LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

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Michael Kenny
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LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#1

Post by Michael Kenny » 20 Oct 2008, 23:51

Alexander Hill claims to have discovered new information showing that LL British tanks formed 25% (?) of Soviet medium tank numbers in December 1941
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals ... 3hill.html

Can anyone confirm the data and the 'new' Units said to be equiped with Matildas and Valentines?

The figures for LL deliveries to Archangel by December 1941 range from 360-460-750.
Any firm data on the numbers delivered in convoys PQ1-PQ5?

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#2

Post by Art » 21 Oct 2008, 16:09

Michael Kenny wrote:The figures for LL deliveries to Archangel by December 1941 range from 360-460-750.
By the end of the year the receipt of 361 British tanks was reported:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... neral1.htm
That doesn't mean, of course, that all made their way to teh front by 31.12.41.
Just for comparison on 9 December 1941 the GABTU (Main Tank Administration) reported that 324 tank were received from UK - 142 Mk-II and 182 Mk-III, plus a convoy with 81 tank arrived to Archangelsk but hadn't been unloaded yet. 166 tanks (94 medium and 72 light) were purchased in the USA of them 62 were shipped and were en route on 9 December.
Nikolay Biryukov (the comissar of the GABTU) gives the follwoing lists of units equipped with foreign tanks in his records made around 20 November 1941:
139 Tank Battalion/146 Tank Brigade - 21 Mk-III
137 Tank Battalion/146 Tak Brigade - 21 Mk-III
138 Separate Tank Battalion - 15 Mk-II, 6 Mk-III
136 Separate Tank Battalion - 2 Mk-II, 9 Mk-III
131 Separate Tank Battalion - 21 Mk-II
132 Separate Tank Battlion - 2 Mk-II, 19 Mk-III
In addition 145 Tank Battalion had 10 British APC's but no tanks.
Of these units the 146th Tank Brigade was committed to actions in late November near Istra north-west of Moscow, 136th Tank Battalion was committed near Naro-Fominsk in early December having 10 T-34, 10 T-60, 3 Mk-II and 9 Mk-III and then served as one of organic battalions of the 20th Tank Brigade (West Front). On 1 January 1942 the 131 Tank Battalion was in the 50th Army, West Front which was south-west of Moscow, and 132 Tank Battalion - in the South-West Front, don't know details about them. I couldn't trace the way of the 138th Tank Battalion, it looks like it somehow disapeared. It's known that one battalion equipped with Mk-IIs was attached to the 1st Guards Tank Brigade in early December, probably it was 138th, but I'm not sure. Probalby there were some other units of battalion strength sent to the front by 1 January. As a conclusion LL tanks appeared on the front in late November (it seems that 146 Tank Brigade was the first) and by the end of the year there were several units comitted to action mainly in the region of Moscow, but it doesn't seem that they played an extraordinary important role. Some additional info:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... F41_42.htm
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... atilda.htm


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LWD
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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#3

Post by LWD » 21 Oct 2008, 17:55

This may or may not bo OT buthow much training did the Soviet crews get on LL vehicles in particular tanks? Just becasue a unit has them doesn't mean the unit is really "operational". Of course if you are just counting tanks ...

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#4

Post by Michael Kenny » 21 Oct 2008, 18:17

Hills claim is that Soviet heavy and medium numbers were so depleted that even this low figure for Matildas and Valentines made up a significant proportion of Soviet MEDIUM tanks (Light tanks are excluded) Thus UK tanks were critical in the Moscow fight.

