highways.
The East Prussian operation, which lasted about three months, was distinguished by the highest consumption of ammunition in the entire Great Patriotic War. In the course of its operation, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts used up 15,038 wagons of ammunition (in the Vistula-Oder operation, 5382 wagons).
After the successful completion of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, our troops reached the line of the r. Oder (Odra) and began to prepare for the storming of the main citadel of Nazism - Berlin. In terms of the level of equipment of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts with military equipment and weapons, the Berlin offensive operation surpasses all offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet rear and the rear of the Armed Forces proper provided the troops with everything they needed to deliver the last crushing blow to Nazi Germany. In preparation for the operation, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, almost 11 million shells and mines, over 292.3 million cartridges and about 1.5 million hand grenades were sent to the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. By the beginning of the operation, they had over 2 million rifles and machine guns, over 76 thousand.240. During the Berlin operation (from April 16 to May 8), 1945, 7.2 million (5924 wagons) of shells and mines were supplied to the fronts, which (taking into account reserves) fully ensured consumption and made it possible to create the necessary reserve by the end operations.
In the final operation of the Great Patriotic War, more than 10 million shells and mines, 392 million cartridges and almost 3 million hand grenades were spent - a total of 9,715 wagons of ammunition. In addition, 241.7 thousand (1920 cars) of rockets were spent241. In preparation for and during the operation, ammunition was transported along the railways of the Union and Western European gauge, and from here to the troops - by front and army vehicles. At the junctions of the railways of the Union and Western European gauge, ammunition transshipment in the areas of specially created transshipment bases was widely practiced. It was a rather laborious and difficult job.
In general, the supply of ammunition to the front troops in 1945 significantly exceeded the level of the previous years of the Great Patriotic War. If in the fourth quarter of 1944 31,736 wagons of ammunition (793 trains) arrived at the fronts, then in four months of 1945 - 44,041 wagons (1101 trains). To this figure it is necessary to add the supply of ammunition to the country's air defense forces, as well as to the marines. Taking into account its total number of ammunition sent from central bases and warehouses to the troops of the army in the four months of 1945, amounted to 1327 trains242.
The domestic military industry and the rear services of the Soviet Army successfully coped with the task of supplying the troops of the fronts and new formations with weapons and ammunition in the last war.
The active army used up over 10 million tons of ammunition during the war. As you know, the military industry supplied individual elements of shots to artillery bases. In total, about 500 thousand cars of these elements were delivered during the war, which were assembled into ready-made shells and sent to the fronts. This colossal and complex work was carried out at the GAU artillery bases mainly by women, old people and teenagers. They stood at the conveyors for 16-18 hours a day, did not leave the workshops for several days, ate and rested right there, at the machines. Their heroic, selfless labor during the war years will never be forgotten by the grateful socialist Fatherland.
Summing up the results of the work of the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army during the years of the last war, it should be emphasized once again that the basis of this type of material support of the Armed Forces was the industry, which during the war years supplied the active army with several million units of small arms, hundreds of thousands of guns and mortars, hundreds of millions shells and mines, tens of billions of cartridges. Along with the steady growth in the mass production of weapons and ammunition, a number of qualitatively new models of ground and anti-aircraft artillery were created, new models of small arms were developed, as well as subcaliber and cumulative projectiles. All these weapons were successfully used by Soviet troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.
As for the import of weapons, it was very insignificant and, in fact, did not have a big impact on the equipment of the Soviet troops. In addition, imported weapons were inferior to Soviet weapons in terms of their tactical and technical data. Several anti-aircraft artillery systems obtained by import in the third period of the war were only partially used in the air defense forces, and the 40-mm anti-aircraft guns remained at GAU bases until the end of the war.
The good quality of weapons and ammunition supplied by the domestic military industry of the Soviet Army during the war years was largely ensured by a wide network of military representatives (military acceptance) of GAU.Of no small importance in the timely supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the active army was the fact that it was based on strictly planned production and supply. Establishing a system of accounting and reporting of weapons and ammunition in the troops, armies and in the fronts since 1942, as well as planning their delivery to the fronts, the artillery supply service continuously improved and improved organizational forms, methods and methods of work to support the troops of the active army. Rigid centralization of leadership from top to bottom, close and continuous interaction of the artillery supply service of the center, fronts and armies, formations and units with other rear services, and especially with the rear headquarters and the military communications service, the intense work of all types of transport made it possible to provide the troops of the fronts and new formations of the Supreme Command Headquarters with weapons and ammunition. In the Main Artillery Directorate, which worked under the direct supervision of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, a harmonious system of systematic and purposeful supply of troops with weapons and ammunition was formed, corresponding to the nature of the war, its scope and methods of warfare. This system fully and completely justified itself throughout the war. Uninterrupted supply of weapons and ammunition to the active army was achieved thanks to the enormous organizational and creative activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet government,
The personnel of the rear services have fulfilled their duty to the Motherland with dignity. "
Rear services of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War
Cm. also
Creation of a material and technical base for the Soviet armed forces
The state of the rear of the Soviet army by the beginning of the war
Rear of the Soviet Army in the first period of the war
Rear of the Soviet Army in the second period of the war
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" ABC-36 SVT-40 and the Mosin rifle mod. 1891/30 - the choice of the best weapon for a soldier of the Red Army
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Der Alte Fritz
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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 30 Sep 2021 11:01