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#5

Post by Ironmachine » 22 Oct 2008, 08:13

It will depend on how you define "significant", of course. :)
For the numbers of Soviet tanks available for the battle of Moscow, take a look here:
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/batt ... kstaff.htm

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#6

Post by Art » 23 Oct 2008, 19:38

Michael Kenny wrote:Hills claim is that Soviet heavy and medium numbers were so depleted
I think it should be added that light tank numbers were depleted too. If someone is interested in figures then according to relatively recent handbook "Combat and numerical composition of the Soviet Army" on 1st December 1941 the Soviet frontline forces had 212 heavy, 322 medium, 1393 light and 31 special (flamethrower etc.) tanks, total 1958. Of them 40 heavy, 179 medium and 560 light were on the central sector of the Soviet-German front (Kalinin, West and the right wing of South-West Fronts). This can be compared with the old official history of the war, which gives 1954 tank on the front (of them 533 modern - must be KVs and T-34s) including 774 (222 medium and heavy) in the Moscow sector. The numbers are almost the same, as one can see. I haven't seen any breakdown by types, but based on what I know I can guess that on 1.12.41 lend-lease vehicles accounted for several dozens.
Just s a note: there was indeed a critical trend in production of heavy and medium tanks in autumn 1941, in October production numbers were on the lowest level as can be seen from this table:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... tm#tanks41
A direct consequence of the encirclement of Leningrad with its LKZ plant producing KVs and evacuation of #183 plant from Kharkov.
even this low figure for Matildas and Valentines made up a significant proportion of Soviet MEDIUM tanks
Proportion of the total number available or proportion of the tanks of the front? It's not the same cause tank arrived to the front ith some time lag.

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#7

Post by phylo_roadking » 23 Oct 2008, 21:00

(of them 533 modern - must be KVs and T-34s)
Depends on the definition of "modern", after all. Many Matildas and especially Valentines later were supplied new, so would be describeable as "modern" - and in all-up weight and armour thickness the Matilda was comparable to the KV-1 :wink: So the MkII/III could be accounted for in several places in that breakdown of numbers.

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#8

Post by Michael Kenny » 23 Oct 2008, 21:05

As noted the crucial detail is the number of LL tanks in Units fighting on the Moscow front. Is there any way this could be calculated?
Not knowing the difference between the front names means I get confused as to what constitutes 'Moscow'!

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#9

Post by Ironmachine » 24 Oct 2008, 08:16

Strictly speaking, the number of LL tanks fighting in the whole Eastern Front (not just in the Moscow area) is also important, as the presence of LL tanks in other sectors of the front would had allowed to deploy more "Soviet" tanks in the Moscow fighting; otherwise they would have been needed to cover those other sectors.

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#10

Post by Kunikov » 25 Oct 2008, 09:30

I'm in the midst of reading the article now, it should be noted that Hill states
"It [the article] will argue that British Lend-Lease
aid to the Soviet Union over the first year of the war, and including the
later stages of the Battle for Moscow, was far more significant for the
Soviet war effort than acknowledged in published Soviet sources or
widely realised in the West, although it was certainly not decisive."

I'll add more as I get through the article...

The important stuff in regards to 1941:

"By the end of 1941, out of 750 promised
tanks, Britain had delivered 466, of which 259 were Valentines and 187
Matildas, the remainder apparently Tetrarch. Of these, 216 Valentines
and 145 Matildas had been supplied to the Red Army. With total Red
Army tank stocks, as of 31 December, consequently being in the region
of 7,700 according to Krivosheev (or 6,347 on 1 December according to
Suprun), of which only 1,400 were medium or heavy models, then
British deliveries to date represented in the region of only 6.5 percent of
total Red Army tank strength, but over 33 percent of medium and heavy
tanks, with British vehicles actually in Red Army hands representing
about 25 percent of medium and heavy tanks in service."


"According to the British Military Mission in Moscow, by 9 December
1941 about 90 British tanks had been in action with Soviet forces. On
20 November 1941 Biriukov reported that 137 and 139 Tank Battalions
of 146 Tank Brigade, along with 131 Independent Tank Battalion, had
been equipped with 21 Valentines each; 132 Independent Tank Battalion
had 19 Valentines and 2 Matildas; 138 Independent Tank Battalion had 15
Matildas and 6 Valentines; and 136 Independent Tank Battalion had 3
Matildas and 9 Valentines. Of these units, the British Military Mission
was referring to 146 Tank Brigade and 131, 136, and 138 Independent
Tank Battalions. The first of these units to have been in action seems to
have been 138 Independent Tank Battalion, which as part of 30 Army of
the Western Front, along with 24 and 145 Tank Brigades and 126 Independent
Tank Battalion, was involved in stemming the advance of German
units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow in
late November. In fact the British intercepted German communications
indicating that German forces had first come into contact with British
tanks operated by the Soviets on 26 November 1941. More widely noted
are the exploits of 136 Independent Tank Battalion, part of a scratch
operational group of 33 Army of the Western Front, consisting of 18 Rifle
Brigade, two ski battalions, 5 and 20 Tank Brigades, and 140 Independent
Tank Battalion. The latter was combined with 136 Independent Tank Battalion
to produce a tank group of only 21 tanks, which was to operate with
the two ski battalions against German forces advancing to the west of
Moscow in early December. In action with the Western Front from early
December was 131 Independent Tank Brigade with 50 Army to the east
of Tula to the south of Moscow. Also seeing action was 146 Tank Brigade
with 16 Army of the Western Front from early December in the region of
Kriukovo to the immediate west of the Soviet capital.
According to Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov, at the end of November 1941
there were only 670 Soviet tanks, of which only 205 were heavy or
medium types, for the Fronts before Moscow, that is, the recently formed
Kalinin, Western, and South-Western Fronts. Most of this tank strength
was concentrated with the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having
only two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the South-Western two tank
brigades (30 tanks). Alternative figures suggest that of 667 tanks with
frontline units of the Kalinin, the Western, and the right wing of the South-
Western Fronts as of 1 December 1941, 607 were with the Western Front,
including 205 which were KV series and T-34s; the Kalinin Front and the
right wing of the South-Western Front had 17 and 43 tanks respectively,
none of which apparently were KV series or T-34s. Either set of figures is
a significant improvement on the 141 heavy and medium tanks available
to the Western, Reserve, and Briansk Fronts before Moscow as of 1 October
1941. In the light of these statistics, it is reasonable to suggest that
British-supplied tanks made up in the region of 30 to 40 percent of the
heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the
beginning of December 1941, and that they made up a significant proportion
of such vehicles available as reinforcements at this critical juncture."

I found this part interesting, although it seems to be overlooked when doing the calculations above:

"However, mechanical problems, in part due to Soviet
unfamiliarity with this new, foreign equipment, kept in the region of 50
percent of imported tanks out of service at any one time up to the end
of 1942."
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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#11

Post by Art » 25 Oct 2008, 13:34

Art wrote: This can be compared with the old official history of the war, which gives 1954 tank on the front (of them 533 modern - must be KVs and T-34s)
Oops, I checked the book again, in fact they write about 533 medium and heavy tanks, not modern. My mistake

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#12

Post by Art » 25 Oct 2008, 13:50

Kunikov wrote: The first of these units to have been in action seems to
have been 138 Independent Tank Battalion, which as part of 30 Army of
the Western Front, along with 24 and 145 Tank Brigades and 126 Independent
Tank Battalion, was involved in stemming the advance of German
units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow in
late November.
The Battalion is mentioned in the daily report by the General Staff summarizing actions on 27th November as a part of the 16th Army, West Front (North-West of Moscow). It is rather far from the Volga Reservoir, probably there is an inaccuracy in the article. I didn't manage to find any mention of this unit after 27.11.
In action with the Western Front from early
December was 131 Independent Tank Brigade with 50 Army to the east
of Tula to the south of Moscow.
I think the author talks about 131 Tank Battallion.

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#13

Post by Art » 25 Oct 2008, 14:17

LWD wrote:This may or may not bo OT buthow much training did the Soviet crews get on LL vehicles in particular tanks?
The training centers were opened in Kazan and Gorkiy soon after delivery of the first party of the British tanks. Secondary sources (for example) Svirin says that training course lasted 15 days, so it was very short. Regarding operational rate there were some complains on perfomance of Mk-II and Mk-IIIs in winter conditions. For example, allready mentioned Biriukov wrote on 8 December that pneumatic transmission system of Matilda's must be substituted with mechanical one, because the first fails in cold. On 17 December he made a record that 41 Mk-II and 29 Mk-III were not seviceable, and 9 Mk-II and 26 Mk-II engines were disbaled due to cold and made a conclusion that Mk-II shouldn't be shipped to the front till March (because it's a "tank for Africa"). As far as I can see this conclusion wasn't implemented, becuase units equipped with Matilda's continued to participate in actions during winter.