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
14 Sep 2021 23:17
Der Alte Fritz wrote:
14 Sep 2021 16:02
An original copy of the 2 volume "Artillery Supply in the GPW" [Артиллерийское снабжение в Великой Отечественной войне 1941-45 гг.] can be found on this blog https://gercenovec.livejournal.com/ available to download
Tom 1: https://vk.com/doc28797168_543454556
Tom 2: https://vk.com/doc28797168_543978506

These are complete copies unlike the soldat version which is heavily editted.
Amazing. If there's a monthly output table in the book and someone could roughly state what the columns/row headings say, I'll enter the data into a spreadsheet and post it here.
I tried to bulk translate the relevant chapters with Google translate but it just produced poor quality text so I have gone through and manually translated the sections about munitions supply which I havce marked in red. Let me know if there are other sections that you want done but I think I have covered everything.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/88lafdk18vdu ... Km_ia?dl=0

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 02 Oct 2021 20:25

Der Alte Fritz wrote:
30 Sep 2021 11:01

I tried to bulk translate the relevant chapters with Google translate but it just produced poor quality text so I have gone through and manually translated the sections about munitions supply which I havce marked in red. Let me know if there are other sections that you want done but I think I have covered everything.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/88lafdk18vdu ... Km_ia?dl=0
You are truly the MVP of AHF. Thank you, thank you.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 08 Oct 2021 19:50

Have been busy lately but am trying to work through the translated files, including those bulk-translated.

Here's a table from Chapter 9:

Image

What is "Innings"? Supplies to the front, including supplies from accumulated stocks (versus "Industrial Supplies" which would perhaps be total production?)? "Decrease" seems like consumption/loss?

What about Shots FOR/ON?

------------------------------------------------------------------

Chapter 7 contains a very interesting discussion of 1941 losses to the artillery supply bases. Quote from the bulk translation:
Not less significant cause of these difficulties is the so - as a significant loss of rear bodies. Already in the first months of the war, most of the artillery depots West Rim - okrugs had lost their property destroyed or PICKUP - Chenoa enemy. Of the 10 stores of the Baltic District 6 would undermine - but, as the fate of the three remained unknown. In the Western Special Military District of 13 warehouses has been undermined 11, and in the Kiev District - from 19 - 9. Total for the three military districts for a small segment of BPE - Meni killed 29 artillery depots of the available 42. D - result of losses sustained major fronts remained essentially business without a warehouse base and had to be content with very limited material resources.
Very interesting that Western/Baltic districts lost something like 3/4 of their prewar artillery bases, while Kiev lost <half. Surely that's a significant factor in their differential battlefield performance in June-July (cause and effect of maintaining a mostly coherent front against Army Group South).