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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#14

Post by Hanny » 26 Oct 2008, 21:42

By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of 750 promised,
of which 259 were Valentines and 187 Matildas, the remainder
apparently Tetrarch. Of these, 216 Valentines and 145 Matildas had been
supplied to the Red Army.19 With total Red Army tank stocks, as of 31
December, consequently being in the region of 7,700 according to Krivosheev
(or 6,347 on 1 December according to Suprun), of which only
1,400 were medium or heavy models, then British deliveries to date represented
in the region of only 6.5% of total Red Army tank strength, but
over 33% of medium and heavy tanks, with British vehicles actually in
Red Army hands representing about 25% of medium and heavy tanks in
service.

7700 is the year end number after initial start strength, with a 42% loss in combat, +delivered from production. 466 is what was delivered to the SU included tetrachs which in his maths are equal to t34 and kvs!!, as he uses tetrach delvered numbers to compare against t34/KV, as if they are somehow the same thing when he wants to show LL asa % of T34/KV strength, not content to equate t34/kvs with Vals, not content to pick the time when the SU had experienced the worst looses it would ever do so, rather than the number of LL AFV in service in field operation compared to SU of the same, he picks also the the number delivered to the SU, not the number acepted into use which would be 316, and not the number acepted into use and with combat and non combat losses reducing it, nor any allowence for replacemnts or traing taken into acount. But instead uses the 466 which was 150 tetrachs.

By the same token he should compare SU deliverys to stock, thats what he does with LL, he used what was delivered, but does not because what those numbers would show, instead he sets out to decieve as to what LL numbers were at any point in time, by using some strange maths, and not applying it to both sides in any event.

Mat and Val, LL of 216+145=316, while in combat since Nov contains no such reduction as to the SU 7700 he comapres it to, if reduced in line with SU loss for the year, LL yields 132, but this is a yearly loss not a period that the LL was in operation over, nor is theyear end such a period, ie the losses are not the same as the period of LL deliverys, From 5 Dec to 31 Dec Kirosheev data shows 492 lost, from 1984 ( erickson Road series for 5 Dec p285) which was a 25% loss from (Nov to Dec period of LL activity we ahve some numbers for), apply that as a better measure and you get LL 316-25%= 237 and that is 16% of 1400, or as Hill likes to count not 316/7700=22%, but 466/7700=33%, second problem is that 466 is deliverd and no loss from non combat nor combat is included allowed while the SU numbers are, but 15o tetracks are inflating the LL number, while SU stocks for lights deliverd are ignored, If you apply the same way of doing the maths to SU delvered, you get from kirosheev:
June, 22, 1941-December, 31, 1941
Tanks Listed Received Total Lost % lost
Heavy 500 1000 1500 900 60
Medium 900 2200 3100 2300 74.2
Light 21200 2400 23600 17300 73.3
Total 22600 5600 28200 20500 72.70

Comes out to 3200/1400=228% of stock was delivered from SU origin, and 16% from LL.

So Hills deciet is clear, he compares what was delivered to what is in stock, had he any honsty he would then show what SU deliverys were, but instead choses to attempt to deciev by how he uses the maths, he picks the total delvered, without any loss of any kind, and compares it to a number that was delivered to a start stock and reduced by all forms of loss. If he was honest he would compare like with like, SU delivery of all types 5600/7700=72% of the year end SU stock was new delverys. Or put another way SU repalced 72% and LL replaced 6%, since this period of the war was all about fielding formations without regard for keeping them upto strength but allow them to be burnt out and repalced by the next mobolised set of formations, LL contribution to this process was helpfull but not significant,as LL contributes 6% of that replacment. Had Hill done the maths that way, he would also answer his lengthy complaint of SU production being inadaquete and slow to get into gear, did not meet planned production numbers etc, which is another kettle of fish the man goes at length to get wrong.

So had he wanted to use maths to find out the answer to his question, how much of the year end stock was LL in origin, he would have used 90/1400=6.5%, or even better 90 in use but reduced by 25% combat loss, to 67/1400=4.8% of year end stocks of t34/KV were LL in origin. A vast difference from his claim, but a mathamatical conclusion from how he should have continued after he started to do this calculation one way, presumably did not like what they showed, and stopped doing it, and went with his BS instead.
then British deliveries to date represented
in the region of only 6.5% of total Red Army tank strength,
And SU deliverys represented 72% of same using the same methods of counting, and UK LL was not 6.5% it was 3% by the same method of calaculation.

90/5600=1.5% of deliverys were LL in origin in 41.
but
over 33% of medium and heavy tanks,
And all deliverys of t34 and kv comes 3200 which includes the 466 LL ones, ( becausehe picks the lowest number provided by Soprin and adds the LL to that, (had be stayed with Kirosheev, 3200+466 would reduce teh LL contribution substainaly, another example of Hill deciet in his methodolgy) 466/3200=14% that is the LL % of delverys, 14% not 33%, and is compring Mat/Val/Tet to T34/KV) If you stay with kirosheev 3200+ 466 =466/3666= 12%. 466 ( includes Mat vals and tetrachs all as equal to T34/kv!!)/1400 Stock of t34/kv = 33% thats how he got to 33%, by selling the idea that by end of year "end of 1941 Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of 750 promised,of which 259 were Valentines and 187 Matildas, the remainder apparently Tetrarch" are what you need to compare to t34/kv numbers to find out what % UK LL was of medium and heavies acording to Hill.
with British vehicles actually in
Red Army hands representing about 25% of medium and heavy tanks in
service
1400 -25% =1050, so where does 350 LL come from?, he has shown no such number to be in service, he shows a max of 361 mat and Val deliverd by that date and nothing more. If you acept his claim that from Nov to end of Dec that 30-40% of the field strength of the SU AFV were UK LL, then how come only 11 got lost by end of year?. How come 30-40% of the SU armour ( Uk LL) came away with 11 loses and the remaining SU armour racked up 481 from its (1984-35% LL=1257)?, just how much combat did the LL have acording to Hill?, lots he records, if only he would acept that in that combat they lost more than 11, while 1257 SU lost 481 you might have belived his numbers, and that the number recieved by years end can also mean they were in combat use before they arrived......

Or another way of exprssing Hills claim, 1400 at year end are 25% LL,( 350/1400=25%) 350 delverys were LL in origin, 3200/1400=222% were SU in origin. lastly 361 LL/3200 SU produced/delivered=11% LL in origin produced and delvered, which the absolute max LL can be, ie 11%. since the numbers to which repalcements/reinfourcemnts are added will reduce the % of LL to that number at any point chosen. For instance, 1337 coomitted to Moscow counter attack Dec 5-Dec31) the 90 LL comprise 7% of this number, 1337 +774 for defence and counter at Moscow=2111, 90/2111=4% LL presence from Nov1-31Dec.


British-supplied tanks made up in the region of 30 to 40 percent of the
heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the
beginning of December 1941, and that they made up a significant proportion
of such vehicles available as reinforcements at this critical juncture.
That proportion number of repalcements, it must either be as he stated the end of year delvered number 466, or a lower number delivered back in oct/Nov and then be delivered and enter service, deliverys rising to a year end number of 361 as and when PQ convoys arrive. 90 commited to action from 316-90=226 for creation of new formations and or repalcements from 5Dec to year end of LL AFVs. Another method is to compare the repalcements to losses, rather than produced, Kiroshhev gives us SU losses for Moscow defense as 2785 and moscow offensive as 492, so LL repalcements of losses were 90/3277=2% over that period, or 90/492=18% for the Moscow counter attack. By contrast SU repalcement for Moscow counter attack 774 Oct strenghth of AFV rose to 1984, an increase of 1210 arriving as replacement units, 492/1210=40% to LL repalcements of 18%, and over the full period, 1210/3277=36% to LL 2%. This showsthe degree of relative importance of LL replacements of losses. As a measure of all repalcements themselves, 90/1210=7% of all replacements were LL in origin, and 93% were SU in origin.