Further on in Chapter 9, there's hints of the catastrophic scale of artillery shell losses. Again quoting the bulk translation:
Only in three border districts
(Baltic, Western and Kiev) during the 10 days of the war,
several thousand
wagons of artillery equipment concentrated in the district
depots were torn up and destroyed during the withdrawal of our troops .
Surviving documents show that tol-
to 17 undermined the warehouses of these districts were 6838
cars of arms and ammunition, including 442 car materi-
cial artillery pieces, 5814 wagons of ammunition, 181 carriage
of small arms and 401 cars of various artillery imu-
exist G
Another bulk translation quote re 1941 and ammo loss:
The losses of ammunition were especially great . During the retreat,
our troops, due to the lack of vehicles, destroyed a significant
part of the ammunition on the spot. According to the reports of Za-
PAPn front only to 22 June on August 1, 1941 was podo-
ragged at the warehouses in 2700 cars, destroying enemy aircraft
G55 and captured by the enemy 79 cars, but only lost 3,434 Ba
rut ammunition. During the same time, the front's combat expenditure amounted to 6679 wagons of ammunition, and, consequently, the losses of ammunition corresponded to approximately half of the combat expenditure.
What's the tonnage equivalent of a wagon load of ammo?

More quotes:
Among the ammunition lost by the Western Front, there were
many large-caliber shells, including 203-mm howitzer -
19.7 thousand, 152-mm cannon - 225 thousand, 122-mm cannon - 68 thousand
and 122-mm howitzer - 140 thousand pcs. 1
'Until August 1, 1941, the Northern Front lost about 386 wagons,
and the North-Western Front - 110 wagons of ammunition. The Southwestern
Front lost 2238
wagons of ammunition only from June 22 to July 10, 1941 . There were also heavy losses on the Southern Front 2 .
The greatest losses of ammunition were noted in the first half of the
war, when 4.5 times more shells and mines were lost than
in 1942. On average, in 1941, more than 4 million
shells and mines and more than 330 million cartridges were lost monthly . to small arms
(Table 48). In terms of wagons, the loss of ammunition in 1941 was
25,126 and in 1942 - 9366 wagons, and the average daily losses
were at the level of 130 and 26 wagons, respectively.

Such huge losses of ammunition occurred due to
the fact that significant stocks of them were concentrated in the western
border districts and were either directly in the troops
or in garrison and district depots located
near the state border. During the retreat of our troops,
part of the stock of rounds was evacuated, some
were given to military units, but most of them were destroyed
or captured by the enemy.
---------------------------------------------------------

I still haven't found monthly artillery shell production stats for 1941, though the first table I screen-shotted probably gives an average for the period. It's perhaps true, given these figures, that RKKA was forced to abandon more shells in the opening months than it was producing.

If true, that's a startling fact that should figure more in the 1941 narrative. Shell shortage was a major problem in 1941, for example Glantz in the Battle of Smolensk, v.1, quotes Zhukov criticizing commanders' supposed “huge expenditure of shells and [mortar] mines virtually without any benefit.” Given the paucity of RKKA stocks and production in 1941, expenditure around Smolensk could have been "huge" only by reference to shell scarcity.

That RKKA killed about as many Germans in July/August 1941 as it did in July/August 1943 - even under these supply conditions and without marked numerical superiority - again suggests some revision to the arc of Soviet tactical combat effectiveness over the war.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 08 Oct 2021 22:58

I would greatly appreciate a translation of the headings in Tables 48-50, copied below from the bulk translation then followed by the original from the .pdf that Der Alte Fritz linked. I'm not sure whether "decrease" means consumption or something more like "net decrease in stocks," among other issues:

Table 48
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Table 49:
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Table 50:
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I'm also unsure whether "decrease" covers both expenditures and shells lost to the enemy or destroyed to prevent such loss. I am guessing, from the narrative context, that there wasn't sufficient ability to track the expended/lost totals at the macro level. Just trying to confirm that impression.

I.e. if "decrease" (or whatever the translation of expenditure/consumption) is used it includes shells lost to the enemy in 1941-42. That's my impression so far.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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