How does he get to the 30-40%?, he uses 205 T34s as refernces by Rotimistov, as being the number upto the end of Nov, 141 as being there from 1Oct to end of Oct,and 90 commited to action as refernced in his article, as haveing been committed by 9th Dec, that gives him his % range, 30% if you add in Oct 40% if you dont, no other combination works to give to the range he picked, Erickson gives for 5 Dec gives the orbat for the Moscow counter attack, it shows 318 t34/Kv, these were all new units brought up from STAVKA for the counter attack, so 141 present in Oct, plus 205 from 1Nov to end Nov, plus 218 from 5Dec to end of Dec means the SU started with and commited to action a total of 141+205+318=664 t34/kvs, and 90 LL Val and Mat, 90/664=13.5%, thats the number of LL.Not what Hill would like it to be, one of Hills things he likes to do is compare the highest number of LL, he adds in 150 to inflate the mat and Val numbers, against the lowest number he thinks he can possible sell, by removing the largest number of T34 commited in the period in this instance, or the SU stocks after the combat losses to all LL delverys without any reductions in anothjer istance. If you remove the Vals as they are not t34 eqivalents, all the LL % fall in line with that reduction, and provide a more acuarate value of t34/Kv equilvalents.

Or if you compare to all SU forces commited over the period, 90/1200 (1Nov-Dec31)=7%, to get to 40% requires using 466/1200, so he used deliverd as though it was the same as in service and hopes you cant do maths and spot what he did. If as Hills expalantion shows 466 LL were committed to action, then the number in stock by years end is not 466, but more likly to be in theregion of 466-25%=349 and 349/7700=4% of stock at years end was LL, and for med and heavy comparison, 316-25%=237, and 237/1400=16%


Data from Kirosheev for easier reference.



June, 22, 1941-December, 31, 1941
Tanks Listed Received Total Lost % lost
Heavy 500 1000 1500 900 60
Medium 900 2200 3100 2300 74.2
Light 21200 2400 23600 17300 73.3
Total 22600 5600 28200 20500 72.70 January 1, 1942 - December 31, 1942
Tanks Listed Received Total Lost % lost
Heavy 600 2600 3200 1200 37.50
Medium 800 13400 14200 6600 46.50
Light 6300 11900 18200 7200 39.60
Total 7700 27900 35600 15000 42. 13 January 1, 1943-December, 31, 1943
Tanks Listed Received Total Lost % lost
Heavy 2000 900 2900 1300 44.80
Medium 7600 16300 23900 14700 61.50
Light 11000 5700 16700 6400 38. 30
Total 20600 22900 43500 22400 51.50
January 1, 1944-December 31, 1944
Tanks Listed Received Total Lost % lost
Heavy 1600 4000 5600 900 16.1
Medium 9200 17000 26200 13800 52.7
Light 10300 200 10500 2300 21.9
Total 21100 21200 42300 16900 40
January 1, 1945-May 10, 1945
Tanks Listed Received Total Lost % lost
Heavy 4700 1500 6200 900 14.5
Medium 12400 6100 18500 7500 40.5
Light 8200 900 9100 300 3.3
Total 25400 8500 33900 8700 25.7

Bottom line, i dont like how he counts, he appears to be doing so to suit an agenda rather than to help explain anything, of course anyone reading thsi with better numbers wont like my maths either!!, so if you have better data, id be happy to redo the calcs and seewaht comes out the other end.
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Re: LL Tanks 'critical' in the Moscow fighting.

#15

Post by mike jones » 29 Oct 2008, 10:19

Just been reading diary of Horst Lange - he was with the German 56th Infantry Division, heading towards the Moscow-Volga canal - about the Moscow fighting. In early December 1941, on the Moscow-Leningrad highway just south of Solnechnogorsk, he encounters wrecks of Britsh tanks, that had been used, hulled-down, in a desperate attempt to stop the German advance. Fits nicely with your material Kunikov about their first introduction into the fighting. Great thread!

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